Nixon, Kissinger & Sanchez on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

1:08:22I don't know, you know, you bring him in and maybe wind him up and...
1:08:34Russia's going to be superb.
1:08:36Without him, he'd be dead.
1:08:38Does Laird know that we rely on Russia?
1:08:41Yeah.
1:08:42Russia's sort of so clever about it.
1:08:44Well, it's an unbelievable situation.
1:08:45I mean, this combination of Laird and Rogers, I mean, this briefing, and Rush is beside himself about this Rogers briefing on the plane.
1:08:56Is it all unsolved?
1:08:57Unsolved?
1:08:58Oh, what did he say?
1:09:00Well, he said it's an outrage he's had through all the meetings.
1:09:05First of all, it puts out something which isn't true so that it puts a monkey on our back if we agreed to more submarines for them.
1:09:15Secondly, if we had wanted to put out that much, we could have put it out.
1:09:20We deliberately stayed away from the details.
1:09:24So we were.
1:09:25Yeah, his story indicated that they were going to freeze the number of submarines at their present levels.
1:09:30Which is totally untrue.
1:09:31Well, of course, we were able to do that.
1:09:33I mean, that'd be nice, but it can't be done.
1:09:36What's he trying to do, torpedo the whole thing?
1:09:38He's trying to do one of two things.
1:09:40He's trying to get credit himself for having thought it out.
1:09:47Secondly, he's trying to stick you with anything less favorable than what he's put out.
1:09:53And seriously, he's trying to torpedo it since he didn't do it.
1:09:59But it's this whole atmosphere where the Camden people, when it's good news, they try to take it away from you.
1:10:08When it's bad news, they try to shove it in you.
1:10:15Defense is announcing that mission for resupply of South Vietnam at 11 today.
1:10:20And while they're there, they're going to show some of those pictures of Soviet equipment.
1:10:27I think we might as well put the heat on the Soviets a little bit.
1:10:39Now, on the Paris talks, I've raised that we have three possibilities.
1:10:46One is just to accept the meeting for next week.
1:10:52The second is to walk out.
1:10:58The third is to reserve and to say we left it north-northeast, not the edge north-northeast, and it will be there next week.
1:11:08I think if they offer nothing at all tomorrow, we should walk out.
1:11:11There is a good possibility, though.
1:11:14They had a piece of paper there yesterday, and then they decided not to give it to me.
1:11:21My impression is they're going to surface something on Thursday to keep us from just walking out.
1:11:28And I think what they're going to surface is what they, in effect, told me, that you have to go, the others can stay, but have to adopt certain policies like releasing all the communists from prison, committing every newspaper, which would have the practical consequences of smashing the non-communists.
1:11:46If he does that, then it's hard to walk out.
1:11:48Then he should say he'll study it and he'll reserve.
1:11:53Well, he can say that he'll study replacing tubes, if it's the point, in a public session.
1:12:08But that's what I think they're going to do.
1:12:22It's a pretty hard prediction, isn't it?
1:12:27Well, that's what I would predict they're going to do.
1:12:30It's a hard prediction.
1:12:33Well, they have two choices.
1:12:34One choice is they clearly want to deprive... One of their privileges, whenever they're trying to crank up pressure on you, is to deprive you of any impression, of creating any impression that progress is being made.
1:12:49That's correct.
1:12:52And on the other hand, another tactic they have is to come up with an unacceptable proposal but present it as if it were acceptable.
1:13:14And of course, if we had announced that I was there yesterday and then they come in with their proposal tomorrow,
1:13:22It might look as if it had happened as a result of the tribal meeting, I don't know.
1:13:25Let me get back to that, but you and the actual priest would not announce the tribal meeting?
1:13:32No, but I told them if they were playing games with us, we'd reserve the right to do what was necessary to defend our position.
1:13:45Well, it's not in my interest to put off the private meetings.
1:13:48It hasn't succeeded in anything.
1:13:51It's not in my interest.
1:13:56Let me run over with you so that we can make this decision.
1:14:05uh we can decide this but what we do tomorrow is only here it's not nearly as important that's what we do in the long run tomorrow's only part of it much bigger puzzle exactly except that it that it gives away all that it you know it signals our attitude i mean that's thinking for sure about that true true except
1:14:30Except this, if on that point, just to use it exponentially, our attitude was signaled by your private conversation, and Moscow will know that.
1:14:40So I think that's how we look at it this way.
1:14:43In terms of tomorrow, I think as far as the signal from Moscow is concerned, it isn't a hell of a lot.
1:14:48I think you have done that through our private letter, and you have done that through your private conversation.
1:14:54Well, continuing plenary sessions would be a weak move.
1:15:00It would be very weak.
1:15:03Porter won't understand it, but he'll do what he's told.
1:15:07But... Well, let's look at it.
1:15:08I don't understand it.
1:15:11But you won't understand it.
1:15:13He can take it, too, but... Well, he will understand it.
1:15:17If you... Let me make the case for continuing on the reception on some basis.
1:15:25Uh...
1:15:29And this all, this all gets back to the assumption of when and how we want to do, uh, either, either the bombing or the other.
1:15:41Which are our two options.
1:15:43We have to do something.
1:15:44That's the best we've got, I'm sure.
1:15:47Laird, while in the crisis, he suggested we do this.
1:15:49He had many great ideas.
1:15:51What's he want to do?
1:15:52Take two in the ass or what?
1:15:55I don't know what to say.
1:15:56Is he...
1:15:56He doesn't say anything.
1:15:58He transmits whatever we do.
1:16:05So in Russia, since all then, did you race with him?
1:16:08Russia, yes, with me.
1:16:09What did he say?
1:16:12He said when he sees these two cabinet guys after him, he's amazed how he ever survived.
1:16:20Has he got rocket numbers all the way?
1:16:24He went through the Berlin exercise with Rogers, where Rogers did exactly the same things he did with Sol.
1:16:33Except that was already done by the time he got his answer.
1:16:37He raised as many frivolous objections as he did to this one.
1:16:39Just like the beginning case.
1:16:41Exactly.
1:16:49Not one of the poems that Rauch has objected to the communiqué in China has anyone else read?
1:16:53I don't know, sir.
1:16:56Not one?
1:17:01Nor has the communiqué.
1:17:02No, he was deliberately looking over to find something, which anybody could find.
