Nixon, Kissinger & Sanchez on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

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It's getting on fire.

I spent a little time and I told Lance there wasn't going to be a briefing.

He said that's because the targets aren't any good anyway.

I went over the targets with him and with Mora and Raj.

They're the best they are.

I'm going to knock out all their airlines out of Honolulu.

Their airlines.

I've got the targets ready.

The targets are okay.

You should get the briefing at some point just to...

But the way to do it is to bring Mota in for you after the Vlasak meeting and just let him know.

Yeah, I'm not going to deal with Laird.

I'm tired of having Laird come in with him all the time.

He screws things up.

I don't know, you know, you bring him in and maybe wind him up.

Russia does what we need to do.

Without him, he'd be dead.

Does Laird know that we rely on Russia?

Yeah.

Russia's story is so clever.

Well, it's an unbelievable situation.

I mean, this combination of Laird and Rogers, I mean, this briefing, and Rush is beside himself about this Rogers briefing on the plane.

Is it all unsolved?

Unsolved.

Oh, what did he say?

Well, he said it's an outrage he's had through all the meetings.

First of all, it puts out something which isn't true so that it puts a monkey on our back if we agreed to more submarines for them.

Secondly, if we had wanted to put out that much, we could have put it out.

We deliberately stayed away from the details.

So we were.

Yeah, his story indicated that they were going to freeze the number of submarines at their present levels.

Which is totally untrue.

Well, of course, we were able to do that.

I mean, that'd be nice, but it can't be done.

What's he trying to do, torpedo the whole thing?

He's trying to do one of two things.

He's trying to get credit himself for having thought it out.

Secondly, he's trying to stick you with anything less favorable than what he's put out.

And seriously, he's trying to torpedo it since he didn't do it.

But it's this whole atmosphere where the cabinet people, when it's good news, they try to take it away from you.

When it's bad news, they try to shove it in you.

Defense is announcing that mission for resupply of South Vietnam at 11 today.

And while they're there, they're going to show some of those pictures of Soviet equipment.

I think we might as well put the heat on the Soviets a little bit.

Now, on the Paris talks, I've raised that we have three possibilities.

One is just to accept the meeting for next week.

The second is to walk out.

The third is to reserve and to say we'll let the North go, at least not Leah's office, and it will be there next week.

I think if they offer nothing at all tomorrow, we should walk out.

There is a good possibility, though.

They had a piece of paper there yesterday, and then they decided not to give it to me.

My impression is they're going to surface something on Thursday to keep us from just walking out.

And I think what they're going to surface is what they, in effect, told me, that you have to go, the others can stay, but have to adopt certain policies like releasing all the communists from prison, committing every newspaper, which would have the practical consequences of smashing the non-communists.

If he does that, then it's hard to walk out.

Then he should say he'll study it and he'll reserve.

Well, he can say he'll study replacing tubes, if it's the point, in a public session.

But that's what I think they're going to do.

It's a pretty hard prediction, isn't it?

Well, that's what I would predict they're going to do.

It's a hard prediction.

Well, they have two choices.

One choice is they clearly want to deprive... One of their strategies, whenever they're trying to crank up pressure on you, is to deprive you of any impression, of creating any impression that progress is being made.

That's correct.

And on the other hand, another tactic they have is to come up with an unacceptable proposal but present it as if it were acceptable.

And of course, if we had announced that I was saying yesterday and then they come in with their proposal tomorrow,

It might look as if it had happened as a result of the private meeting, but they don't want it.

Let me get back to that.

But you and the doctoral group would not announce the private meeting?

No, but I told them that they were playing games with us.

We reserved the right to do what was necessary to defend our position.

Well, it's not in our interest to put off the private meetings.

It hasn't taken any, it hasn't succeeded in anything.

It's not in our interest.

Let me run over with you so that we can make this decision in the context in which we now

We can decide this, but what we do tomorrow is not nearly as important as what we do in the long run.

Tomorrow is only part of a much bigger puzzle.

Exactly.

Except that it gives away our attitude.

It signals our attitude about Moscow as our land.

I mean, that's for sure.

True, true.

Except...

Except this, from that point, this is, evidentially, our attitude was signaled by your private conversation, and Moscow will know that.

So I think you, especially this way, in terms of tomorrow, I think as far as the signal from Moscow is concerned, it isn't a hell of a lot, but I think you have done that through our private letter, and you have done that through your private conversation.

Well, continuing plenary sessions would be a weak move.

It would be very weak.

Porter won't understand it, but he'll do what he's told.

But... Well, let's look at it and understand it.

I don't understand it, but...

But you won't understand it, and he can take it, too, but... Well, he will understand it.

If you... Let me make the case that in the final recession, on some basis...

And this all, this all gets back to the assumption of when and how we want to do, uh, either, either bombing or the other.

Which are our two options.

