Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Vietnam War and North Vietnamese offensive

13:44I have not said anything to him about this.
14:08One thing I do think you need to do today, not only for a couple minutes, in order to have it done, is see Gray and Kleinke before we put out that announcement, I think.
14:23No, I think we'll do it at 3.
14:26Well, I told the leaders I didn't name the names, but I told them what we were planning.
14:36Oh, okay.
14:39Well, he doesn't have to do this.
14:45Well, no.
14:48He's got a hearing that he's presiding and then he has to go up to the Hill.
14:52The services, I don't think you ought to do it before the Rotunda thing either.
14:55Well, I don't know what the difference is happening.
14:59I don't think it makes a big difference.
15:04I thought Ron was going to do it at three.
15:06I think Ron ought to do it at two rather than .
15:10But it is .
16:08Well, how are you feeling today?
16:09I'm feeling great.
16:10No, actually, it looks like I had leaders who defended you this morning.
16:17In my remarks, I got one about your grief.
16:20Oh, God, yeah.
16:22You know, because the boys are all right.
16:24They definitely said it.
16:27Yeah, the main panic stuff comes out of the New York Times.
16:30They've got two real hatchet boys working on Craig Whitman and Shatner.
16:36They pulled out the fellow who was driving the good stuff and got spotted with it.
16:40Threw him out, didn't they?
16:41I don't know.
16:42He certainly isn't driving anymore.
16:44That's all right.
16:45We're not concerned about the database.
16:49We're concerned about the facts.
16:52Did you work out that situation on Saturday, about a Sunday?
16:59Yes, sir.
17:00I've kind of been down to the last half-minute.
17:03You'll be pleased to know that I've leaked out all our submarine discussions.
17:11You saw them?
17:13Yes.
17:13Oh, I saw them.
17:14Yes, sir.
17:15That's what I told you they were going to do.
17:18And the... You have gone Monday night.
17:22And on top of it, from the Rajas, finds the elitist version of Pithopil Krishna, which is equal numbers.
17:33That doesn't make any difference.
17:37It's all his crap around.
17:38But let me say, it's such cheap crap, though.
17:40I mean, why they did it, though, it's... Well, that's what... You see, they were... Rogers and Smith were playing for time, so they could do this.
17:49And what the Christ is the matter with them?
17:51I told you they would do it by...
17:54Anyway, that's one second.
17:55And you've got the front page of every paper that... We've got our story on that.
17:59It's your story.
18:00We can...
18:04Well, let me finish with Henry now.
18:07I assume you can get at this other one.
18:09I assume you have to, if you want to hold it for free.
18:14Let me find out.
18:14It's perfectly all right to hold it for free.
18:16One thing on this part I may want to address with you is, you had told Laird you wanted him to give a press conference today, too.
18:25He's sort of wobbly about it.
18:26I don't think it's going to...
18:32I think it's a bad idea, because he'll attack the South Vietnamese who are not fighting well enough, and he'll just be covering his own rear.
18:38Yes.
18:39Yeah.
18:39Yeah, I tell you.
18:40Well, then you tell Laird that I feel that because of the Hoover thing, we shouldn't have anything today.
18:46Yeah.
18:46And he's eager to do it.
18:48Who's talking to him?
18:49I'm talking to him.
18:50I can get it done.
18:50You talk to him.
18:51What do you do?
18:52Tell Laird that I feel that I told him.
18:53See, I spoke to Laird.
18:54I was the one that asked this.
18:56But earlier in the week, he did want to do it.
18:59You just say, well, he gave us some cooters and stuff and everything, and we ought to wait until after Thursday, and we'll take a new look at it then.
19:04No, he's eager to do it.
19:09Nobody's eager to do anything on this time.
19:13He'll do it, but what do you mean?
19:15Do you have to go to the Washington meeting?
19:18Well, I've got a covering it, so I should be there in about 20 minutes.
19:22They should hear from me.
19:27We have to give our chances today to reflect on our course of action and see what we do and where and how we're doing the right thing.
19:45I've handed the letter to Dobrina.
19:46I was icy.
19:47There was a phrase in there, we won't put any additional considerations before you.
19:50And then he said, we invite your consideration.
19:52He said, how can you invite our consideration if you won't give us any beauties?
19:55I said, Anatole, stop the debating points.
19:57You've heard from our point at great length in Moscow, and that's it.
20:04If you don't want to give us your views, fine, we'll ask you in the bathroom.
20:08I just thought for two minutes, I handed it in.
20:11He said, do you want to talk about it?
20:12I said, no, I don't want to discuss it with you.
20:31What is your evaluation this morning of the situation, particularly in regard to that?
20:38Was that my message was delivered, I trust, to the chief?
20:41Yes, your message was delivered then.
20:45Oh, yes.
20:45Punker said, I have conveyed the President's message to express his appreciation.
20:49Great pleasure in receiving it.
20:50The message came at an opportune moment.
20:53He was obviously encouraged by being made aware once again of the President's strong support.
21:01You know, I have a feeling here, intuition, a feeling, the South Vietnamese may not be that bad off, the North Vietnamese may be worse off.
21:11I think they're going to take some of the Amaral, take the Khantoum, anyway, but anyway, the North Vietnamese are taking a hell of a mountain here, they've got to.
21:20And what's your view this morning?