1:17:07He would build everything.
1:17:08And after the first news stories, the communiqué out of China played very positively.
1:17:12Sure, sure.
1:17:12And we had a little bit.
1:17:14We just had to write it through, and we had...
1:17:24He could have been a big hero of the Chinese treason subject.
1:17:29As a result of his not playing it right, he appeared to be a dog in the manger that was left out in the early building.
1:17:34So he lost on that.
1:17:35Rogers could have seen her.
1:17:37On that salt thing, if he had told Smith, now you go out there and get us the best agreement you can, instead of leading the opposition, I mean, after all, I'm the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense.
1:17:50The director of the Central Intelligence Agency to report something has been unusually good.
1:17:58And Roger, who doesn't know what our position is, suddenly totally reverses what he said two months ago.
1:18:05You know he's just being nasty.
1:18:06I mean, you've got a front-page story out of this in every paper in the country yesterday now.
1:18:15I admit it isn't a great thing and it is going to change the course of events.
1:18:20But it shows a few positive things are going on.
1:18:24You deserve the whole credit for it because the whole thing was done here.
1:18:32He has no reason to complain.
1:18:33My name hasn't been mentioned in connection with this in any story.
1:18:36Is that fine with me?
1:18:37I don't want to be mentioned.
1:18:39I don't think that's it.
1:18:40I just really think it's his and Smith's fault.
1:18:43It's the White House generally.
1:18:45It's the President.
1:18:47They are not in vanity wanting to get credit for stuff.
1:18:49That's right.
1:18:52But they don't want credit.
1:18:53I mean, now, I don't hear them come rushing over here.
1:18:59trying to see what they can do to help out on Vietnam, that they're glad enough to keep shoving over to us.
1:19:04Let me analyze this thing some, and so forth, and particularly if you have a border thing.
1:19:29You're absolutely right that anything less than walking out is a weak note.
1:19:34What I would like to see is anything that you can say which does not indicate a total
1:19:54breakdown and thereby lack of hope on the negotiating front.
1:19:59Now, you and I know there's no hope at all at the moment.
1:20:02On the other hand, we have a hell of a lot of people being used on this particular point.
1:20:09You made this point often, and I will have to agree with you, that as a result of your hit from Moscow and as a result of our sending Porter back to the final recession,
1:20:21something that was supported even by our conservative papers like the Star and others beforehand.
1:20:27As a result of all that, they say, well, we support the mine, but we also are glad that the president is at least trying to see, trying, I'm putting the strongest case I can for this.
1:20:41Now, so we have to weigh what we lose,
1:20:52appearing to be, I mean, just breaking off the Potsdam, as we did before on the show, which is a message which is needed by the Russians, needed, not really by Hanoi, because, except if you told them that privately, that, oh, it might help some.
1:21:12It might help some of the Jews.
1:21:14But they've been saying that they're forcing it back to the Congress, isn't it?
1:21:20All right, let's forget the debating point.
1:21:22All right, what I mean is that is the debating point.
1:21:25And the thing that we have to have in mind is that, let's look at it in terms of American public opinion.
1:21:34The walkout would be greeted in the first instance by a surge of great enthusiasm by the Hawks.
1:21:48The other hand, it would turn loose at this particular time.
1:21:55The greatest and what I'm most concerned about, of course, at the moment is the breakdown of negotiations.
1:22:12The problem with the Senate, you know, the Senate meets this morning and the Senate Democratic Caucus will overrun and make a group and sort of put the bug out.
1:22:31And then Byrd will introduce a Mansfield-type resolution after that.
1:22:33And there will be action around, so forth and so on.
1:22:38In terms of being able to beat that,
1:22:40We had a very, very good vote earlier this week.
1:22:42Aiken raised it this morning.
1:22:43First, Fulbright got only 15 votes for some of the ancillary things.
1:22:48You know, one of the bug out things.
1:22:54And which the ocean outfit has gotten only one Republican voted with Fulbright.
1:22:58And if they can find out, he said, the reason for that is that the public understands that there is a massive debate in support of the Russians.
1:23:06And at the same time, he said, another reason for it is they think that we're making every effort to negotiate.
1:23:13He said, you've got them in a crack now.
1:23:14There's old George.
1:23:15So why is old Paul talking?
1:23:16See my point?
1:23:17Now, what we have to realize is that these terms of the domestic front that
1:23:28This kind of a move, and I'm going to put it in the context of the bombing in some way, this kind of a move can have a good short-range effect to welcome.
1:23:44Long-range, we have to consider it in the context of what our plans are.
1:23:56I see the sun.
1:23:57And of course, I'm at the strongest point of not making the sun a hostage.
1:24:10The hostage should be a part of the sun.
1:24:19Anyway.
1:24:25The cancellation of the summer, summer, summer, or that is that it can't be any halfway.
1:24:31We can say that we're going to postpone it, or we aren't going to go at this time, or we'll be glad to go at a later time, and let's do the stop, or this, that, or the other thing, and so forth.
1:24:40I just, I try to think of all the language that we can work out.
1:24:47First,
1:24:49analyzing it from the foreign standpoint, it will have a beneficial effect, as you pointed out last time on the pew.
1:24:58It will have a, certainly some shock effect on the enemy.
1:25:07It will have some effect on the Russians.
1:25:18And more on that in a moment.
1:25:21The question arises, what effect does it have here?
1:25:27The initial effect would be, in my opinion, extremely favorable.
1:25:32Creates a president, puts everything on the line, stands up to the Russians, and so forth.
1:25:45and getting the domestic thing out of the way first, because it does have some bearing.
1:25:50We have to realize that once we have canceled the summit, but then we will unleash without any questions, not simply the calls, but we will unleash again, predict who they are,
1:26:14the type of senators in Congress who are presently off balance, one, because someone is coming, and two, because they think something is going on, which you and I are close by on.
1:26:32But, and you are correct, certainly in your suggestion, in the Soviet, if we cancel the summit, well,
1:26:41None that we can turn right.
1:26:42Their reaction could be one of two things.
1:26:45It could be, it could present a problem.
1:26:48Their reaction, however, might be to say, well, the God is good.
1:26:52that had been thrown down, some of it was lost, and despite the fact that the President said we would negotiate all the bilateral issues and so forth, they had unleashed their rather massive propaganda efforts abroad and here in this country.