We have to do something.

That's the best we've got, I'm sure.

Laird wasn't in a crisis, he suggested we do this.

He had many great ideas, but what's he want to get kicked to in the ass or what?

I don't know what to say.

Is he...

He doesn't say anything.

He transmits whatever we do.

So it rushes with him.

It's all then that you race with him.

The rush races with me.

That's what he said.

He said when he sees these two kinds of guys after him, he's amazed how he ever survived.

Has he got rocket numbers all the way?

No, you see, he went through the Berlin exercise with Rogers, where Rogers did exactly the same things he did with Sol.

Except that was already done by the time he got his answer.

He raised as many frivolous objections as he did to this one.

Exactly.

Not one of the points that Raj has objected to the communique in China has anyone else read.

I know, I've noticed that.

Not one.

Nor has the communique.

No, he was deliberately looking over to find something, which anybody could find.

He would build everything.

And after the first news stories, the communique out of China played very positively.

Sure, sure.

And we, I don't know, we just had to write it through and we had...

He could have been a big hero of the China treatment center.

As a result of his not playing it right, he appeared to be a dog in a manger that was left out in that early building, so he lost on that.

Rogers could have seen her.

But that's all things.

If he had told Smith, now you go out there and get us the best agreement you can, instead of leading the opposition, I mean, after all, I'm the chairman of the joint chiefs, the secretary of defense.

The director of the Central Intelligence Agency to report something has been unusually good.

And Roger, who doesn't know what our position is, suddenly totally reverted what he said two months ago.

You know he's just being nasty.

I mean, you've got a front-page story out of business in every paper in the country yesterday.

Now, I admit it isn't a great thing if it's going to change the course of events.

Fatima, everything shows a few positive things are going on.

You deserve the whole credit for it because the whole thing was done here.

He has no reason to complain.

My name hasn't been mentioned in connection with this in any story.

Is that fine with me?

I don't want to be mentioned.

I don't think that's it.

I just really think it's his and Smith's own.

It's the White House, generally.

It's the President's.

But they don't want credit.

I mean, now, I don't hear them congratulating over the years.

trying to see what they can do to help out on Vietnam, that they're glad enough to keep shoving over to us.

Let me analyze this thing some and so forth, and particularly a few of the other things.

You're absolutely right that anything less than walking out is a weak point.

What I would like to see is anything that you can say which does not indicate a total

and thereby lack of hope on the negotiating front.

You and I know there's no hope at all.

On the other hand, we have a hell of a lot of people being used on this particular point.

You've made this point often.

I will have to agree that as a result, you're a hit from Moscow.

And as a result of our sending Porter back to the plant recession,

something which, incidentally, was supported even by our conservative papers like the Star and others beforehand.

As a result of all that, they say, well, we supported the mine, but we also are glad that the President is at least trying to see, trying, I'm putting the strongest case I can for this.

Now, so we have to weigh what we lose

They're appearing to be, I mean, just breaking off the talks again, as we did before on the show, which is a message which is needed by the Russians, needed, not really by Hanoi, because, except, because you told them that privately, that, oh, it might help some.

It might help some of the Jews.

But they've been saying that they've forced us back to the conference table.

Let's forget the debating point.

What I mean is that is a debating point, and the things that we have to have in mind, let's look at it in terms of American public opinion.

The walkout would be greeted in the first instance by a surge of great enthusiasm by the Hawks.

and perhaps in Jordan, waiting, waiting, waiting.

On the other hand, it would turn loose at this particular time.

The creating of sand, what I'm most concerned about, of course, at the moment, is the breakdown of associations.

The problem with the Senate, you know, the Senate meets this morning and the Senate Democratic Caucus will overrun and make a group, you know, so it's going to get bugged out.

And then the Byrds will introduce a Manseel-type resolution after that.

And there will be action rounds over the summer.

In terms of being able to beat that,

We had a very, very good vote earlier this week.

Aiken raised it this morning.

First, Fulbright got only 15 votes for something, so they may, you know, want to bug out on things.

In which the vote was about to have gotten only one Republican voted with Fulbright.

And if they can find out, he says, the reason for that is that the public understands that there is a massive debate in support of the Russians.

And at the same time, he said, another reason for it is they think that we're making every effort to negotiate.

He said, you've got them in a crack now.

There's old George.

So why is old Paul talking?

See my point?

Now, what we have to realize is that these terms of the domestic front that

This kind of a move, and I'm going to put it in the context of the bombing in some way, this kind of a move can have a good short-range effect to welcome.

Long-range, we have to consider it in the context of what our plans are.

And what effect it will have on the summit.

Because I see the summit.

And of course, I'm not the strongest opponent of not making the summit a hostage to be a part of the summit.

Anyway.

the cancellation of the summer, summer, summer, or that is that it can't be any halfway.