21:24My view is, you know, what I told you the night I came back from Moscow, the real question isn't how many towns they take and the view you expressed, but how many divisions they chew up and how much they lose.
21:37Both sides.
21:38That's right.
21:39I look back on it and it doesn't make any difference anymore.
21:41They've been just horrendous mistakes that we should never have.
21:46deployed around the country, and in fact, we should have pulled them back.
21:49I said pull back, give them territory, give them a line.
21:56Oh, no.
21:56We've seen it here.
21:58But this poor Abrams out there has been gambling like a wild poker player, and now he's panicking.
22:06We can't make him treat us that now.
22:08It's out of the question to have two deceited generals and to make it the graveyard for
22:15guys who bail in Vietnam.
22:18My evaluation is that there's a slightly better than 50-50 chance of holding it.
22:23Now that they've changed the commander in I-Corps, and they've put the Delta commander there, of course, that's totally different territory.
22:36We just don't know how well they'll do up there.
22:38They need to change land.
22:40They took land out, which was a good decision.
22:44At least Phu is a good commander.
22:46And Phu is a good commander.
22:49And he has a big shake-up in his command.
22:51What about the third division?
22:52That's finished.
22:53That's finished.
22:54We shouldn't kid ourselves.
22:55Now, obviously, there should be some of them who's getting back.
23:00Well, some of it is going back, and they may be able to use them as replacements.
23:04But I think it's an organized unit that's finished.
23:06If you want my evaluation.
23:07Well, the third division's half-minus, you know.
23:11Uh-huh.
23:13If the North Vietnamese, I think if the North Vietnamese run for away, they're going to get it.
23:20If the North Vietnamese do what they did in Khantoum and string up the area slowly, we'd have a chance.
23:29And then we can get some...
23:37some forces in there.
23:38Is it not true that the copyists in South Vietnam generally, it's certainly not running out of time?
23:47No, they're trying to panic out of the way, because obviously, I think the military situation is salvageable if everyone keeps his cool and if it's very tough out there.
24:05We've just got to see what we can do to bleed these guys.
24:10Let me present briefly.
24:15You'd rather go down or come back?
24:18Why don't you do that?
24:19I could.
24:19Why don't you do that?
24:21Why don't you come back?
24:26Because I've got to get to...
24:31The real thing that we have to do, the most immediate thing, is to determine if it's going to be shuttered.
24:35If it's going to be shuttered, we're going to follow through on what we're doing on the quarter.
24:40Right.
24:40And I, as undersigned, understood I was going to have a reading from more words in the paper.
24:44Right, on that high-five strike.
24:45Now, Laird wants to sit in on that.
24:47What's going to happen?
24:48In that case, you may want to scrap it, you know.
24:52I'm scrapping.
24:52What do you think?
24:53What do you think is good for me to have?
24:58I don't know, uh...
25:01You take a look at the goddamn thing.
25:03The thing with getting layered in is that he'll come in and make all of his protests with regard to it.
25:09Oh, yeah.
25:09Has he already told me last night?
25:11He's yesterday.
25:12Well, he says there aren't any targets up there, son of a bitch.
25:15There are never any targets for you on the attack.
25:19And he doesn't understand the political.
25:22We've got to do something, Mr. President.
25:24After all the huffing and puffing we've done, we've either got to hit or cancel the summit or vote, in my view.
25:33I think it's frankly more of a better use of my time.
25:46For you to look at the Mars briefing, you and I, and for you and I to talk about it.
25:53I couldn't agree more.
25:54You don't need it.
25:55And so what time can you be back here?
25:5715 minutes.
25:57I do have some problems that I have to work on, so I've got to get that damn bullet you're in.
26:05I'll be back within 20 minutes.
26:06Take your time.
26:07Okay.
26:08Why don't we say quarter to quarter?
26:10And then we'll work on the whole thing.
26:14Right.
26:14And Dougie suggests this.
26:16But if you have any views on Porter other than what we discussed yesterday, it would be useful to... Well, that's what I want to discuss first.
26:25When you come back, I already want to do it now.
26:27Does he have to know right away?
26:29No, but Sullivan has to get some...
26:31I'm going to tell Sullivan.
26:32I'll let him know later this afternoon.
26:38It's really the question, it's really the question of how he does this.
26:43Who's back, we want the monkey on.
26:46And, you see what I mean?
26:50Yeah.
26:51And why don't you try to get some of those people to look for him.
26:57How would that work?
27:00No, no.
27:00They have views, I saw.
27:02Well...
27:03They don't mention it.
27:04I'll be as brief on the vote.
27:06Oh, I understand that.
27:08I understand that.
27:09I'm just trying to say, don't tell Sullivan.
27:11Tell him the president is considering a very hard line.
27:16And what do you all think?
27:18Well, they'll say it depends on the private talk.
27:21I'll check with Sullivan.
27:22You're not going to tell them the private talk, sir?
27:25No.
27:25No.
27:26Leave that open.
28:26Yeah, the reason we made that, of course, is the one, you know, that stopped before us.

Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Vietnam War and North Vietnamese offensive

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on May 3, 1972

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