Nixon White House TapesTape 718 › Conversation 718-004

Nixon & Haldeman on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

Wednesday, May 3, 1972 · 10:20 AM–10:50 AM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob")Conversation718-004 onTape 718 (tape position 00:30:16–00:58:54)StartWednesday, May 3, 1972 at 10:20 AMEndWednesday, May 3, 1972 at 10:50 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 718-004 ↗

President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman met to discuss the political implications of the Vietnam War, specifically debating whether to cancel the upcoming Soviet Summit in response to North Vietnamese aggression. They analyzed Henry Kissinger's advice regarding the potential for a short-term boost in domestic support against the long-term risk of damaging U.S. foreign policy and inviting intense international propaganda. Additionally, they reviewed administrative matters, including the handling of recent press leaks regarding SALT negotiations and the strategy for managing the FBI transition and leadership confirmations following the death of J. Edgar Hoover.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 00:30:16 into the tape and ends around 00:58:54.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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30:35And that'll be the thing.
30:39I checked, they said they'll have a call, so I'm coming in.
30:51Basically, the argument that, do you have something else that you have to ask?
30:58No, we've got Annapolis squared away.
30:59Annapolis is squared away, no problem.
31:02I did it on the basis that we were going to work out the format of the chapel versus the army and all that.
31:09It just seemed like it would be better to hold off Annapolis.
31:12No, it's good.
32:51to raise the question let me explain
33:14In other words, the invasion, which I'm urged to continue to hammer, hammer, hammer, hammer, hammer.
33:20It's coming.
33:20It's rushing.
33:21You understand?
33:23Yep.
33:23They're all doing that now.
33:25Yep.
33:25They need to keep it on.
33:27That's the big thing.
33:28So anyway, he said, well, you can go to Moscow.
33:35He said, well, I'll be over there.
33:40I mean, don't do that.
33:43He talks in a certain way.
33:43But anyway, I said, George, I'm going to ask you a question.
33:45I'm going to ask you a question.
33:50I'm going to ask you a question.
33:52I'm going to ask you a question.
33:59I'm going to ask you a question.
34:03I'm going to ask you a question.
34:09Now, the other side of this coin, however, is that we had here a situation where I, who had been the strongest advocate of the time, they had been caught through Russians.
34:25I think I've got Henry on my wavelength, but I think he's on the wavelength here, partly for the wrong reason.
34:37In a word, Henry had his hopes so high when he went to Moscow and he heard that he had his hopes high when he went to Paris and heard that.
34:44And now he says, he's going through the argument, he says, I think there's only one course and that is to cancel some of the hunting.
34:57And then after that, he would bomb an arm.
35:00Now, the purpose of that, he says, that hunting, the arms of that hunter,
35:05And until we get money on intangibles, it'll have an enormous effect, certainly, on full-strength psychos.
35:14We're going to put all the chips in the pot.
35:16It will have an enormous effect also on anhydrous physical tolerance.
35:22We are not allowed, even in our interest, in our Russian summit in New Jersey, which I was right there.
35:28And on this last one, that's hard to find out.
35:33looking at the last line first, because it could turn out to be the most important.
35:45He's certainly right in the short run.
35:52And sure, if I go on television and say there's Soviet tanks and guns and they're shooting up civilians and arresting them, people will say, a damn courageous act.
36:00It would mobilize our hawks and soldiers.
36:03Well, I don't gain points on YouTube.
36:05It's even an isolation when they cancel it out.
36:10People rouse on the president's very hand.
36:11And the law doesn't.
36:19at is what happens.
36:21Now, if the cancer in the summit, and nothing is sure, but would substantially increase the chances of bringing the Vietnam thing to a successful conclusion, I would do it in a minute.
36:36If, on the other hand, cancer in the summit is only marginal in terms of bringing it to a successful conclusion,
36:43Then you're losing a lot of long-range plusses.
36:46Right.
36:47Then you're losing a lot of long-range plusses.
36:48Well, not too big plusses, except that you're buying a lot of long-range negatives.
36:52Okay.
36:53The long-range negatives being that collapse of the foreign policy, but also the massive, when you cancel a summit,
37:05uh, lots of upgrading of some bombers and all those.
37:11The Soviet propaganda, uh, force, I'm not referring to the US as Henry talks to, but I'm referring to all over the world.
37:21Uh, demonstrations and so forth and so forth.
37:25We've unleashed many armed sanctions.
37:28You would have the embassies and, well, you know what I mean?
37:32They really started raising holy hell with us because they figured what the Christ makes us draw on the sword.
37:38We have no interest in it, whatever.
37:41So we got a meeting.
37:43That's the point that I think we have to have in mind.
37:46Is a postponement of the summit not a possibility?
37:56There's a chance that they don't.
38:23It also bears on the
38:43later success of our next foreign policy.
38:46Now, the whole policy comes down and shambles as a result of his insistence on fighting this terrible war in Vietnam.
38:57Now, that's the line.
38:59In a sense, that cost is too high to pay, in a sense.
39:06It's too high to pay because you can confuse the Vietnam
48:14Well, coming back to this thing, you see, I think the Henry analysis, and I have to really look at it, because I think you said it very strongly, we can't go to Moscow and so forth.
48:38I think Henry is...
48:41I agree.
48:45First, once you make the announcement, you're going to have a hell of a lot of hawkish time.
48:55It won't last.
48:56That won't hold very long.
48:57That'll give you a blip.
