Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 714 › Conversation 714-014

Nixon, Haig & Cox on Vietnam War and Operation Linebacker

Thursday, April 20, 1972 · 12:30 PM–1:07 PM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haig, Alexander M., Jr.; Sanchez, Manolo; Woods, Rose Mary; White House operator; Cox, Tricia NixonConversation714-014 on Tape 714 (tape position 03:18:30–03:55:10)StartThursday, April 20, 1972 at 12:30 PMEndThursday, April 20, 1972 at 1:07 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 714-014 ↗

President Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met to discuss the status of the ongoing North Vietnamese offensive and coordinate communication with Henry Kissinger, who was currently in Moscow. The conversation focused on the tactical efficacy of B-52 bombing strikes, the performance of South Vietnamese forces in areas like An Loc, and the psychological impact of these actions on North Vietnamese morale. Nixon and Haig also strategized on how to frame these military efforts to the American press and Congress, aiming to counter domestic opposition while maintaining pressure on the North through sustained air operations.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 03:18:30 into the tape and ends around 03:55:10.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
3:20:22I think it's vitally important for him to know, to trust General Henry, we have to face the fact
3:20:52He wanted to take the scripturality of the song, and would have taken the creative of the song if we hadn't read it.
3:20:57That wouldn't have worked.
3:21:01Now, Henry, of course, would have liked it.
3:21:05On the other hand, he would consider it a success if he just comes back and says, well, we worked out the anatomy of the song.
3:21:12It will not be.
3:21:13Did you read the matter?
3:21:15I did, and it's precisely what I told him when I saw him last night.
3:21:20I said, my greatest fear, and I think it will be the president's, is that we've done this now, and it cannot appear to be a backing away.
3:21:29And I said, that was huge concern.
3:21:32And somehow we've got to be sure that Vietnam was the purpose of this trip and portrayed it as that.
3:21:37What did he say?
3:21:38He said he agreed completely, and he said that what we have to do is hopefully, if they agree, he could come out on Tuesday.
3:21:46Announce that, announce the plenary, and we will defuse these bastards totally.
3:21:51Well, if, for example, on Tuesday, you saw a very little central line, I don't think they could agree with that.
3:21:58I don't either.
3:21:59So you'd agree that they would work toward a negotiated settlement of the conflict.
3:22:05Now, that is the help of the nation saying that.
3:22:08That's right.
3:22:09What worried me was that we would announce the plenary, you say, without having referred to Moscow.
3:22:15And that'll look like we've backed down.
3:22:17I thought we turned that down today.
3:22:21Yes, sir, but in order to meet secretly, you see, now we're going to have to announce the 27th.
3:22:25Yeah, when's the secret meeting?
3:22:29May 2nd.
3:22:30May 2nd.
3:22:32And it'd be ideal if we could hit the Soviets.
3:22:36But on the other hand, does this mean that the moment we make the announcement, we have to de-escalate the bombing?
3:22:42No, sir.
3:22:44He's not going to do that.
3:22:45Now, of course, we might drop down from the Hanoi area and keep it down low as a sign of goodwill until we have our meeting.
3:22:53But we're going to bang tonight that in the strike zone, it's going to be 24 B-52s, 190 fighter bombers, and another 50 support aircraft.
3:23:05They're going to put the B-52s at the end of the strike this time.
3:23:10How do they do it?
3:23:12Well, they're going to hit the supply complex of warehouses, POL, ammunition storage.
3:23:23Do you think that's all there?
3:23:24Are you sure?
3:23:25Or is that just guessing?
3:23:27Well, the photographs look like it's pretty well shut full.
3:23:31And they've had this target as the best one for some time, and one of the best.
3:23:36And it'll start tonight and be finished tomorrow morning our time.
3:23:42And then they're going to continue hitting from 19th along down every day.
3:23:46They put a lot in there yesterday.
3:23:48How's the weather?
3:23:51The weather's been good in the north.
3:23:54And the offensive is...
3:23:55They must be dark.
3:23:57What is the situation?
3:23:58I was reading a story in the paper this morning about town halls and all that bullshit.
3:24:05What is that out there?
3:24:07That's an idea.
3:24:08I might not expect it, et cetera, et cetera.
3:24:11This is the area in southern I-Corps and northern II-Corps in Vientiane.
3:24:24It's an area that we know.
3:24:25It's always been pacified the least.
3:24:40the toughest area.
3:24:43Now, that outpost, it's a little... Oh, yes, there's a close air support in there.
3:24:48A hell of a lot of them.
3:24:51And that thing is not overrun.
3:24:52As of this morning, they're still fighting, but they're badly outnumbered.
3:24:57It's going to be a tough one.
3:24:59It's not a severe one.
3:25:00How many northerners are there?
3:25:05I'd say about 120,000 or something.
3:25:11Oh, we will.
3:25:13We will.
3:25:13We have to.
3:25:13We've got to.