We can say that we're going to postpone it, or we aren't going to go at this time, or we'll be glad to go at a later time, and let's do this job, or this, that, or the other thing, and so forth.

I just, I try to think of all the libraries that we could work out.

First,

Analyzing it from a foreign standpoint, it will have a beneficial effect, as you pointed out last night on the pew.

It will have a, certainly some shock effect on Ham.

It will have some effect on the Russians.

And more on that in a moment.

The question arises, what effect does it have here?

The initial effect would be, in my opinion, extremely favorable.

The courageous president puts everything on the line, stands up to the Russians, and so forth.

and getting the domestic thing out of the way first, because it does have some bearing.

We have to realize that once we have canceled the summit, but then we will unleash without any questions, not simply the cause, but we will unleash again, predict who they are,

the type of senators in Congress who are presently off balance, one, because someone is coming, and two, because they think something is going on, which you and I are closely tied on.

But, and you are correct, certainly in your suggestion of the Soviet, if we cancel the summit, well,

And we didn't turn right.

Their reaction could be one of two things.

It could be it could present a problem.

Their reaction, however, might be to say, well, the God is good.

been thrown down, some of it was lost, and despite the fact that the President said we'll negotiate all the bilateral issues and so forth, they had unleashed their rather massive propaganda efforts abroad and here in this country.

So what would happen is that over a period of time, the time that this action would have taken,

that the immediate, I'm speaking now of the affected home, the immediate affected home would very substantially grow.

It would be favorable, very favorable at the beginning.

And then it would grow there.

And it would grow for a variety of reasons.

It would grow because of

But, of course, the attack of our enemies, which we must expect, which would be unleashed, would not be off balance any longer.

It would erode because the Holy Spirit, you know, peace and so forth, could not be found.

And it would erode also because there would be, we'd have to anticipate, a massive attack

in the meeting on the ground about an idea that so-called next to the foreign policy had collapsed.

Collapsed because of our insistence on seeing the Vietnam War through to an honorable conclusion.

That would be the argument that they would make.

And we, on our side,

But, of course, we argued, strangely, that what they were doing was like what I found out last night, that the government put them right on the arms of the Soviet.

The Soviet was responsible for this war by raising the supply of arms and continuing the supply at the present time.

Now, let's come to the other point.

At the heart of the matter is

what effect the cancellation of the summit would have on the Arctic War itself.

If the cancellation of the summit very substantially improves the chance for a favorable outcome in Vietnam, that is a decisive factor.

If only the cancellation of the summit

It has a marginal effect in that respect, and of course the bombing had a marginal effect.

I think we have to look at it another way, and that way would be along this line, that if we are looking at a situation here where

where over 33 years we have built, in a magical way, a new foreign host of the China game, the Soviet game.

It's a very big game.

You and I both know that it's a very difficult operation.

The Soviets have been liars and bastards and thugs and so forth and so on.

We also know that at the present time we've got some American public events developing along that line.

However, if we put it in perspective, I think we have to realize that

If we're looking at the effect, the effect on the Democratic Convention coming up in July, really the election coming up in November, at the effect on the election, I think, cold-bloodedly, we have to say this.

First, the heart of the matter is Vietnam and how it comes up.

If Vietnam comes out battling the election, it is very seriously jeopardized.

However, if Vietnam comes out battling and we also cancel the summit, in other words, if we cancel the summit and it still comes out battling the election, it would certainly be down to something which

There's so much that needs to be done.

You hear this military briefing and you realize that our military has let us down.

That's just one thing, but you need a new foreign policy, you need a new military policy and so forth.

It's not going to be done by any successor.

There's so much for that.

Yet, on the other hand, canceling the summit is the only and critical factor which may save the situation in Vietnam, as you know.

Because if the situation in Vietnam is saved, canceling the summit will look good.

I mean, it will arrive well, even though we will, after our first flip upward and then our erosion, we'll come back up again.

There's one other equation to throw into this.

If we see that the South Vietnamese, that the Vietnamese situation is, if our cold weather analysis is, and we cannot make that now, I realize, that's my guess, I think it's half and half.

If we do it better than half, they'll survive.

Because I think they're suffering a hell of a lot more than we have any reason to believe.

But we shall see.

If the South Vietnamese survive, then, I mean, do not survive, then, having a son,

even under very difficult circumstances but having where we hear you say vietnam will be at the top of the agenda all right

at least as a marginal, as a marginal plus, instead of being a very substantial negative in the long run.

That's what we have to face.

I'm speaking on the domestic side.

So that brings me back to the other option.

The other option.

is to react as we had originally planned with our two-day shrines and see whether the Russians go forward on their use, whether they face the risk that they may smooth cancer, which they might.

The two-day strike thing certainly would have great support in this country again.

So it would give some incursion to the South Vietnamese, some pause to Russians, and some pause to the panel.