48:58What the hell is happening with the next foreign policy?
49:01But then you get the erosion.
49:02The press will just...
49:05They're already trying to set it up that you've gambled all the deep.
49:09pieces that you were putting together are are in grave danger of coming apart the cancellation of the summit would be the maximum signal that they have come apart and they to them it would give them a rallying point to build that case on and they're they're so you know they leap on everything they can get anything to get a foot in at all that
49:38So it would erode over, you'd get a good look, I think you'd get a hell of a bounce at first, a strong move by the President, or he's not going to kick us around and that kind of stuff.
49:52But then you have to do that in early May.
49:58Second thoughts would be very, very difficult.
50:00Would build up, and then the Democrats at the convention in July would say, here we are, a president that was going to go to Moscow and bring us a generation of peace is now being bogged us down in an unwinnable, desperate war in Vietnam.
50:22Governor, they say that Henry is, in my, I mean, if I can pronounce it correctly, he doesn't even know this.
50:30But put yourself in this position.
50:33He feels, and he says what is terribly disappointing to Henry, because it was false, and he could know it too.
50:59Because he failed.
51:00I mean, because they did not come true.
51:03As he had told people here, both Moscow and Vietnam.
51:10He wants to say, in effect, God damn you, you can't do this to us.
51:15Get my point?
51:17It's sort of a bravado act, basically.
51:20So we say we're going to cancel the summit.
51:23It's a good short-term bravado act, isn't it?
51:27Now, on the other hand, let's look at it this way.
51:29Assuming the situation that we have now, assuming you don't, if we don't go to the summit, we've got to get the hand-by-hand long-airing to sure as hell.
51:38That goddamn Laird is playing his usual game saying we can't find targets and so forth.
51:44He is a miserable bastard, really.
51:45You know, if Laird and Rodgers haven't really got two clowns here that go on for, you know, when they say that they went on and did well on television or whatever the hell else that they do and they go on.
51:54But now, you know damn well that stuff on Salt was leaked out by Rogers and Graceman, wasn't it?
51:59And it shouldn't have been, should it?
52:01And you know the Gordsman story is, because he's on the plane.
52:11Why the hell would Biddle do that to Conrad?
52:13The courts must start counting on Conrad.
52:14Why Biddle though?
52:14I mean, God damn it, he knows the necessity for confidentiality when the president is concerned.
52:18Why is he put on such an ad?
52:20He just can't help himself.
52:21Man, if the government pressed, we'd all understand.
52:27I don't know.
52:29It's quite disturbing to me.
52:31It's quite disturbing.
52:39But Henry was right on this.
52:41It's about him.
52:42The one thing I disagree with on it, it's all this big deal.
52:45But Henry was right.
52:46On the other hand, Henry was right in terms of saying, be sure we get out in front of them.
52:53You agree?
52:53Yeah.
52:53Because Rogers and Smith were sitting there ready to put the deal out as theirs.
52:58Huh?
52:59Even that wouldn't have been as bad as Henry thinks it would have been because Rogers and Smith are your employees.
53:06I agree.
53:07I would agree just like Henry does.
53:09He overlooks that.
53:11He's the only one that's considered to be our man.
53:14The others have built up the other way.
53:18That's not really true.
53:20It's stronger, obviously.
53:21It was good we put it out.
53:23It's better to have it out of here.
53:30At least on the Hoover thing, though, you say that's when they did come out and did it the right way.
53:34They did something the right way.
53:41Okay.
53:41I mean, I think you dominated the ride on a big fleet gun on all of these last time.
53:45That's exactly where you should have.
53:46They used the stuff on the air clip.
53:48It was the right thing to do.
53:49And it played right.
53:56And they're going, you know, it's 99.9% superpositive stuff, of course.
54:02You've got a few shits like Randy Davis and Dr. Spock, and that's all the better you want then.
54:08Well, that prayers out my point about the vicious detractors.
54:11You've got to have some detractors.
54:13The press won't detract now.
54:15They're going the other way.
54:18But...
54:19They're starting, what they are trying to do is move, they're trying to prod the Senate, which again confirms the wisdom of not going up there with a new direction.
54:28To investigate the FBI.
54:29To investigate the FBI.
54:31They keep saying it remains, now that they know it's probable that the Senate will try to careful look at the FBI, which they've not been willing to do.
54:41Or which there's been pressure to do, but it's not starting on business.
54:52Well, we also have a question then of a new nominee for Deputy Attorney General.
54:57We should say that, in answer to your question, you'll withdraw Gray's nomination as Deputy Attorney General, and be submitting another one.
55:06But we sure as hell shouldn't do that until after Plain East is confirmed.
55:09No, because you don't want to get into the same guy there.
55:13No, no.
55:16But I don't think we have to say that.
55:17I think one could just say, well, the president is considering having to do quite a delay.
55:22Yes, he has some time.
55:24I mean, we didn't have to.
55:25After all, we didn't anticipate Hoover's death.
55:27And so he's going through the process.
55:29It will take some time for him.
55:32Importantly, of course, is to provide leadership to the FBI immediately.
55:34And Deputy Attorney General, he'd be longer out for a while.
55:38So we're making the right sacrifice in terms of leadership.
55:53Gray is all set to take the prison.
55:56He wanted to be Deputy Attorney General, but he will do whatever he's told.
56:03And he's not doing it unwillingly at all.
56:20Well, looking at the problem, he said, if he's the right kind of human being...
58:43forgotten that assignment to find out how many of the Washington White House Correspondents had their children.

