Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 716-003
Date: Monday, May 1, 1972 at 5:31 PM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.
Recording device: Oval Office
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/716-003

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[1:25:35] Okay.
[1:25:36] If you want to put all this in, it's going to take a long time just going over that record and feeling active.
[1:25:49] Don't, there's any other way to go over it with this.
[1:25:51] Just hand it over and here's the record.
[1:25:58] High five.
[1:25:59] I think the stronger they get, the more quickly to the point.
[1:26:02] Okay.
[1:26:06] It's been a record of when you talk by his seat, et cetera, et cetera.
[1:26:11] It's not going to go down.
[1:26:35] On page seven is where you get to it.
[1:26:37] Yes.
[1:26:41] See, I have here, you said I have in my possession, I actually have a record.
[1:26:47] It is a shocking record.
[1:26:49] And then put in here.
[1:26:50] It's a shocking record.
[1:26:51] I said, since we don't have enough time.
[1:26:53] It's not a waste of time, but you know it.
[1:27:35] What I will do here, Mr. President, is where it says would be restored, I will put wherever it says would, must.
[1:27:49] Oh, this is the announcement.
[1:27:54] Now, this is still history.
[1:28:12] The U.S. in 72 is about to fall from France in 54.
[1:28:23] I said, I put there, I put the goal, and I say, the president is prepared to do what it's told me to do, whatever is necessary to stop this invasion.
[1:28:33] He will stop at nothing, I warn you.
[1:28:35] You say that, he will stop at nothing.
[1:28:40] And I can assure
[1:28:44] P.O.
[1:29:12] What are the effects of what you're telling us is on our city?
[1:29:17] They have to go back across the D.C.
[1:29:19] They have to go back across the D.C.
[1:29:21] They have to go back all over the city.
[1:29:41] They must release prisoners.
[1:29:46] We then will reduce some of the additional forces we brought into the area and stop bombing the north.
[1:29:53] That's the first step that we would consider progress.
[1:30:01] And the second is, we can say that we started covering our January 27th proposal.
[1:30:10] And, frankly, what we have to stay away from now is the idea of a withdrawal for prisoners in the ceasefire.
[1:30:19] That's what worries me, is that they're going to come up with our matrix.
[1:30:22] Do they accept our matrix?
[1:30:24] Yeah.
[1:30:24] Due to the spigot leaks, you mean that, sir?
[1:30:29] Yeah, and because it might be favorable to them.
[1:30:33] Well, you can say it.
[1:30:39] that's fine to go back to the lines.
[1:30:45] That's good.
[1:30:45] Provided they go back to the lines, yes.
[1:30:47] Yes, you go back to the lines or we take you immediately, but we're not going to take you now.
[1:30:53] You cannot be rewarded for your aggression.
[1:30:57] What I will do, Mr. President, is first I'll make this stuff open and say that we shouldn't say anything, except show covenant.
[1:31:04] Then I'll say now I want to hear what you have to say.
[1:31:07] If he gives me a long recital, and this is where it's, you're right, if I'm not presenting the whole thing, if he's going to start a long recital, I've done, I've already heard that.
[1:31:18] And I'll be brutal.
[1:31:19] I know you will.
[1:31:26] If I be as brief as possible, come to the talk, take a look on the final, and say, well, we can't go without a balance, but we're going
[1:31:40] I just want you to know that the president will stop at nothing.
[1:31:46] And I just leave that as damn clear.
[1:31:49] Because it's absolutely true.
[1:31:50] We're prepared to sink the whole ship of this thing.
[1:31:54] These people are not going to get away with this.
[1:31:58] I agree completely.
[1:32:00] I'll say it.
[1:32:03] Maybe it's not as pessimistic as it is.
[1:32:07] Well, the truth is, Mr. President, we've taken our head over the NFC record.
[1:32:15] You remember Laird sitting in there in February telling you you needed no reinforcements?
[1:32:21] The Vietnamization is succeeding.
[1:32:23] These guys can do it without American air power.
[1:32:26] And the Vietnamization was always a gamble.
[1:32:35] We knew it was a gamble, and if it holds, it will be because of the additional stuff you've got out there, because of the heavy tanks you've got out there.
[1:32:44] We are sending new heavy tanks now to replace them out of Japan and Okinawa.
[1:32:49] Are they using the present heavy tanks at all?
[1:32:51] Well, they're using them, but they don't have enough people trained.
[1:32:56] Even the ones we got out there?
[1:32:57] Well, not those they're using, but we've suffered enormous casualties of them.
[1:33:00] We had 60 to start with, and they're down to 21 now.
