Conversation: 718-009
Prev:  718-008 Next: 718-010Start Date: 3-May-1972 10:59 AM
End Date: 3-May-1972 12:11 PM
Participants:
Nixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Sanchez, Manolo; Recording Device: Oval Office
Full Tape Conversation Start Time: 01:07:23
Full Tape Conversation End Time: 02:19:19
NARA Description:
On May 3, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:59 am to 12:11 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 718-009 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid:
Conversation No. 718-9 Date: May 3, 1972 Time: 10:59 am - 12:11 pm Location: Oval Office The President met with Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger's meeting Vietnam -North Vietnamese offensive -Briefing on targets -Melvin R. Laird's opinion -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer -[David] Kenneth Rush Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 10:59 am. Food order Sanchez left at an unknown time before 12:11 pm Vietnam -North Vietnamese offensive -Targets -President's briefing -Moorer -Laird -The President’s view -Rush -Value -Compared with Laird Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] 15 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. Dec-01) Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.) -Briefing -Role of Laird and William P. Rogers -Rush's position -Information released -Submarines -Freeze -Amount of detail -Rogers's intentions -Reasons -Cabinet -Role in talks Vietnam -South Vietnam -Resupply mission -Announcement -Photographs of Soviet equipment -Paris peace negotiations -Possibilities -Accept another meeting -Walkout -Postponement -Kissinger’s view -North Vietnamese offers -US response -Contents -Nguyen Van Thieu -Prisoners -Public sessions -Thieu -Kissinger's prediction -North Vietnam's options -North Vietnam's goals -North Vietnam proposals -US reactions -Private meetings -Le Duc Tho -Kissinger's view -Bombing -Importance -US attitude 16 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. Dec-01) Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.) -Soviet interpretation -North Vietnamese offensive -Negotiations -Plenary sessions -William J. Porter -Thieu's interpretation -Plenary sessions -President's options -Laird's advice -Thieu SALT -Rush -View of Rogers and Laird -Work with Rogers -Berlin -People's Republic Of China [PRC] communiqué -News stories -Rogers's role -Objections -Rogers -Gerard C. Smith -Support -Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] -Secretary of Defense -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] Director -Objections -Rogers -News stories -Rogers's complaints -Credit for agreement Vietnam -President's policies -Credit -North Vietnamese offensive -Paris peace negotiations -Walkout -The President’s view -Kissinger's trip to Moscow -Porter and plenary session 17 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. Dec-01) Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.) -Editorial comment Washington Star -President's evaluation -Possible walkout -Soviet interpretation -North Vietnam's interpretation -US public opinion -Support for walkout -Criticism -Senate Democratic caucus -Position -Robert C. Byrd -Michael J. Mansfield Resolution -George D. Aiken -J. William Fulbright proposal -Aiken’s view Soviet Summit -Cancellation -US public opinion -Impact of walkout on Vietnam negotiations -President's approach -Possible options -Impact on Thieu -Impact on Hanoi -Impact on Soviets -Initial impact -Columnists -Senators and Congressmen -Concerns -Suspicions -Soviet response -Further negotiations -Impact of propaganda on public opinion in US and abroad -Erosion over time -Reasons -Media attacks on President's foreign policy -Soviet responsibility -Impact on war's outcome -Relation to new foreign policy -PRC 18 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. Dec-01) Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.) -Soviet Union -The President’s view -Effects -US public opinion -Forthcoming Democratic convention -Forthcoming election Vietnam War -Impact on forthcoming election -Impact on war's outcome -Importance -Alexander M. Haig, Jr. -Military failure -Military-foreign policy of successor -Soviet Summit -Possible effects of cancellation on South Vietnam -President’s evaluation -Place on summit agenda -Domestic impact -US options -Military action -Effect on Soviet Summit -US public support -Effect on Soviet Union -Effect on South Vietnam -Effect on Soviet Union -Effect on North Vietnam -Perception -Hue -Importance -Military action -Effects President's choices -Cancellation of Summit compared with military action -Risks -Impact on war's outcome -Kissinger's assessment -Effects of cancellation -Vietnam War -Presidency 19 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. Dec-01) Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.) -President's place in history -US role in the world -President's trip to Moscow -Risks -US credibility with Soviet Union -Allies' perception of US -Soviet supplies