1:27:11So what would happen is that over a period of time, the time that this action would have taken,
1:27:23that the immediate, I'm speaking now of the affected home, the immediate affected home would very substantially erode.
1:27:33It would be favorable, very favorable at the beginning.
1:27:38And then it would erode.
1:27:41And it would erode for a variety of reasons.
1:27:43It would erode because of
1:27:48But, of course, the attack of our enemies, which we must expect, which would be unleashed, would not be off balance no longer.
1:27:57It would erode because the Holy Spirit, you know, peace and so forth, could not be found.
1:28:09And it would erode also because they repeatedly had to anticipate a massive attack
1:28:14in the meeting on the ground about an idea that so-called next to the foreign policy had collapsed.
1:28:23Collapsed because of our insistence on seeing the Vietnam War through a non-negotiable conclusion.
1:28:37That would be the argument that they would make.
1:28:39And we, on our side,
1:28:43But, of course, we argued strangely that what they were doing, as I pointed out last night, that the government put them right in the arms of the Soviet.
1:28:56The Soviet was responsible for this war by raising the supply of arms.
1:29:02Now, let's come to the other point.
1:29:05At the heart of the matter is
1:29:08what effect the cancellation of the summit would have on the Arctic War itself.
1:29:15If the cancellation of the summit very substantially improves the chance for a favorable outcome in Vietnam, that is a decisive factor.
1:29:32If only the cancellation of the summit
1:29:40It has a marginal effect in that respect, and of course the bombing had a marginal effect.
1:29:47I think we have to look at it another way, and that way would be along this line, that if we are looking at a situation here where
1:30:03where over 33 years we have built in a magical way a new foreign host, the China game, the Soviet game.
1:30:11It's a very big game.
1:30:17You and I both know that it's a very difficult operation.
1:30:21The Soviets have been liars and bastards and thugs and so forth and so on.
1:30:27We also know that at the present time we've got some American public events developing along that line.
1:30:39However, if we put it in perspective, I think we haven't realized that
1:30:45If we're looking at the effect, the effect on the Democratic Convention coming up in July, really, the election coming up in November, at the effect on the election, I think, cold-bloodedly, we have to say this.
1:31:06First, the heart of the matter is Vietnam when it comes up.
1:31:12If Vietnam comes out badly, the election is very seriously jeopardized.
1:31:18However, if Vietnam comes out badly, and we also cancel the summit, in other words, if we cancel the summit, it still comes out badly, badly, the election would certainly be down to something which
1:31:38There's so much that needs to be done to hear this military briefing and to realize that our military has let us down.
1:31:52That's just one thing.
1:31:54Foreign policy, military policy, and so forth, it's not going to be done by any successor.
1:32:02But so much for that.
1:32:05Yet, on the other hand, canceling the summit is the only and critical factor which may save the situation in Vietnam, as you know.
1:32:19Because the situation in Vietnam is safe, canceling the summit will look good.
1:32:25I mean, it will arrive well, even though we will, after our first flip upward and then our erosion, we'll come back up again.
1:32:34Now there's one other equation to throw into this.
1:32:45If we see that the South Vietnamese, that the Vietnamese situation is, if our coal-leaded analysis is, and we cannot make that now, I realize that's my guess, I think it's half and half.
1:32:59If we do it better than half, they'll survive.
1:33:03Because I think they're suffering a hell of a lot more than we have any reason to believe.
1:33:11But we shall see.
1:33:12If the South Vietnamese survive, then, I mean, do not survive, then, having a son,
1:33:27even under very difficult circumstances, but having, where we are, you say the at the top of the agenda, having that in mind, in fact.
1:33:36It's not a possibility to put Vietnam at the top of the agenda, but those who consider that very many years.
1:33:40All right.
1:33:41They're there to travel.
1:33:43All right.
1:33:45All right, we're having some.
1:33:52at least as a marginal, as a marginal plus, instead of being a very substantial negative in the long run.
1:34:07That's what we have to face.
1:34:09I'm speaking now as a domestic scientist.
1:34:12So that brings me back to the other option.
1:34:15The other option.
1:34:19is to react as we had originally planned with our two-day strike and see whether the Russians go forward on their use, whether they face the risk that they may spoon to cancer, which they might.
1:34:41The two-day strike thing certainly would have great support in this country.
1:34:48So it would give some encouragement to the South Vietnamese, some pause to the Russians, and some pause to the panel.
1:35:03The argument you made last night is very strong in the effect that, well, it would look like an act of desperation due to the fact that Gouet is being threatened and so forth and so on.
1:35:15Well, maybe so.
1:35:15Maybe the first track looked that way, too.
1:35:18But we all know that in the present time, the public sector will support that kind of a strategy we want to look at.
1:35:27So we have to weigh that in.
1:35:28So it really comes down to this.
1:35:31But it would be really honest to feel that the canceling of the summit could have, could be a decisive factor or even a substantial factor in resolving the situation.
1:35:46On that point, I have great confidence.
1:35:53And if that is true, then the case for it isn't strong as we thought it was last night.
1:36:01As far as the strike in the north is concerned, I have serious doubts whether that will have a great effect on the situation in Vietnam.
1:36:10We all know, we know this, it's a choice of one of two things.
1:36:16Either we hit the north for two days, or we cancel the summit.
1:36:20We have no other option.
1:36:21And hitting the north for two days may cancel the summit.
1:36:24Oh, I understand.
1:36:26And they may cancel it.
1:36:27I understand.
1:36:29And then all the factors you mentioned may be even more telling against you.
1:36:35I mean, every argument that you made on canceling the summit would apply then even more because it would tie Vietnam even more intricately to it, and you wouldn't be able to get your story out there as well.
1:36:52And I think there'd be a slightly better than 50-50 chance that they would cancel the summit.
1:37:02which is why I have moved to the point that we should postpone the summit.
1:37:09Now, nobody can present any of these positions to you with the argument that they will save the situation in South Vietnam, because I can't say that they will.
1:37:20Nothing may.
1:37:22Canceling the summit may not.
1:37:25This may not.
1:37:25But if the situation I'm thinking of, the President is thinking of your position in history,
1:37:33and of the position of the country in the long term.
1:37:35If you go to Moscow without having done anything, it will be a total disaster.