[1:33:02] They have lost 40 tanks?
[1:33:03] Yeah.
[1:33:07] mostly in military reasons.
[1:33:13] Why have they lost the sanctions?
[1:33:17] That artillery is just .
[1:33:18] That Russian artillery is just .
[1:33:20] Russians have always been good with artillery.
[1:33:23] Russians have always been good with artillery, these guys.
[1:33:25] I like these guys.
[1:33:29] Not French artillery, but the Russians have had massive artillery.
[1:33:42] Oh, it's another intelligence failure, too.
[1:33:51] I mean, when they shoot 1,400, about 4,400 into Quantree, about 1,400 into Amlok day after day, that's 150 tons of ammunition, 100 tons of ammunition a day.
[1:34:04] We had no idea.
[1:34:05] And that's just ammunition.
[1:34:07] You have to add food, and you have to add weapons.
[1:34:12] No.
[1:34:14] I thought of it last night.
[1:34:16] I opened my mind, read this thing, got us into these difficulties.
[1:34:22] Mistaken, for which I blame myself last year, we had sat on top of the Cambodians at Laotian Operation last year, the way they're sitting on top of this.
[1:34:33] We would have won.
[1:34:35] But basically, they wasted the Cambodian Operation tree set, nearly.
[1:34:39] That was a disaster.
[1:34:41] Yeah, because they just fooled around with that.
[1:34:45] They just didn't pick up the stockpile, I'd say.
[1:34:50] So that gave us this capability.
[1:34:53] Oh, yes.
[1:34:54] Oh, without a doubt.
[1:34:55] Well, in 1972, we didn't have an offensive action.
[1:34:58] And every year, we had an offensive action.
[1:35:02] There was no offensive.
[1:35:10] So, uh...
[1:35:15] They're not good on the offensive.
[1:35:21] They must be pretty good on the defensive.
[1:35:26] But we've been full-fledged about their capabilities.
[1:35:29] They're pretty good on the defense.
[1:35:31] They're useless on the offense.
[1:35:34] And do you remember when they were telling you the Vietnamese could have done Cambodia alone, how they wouldn't be five, they'd still be five miles from the border?
[1:35:47] But the other side must be hurting very fast.
[1:35:50] We can't berate ourselves too much.
[1:35:52] We've done more than almost the human spirit can bear as it is.
[1:35:59] But the point is, right now, if we're prepared enough, I want this goddamn military to come up with some ideas.
[1:36:05] I mean, I'm only going to do everything.
[1:36:16] No, I remember only too well that you came in and you pleaded with Abrams to come up with some new ideas.
[1:36:31] No, we've done superhuman things in keeping this thing alive.
[1:36:43] Right now, there would be a hell of a depression for the American people.
[1:36:51] If after this offensive began so late, it is like losing earlier.
[1:36:57] The South Vietnamese were defeated.
[1:37:00] We got run out of there.
[1:37:02] Now, by God, don't ever underestimate what's happening at any point.
[1:37:06] There would be a hell of a depression if we got run out of business.
[1:37:09] The American people don't want to lose.
[1:37:11] The American people got confused there for a year or two because we were trying to win and the opponents were shouting from the rooftops.
[1:37:20] That's what screwed them up.
[1:37:23] It's – I don't think the American people – I had dinner last night with a number of people, but Roland Evans and Tom Braden were there.
[1:37:35] Evans is hawkish as hell.
[1:37:36] He said the president has the power in North Carolina.
[1:37:38] He said we can't take this.
[1:37:41] Braden is beating around, but – He would.
[1:37:44] He would.
[1:37:45] You'd expect that.
[1:37:46] He's savage.
[1:37:46] Yeah.
[1:37:48] Not as much.
[1:37:49] Evidence, evidence is...
[1:38:22] I just want to be sure that pilots and stuff are well selected.
[1:38:27] I mean, I don't want to select them, but I just want to be sure that it's worth doing.
[1:38:33] I'll get myself a full briefing from Abrams.
[1:38:35] I think on almost any conceivable...
[1:38:37] I've got to say it through this time.
[1:38:40] All right, we'll get you a briefing.
[1:38:43] On almost any conceivable...
[1:38:44] I've got to see some options, too.
[1:38:49] Right.
[1:38:53] I want to see about the Dykes, too.
[1:38:55] The only point, I'll be careful about, Mr. President, is if you order them to use the B-52s and they'll do it, they're apt to get the Korov.
[1:39:03] If one of these clusters of B-52s hits a populated area, you're going to have 5,000 dead.
[1:39:09] My man, that could be...
