Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 718 › Conversation 718-002

Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Vietnam War and North Vietnamese offensive

Wednesday, May 3, 1972 · 10:06 AM–10:19 AM ET · Oval Office · 15 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation718-002 on Tape 718 (tape position 00:13:55–00:28:39)StartWednesday, May 3, 1972 at 10:06 AMEndWednesday, May 3, 1972 at 10:19 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 718-002 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman and Henry Kissinger to coordinate the administration's messaging and response to the ongoing North Vietnamese offensive. The discussion centered on managing the press, specifically regarding public statements by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and reviewing the viability of South Vietnamese military defenses. Kissinger briefed the President on his diplomatic communications with Soviet official Anatoliy Dobrynin and upcoming military planning sessions, leading to a decision to finalize bombing strategy for Haiphong in a subsequent private meeting.

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Position in tape: 00:13:55 – 00:28:39

part A, 13:53

718a.mp3
718b.mp3

NARA Description

On May 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:06 am to 10:19 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 718-002 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 718-2

Date: May 3, 1972
Time: 10:06 am – 10:19 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     President's schedule
          -A meeting
                 -Arrangements
                 -Time
          -Meeting with L[ouis] Patrick Gray, III and Richard G. Kleindienst
                 -Announcement of appointment
                      -Time
                      -President's previous meeting with Republican Congressional leaders
                      -Kleindienst's schedule
                      -Time
                      -Ronald L. Ziegler’s role
                      -Kleindienst’s role

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 53s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

*****************************************************************

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 10:07 am.

     Greetings

     Meeting with Republican Congressional leaders
          -Kissinger
          -Support for President

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -New York Times reporters
                    -Craig Whitney [?] and Sydney Schanberg
                    -[First name unknown] Butterworth
Show the rest of the log (108 more lines)
     Instructions to Haldeman

     Kissinger's schedule
          -Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG] meeting

     Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] negotiations
           -Submarines
                -Information leaks
                -William P. Rogers's version
                -Numbers
                -Purpose
                -Rogers
                -Gerard C. Smith
                -President's story

     President's schedule
          -Meeting with Kleindienst
                 -Time

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -Melvin R. Laird's press conference
                    -South Vietnamese performance
                    -The President’s instructions
                    -Postponement
                          -J. Edgar Hoover funeral
                    -Laird's reluctance

Haldeman left at 10:10 am.

     WSAG meeting
        -Kissinger's attendance
              -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s attendance

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -Course of action
               -Letter to Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                     -Tenor
                     -New proposals
                     -Further discussions
               -President's message

               -Nguyen Van Thieu
                     -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
          -South Vietnamese strengths
          -North Vietnamese weaknesses
               -Casualties
                     -Kontum, Hue
          -Losses
               -Divisions
          -South Vietnamese military dispositions
               -Kontum, Pleiku
          -Abrams
               -Tactics
               -Possibility as Army Chief of Staff
          -Chances of stopping
               -Kissinger's evaluation
               -South Vietnamese command
                     -Changes
                     -Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam
                     -Gen. Pham Van Phu
          -South Vietnamese forces
               -3rd Division
                     -Loss
                     -Remaining strength
                     -Kissinger’s view
          -Hue
               -Possible capture
               -Strategy
                     -Kontum
          -South Vietnamese
               -Attitude toward communists
          -Outcome

Kissinger's schedule
     -WSAG meeting
     -Meeting with President

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese offensive
               -William J. Porter
               -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer briefing
                    -Bombing plans
                           -Haiphong
                    -Laird's attendance
                           -Position on bombing
               -US options
                    -Military action
                    -Soviet Summit cancellation
               -Porter's instructions
               -Moorer’s briefing
                    -Attendance by Kissinger and Haig
                    -Kissinger's meeting with President
                           -Time

     President's schedule
          -Hoover eulogy preparation

     Porter
          -Instructions for walkout
          -William H. Sullivan
          -Laird
          -WSAG
          -Sullivan
                -Views

Kissinger left at 10:19 am.