1:37:42We can make it look like we can put on an act, but all the things that will be needed to put on, the Russians will then despise us.
1:37:50We will have lost all credibility.
1:37:52I mean, without any... No, I know, I'm just going up the ladder.
1:37:58I don't know.
1:38:01So that's our question.
1:38:03That I don't see how we can do.
1:38:07And the cranking up all the machinery and the reading them, your dispatches.
1:38:14But even without it, secondly, for the United States, I mean, what the Russians have done systematically since last October is put it to us.
1:38:25And they've said, you can have your summit, and at the same time, we're going to screw you.
1:38:31Now we go there and sign great principles of coexistence.
1:38:38And I think the feeling of uneasiness, I mean, I'm very worried now about Vietnam.
1:38:45The fact is, Russian arms have run us out of Vietnam.
1:38:47And the president goes to Moscow and signs principles of coexistence, gives them credit, and agrees with Indra Skru, one of his allies in the Middle East.
1:38:59Now,
1:39:01You know that I'm in favor of helping up the principles of all negotiations, and the trade is all done in the Middle East, one we can do, and in fact, we're prepared to do that too.
1:39:15So you do all these three things after India, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, and the fact that the fascists have not done one goddamn thing for us ever, then I must say it's objectively a sign of great weakness which will encourage them
1:39:31Your great strength in foreign policy is your toughness, and your great standing abroad is due to the fact that you've gone your way.
1:39:42Now you could say you could go to the summit, go through with it, don't sign these principles, don't give them credits, and don't make a deal on the Middle East.
1:39:51Well, then you will have a pretty icy summit.
1:39:55And to get out of the summit what you want, you have to come back and be able to talk about peace
1:40:02about having made tremendous strides towards peace, and otherwise, words give the Soviets a certificate of good conduct.
1:40:10Now, if we can win in South Vietnam by doing all of this, that would be great.
1:40:15That'd be the best of all the worlds.
1:40:18For that, we can't, unfortunately, no.
1:40:30But if you are in Russia, what are you waiting for?
1:40:38Everything that's in here, there's just no way of making it look good.
1:40:40I just want to be sure you consider all this.
1:40:51I, Mr. President, I, God be that we suffered and
1:40:58anguish to get to this point.
1:41:06So they may give us an answer that enables us to do it.
1:41:10Do you want to give an answer?
1:41:14Oh, yes, I'll give an answer.
1:41:16But they may give us a very threatening answer, because in a way they echo in the tooth.
1:41:21This letter is couched in terms that suggest we're going to attack North Vietnamism.
1:41:25There's no threat to the Soviet summit advanced yet.
1:41:27But they may figure that since that's what we may do, they may preempt us and cancel the summit.
1:41:32Okay.
1:41:33If we cancel the summit, it's then called a massive attraction to North Korea.
1:41:35Yes.
1:41:36That's my right.
1:41:38That would be my view.
1:41:45And we have to go right in this country, and we just have to put it with the past, sir.
1:41:51I know.
1:41:51Now, you realize that when you look to, you know, your political opponents to suppress the rest of the legally deceased and collapse the next foreign policy generation to be... Mr. President, next to you, I have more stake in it than anyone else.
1:42:12I mean, next to you.
1:42:13So, from my own point of view,
1:42:18I would also, I'd like to get more friendly residents, columns, and that sort of stuff.
1:42:23You know, that's nice to have.
1:42:24Residents, sightings, residents.
1:42:26I beg your pardon?
1:42:27Residents, sightings, are all discovering you because they really don't like you.
1:42:31They want to play me against you.
1:42:33They want to isolate you.
1:42:35They realize he's not going to sight us.
1:42:39They're using you.
1:42:40Oh, I started, the only problem is, what's so vicious?
1:42:43I was talking to Bob about this this morning.
1:42:46You go through my press briefings.
1:42:50Never have I as much as hinted.
1:42:55Never have I even expressed an opinion which said Henry Kissinger's thing says.
1:42:59I always say to the president, these bastards are doing this in order to make you the villains.
1:43:08So it's perfectly obvious what the game is.
1:43:12And I mean, when you get Richard Dutman, Keith Lee,
1:43:17All within a 48-hour period.
1:43:19I think state is suing them, Mr. President, for the first time by attacking me cleverly.
1:43:31Attacking me by making the impression that it's separating me from you.
1:43:39in which case I'm no longer an authentic spokesman of the administration.
1:43:46I know it came out of state.
1:43:48There was all this ceasefire talk.
1:43:50I mean, for example, I think Rogers himself has been talking to Gertzman not about this, but for example, last week there was a long article in the New York Times by Gertzman of what I allegedly did in Moscow.
1:44:05Now, I don't even know Gertzman.
1:44:10No one on my staff talked to Goodman, but that had a telling article.
1:44:15It said, Kittinger came to Moscow because suddenly a letter arrived from Brezhnev asking that he be put on the next plane.
1:44:24Now there's only one man in town who's ever been told this.
1:44:28We told him that as well.
1:44:31Exactly.
1:44:31So that was a dead-giver letter.
1:44:33Haig spotted that, and I hadn't spotted that.
1:44:37You see, any one of my staff that's done it, my staff doesn't leave, but assuming my staff, there are only two people that have done it, my staff or us.
1:44:47My staff couldn't do it because they knew this wasn't historic.
1:44:53So this had to come from Rogers.
1:44:55So then you had all these cease-fires.
1:44:56Then they suddenly said, Kissinger's May 31st plan is going to get accepted.
1:45:00Murray Mathers came up with that.
1:45:01Yeah, I saw that.
1:45:02And so you had all...
1:45:03I think Rogers had the muscle to set up.
1:45:06When I told him Sunday morning, we were going to meet in the press, he said, I don't know what to say about the May 31st plan.
1:45:10I don't know what the hell he was talking about.
1:45:16What do you mean?
1:45:20And you see, another music thing, because the May 31st plan, for a while he was accusing me also of selling out the country.
1:45:29That was, was the first.
1:45:31And he said that had too many discrepancies, and how was he going to explain it?
1:45:36Well now, you see, nobody even remembers the May 31st plan.
1:45:39I have never even mentioned it.
1:45:43And it's a minor deal, it's a minor thing, so these guys are now, it's really,
1:45:50It's a very interesting study for me to see how the expanse is answering.