[1:39:15] They'd have every camera crew in the world.
[1:39:17] They'd have a new atrocity.
[1:39:20] They'd beat your brain.
[1:39:20] I'm aware of that.
[1:39:22] That's why I asked the question.
[1:39:26] I know there's a difference.
[1:39:28] Yet that's the gamble we always trade.
[1:39:29] Well, within rational limits, we should take the gamble.
[1:39:32] But I think these...
[1:39:35] I think... We had the intelligence report last week that Haiphong had still not recovered from our last strike.
[1:39:42] I think this next weekend we have to lay a tremendous strike on them.
[1:39:48] and get as close to the pier as we can and burn out the rest of the P.O.L.
[1:39:54] This time we're going to lose some planes because there's some that did that.
[1:39:58] Why would you lose B-52s?
[1:40:06] Well, they found a loose one somewhere there.
[1:40:09] Oh, so we lose.
[1:40:09] Yeah.
[1:40:10] It's war.
[1:40:15] But we can't wait much longer.
[1:40:16] We can't wait longer than that.
[1:40:18] You know, the thing that concerns me about all this is Russians.
[1:40:29] This raises a great question about all that good texture crap over there in England.
[1:40:33] Doesn't it to you?
[1:40:35] Don't you think so, Mr. President?
[1:40:36] I think we get the shit kicked out of us in a conventional operation.
[1:40:41] We have to redo our military establishment as soon as the election is over.
[1:40:47] Because by 77, it won't be worth being president of this country anymore.
[1:40:52] You know, really, that's the thing.
[1:40:55] If he'd do it.
[1:40:56] In defense.
[1:40:57] If he would do it.
[1:40:59] That's what he ought to do.
[1:41:05] I don't know if he'd do it.
[1:41:05] He'd be superb as Secretary of Defense.
[1:41:07] He'd be outstanding.
[1:41:29] Well, I've looked at some of those pictures, and we are, you know, with TANWA and so forth, we are getting to them, but of course it takes a while.
[1:41:44] I mean, we've dropped the bridge, and now they're moving a lot of stuff through the Bunker Eye Pass, and they've been really shooting that up.
[1:42:01] It takes a hell of a long time.
[1:42:08] Do you remember when this offensive started in military region one, you and the AAC said we should wait until the weather clears.
[1:42:13] It's not as clear.
[1:42:16] Now the Carthaginians are not fighting, unfortunately.
[1:42:19] That's really the problem.
[1:42:20] They couldn't have fought much.
[1:42:45] They've got to keep their spirits up.
[1:42:53] The spirit is going to determine this thing in the final analysis.
[1:42:58] Even lousy, lousy armies that are still defending can survive.
[1:43:09] When you look at those boxes of B-52, if they were anywhere near the front lines, they just must inflict some enormous casualties on them.
[1:43:27] Because then, after they hit, it's obvious the nation would advance.
[1:43:34] That's war.
[1:43:34] They don't advance.
[1:43:35] After they stopped them, they should have moved up.
[1:43:39] And they had this great scheme of an offensive.
[1:43:43] And they showed us the plans.
[1:43:45] And if they had actually done it, they wouldn't have lost our power, to speak of quantity.
[1:44:25] I don't mind your telling the staff.
[1:44:29] I think we've got to call our own.
[1:44:46] We've lost now only one provincial capital.
[1:44:47] I think that's what we've got to say.
[1:44:48] And so forth and so on.
[1:44:48] But we still have to bear in mind, I can honestly say that this is a hell of a message supported by the most sophisticated weapons.
[1:44:51] And we're going to suffer some losses.
[1:44:52] But in the end, the enemy will not be allowed to succeed.
[1:44:53] Now, that's the line to take.
[1:44:54] Don't you agree?
[1:44:54] And tell them and say, sure, we're going to suffer losses.
[1:45:15] As I say, the only problem with pressurizing an enemy is not... ...is the effect on us, but it's the effect of his general positive power becoming discouraged.
[1:45:32] If night after night they get the impression that we're going to lose, see, on the other hand, we just keep going.
[1:45:40] It is difficult to blouse.
[1:45:42] We got that pounded in and pounded down, and we did lose, at least the polygon.
[1:45:48] Yeah, but because when it was all over, it looked as if we had lost.
[1:45:52] I don't think this was handled that way.
[1:45:55] It was by the end of May.
[1:45:59] We had lost only one more political capital, or two.
[1:46:05] Uh, I just want to get to three times, see if I can handle that.
[1:49:13] First of all, I don't even know what he had when he did it.
[1:49:15] I'm excited to find out.