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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I have not said anything to him about this matter.
One thing I do think you need to do today, not only for a couple minutes, in order to have it done, is see Gray and Clankings before we put out that announcement, I think.
No, I think we'll do it at 3.
Well, I told the leaders I didn't name the names, but I told them what we were planning.
Oh, okay.
Well, he doesn't have to do this.
No, he's got a hearing that he's presiding and then he has to go up the hill.
The service is, I don't think you ought to do it before the rotunda thing either.
Well, I don't know what difference does that make.
I don't think it makes a big difference.
I thought Ron was going to do it at three.
I think Ron ought to do it at two rather than .
But it is .
How do you feel in the day?
No, actually it works out.
I literally defended you this morning in my remarks.
You know, the boys are all right.
They're pretty steady.
Yeah, the main panic stuff comes out of the New York Times.
They've got two real hatchet boys working on Craig Whitman and Shatner.
They pulled out the fellow who was driving the good stuff and got spotted with it.
Threw him out, didn't they?
Well, I don't know.
He certainly isn't driving anymore.
That's all right.
We're not concerned about the database.
We're concerned about the facts.
Did you work out that situation on Saturday about Sunday?
Yes, sir.
I've kind of been down to the last half-minute.
You'll be pleased to know that I've leaked out all our submarine discussions.
You saw them?
Yes.
Oh, I saw them.
Yes, sir.
That's it.
I've told you they're good.
You haven't gone Monday night.
And on top of it, from mirages, find the elitist version of Pippo Bill Greta, such as equal numbers.
That doesn't make any difference.
That's all, all his crap around.
But let me say, it's such cheap crap, though.
I mean, why they did it, though, they were, you see, they were, Rogers and Smith were playing for time, so they could do this, and what in the Christ is the matter with them?
I told you they would do it.
Anyway, that's one subject.
And you've got the front page of every paper.
And we've got our story on that.
It's your story.
We did not.
Well, let me finish with Henry now, and you can get at this other one.
I see why you have to, if you want to hold it to three, fine.
Let me find out.
It is perfectly right to hold it to three.
One thing on this part I may want to express with you is, you had told Laird you wanted him to give a press conference today, too.
He's sort of wobbly about it.
I don't think it's enough.
I think it's a bad idea because he'll attack the South Vietnamese who are not fighting well enough and he'll just be covering his own rear.
Yes, yes.
Don't be dumb.
Yeah, I tell you.
Well, then you tell Laird that I feel that because of the Hoover thing we shouldn't have anything today.
Yeah, and he's eager to do it.
Who's talking to him?
I can get it done.
You talk to him.
What do you know?
Tell Laird that I feel that I told him.
See, I spoke to Laird.
I was the one that asked this.
But earlier in the week, we did want him to do it.
You just say, well, he gave us a cooler step and everything.
We ought to wait until after Thursday, and we'll take a new look at it then.
Nobody's eager to do it.
Nobody's eager to do anything on this topic.
He'll do it, but what you'll do is you have to go to the Washington meeting.
But I've got hate covering it, so I should be there in about 20 minutes.
They should hear from me.
We have to give our chances today to reflect on our course of action and see what we do and where and how we're doing the right thing.
I've handed the letter to the Breeder.
I was icy.
There was a phrase in there, we won't put any additional considerations before you.
And then he said, we invite your consideration.
He said, how can you invite our consideration if you won't give us any of yours?
I said, Anatol, stop the debating points.
You've heard from our point at great length in Moscow, and that's it.
If you don't want to give us your views, fine, we'll ask you in the bathroom.
I just saw him for two minutes.
I handed it in.
He said, do you want to talk about it?
I said, no, I don't want to discuss it with you.
What is your evaluation this morning of the situation, particularly in regard to that, was that my message was delivered, I trust, to the chief?
Yes, your message was delivered, yes.
Oh, yes.
Punker said, I have conveyed the President's message to express his appreciation, great pleasure in receiving it.
The message came at an opportune moment.
Q was obviously encouraged by being made aware once again of the President's strong support.
You know, I have a feeling here, intuition, a feeling, the South Vietnamese may not be that bad off, the North Vietnamese may be worse off.
I think they're going to take some of the Amaral, take the Khantoum, anyway, but everything, the North Vietnamese are taking a hell of a mountain here, they've got to.
And what's your view this morning?
My view is, you know, what I told you the night I came back from Moscow, the real question isn't how many towns they take and the view you expressed, but how many divisions they chew up and how much...
Both sides.
That's right.
I look back on it and it doesn't make any difference anymore.
There have been just horrendous mistakes made.
We should never have...
deployed around Kahn, Thurman, Freykuh, we could have pulled them back.
I said pull back, give them territory, give them the line.
Oh no, we've seen it here.
But this poor Abrams out there has been gambling like a large poker player and now he's panicking.
We can't make him treat us yet.
It's out of the question to have two deceited generals and to make it the graveyard for
guys who bail in Vietnam.
My evaluation is that there's a slightly better than 50-50 chance of holding it.
Now that they've changed the commander in I-Corps, and they've put the Delta commander there, of course, that's totally different territory.
We just don't know how well they'll do up there.
They need to change land.
To glam out, which was a good decision.
At least Phu is a good commander.
And Phu is a good commander.
And he has a big shake-up in his command.
What about the third division?
That's finished.
That's finished.
We shouldn't kid ourselves.
Now, obviously, there should be some of them who's getting back.
Well, some of it is going back, and they may be able to use them as replacements.
But I think it's an organized unit that's finished.
If you want my evaluation...
If the North Vietnamese, I think if the North Vietnamese run for Huawei, they're going to get it.
If the North Vietnamese do what they did in Khantoum and string up the area slowly, we'd have a chance.
In other words, they prepare for that.
Yes.
Because we'll prepare also.
And then we can get some...
some forces in there.
Is it not true that the copyists in South Vietnam generally is, is it certainly not running out of time?
No, no, they're trying to panic out of the way.
I think the military situation is salvageable if everyone keeps it cool and if it's very tough up there.
We've just got to see what we can do to bleed these guys.
Let me present briefly.
If we get to this meeting now, are you going to go down or come back?
Why don't you do that?
I could.
Why don't you do that and I'll come back?
Because I've got to get to...
The real thing that we have to do, the most immediate thing, is to be sure that we're going to follow through on what we're doing on Porter.
Right.
And I, as undersigned, understood I was going to have a reading from more words in the paper.
Right, on that high-five strike.
Now, Laird wants to sit in on that.
What's going to happen?
In that case, you may want to scrap it, you know.
I'm scrapping.
What do you think?
What do you think is good for me to have?
I don't know.
You take a look at the goddamn thing.
Now, the thing with getting Laird in is that he'll come in and make all of his protests with regard to it.
Oh, yeah.
Has he already told me last night?
He's yesterday.
Well, he says they have any targets up there.
Son of a bitch, they'll never have any targets for you who want to attack.
And he doesn't understand the political.
We've got to do something, Mr. President.
After all the huffing and puffing we've done, we've either got to hit or cancel the summit or vote, in my view.
I think it's frankly more of a better use of my time.
So for you to look at the cars breaking, you and I, and for you and I to talk about it.
I couldn't agree more.
You don't need it.
And so what time can you be back here?
I do have some problems that I have to work on, so I've got to get that damn eulogy ready.
I'll be back within 20 minutes.
Take your time.
Okay.
Why don't we say quarter to quarter and then we'll work on the whole thing.
Right.
And Dougie suggests this.
But if you have any views on Porter other than what we discussed yesterday, it would be useful to... Well, that's what I want to discuss first.
When you come back, or do you want to do it now?
Does he have to know right away?
No, but Sullivan has to get some...
I'm going to tell Sullivan.
I'll let him know later this afternoon.
It's really a good question.
It's really a good question of how he does this.
Who's back?
We want the monkey on.
And you see what I mean?
Yeah.
And why don't you try to get the classic, get some of them to you.
I would like to know.
The only bad, bad views I saw.
Well.
They don't mention it's obvious we won the vote.
Oh, I understand that, I understand that.
I'm just trying to say, don't tell Sullivan, tell him the president.
Well, I haven't heard it.
No, the president is considering a very hard line, and what do you all think?
Well, they'll say it depends on the private talk.
I'll check with Sullivan.
You're not going to tell them the private talk, sir?
No.
No.
Leave that open.
Yeah, the reason we made that, of course, is the one that was shot before us.
I think it's very distinguishable, but I do not.