1:45:57Because I haven't been talking to anybody.
1:46:00I saw that Saidi article.
1:46:01I didn't talk to Saidi.
1:46:03I talked to Schechter.
1:46:05But Schechter apparently gave this stuff to Saidi.
1:46:10I think that getting to time is much more important than life.
1:46:14Getting to Roger, however, that whole bet on Doug and all that punch, that had to be breathing that space.
1:46:30I don't know if you think Roger did it himself.
1:46:33That he didn't do, but the Goodman stuff.
1:46:35Who do you think did it himself?
1:46:50But that did not happen, I don't know what Bob did, but this could not have happened by accident.
1:46:57Because the only contact I had with the press last week was the briefing before your speech, which was totally innocuous and totally in line with your speech.
1:47:12The United States is not giving credit to the U.N. How do you get him out of our hair?
1:47:20Everything depends on how this comes out now.
1:47:24He's not going to be in a safe environment after this.
1:47:32But it's a tawdry performance.
1:47:35I think it's a possibility to do the two-day straddle and go forward with the monster trip.
1:47:40I don't exclude that as a possibility.
1:47:45That's the other, the only thing I think we ought to consider.
1:47:47I just want to consider it well, and frankly, if they cancel the summit, then we'll say, so be it.
1:47:53We'll continue to try.
1:47:55Well, that puts you into a weaker position.
1:47:57A weaker, I agree, I agree.
1:47:58It's better for you to postpone the summit and say that that's always approved.
1:48:01I've been saying that all along now.
1:48:06And, uh...
1:48:10So, uh...
1:48:16Well, we've got it all in mind.
1:48:18Now, can I suggest that with regard to the thing tomorrow, I haven't had anyone present a speech yet because I wanted to make sure you didn't want to do it.
1:48:28Well, I think it should be prepared in terms of the options.
1:48:33So I can go either way.
1:48:36And as you said, the situation is developing very fast.
1:48:40And you know, with your two-conclusion idea,
1:48:44Could you do that?
1:48:44Yeah, but I don't think you should go on television and be abounding about it.
1:48:50I mean, I designed to have the speech there in case, so that I can make that decision at the latest possible time.
1:48:56Done.
1:48:56I don't want to make it today.
1:48:58No, you don't have to.
1:48:59See?
1:48:59But I have to have a speech during preparation on the way, and so you might say that I'm going to go on just to make up a speech in Russian perfectly, do you know what I mean?
1:49:08And so forth and so on.
1:49:09You see my point?
1:49:11Done.
1:49:11Some remarks.
1:49:14Could you make it up so that it doesn't, yeah?
1:49:18Lord, Lord.
1:49:19You can trust my people.
1:49:20They won't believe you haven't.
1:49:21Lord, that's fine.
1:49:22Oh, I'm not concerned about that.
1:49:24As long as I'm good, it's all good.
1:49:25Just let the Lord go on it.
1:49:27Will you let the Lord go on it?
1:49:29I get Lord, and the Son of God is good at this.
1:49:31The Son of God, too.
1:49:32I said, Lord, the Son of God.
1:49:33Let them get up here after a bit.
1:49:36Along the lines you talked about last night.
1:49:39Fair enough.
1:49:40And on view of this, you could just say that, and I would be, I'd say, look, one option that you're presenting to the president is canceling the Senate, and therefore you want a speech.
1:49:53Just tell him.
1:49:55Good?
1:49:56Good.
1:49:58Bye.
1:49:59With regard to what we do tomorrow, what's tomorrow?
1:50:05Oh, in that, yeah, yeah.
1:50:07Putting that in this context, I would prefer if you could work it out.
1:50:12I don't think that's a big enough deal, a big enough deal to, you know, rather to go for the walkout.
1:50:27In other words, if we're going to borrow land trouble, I'd rather do it on a Monday or as a result of a strike.
1:50:33And do it then, rather than tomorrow, twice.
1:50:37You see what I mean?
1:50:39Now, if you could find a way where he could, you, I think you were approaching here the other day, where he simply says, you haven't presented anything, and I'm not coming to another meeting until you do, or, you know what I mean, but where he does not.
1:50:52There are three ways.
1:50:53There will be three choices he has.
1:50:55One is to accept the meeting for the following week.
1:50:58The second is to say he cannot accept it.
1:51:00He left it.
1:51:01No, he has not accepted it.
1:51:03He will reserve the decision.
1:51:07He will let them know truly is not this.
1:51:11And then come or not come.
1:51:12And the third is to say, I will not come until you have something new to say.
1:51:18Well, if I could suggest, I think the second, while it is a soft response, a softer response to Russian third, is nevertheless quite an honest response to the enemy.
1:51:33I don't know if we can do it.
1:51:35The basic strategic decision we have to make as a president is this, because we face it all along.
1:51:42Well, what I meant is the walking out of the thing poses a negotiating track, period, with the Mainz people.
1:51:55If our decisions, because we go ahead and bomb,
1:52:00I think I would just as soon let them go to the negotiating track.
1:52:03You see the point?
1:52:06Well, what will happen is if they get a fix in the parish, once they catch on to the fact that you feel as you do, or if they think you feel as you do, that you're afraid to leave the table, then the next thing is going to be that they'll start operating on the party.
1:52:24And then, before you know it, they will have walked out saying,
1:52:29And they'll have you in the charging position saying they won't talk now until the time is set.
1:52:34All right.
1:52:36And how can you state the third position in a way that leaves the district correct?
1:52:42That's what perhaps I see all those points.
1:52:46Well, we may not have a real choice.
1:52:48If they make a proposal tomorrow, as I'm inclined to believe, they will because they don't want to keep you from farming.
1:52:55And I think they're going to make publicly the proposal tomorrow that they made to me privately, yes.
1:53:01If they do, maybe we have to walk out.
1:53:05Well... Or do you?
1:53:06Maybe not.
1:53:07You can't.
1:53:10Then...
1:53:13It's a hell of a thing to say we're studying the proposal to overthrow... No, no, no, no, no, no.
1:53:18We reject this proposal.
1:53:21But what we can say is we reject this proposal.
1:53:25We will consider whether there are elements in it that reject the replacement of Pugh altogether.
1:53:33And we will be in touch with you through the Israel office if there's any sense in another meeting.