3:25:15With all the air and the rest of it, for these men's under our arms, for Christ's sakes, you can stop 120,000.
3:25:23Yes, sir.
3:25:24Now, we have that fighting there.
3:25:26The Koreans who were trying to open up the road on Route 19 got a bloody nose at Dion K Pass.
3:25:33They failed.
3:25:35Well, they have to reinforce.
3:25:37They're in a tough fight there.
3:25:41And that's not bad.
3:25:42I went to see the Koreans.
3:25:43Uh-huh.
3:25:44They had intentions at all before?
3:25:47Well, yes, they did in the early days.
3:25:48They had quite a few.
3:25:50Now they just stopped fighting.
3:25:52Now they're into it, and they've got the reinforcements.
3:25:55The other place where it's very active today is in Three Corps again, the area of the soldiers.
3:26:02And Locke was fighting in the town again.
3:26:05An Army battalion, an airborne battalion south of the town got badly hit
3:26:12and they've come back into the town.
3:26:15And also the enemy's attacking Daltiani, and I indicated they would.
3:26:19They slipped by and they hit it this morning.
3:26:22And that's a tough fight going on right now.
3:26:26We can expect this for a couple of weeks, sir.
3:26:28Yeah, but I mean, I just want to know whether or not the South Vietnamese are fighting well.
3:26:33They're fighting, yes, sir.
3:26:34They're fighting well, and the 21st Division's fighting well.
3:26:38It's the men, it's the...
3:26:39The court commander was just a sorry son of a bitch.
3:26:42And he's developed a group.
3:26:45But basically, and Locker and the rest, they are, you say they're, you say at the time they got a bloody nose, which he thought that they were just, was it, put out of action?
3:26:59No, no, sir.
3:26:59But it got mauled.
3:27:01They had a lot of casualties and had to come back in.
3:27:03Were there any other casualties?
3:27:06Pardon me?
3:27:08Oh, yes.
3:27:08We had 190 air soldiers in there last night, one in that one area.
3:27:13So they'd just been banging the hell out of it, and there were 18 B-52 strikes in support of that action.
3:27:20So we just got to be cooperative.
3:27:24But they fell back and used those four days to regroup, and now they're trying to take it again.
3:27:45The morale goes down.
3:27:49The equipment is down.
3:27:53They're still knocking out tanks there.
3:27:58They knocked down, I think, 13 last night.
3:28:02But this is the only tough fight, and it's going to stay tough.
3:28:07But I think we're going to do it.
3:28:14That's an incredible number of sorties to put in there, 18 B-52 sorties.
3:28:26On top of the 190 fighter bombers and gunships that are always on the station.
3:28:47Yes, sir.
3:28:50Well, it's 42%.
3:28:55They're flying very well, and their support has been better than theirs because they've been able to come in lower.
3:29:03Now, they've had some planes shut down because of it.
3:29:12They're going in and the army troops are very high on them.
3:29:17Any of the commanders I talk to, very high on them.
3:29:21Got to get them a little tired.
3:29:23That's why it was quickly reinforced.
3:29:29Because they've been going in full bore.
3:29:41like where everything's, except for that sudden promise there, which we knew was going to be tough.
3:29:47That's a guerrilla song, and it always has been, and it'll stay tough.
3:29:54And all the press and all that bad action.
3:30:05No, it isn't.
3:30:07It's safe.
3:30:10It's not too bad.
3:30:11I went over the, not a star last night, we had two very positive editorials, a journalist, Hempstone.
3:30:21Beautiful.
3:30:25I just went over the vice president's speech.
3:30:27Yeah.
3:30:27And I added this paragraph to it when he talks about the press.
3:30:32You don't use the word bastard, do you?
3:30:34No, no, no.
3:30:35No, I just said that the young lieutenant colonel used some colorful language.
3:30:39Yeah.
3:30:42He's already been notified of your commendation and has come back saying that first he was stunned, and he said, and the more he thought about it, he said he's never been so proud and so conscious of the kind of support that you've given.
3:31:04But I've certainly been really shocked
3:31:12Discussing the other thing.
3:31:15Oh, God.
3:31:17This war was shocking.
3:31:18Just bad.
3:31:18The Vice President's got a two-fisted speech.
3:31:19It's a good speech.
3:31:21It's the point he takes them all.
3:31:23He takes Fulbright, quoting Fulbright's references to Ho Chi Minh, much like our American revolutionaries, and he goes into the murder of the people that he murdered.
3:31:38And he takes on that.
3:31:40Some of the Congress takes on the presidential candidates right down the line, quotes their statements of 66, 67, and their statements of the past week.
3:31:53Does that for Muskie, Kennedy, Humphrey?
3:31:58Humphrey referred to it as the great adventure.
3:32:00It's a good speech.
3:32:02It's a good piece of speech.
3:32:04Does he get this in the business of the Nelson Barriot that sat up and condemned the enemy?
3:32:11You've got to constantly keep hammering that.
3:32:14I noticed that even the House caucus, Democratic caucus, they had a half-assed phrase to the effect of condemning anarchy of committees.
3:32:22What a great response you've got.
3:32:24If they condemn the bombing, then condemn them for the aggression.
3:32:26What the hell are they going to do to stop it?
3:32:30Well, pass a resolution.