Also recorded on May 3, 1972

  • 099-012 8:09 AM · 1 hr 53 min — Richard M. Nixon and Republican Congressional leaders, including Robert P. Griffin, Margaret Chase Smith, Peter H. Dominick, Gordon L. Allott, George D. Aiken, Gerald R. Ford, Leslie C. Arends, John B. Anderson, John J. Rhodes, Barber B. Conable, Jr., Samuel L. Devine, H. Allen Smith, Robert C. ("Bob") Wilson, Richard H. Poff, William S. Mailliard, William E. Timmons, Richard K. Cook, Thomas C. Korologos, Patrick J. Buchanan, Ronald L. Ziegler, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 8:09 am and 10:45 pm.
  • 718-003 10:19 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:19 am and 10:20 am.
  • 718-004 10:20 AM · 29 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:20 am to 10:50 am.
  • 718-005 10:50 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:50 am and 10:54 am.
  • 718-006 10:54 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:54 am to 10:56 am.
  • 718-007 10:56 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:56 am and 10:59 am.
  • 718-008 10:56 AM · 42 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:56 am and 10:59 am.
  • 718-009 10:59 AM · 1 hr 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:59 am to 12:11 pm.

All 59 conversations from May 3, 1972 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 718-002, May 3, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/718-002 (accessed November 2, 2026).