1:53:40Uh or what would you or how else would you handle?
1:53:42You just say this is this is such a this post was so painfully unacceptable on the space that we rejected and we're not going to come to another meeting until we'll uh until uh our authority as an officers we find that you have something else to offer.
1:53:57Maybe that's why you got something else to offer.
1:54:00That's uh we're we're we'll be glad to have another meeting but not on these terms.
1:54:07You might say we consider this proposal an ultimatum, you know what I mean, or a... Well, what he can do... Just get the language carefully done, that's all so that we can...
1:54:20He can go through the whole ritual.
1:54:22See, I think that, painful as it is, Mr. President, see, as far as the doves are concerned, you're down the tube anyway.
1:54:30There is nothing you can do to point them happy, or even play with them.
1:54:37And as you know, I have been desperately trying to keep the summit alive, even when you had more severe doubts than I did, for precisely the reasons you're advancing here.
1:54:48Because I saw the great political and strategic advantage of keeping your opponents confused, of preventing a full-scale onslaught.
1:54:58I was not dying to get this attack on Hanoi and Haiphong, as you know, and you sent me many cables on that subject and talked to him about it.
1:55:10Again, for precisely...
1:55:13That reason, and I tell you candidly, if they had come with anything at all yesterday, I would have urged you to play it through the summit.
1:55:22Right.
1:55:23But they haven't come.
1:55:24And that would have been my recommendation to you.
1:55:27So I'm not...
1:55:29When will we get the message back?
1:55:31Let me put it this way.
1:55:33The immediate decision is now in the Thursday meeting.
1:55:36So I think you'll get a message back within 48 hours.
1:55:41Well, then...
1:55:43You see, my point is... You won't get a message back in time for the Thursday meeting.
1:55:48I just would like the right, the Thursday meeting, let me say, you go ahead and give me some instructions, except that I feel that I should be written in such a way that there's a tiny correction, you know, that we're ready to discuss or something like that, so that it doesn't appear that we're, you see my point, not discuss that proposal, but whenever they've got another... Well, we can make them go through the whole interview.
1:56:12Are they prepared to discuss ending the offensives?
1:56:16Are they prepared to discuss mutual de-escalation?
1:56:19Are they prepared to discuss circumstances in which a ceasefire could, you know, we know they will be rejected.
1:56:25Are they prepared to discuss Christmas and withdrawal issues?
1:56:29And it will turn out they'll say no to all of them.
1:56:31They say no to all of them.
1:56:33Then we can say, well, I see no reason for another meeting next week until you're prepared to discuss some of these proposals.
1:56:41And whenever you are, we'll get together again.
1:56:43That's all right.
1:56:44Can you do it that way?
1:56:46Sure.
1:56:46That's all that I had to say.
1:56:48I would put it in a position where we're ready to have discussions if they come up with a totally unacceptable proposal.
1:56:55Fair enough.
1:56:57If indeed they come up with a proposal.
1:56:59And if they don't come up with a proposal, then they should go through the ritual anyway.
1:57:03And then say, well, under the circumstances, you have nothing to offer here.
1:57:09You see, what they may well come up with, and what I think they will come up with, is that you have to go, that the concentration camps have to be open, that freedom of the press has to be allowed.
1:57:19All of this sounds great to the New York Times.
1:57:21Oh, it is.
1:57:22The practical consequence of it, though, is that the Sargon thing will come apart.
1:57:28He rejects that totally.
1:57:30And...
1:57:33I'm asked between whether we postpone the summit or do the two-day strike.
1:57:40Well, can we, I mean, just ask if we haven't got 24 hours to think about that.
1:57:45Oh, yes, we have more than that.
1:57:47No, not much.
1:57:48Oh, yes, yes, we'll put the two-day strike off until Saturday.
1:57:51I don't think, I have never had the sense of urgency about the two-day strike that others have had because Hanoi and Haiphong aren't going to go away.
1:58:01You'll
1:58:03In other words, we shouldn't do it over the weekend anyway.
1:58:07Well, I think we should do it fairly soon if we're going to do it.
1:58:13There's something to be said for not doing it on Saturday so that it doesn't catch the weekly news magazine.
1:58:23Ah, but we can do it Sunday.
1:58:26Sunday is Monday.
1:58:32Why don't you analyze for me what you think of it so that I get to just take a minute as to what you think we've gone through in the summit and what the two-day strike thing does.
1:58:43First, I don't need to go in.
1:58:44I know the risks of the Soviet passing the summit.
1:58:49Fine.
1:58:49Let's get that out of the way.
1:58:51What does it do in terms of the war?
1:58:52It has some benefits.
1:58:53Well, the two-day strike has a number of military benefits.
1:58:56They're not in themselves decisive, but when a country is stretched as thin as they are now,
1:59:02anything that impedes.
1:59:03I mean, they have, for example, changed the whole pattern of unloading gasoline in Haiphong as a result of the other strikes.
1:59:13Secondly, it tells Hanoi that you may just go crazy, press too hard.
1:59:20Thirdly, it really puts it to the Russians in the sense that you are saying, all right, you can't do the summit if you want to, and leave the choice up to them.
1:59:29Now, there's a certain
1:59:31And so, in other words, you should think the decision of canceling the summit to them, which isn't easy for them.
1:59:40We have an intercept of a passionate conversation with Gus Hall, which he praises to Hall and my visit very much, and in fact gives him a pretty objective account of, but repeats how eager they are for the summit, that they are under a lot of pressure from other communist parties to cancel it.
1:59:59A little longer, closer to your arrival in Moscow, you do the two-day strike, the tougher it is for them.
2:00:08And you see, the thing that worries me so much about the visit is for you to give them credits while they're trucks and guns.
2:00:19But if you don't give them credit, they're going to be very cool.
2:00:24And to sign these common principles.
2:00:42God, you know, it's a tragedy.
2:00:45We had a tremendous breakthrough all along the front.
2:00:48We've worked three years to get it.
2:00:50And next to you, I'm the one most reluctant to give it up.
2:00:55And give us a month of relative peace and quiet.
2:01:04But... Would you work?
2:01:09Yeah.
2:01:11No question.
2:01:13I will compare, and for a week after, it's two weeks after the procedure.
2:01:20And also, with common, you have to realize the end of the sun comes at a time, providing it's out at a time where others can be escalated, whether or not other factors.