3:32:31This is what the Vice President's speech says.
3:32:33He said, all these people claim this, but what do they do to stop it?
3:32:42I hope his speech gets played.
3:32:43Well, I can't tell him.
3:32:44All right, sir.
3:32:45But in the meantime, what does that mean?
3:32:55See, they're coming at us.
3:32:58Well, we're going to have this back and forth.
3:33:01I don't believe in getting us disturbed on the day you got a report.
3:33:05No, I don't.
3:33:06I mean, you pick up the paper and say, oh, Jesus, we lost the town.
3:33:09So you lose the town.
3:33:11No.
3:33:12It's hard not to, but these are all infinitesimal things.
3:33:16Those fire bases that were overrun in the first days that they reported, they weren't fire bases.
3:33:21They were goddamn OTs that were put up there to watch infiltration and to keep the eyes and ears open and see this.
3:33:32They just weren't intended to be held.
3:33:34They were not defensive positions.
3:33:36When you talk about Tom, it's probably not worth saying
3:33:42Not that thorough.
3:33:43I actually believe in the strategy.
3:33:48Do you think they should try to keep that on?
3:33:51I wonder if it makes sense to back out of the town and bomb the smithereens.
3:33:57In a military sense, it doesn't make sense.
3:34:00Psychologically, it's like we're gone.
3:34:01For Chew, he can.
3:34:04He's just Chew is the man that's put out these orders, and for him it's psychologically essential that he hold them.
3:34:11We could give up some stuff in Tupor.
3:34:13Hell, that place is...
3:34:15If they lost Khantoum or Dato City, it would be a very minor incident.
3:34:22The other guy, I suppose, kind of holds...
3:34:24It has its points of one sense in that you're certainly punishing him if he's willing to take the heat.
3:34:33The only thing is that what I was thinking about...
3:34:37Our purpose here is not to hold territory and to destroy the enemy.
3:34:40If you could retreat and get the enemy in Mark Skoll's position for bombing, I would retreat and then destroy it and go back in.
3:34:47Does that make sense?
3:34:50That's the way the book says to do it.
3:34:53And that's the way I would do it.
3:34:56They won't because of the psychology of it.
3:34:59And on the other hand, it's not so bad because you still have to concentrate around these.
3:35:03And 82, there are 82.
3:35:07It takes a good disciplined army to be able to withdraw and fight.
3:35:13Once you start moving back, and I think that's no problem to be confronted with, these little guys are good in defense if they have good strong positions and they dig in and hold.
3:35:24You need a very sophisticated army to be able to withdraw and fight well.
3:35:36But beyond that, the Germans did it fantastically well against the Russians in World War I.
3:35:47They were so professional, that's right.
3:35:49Jesus Christ, I mean, they would roll back, you know.
3:35:51And then this glockenspiel, the Russians are going to march in and just kill them.
3:35:58Just kill them.
3:36:01The Russian armies would go...
3:36:04They're fighting that way in Angkor.
3:36:30This division commander in the first division, he's crazy.
3:36:33He said, I don't care about these fire bases.
3:36:34As long as I can kill them, which they are concentrating on, then I'll keep it up.
3:36:39When it gets too hairy, I'll pull back and we'll hold it the next.
3:36:43He hadn't pulled back the one yet.
3:36:46And they've killed about 2,500 in that zone.
3:36:51And they said they opened the road to them yesterday and completely resupplied and put reinforcements in.
3:36:58So it's a good, strong position still.
3:37:06Haybridge has got it all sort of charted out, fight, lose some, win some.
3:37:14What good do you think this strike does tonight?
3:37:16It's more psychological than anything else, isn't it?
3:37:22Do you consider it psychological at all?
3:37:24Yes, but I think...
3:37:24Psychology is important.
3:37:25Psychology is important, especially now, where Henry is, and maybe we'll get to then while Henry's there, and that's good.
3:37:33The other thing is, this thing's going to get more
3:37:35of a logistics exercise.
3:37:38And what's going to happen is, and I think they're in there to hold.
3:37:46That's their strategy.
3:37:48This isn't a high point.
3:37:49Hell yes.
3:37:49I mean, to hold, to stay in Saudi or not.
3:37:55To stay there this time and to get their infrastructure built back and to destroy pacification and de-indemnization.
3:38:04And that's why their logistics are going to become the more... What the hell?
3:38:07Well, here's what I would hope, sir.
3:38:13If we could get them to agree that the Vietnamese would go back, North Vietnamese.
3:38:19Go back?
3:38:21Where?
3:38:22Just to my country?
3:38:23No, status quo.
3:38:25Plante, before the attack started.
3:38:28Which would mean 3 Corps and I Corps.
3:38:302 Corps, they were in there.
3:38:31Now that's a worthless country in there.
3:38:34And it's going to be mucked down in the rain here very shortly.
3:38:38And we would stop bombing.
3:38:42And everyone would negotiate.
3:38:45Hopefully get some prisoners back and a token exchange.
3:38:51And hold us for a year with a Soviet firm guarantee in writing.
3:38:57God, I think you would.
3:39:00Then they would have had the course because you would get