On May 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:20 am to 10:50 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 718-004 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 718-4

Date: May 3, 1972
Time: 10:20 am - 10:50 am
Location: Oval office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     Henry A. Kissinger
         -Location
               -Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG]

     A meeting
         -Nelson A. Rockefeller's attendance
               -John N. Mitchell

     President's schedule
          -Meeting with Richard G. Kleindienst
                 -Time
          -Announcement on L[ouis] Patrick Gray, III
                 -Time

     Polls
             -Results

                                      (rev. Dec-01)

    President's schedule
         -Trip to Annapolis, Maryland
                -Cancellation
                -Arrangements
                -Format
                     -Chapel

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 1m 34s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

*****************************************************************

    Vietnam
         -George D. Aiken
         -J. William Fulbright’s amendment
         -North Vietnamese offensive
              -Support for President in Senate
                    -Disenchantment over Soviet backing
         -Soviet Summit
              -Cancellation
                    -Aiken
              -Kissinger’s schedule
                    -Moscow, Paris
              -Kissinger's advice
                    -Reasons
              -Cancellation
                    -Impact
         -South Vietnamese morale
         -Soviet Summit
              -Cancellation
                    -Impact on President's policies
              -Kissinger's advice
              -Dwight D. Eisenhower

                                      (rev. Dec-01)

                   -U-2 incident
              -Cancellation
                   -Domestic impact
                   -President's reasons
                         -Conclusion of war
                   -Soviet propaganda
                         -Kissinger
                         -Worldwide reaction
              -Postponement
                   -Possibilities
                   -Disadvantages
                         -Soviet propaganda
                         -Effect on US foreign policy
                               -Cost

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 8m 59s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

*****************************************************************

    Vietnam
         -Soviet Summit
              -Cancellation
                   -Kissinger's advice
                   -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                   -Announcement
                         -Support
                              -Initial reaction from “hawks”
                              -Erosion
                                     -Press criticism
                   -Problems
                   -Support
                         -Duration

                                   (rev. Dec-01)

                     -Erosion
                     -Democrats' position
               -Kissinger's advice
                     -Reasoning
                     -Evaluation
           -Bombing
               -Targets
                     -Hannoi and Haiphong harbor
                     -Melvin R. Laird's position
                          -The President’s view
                     -William P. Rogers's position

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
      -News leaks
           -Rogers
           -Gerard C.Smith
           -Bernard Gwertzman's story
           -Rogers's dealings with press
           -Credit for SALT
                -Rogers and Smith
                -President's role
                -Kissinger's concerns

J. Edgar Hoover
     -Funeral
          President's eulogy
                -News coverage
     -Detractors
          -Rennie Davis, Dr. Benjamin (McLane) Spock
          -Press coverage
                -Investigation of Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]
                      -Pressure
                      -Relation to confirmation of new director
                            -L[ouis] Patrick Gray, III
                                  -Withdrawal of nomination as
                                   Deputy Attorney General
                                  -Timing
                                  -Kleindienst's confirmation
                                  -Wording of Ronald L. Ziegler’s statement
                                  -Gray's preferences

                                        (rev. Dec-01)

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 1m 17s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5

*****************************************************************

Haldeman left at 10:50 am.
  • 718-002 10:06 AM · 15 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:06 am to 10:19 am.
  • 718-003 10:19 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:19 am and 10:20 am.
  • 718-005 10:50 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John D. Ehrlichman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:50 am and 10:54 am.
  • 718-006 10:54 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:54 am to 10:56 am.
  • 718-007 10:56 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:56 am and 10:59 am.
  • 718-008 10:56 AM · 39 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:56 am and 10:59 am.
  • 718-009 10:59 AM · 1 hr 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:59 am to 12:11 pm.
  • 718-010 12:14 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:14 pm and 12:18 pm.

Conversation 718-004, May 3, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/718-004 (accessed September 18, 2026).