to Vietnam -Principles of coexistence -Trade -Middle East -India-Pakistan War -Southeast Asia -Perception of President's policies -Relationship to Vietnam War -Peace -Military victory -Military defeat -Hue -A letter -Possible Soviet responses -Content -Responses -Cancellation of Summit -Further military action Press relations -Response of liberals and press -Impact on President and Kissinger -Column by Hugh S. Sidey and James B. (“Scotty”) Reston -William P. Rogers -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman -Kissinger's press briefings -Portrayal by press -Reasons -Press -Richard [Surname unknown] -[Unknown person] -Attacks by State Department -Rogers -Bernard Gwertzman -New York Times article by Gwertzman 20 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. Dec-01) Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.) -Sources -Rogers -Haig -Rogers -Content -Murray Marder article -Rogers -May 31, 1971 plan -Kissinger's press contact -Sidey -Jerrold L. Schecter -State Department press contact -Time poll -New York Times article by Gwertzman -Richard F. Pedersen -Robert J. McCloskey -Kissinger's press contact -Haldeman's views -Pedersen -Position at United Nations [UN] Vietnam -Military action -Effect on Summit -Possible cancellation -President's speech -Preparation -Conclusions -President's options -Bombing Hanoi -Kissinger draft -Winston Lord -John K. Andrews, Jr. -Helmut Sonnenfeldt -President's options -Paris negotiations -Walkout -Timing -Choices for US -North Vietnamese offensive -President's response 21 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. Dec-01) Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.) -Walkout -North Vietnamese response -Lyndon B. Johnson -North Vietnamese proposals -Contents -US rejection -US counterproposal -US response -Language -Benefit of continuing negotiations -Thieu -Effect on further military action -Effect on Soviet Summit -May 4, 1972 meeting -Issues -Offensive -Ceasefire -Prisoners of war [POWs] -Expected response -Thieu -Press freedom -New York Times -Military action -Urgency -Timing -News coverage -Soviet response -Impact on Summit -Military benefits -Signal to Hanoi -Message to Soviets -Leonid I. Brezhnev's conversation with Gus Hall -Possible cancellation of Summit -President's visit to Moscow -Timing with North Vietnamese offensive -SALT agreement -Common principles -Possible signature -Possible cancellation -North Vietnamese offensive -Weather 22 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. Dec-01) Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.) -Resupply of South Vietnam -Haig -Tanks -Planes -B-52s -F-4s -Message for Porter -Wording -Le Duc Tho -President’s speech -Wording -President’s schedule -Kissinger's forthcoming trip to Japan -President’s summary -Forthcoming election -Need to avert defeat by Soviets ***************************************************************** BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3 [Personal returnable] [Duration: 1m 15s ] END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3 ***************************************************************** Soviet Summit -Risks of military action in Vietnam -Ceasefire possibility -Possible US response -North Vietnam -Hue President's foreign policy -Negotiating principles -Trade, Middle East -PRC -Vietnam 23 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. Dec-01) Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.) Soviet Summit -Danger of attending during North Vietnamese offensive -Appearance of US weakness -US cancellation -Consequences for Vietnam -Thieu's defeat -The President’s view -Effect of US military action -Soviet cancellation of Summit -Effect on peace talks -The President’s meeting with Congressional leaders -Effect on forthcoming election South Vietnam -Thieu -Opposition -Duong Van Minh's position -Moorer -US relations with Thieu -Expendability -North Vietnamese conditions Soviet Summit -Cancellation and military action -Timing -Advantages -Disadvantages -Relationship to military activities -Hue -Kontum -Agreements with Soviets -Benefits -Health, science -Brezhnev -Risks -Europe, PRC -Value -Forthcoming elections -Response of allies -Frank J. Shakespeare's assessment of détente 24 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF Tape Subject Log (rev. Dec-01) Conv. No. 718-9 (cont.) -Effect on President's prestige -Link to Southeast Asia -Importance of area -Respect for President -Cancellation -Reasons -Danger of attending during North Vietnamese offensive -Nelson A. Rockfeller and Attica prison comparison President's forthcoming speech -Decision -Timing -Draft of speech -Time of delivery -Air strikes -Arrangement with Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. and Moorer -Timing of possible Summit cancellation -Draft of speech -Effect on President's thinking -Preparation -Expected effects of speech -Military action -Timing -Summit -Cancellation -Effect on military action -Preparation of draft -Timing of decision Kissinger left at 12:11 pm.