3:39:04Absolutely swept into office on the head or something like that.
3:39:08And the doves would be licked.
3:39:11And then they'd be faced with a four-year president who they know goddamn well won't put up with a second roundup.
3:39:18Well, there's one other course of action we may have to do.
3:39:23And that is that we can get this to this point.
3:39:36that you're afraid of the blockade problem.
3:39:39My own feeling is that a blockade at public support would not probably be higher than the later time.
3:39:45But on the other hand, it may be the best time to throw a blockade is about three weeks before the election.
3:39:59That would be all right.
3:40:01I don't think blockade would
3:40:27what Saul was saying in the short run, in a military sense or in a political sense.
3:40:33In a military sense, we've had several studies made now, an awful lot of this stuff can come through China, even Soviet stuff.
3:40:41And Bayer.
3:40:44And Bayer.
3:40:47So we shouldn't fool ourselves about that.
3:40:49It's great now to get the Soviets' attention.
3:40:51Yeah, we got their attention.
3:41:01And the thing in the long run that's going to discourage everyone is to kill those guys sitting down there, just like the man.
3:41:19When you hear these prisoners, there's nothing left in the villages but wounded veterans.
3:41:25The wounded veterans are telling the few kids that are left to go and hide.
3:41:31Yes, the young girls have no men, so they have a social problem.
3:41:37The young girls are consorting with older married men and have illegitimate children.
3:41:42The society is very disrupted by that.
3:41:44It's a D.C. country.
3:41:45It's North Vietnam.
3:41:47Oh.
3:41:48Do you know it?
3:41:50One prisoner just said it's an incredible situation.
3:41:53Men are gone.
3:41:57No, no young men.
3:42:11And they claimed that when they came down, they all knew they were going to die.
3:42:16They do have deserters up there in the training centers.
3:42:19They're deserting.
3:42:20They're in short training, not ready for it.
3:42:24They get down on the battlefield, some of them are wandering around.
3:42:26That's how these RFPF would kill them.
3:42:28They don't know what to do.
3:42:30What is the situation with regard to...
3:42:44I think it has that effect in the short term.
3:42:49But this country's been through it before.
3:42:52They've had it, I think, at this point in time, not so much so.
3:43:00They're just sick of it, too.
3:43:03And when the 1968 bombing halt came, we had run it through so long, initially it did in the open, and made them fight harder.
3:43:11But by 1968, when we stopped bombing, they were on their knees.
3:43:18Well, it happened that, too.
3:43:21The type of bombing that we intended that we're doing now was really more effective than the 1968 bombing.
3:43:28Oh, yeah.
3:43:29But I mean, isn't this true, you know, in 1968, when you were picking out targets and all that sort of thing?
3:43:36It's entirely different.
3:43:37Is this strike, is it an enormously effective strike compared to most of those, or was it?
3:43:43No, it wasn't.
3:43:43In the first place, our techniques are better.
3:43:45Secondly, instead of Robert McNamara, as he used to do, sitting at the desk picking the targets, you've allowed the field commanders to do this, and they're doing it more effectively.
3:44:00without, what I call, debilitating the strengths, and that's what they had all during the 60th period.
3:44:09They just constantly shifted the targets, and they were all run from here, where people didn't know what the hell they were doing in a close, and were oriented on restraint.
3:44:23I think we've done an awful lot in these few strikes that we've put in there.
3:44:28Especially when you put B-52s in, that's just... Never done.
3:44:36Yes, sir.
3:44:37It's just a frightening weapon.
3:44:43It's a frightening weapon when you're on the ground.
3:44:45I've used it close into our troops, and I'll tell you, it's... You just see these shockwaves all ground, come moving.
3:44:59You get no warning because they're up higher than you.
3:45:01You can't see them when they're coming.
3:45:02You just hear all of a sudden this whistling, eerie whistle.
3:45:11It does get your attention.
3:45:14House Democrats for that.
3:45:29Call for a resolution.
3:45:31We condemn the bombings, and we condemn the .
3:45:38What are you going to do with this?
3:45:41We'll kill you with the resolution.
3:45:47OK, fine.
3:45:48I will not, uh, I'll give you a call.
3:45:50I'll give you a call.
3:45:57I spoke to Secretary Rogers this morning on the secure line.
3:46:01He incidentally took the spread.
3:46:03I heard about it, and I think you have.
3:46:06He questioned you closely, and you gave exactly the right answers.
3:46:11He said, well, why don't we, he said, I can do credibility for this if I work.
3:46:15He can't do it.
3:46:16He's got his announcer acting.
3:46:19We've got our husband and home and Henry.
3:46:23He goes up there and puts too much.
3:46:24Puts too much heat into it, that's all.
3:46:27All right.
3:46:28Hi.
3:46:29How are you doing?
3:46:32Good.
3:46:32How are you doing?
3:54:03She now thinks you're gone.
3:54:04Why don't you ask her?
3:54:05See if you can put you there right now.
3:54:12Just pick it up and see.
3:54:15Would you ring Teresa, please?
3:54:17Thank you.
3:54:19Yes.