2:01:37Well, can we take our 24 hours now?
2:01:41We can, but we don't have to make a decision.
2:01:43I want you to go forward, though, if you will, on things.
2:01:47Now, it is following up and seeing if we get more tanks and more guns.
2:01:53Yes, and we're moving 72 more planes out there.
2:01:56More planes, good.
2:01:57It turns out it isn't too effective to put more B-52s out because...
2:02:00But I repeat how eager they are for the summit, that they are under a lot of pressure from other communist parties to cancel it.
2:02:07A little longer, closer to your drive in Moscow, you do the two-day strike, the tougher it is for them.
2:02:18But you see, the thing that worries me so much about the visit is
2:02:22for you to give them credits while they're trucks and guns.
2:02:26But if you don't give them credits, they're going to do very good.
2:02:31And to sign these common principles.
2:02:50God, you know, it's a tragedy.
2:02:53We had a tremendous breakthrough all along the front.
2:02:56We've worked three years to get it.
2:02:58And next to you, I'm the one most reluctant to give it up.
2:03:03And to give us a month of relative peace and quiet.
2:03:11But...
2:03:12Which it worked.
2:03:16Yeah, literally.
2:03:17No question.
2:03:22I will prepare, and for a week afterwards, two weeks afterwards.
2:03:28And also, with calm, you have to realize the end of the sun comes at a time.
2:03:33Providing it's out at a time where others could be escalating.
2:03:35I mean, weather and a lot of other factors.
2:03:45Well, can we take our 24 hours now?
2:03:48But we can and we don't have to make a decision.
2:03:50I want you to go forward, though, if you will, on things.
2:03:55It is following up and seeing if we get more tanks and more guns.
2:04:01Yes, and we're moving 72 more planes out there.
2:04:04More planes, good.
2:04:04It turns out it isn't too effective to put more B-52s out because two F-4s can carry as much as one of these B-52s.
2:04:12So we're moving 72 more F-4s out there.
2:04:21The other thing is that if you could, and you prepared the quarter message, I very kindly, just so the quarter message leaves,
2:04:40I mean, they could tell, but if you have the options, but be sure it goes through the ritual.
2:04:45Would you have even the thing you did there with that, but these aren't supposed to affect you.
2:04:48If you think you're going to get those same answers, well, how come?
2:04:53And have the speech begin, right?
2:04:56Have them go forward with the speech.
2:04:58I canceled it.
2:04:59I totally canceled that Saturday and Sunday.
2:05:03So I got today, Saturday and Sunday, for thinking purposes.
2:05:08You do?
2:05:10No, I have a job coming in in five minutes who wants to meet with me for going to Japan the weekend after this.
2:05:20Fine.
2:05:20I really don't see how I can help, help, help.
2:05:23You just say that to the view of the situation here, you can't go.
2:05:27And the other thing they have in mind is this, which we have here, perspective of this time.
2:05:54The other side has some problems, which we hope to make worse.
2:06:04And without being polyamorous, if we have to go right, we will go right.
2:06:09And frankly, I will do it knowing that we'll probably lose the election.
2:06:13But frankly, to hell with it.
2:06:15The main thing is we've got to do,
2:06:22See, the thing on the Ohio president can't go down with this kind of soap.
2:07:49We have to balance it, though.
2:07:51We have to listen to the lead.
2:07:53We have to consider what we're doing.
2:07:55But I think also, essentially, I'm going to bounce it off.
2:08:00And you see, I hit it pretty coldly.
2:08:03I think if there are ways we could do it both, we should.
2:08:06And if there isn't, I hope that the best situation would be to some end, and some lead down.
2:08:09That is why the bombings in the north may be a risk worth taking.
2:08:18Unless they cancel the second time.
2:08:19And then we get possibly they cancel them.
2:08:21All right.
2:08:22So they cancel them.
2:08:23Maybe that's not too bad either.
2:08:25So you expected that?
2:08:29I sort of expect that now, yeah.
2:08:33But let's see what happens if they come up with it.
2:08:37We'll see.
2:08:37And they call for a ceasefire.
2:08:41Well, what do we say then?
2:08:43No.
2:08:43No, I forget the means.
2:08:45You want to agree to that, don't we?
2:08:47Yeah.
2:09:02You see, these principles and trade in the Middle East from a strong president would be great.
2:09:10China was great because no one questioned that you were tough and strong.
2:09:15But you weren't getting around to be a man at that time.
2:09:19And not by Chinese equipment.
2:09:21Yeah.
2:09:21The other thing I was going to say, look, I haven't argued this goal to be 1,000%.
2:09:26I'm just trying to think of, I'm trying to think of this, I'm trying to think also, and really, really the argument that is made that falls and that the canceling of the sun in and of itself would be a good thing.
2:09:45So basically, what we have to realize, if we can't run out of Vietnam, we're down to two spaces.
2:09:56You understand?
2:09:57A chance to save it if we have the summit.
2:10:01A little bit of a margin, but it's so marginal it's making it.
2:10:04But my point is, though, that with the summit,
2:10:10the summit, if it has any effect on keeping us from getting rid of Vietnam, which I kind of don't think it really has.
2:10:21But I think the main one you're really getting to is the summit in and of itself, and obviously that I am, in view of the situation in Vietnam.
2:10:30That may be it.
2:10:31That's the point.
2:10:33That's the thing that's worried me.
2:10:34Like I said, tipping the glasses and all that sort of thing.
2:10:36At this point, Russian tanks are there.
2:10:39It's not a strong sign.
2:10:44Tipping the glasses.
2:10:44I look at this hall and all this.
2:10:49A lot of Russian tanks are running around in Vietnam.
2:10:53Well, let's say, let's say a minute before your job is turned around, just send this in.
2:10:56So, if the scenario goes like this, we cancel a sign.
2:11:01And then, in review, we do this on and on and on.
2:11:03Oh, you said they do it anyway.
2:11:07Right.
2:11:09And then, two syllables, and what happens?
2:11:15Well, just one of those things.
2:11:23Well, then, you see, take it the other way.
2:11:27Supposing you're Bolsonaro and I find they can't do this.
2:11:31And then at least you've maintained your plan.
2:11:33You just keep going anti-communist and accuse your opponents of first having screwed up the peace talks.
