On May 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:06 am to 10:19 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 718-002 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
I have not said anything to him about this.
One thing I do think you need to do today, not only for a couple minutes, in order to have it done, is see Gray and Kleinke before we put out that announcement, I think.
No, I think we'll do it at 3.
Well, I told the leaders I didn't name the names, but I told them what we were planning.
Oh, okay.
Well, he doesn't have to do this.
Well, no.
He's got a hearing that he's presiding and then he has to go up to the Hill.
The services, I don't think you ought to do it before the Rotunda thing either.
Well, I don't know what the difference is happening.
I don't think it makes a big difference.
I thought Ron was going to do it at three.
I think Ron ought to do it at two rather than .
But it is .
Well, how are you feeling today?
I'm feeling great.
No, actually, it looks like I had leaders who defended you this morning.
In my remarks, I got one about your grief.
Oh, God, yeah.
You know, because the boys are all right.
They definitely said it.
Yeah, the main panic stuff comes out of the New York Times.
They've got two real hatchet boys working on Craig Whitman and Shatner.
They pulled out the fellow who was driving the good stuff and got spotted with it.
Threw him out, didn't they?
I don't know.
He certainly isn't driving anymore.
That's all right.
We're not concerned about the database.
We're concerned about the facts.
Did you work out that situation on Saturday, about a Sunday?
Yes, sir.
I've kind of been down to the last half-minute.
You'll be pleased to know that I've leaked out all our submarine discussions.
You saw them?
Yes.
Oh, I saw them.
Yes, sir.
That's what I told you they were going to do.
And the... You have gone Monday night.
And on top of it, from the Rajas, finds the elitist version of Pithopil Krishna, which is equal numbers.
That doesn't make any difference.
It's all his crap around.
But let me say, it's such cheap crap, though.
I mean, why they did it, though, it's... Well, that's what... You see, they were... Rogers and Smith were playing for time, so they could do this.
And what the Christ is the matter with them?
I told you they would do it by...
Anyway, that's one second.
And you've got the front page of every paper that... We've got our story on that.
It's your story.
We can...
Well, let me finish with Henry now.
I assume you can get at this other one.
I assume you have to, if you want to hold it for free.
Let me find out.
It's perfectly all right to hold it for free.
One thing on this part I may want to address with you is, you had told Laird you wanted him to give a press conference today, too.
He's sort of wobbly about it.
I don't think it's going to...
I think it's a bad idea, because he'll attack the South Vietnamese who are not fighting well enough, and he'll just be covering his own rear.
Yes.
Yeah.
Yeah, I tell you.
Well, then you tell Laird that I feel that because of the Hoover thing, we shouldn't have anything today.
Yeah.
And he's eager to do it.
Who's talking to him?
I'm talking to him.
I can get it done.
You talk to him.
What do you do?
Tell Laird that I feel that I told him.
See, I spoke to Laird.
I was the one that asked this.
But earlier in the week, he did want to do it.
You just say, well, he gave us some cooters and stuff and everything, and we ought to wait until after Thursday, and we'll take a new look at it then.
No, he's eager to do it.
Nobody's eager to do anything on this time.
He'll do it, but what do you mean?
Do you have to go to the Washington meeting?
Well, I've got a covering it, so I should be there in about 20 minutes.
They should hear from me.
We have to give our chances today to reflect on our course of action and see what we do and where and how we're doing the right thing.
I've handed the letter to Dobrina.
I was icy.
There was a phrase in there, we won't put any additional considerations before you.
And then he said, we invite your consideration.
He said, how can you invite our consideration if you won't give us any beauties?
I said, Anatole, stop the debating points.
You've heard from our point at great length in Moscow, and that's it.
If you don't want to give us your views, fine, we'll ask you in the bathroom.
I just thought for two minutes, I handed it in.
He said, do you want to talk about it?
I said, no, I don't want to discuss it with you.
What is your evaluation this morning of the situation, particularly in regard to that?
Was that my message was delivered, I trust, to the chief?
Yes, your message was delivered then.
Oh, yes.
Punker said, I have conveyed the President's message to express his appreciation.
Great pleasure in receiving it.
The message came at an opportune moment.
He was obviously encouraged by being made aware once again of the President's strong support.
You know, I have a feeling here, intuition, a feeling, the South Vietnamese may not be that bad off, the North Vietnamese may be worse off.