On April 20, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Manolo Sanchez, Rose Mary Woods, White House operator, and Tricia Nixon Cox met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:30 pm to 1:07 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 714-014 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 714-14

Date: April 20, 1972
Time: 12:30 pm - 1:07 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

     Haig’s physical condition

     Message for Henry A. Kissinger
         -Receipt
         -Reply

     Kissinger’s trip to Moscow
          -Possible results
                -Summit
          -The President’s memorandum to Kissinger
          -Problems
                -Purpose
                       -Kissinger’s discussion with Haig
                            -Nguyen Van Thieu

                           -Plenary session
                                -Date
          -Vietnam
               -Soviet participation in settlement
          -Secret meeting
               -Date
          -Announcement
               -De-escalation of bombing
                     -Hanoi area

     Vietnam
          -Bombing of North Vietnam
               -B-52s
               -Fighter-bombers
               -B-52s
                     -Targets
                           -Supply
                                  -Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants [POL]
                           -Surveillance
                     -Start of raids
                           -Frequency
               -Intensity
                     -Weather
          -South Vietnam
               -Southern I Corps and II Corps
                     -Binhdinh Province
               -Hue
               -Area of Vietminh strength
                     -Binhdinh Province

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 12:30 pm.

     Refreshment

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 12:56 pm.