2:11:41Yeah, I have said that in motion with the leader today.
2:11:45I said that the responsibility... And saying they made it inevitable that the thing collapse.
2:11:51And...
2:11:52Now they want to sell out the direction.
2:11:54Maybe you'd probably lose.
2:11:55You may well lose the election then.
2:11:59Why not?
2:11:59But you might not.
2:12:01Well, I just think we have to see what we're up to.
2:12:05So you get back to Vietnam again, don't you?
2:12:11Could I ask one other thing?
2:12:17The situation in the South.
2:12:20Generally speaking, there is not a very substantial opposition that you would all be under something.
2:12:26Not yet.
2:12:28Or is it something about big men?
2:12:31Oh yes, big men is trying to organize, get itself into a reserved position.
2:12:37And they'll all begin to do it as the situation gets worse.
2:12:39Is that presented to us well?
2:12:46Well, I consider, I tell you, if they had made any sort of proposition yesterday, I don't, I consider it too expendable.
2:12:53Thank you.
2:12:57That isn't the problem.
2:12:58No, but I think the worst is to not just replace him and they want to impose conditions that would lead to a communist government.
2:13:11And that's, again, their plan.
2:13:18Can I ask this question on the timing of the cancellations?
2:13:28Is it worth considering to have him do this, then have the bombing go forward?
2:13:36Well, not have the bombing go forward.
2:13:40I mean, have him discontinue to fight the battle in the South, or at the very best,
2:13:47And that was some cancellation at the end of the next week rather than the beginning.
2:13:52Just think about it.
2:13:53What's the advantage of that?
2:13:54The advantage of it gives us more time to assess whether Vietnam might survive.
2:14:00Maybe we won't know any more then than now.
2:14:05You see my point?
2:14:08I am greatly affected by that if we have some feelings.
2:14:11The other problem, though, is supposing the way has fallen by the end of next week.
2:14:16Then it will look like a petulant reaction to a defeat.
2:14:19I think it's going to look that way anyway.
2:14:22I mean, they play the defeat part so heavily, and I don't think we can have any illusions about the petulant reaction to the defeat.
2:14:30So the fall of Rey, I don't think it's going to make that much sense.
2:14:41Would you not agree?
2:14:44I think, you know, it doesn't have to be Monday.
2:14:46It can be Tuesday.
2:14:48I think if we're going to cancel it, we'd better do it early rather than late.
2:14:53And we won't know how long.
2:14:54Well, that's the answer.
2:14:56We won't know how long.
2:14:58We know we'll lose Kuntu.
2:15:02See, supposing it gets all unstuck, I don't see how you can go to Russia then, in my view.
2:15:08I couldn't agree more.
2:15:09But, you know, the other argument is you could use it to divert attention from the disease.
2:15:14If you go to Russia then, what the hell can you agree on at some point?
2:15:21You can't agree to get your credits, you can't agree to... See, the whole idea, you see, of agreeing, of having you sign,
2:15:32health agreements, science agreements, what do they want of the summit?
2:15:35They want to show that you and Brezhnev are ordering the world.
2:15:41And when you do it as equals, it's risky enough because it's going to hurt us enormously in Europe.
2:15:46It's going to hurt us with the Chinese.
2:15:49It's a risk worth taking on the assumption that you can recover from it in the next election, after the next election.
2:15:56By turning hard.
2:15:57By turning hard.
2:15:59And that's how I've justified it.
2:16:00But basically, Shakespeare isn't wrong in his assessment of what this detente is doing to our allies.
2:16:07Now, if a strong president does it, somebody to whom you can say, look how you stood in all the crises, but it's somebody who's been humiliated or at least been challenged in South Asia by the Russians.
2:16:22And then the most vital area where we have 50,000, I mean, vital from the point of view of our national center, it is not about strategic interest.
2:16:32And he still does it.
2:16:36That's something, I think, Mr. President, that's going to be hard to recover from.
2:16:40And who is then going to be left to respect you?
2:16:43I mean, I shouldn't talk this way, but I mean, the hogs, the doves,
2:16:53uh a strong president the reason you've got a real real hard question that's good to talk about in this way real hard question is that what i'm getting at is really isn't about vietnam because of the word we have to realize it's about what you said at the end it's about the president that's right the real why here is that
2:17:17is that the canceling of the summit or the buying, neither may prove to have too much of an effect on the outcome in Vietnam.
2:17:26So scrub both of those things.
2:17:28The real reason we have to cancel the summit, if we do cancel the summit, is that we cannot go to the summit while Russia and Jackson guns are kicking the shit out of us in Vietnam.
2:17:42But we cannot make an agreement with people that are doing that.
2:17:45So we don't meet with a bunch of outlaws.
2:17:47It's like going to Rockefeller or going to the person you're going to ask to meet with those God-dead people.
2:17:52Right?
2:17:53That's my sense, Mr. President.
2:17:55But great reluctance and knowing how we may get a turn in the situation and we may get an answer from President that we can live with.
2:18:08I doubt it.
2:18:09Well, our answer, our decision on the speech and so forth should be made, it seems to me.
2:18:16You don't have to make it before Friday or Saturday.
2:18:20Let's get the speech ready.
2:18:21I'll get the speech done.
2:18:22I need to get the speech ready, and I'll work on it.
2:18:25And I should make a decision as to whether to give it or not Monday.
2:18:28And it'll be either Monday night or Tuesday night.
2:18:31And have in mind the fact that, and then we can have the stranglehold, in the case of don't make the speech, we can have the stranglehold Tuesday or Wednesday or Thursday of next week.
2:18:42That's it.
2:18:43I think in any event that we should.
2:18:48Tell Abrams to see this because it's just at the other point that he can have these assets.
2:18:53Sir, don't worry about this.
2:18:54Abrams, I'll talk to Morta.
2:18:57We can wait with that until tomorrow morning.
2:18:59He hasn't got his execute over there.
2:19:00Okay.
2:19:01What I'm getting at is this.
2:19:04I don't think we should get over the weekend.
2:19:06That's fine.
2:19:07Let's make a final decision with regard to answering this on a brief Monday.
2:19:12I want the speech, or I haven't prepared the speech, because getting the speech and writing it will help me get my own thinking in the right time of day.

Nixon, Kissinger & Sanchez on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

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Also recorded on May 3, 1972

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