I think they're going to take some of the Amaral, take the Khantoum, anyway, but anyway, the North Vietnamese are taking a hell of a mountain here, they've got to.
And what's your view this morning?
My view is, you know, what I told you the night I came back from Moscow, the real question isn't how many towns they take and the view you expressed, but how many divisions they chew up and how much they lose.
Both sides.
That's right.
I look back on it and it doesn't make any difference anymore.
They've been just horrendous mistakes that we should never have.
deployed around the country, and in fact, we should have pulled them back.
I said pull back, give them territory, give them a line.
Oh, no.
We've seen it here.
But this poor Abrams out there has been gambling like a wild poker player, and now he's panicking.
We can't make him treat us that now.
It's out of the question to have two deceited generals and to make it the graveyard for
guys who bail in Vietnam.
My evaluation is that there's a slightly better than 50-50 chance of holding it.
Now that they've changed the commander in I-Corps, and they've put the Delta commander there, of course, that's totally different territory.
We just don't know how well they'll do up there.
They need to change land.
They took land out, which was a good decision.
At least Phu is a good commander.
And Phu is a good commander.
And he has a big shake-up in his command.
What about the third division?
That's finished.
That's finished.
We shouldn't kid ourselves.
Now, obviously, there should be some of them who's getting back.
Well, some of it is going back, and they may be able to use them as replacements.
But I think it's an organized unit that's finished.
If you want my evaluation.
Well, the third division's half-minus, you know.
Uh-huh.
If the North Vietnamese, I think if the North Vietnamese run for away, they're going to get it.
If the North Vietnamese do what they did in Khantoum and string up the area slowly, we'd have a chance.
And then we can get some...
some forces in there.
Is it not true that the copyists in South Vietnam generally, it's certainly not running out of time?
No, they're trying to panic out of the way, because obviously, I think the military situation is salvageable if everyone keeps his cool and if it's very tough out there.
We've just got to see what we can do to bleed these guys.
Let me present briefly.
You'd rather go down or come back?
Why don't you do that?
I could.
Why don't you do that?
Why don't you come back?
Because I've got to get to...
The real thing that we have to do, the most immediate thing, is to determine if it's going to be shuttered.
If it's going to be shuttered, we're going to follow through on what we're doing on the quarter.
Right.
And I, as undersigned, understood I was going to have a reading from more words in the paper.
Right, on that high-five strike.
Now, Laird wants to sit in on that.
What's going to happen?
In that case, you may want to scrap it, you know.
I'm scrapping.
What do you think?
What do you think is good for me to have?
I don't know, uh...
You take a look at the goddamn thing.
The thing with getting layered in is that he'll come in and make all of his protests with regard to it.
Oh, yeah.
Has he already told me last night?
He's yesterday.
Well, he says there aren't any targets up there, son of a bitch.
There are never any targets for you on the attack.
And he doesn't understand the political.
We've got to do something, Mr. President.
After all the huffing and puffing we've done, we've either got to hit or cancel the summit or vote, in my view.
I think it's frankly more of a better use of my time.
For you to look at the Mars briefing, you and I, and for you and I to talk about it.
I couldn't agree more.
You don't need it.
And so what time can you be back here?
15 minutes.
I do have some problems that I have to work on, so I've got to get that damn bullet you're in.
I'll be back within 20 minutes.
Take your time.
Okay.
Why don't we say quarter to quarter?
And then we'll work on the whole thing.
Right.
And Dougie suggests this.
But if you have any views on Porter other than what we discussed yesterday, it would be useful to... Well, that's what I want to discuss first.
When you come back, I already want to do it now.
Does he have to know right away?
No, but Sullivan has to get some...
I'm going to tell Sullivan.
I'll let him know later this afternoon.
It's really the question, it's really the question of how he does this.
Who's back, we want the monkey on.
And, you see what I mean?
Yeah.
And why don't you try to get some of those people to look for him.
How would that work?
No, no.
They have views, I saw.
Well...
They don't mention it.
I'll be as brief on the vote.
Oh, I understand that.
I understand that.
I'm just trying to say, don't tell Sullivan.
Tell him the president is considering a very hard line.
And what do you all think?
Well, they'll say it depends on the private talk.
I'll check with Sullivan.
You're not going to tell them the private talk, sir?
No.
No.
Leave that open.
Yeah, the reason we made that, of course, is the one, you know, that stopped before us.