     Vietnam
          -South Vietnam
               -Area of North Vietnamese-Viet Cong strength
               -Area of fighting
          -North Vietnam
               -Number of troops in South Vietnam
          -South Vietnam

     -Republic of Korea operations
           -Current fighting
                 -Route 19
                       -Ankhe Pass
                 -Casualties
     -III Corps
     -An Loc
           -Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN] battalion
     -North Vietnamese attacks
           -Dou Tien [sp?]
-North Vietnamese offensive
     -Duration
     -South Vietnamese performance
           -21st Division
                 -Commander, Brig. Gen. Nguyen Van Minh
     -An Loc
           -ARVN battalion
                 -Casualties
           -North Vietnamese casualties
                 -Air sorties
                       -B-52 strikes
     -Morale of North Vietnam
     -Tanks
           -Destruction
     -South Vietnamese success
     -Air sorties
           -B-52s
           -Number
           -Gunships
           -South Vietnam
                 -Performance
                 -Losses
                 -Impact on morale
     -Guerrilla action
           -I Corps
     -Ultimate result
     -Press reports
           -Editorials in Washington Star
                 -Smith Hempstone, Jr.
           -Vice President's Spiro T. Agnew’s speech
                 -Language
-Unknown army Lieutenant Colonel
     -Criticism of press

            -The President's commendation
-Press
      -Treatment
-Agnew’s criticisms in speech
      -J. William Fulbright
            -References to Ho Chi Minh
      -Congress
      -Presidential candidates
            -Edmund S. Muskie, Edward M. Kennedy and Hubert H. Humphrey
                  -Past statements
      -Democratic caucus
            -Resolution
      -Publicity
-Battle reports
      -Misinterpretation
      -Fire bases
      -Observation posts [OPs]
            -Mission
-North Vietnamese offensive
-An Loc
      -Holding
            -Necessity
                  -Bombing
                  -Compared to Verdun
                  -Thieu
-Losses
      -II Corps
            -Towns
            -Retention
                  -Kontum
-North Vietnamese offensive
      -South Vietnamese retreats
            -Resistance
            -Problems
            -Soviets in World War II
            -Germans in World War I against Russians
      -I Corps
            -1st Division commander
                  -Damage to North Vietnam
                        -Casualties
                              -Fire Base Bastogne
      -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
      -Air strikes

          -Value
                -Psychology
                      -Kissinger in Moscow
                -North Vietnamese supplies
     -Purpose
          -Destruction of pacification and Vietnamization
-Soviets
     -Possible role
     -Pressure on North Vietnam
          -Trade-off
          -Bombing halt
          -Prisoners of war [POW] exchange
          -Effect on 1972 election
-North Vietnamese offensive
     -Blockade
          -Timing
                -1972 election
          -POWs
          -Effectiveness
                -Studies
                      -Circumvention
                           -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                           -Soviets
          -Benefits
     -Counterattacks
          -Effects on North Vietnamese morale
                -Wounded veterans
                -Social problems
                -POW testimony
                -Loss of young men
                -Desertions
                -Lack of training
-Bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong
     -Effect on North Vietnamese morale
          -Effectiveness
                -Compared with 1968 strikes
                      -Bombing halt
                      -Techniques
                      -Target selection
                           -Robert S. McNamara
                           -Restraints
          -B-52s
                -Impact on ground troops

                           -Warning
                -Resolution of House Democrats

     The President's return call

     William P. Rogers
          -Conversation with Haig

Rose Mary Woods entered at 12:56 pm.

                -Rogers's trip to Camp David
                     -Problems
                     -John D. Ehrlichman
                     -H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
                     -Kissinger

Haig left at 12:57 pm.

     The President's schedule
          -American Society of Newspaper Editors [ASNE] reception
               -Duration

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 7m 23s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

*****************************************************************

     The President’s schedule
          -Tricia Nixon Cox
                -Woods's call

Woods talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 12:57 and 1:07 pm.

     [Conversation No. 714-14A]

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 55s ]

[See Conversation No. 23-50; one items has been withdrawn from the conversation.]

Woods conferred with the President.

Woods talked with Tricia Nixon Cox.

[End of telephone conversation]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

*****************************************************************

     The President's schedule
          -Camp David
               -Helicopter
                      -Time

     Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
          -Woods's call
               -Woods's presence at Camp David

Woods left at 1:07 pm.
  • 714-012 12:03 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:03 pm and 12:06 pm.
  • 714-013 12:06 PM · 24 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:06 pm to 12:29 pm.
  • 023-049 12:07 PM · 15 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 12:07 pm to 12:08 pm.
  • 023-050 12:57 PM · 1 min — Rose Mary Woods, White House operator, and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 12:57 pm and 1:07 pm.
  • 714-015 1:07 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:07 pm and 1:10 pm.
  • 714-016 1:07 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:07 pm and 1:10 pm.
  • 023-051 1:10 PM · 4 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 1:10 pm and 2:46 pm.
  • 332-010 1:10 PM · 18 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:10 pm and 2:46 pm.

Conversation 714-014, April 20, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/714-014 (accessed October 12, 2026).