The argument you make last night is very strong in the effect that, well, it would look like an act of desperation due to the fact that Gouet is being threatened and so forth and so on.

Well, maybe so.

Maybe the first track looked that way, too.

But we all know that in the present time, the public sector will support that kind of a strategy we want to look at.

So we have to weigh that in.

So it really comes down to this.

But it would be really honest to feel that the canceling of the summit could have, could be a decisive factor or even a substantial factor in resolving the situation.

On that point, I have great doubts.

And if that is true, then the case for it isn't strong as we thought it was last night.

As far as the strike in the north is concerned, I have serious doubts whether that will have a great effect on the situation in Vietnam.

We all know that it's a choice of one of two things.

Either we hit the north for two days, or we cancel the summit.

We have no other option.

And hitting the north for two days may cancel the summit.

Oh, I understand.

And they may cancel it.

I understand.

And then all the factors you mentioned may be even more telling against you.

I mean, every argument that you made on canceling the summit would apply then even more because it would tie Vietnam even more intricately to it, and you wouldn't be able to get your story out there as well.

And I think there'd be a slightly better than 50-50 chance that they would cancel the summit.

which is why I had moved to the point that we should postpone the summit.

Now, nobody can present any of these positions to you with the argument that they will save the situation in South Vietnam, because I can't say that they will.

Nothing may.

Canceling the summit may not.

This may not.

But if the situation I'm thinking of, the presidency, thinking of your position in history,

and of the position of the country in the long term.

If you go to Moscow without having done anything, it will be a total disaster.

We can make it look good, we can put on an act, but all the things that would be needed to put on, the Russians will then despise us.

We will have lost all credibility.

I know, I'll just keep going up the ladder.

So that's out of the question.

That I don't see how we can do.

And the cranking up all the machinery and the reading in your dispatches.

But even without it, secondly, for the United States, I mean, what the Russians have done systematically since last October is put it to us.

And they've said, you can have your summit, and at the same time, we're going to screw you.

Now we go there and sign great principles of coexistence.

And I think the feeling of uneasiness among, I'm very worried now about Vietnam.

The fact that Russian arms have run us out of Vietnam, and the president goes to Moscow and signs principles of coexistence, gives some credit, and agrees with him to screw one of his allies in the Middle East.

Now,

You know that I'm in favor.

Hell, we got the principles all negotiated, so it's... And the trade is all done in the Middle East, one we can do, and in fact, we're prepared to do that too.

So you do all these three things after India, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia, and the fact that the fascists have not done one goddamn thing for us ever, that, I must say, is objectively a sign of great weakness, which will encourage them

Your great strength in foreign policy is your toughness.

And your great standing abroad is due to the fact that you've gone your way.

Now you could say you could go to the summit, go through with it, don't sign these principles, don't give them credits, and don't make a deal on the Middle East.

Well, then you will have a pretty icy summit.

And to get out of the summit what you want, you have to come back and be able to talk about peace.

and about having made tremendous strides towards peace, and otherwise, words give the Soviets a certificate of good conduct.

Now, if we can win in South Vietnam by doing all of this, that would be great.

That'd be the best of all the worlds.

For that, we can't, unfortunately, no.

But if you are in Russia, why wait for everything to disintegrate?

There's just no way of making it look good.

I just want to be sure you consider all this.

I, Mr. President, I, God be that we suffered and

to get to this point.

So they may give us an answer that enables us to do it.

I don't think you're going to get an answer.

Oh, yes, I'll get an answer.

But they may give us a very threatening answer, because in a way they echo in the tooth.

This letter is couched in terms that suggest we're going to attack North Vietnamism.

There's no threat to the Soviet summit at last yet.

But they may figure that since that's what we may do, they may preempt us and cancel the summit.

Okay.

If we cancel the summit, it's then called a massive attraction to North Korea.

Yes.

That's my right.

That would be my view.

And we have to go right in this country, and we just have to put it in the past, sir.

I know... Mr. President, next to you I have more stake in it than anyone else.

Next to you.

So from my own point of view,

I would also, I'd like to get more friendly resident columns and that sort of stuff.

You know, that's nice to have.

Resident Siding Hall, Resident Siding Hall.

They want to play me against you.

They want to isolate you.

Oh, I started, the only problem is, what's so vicious?

I was talking to Bob about this this morning.

You go through my press briefings.

Never have I as much as hinted.

Never have I even expressed an opinion which said Henry Kissinger's thing says, I always say to the president, these bastards are doing this in order to make you the villains.

So it's perfectly obvious what the game is.

And I mean, when you get Richard Duffman, Keith Lee,

All within a 48-hour period.

I think state is suing them, Mr. President.

They, for the first time, are attacking me cleverly.

Attacking me by making the impression by separating me from you.

in which case I'm no longer an authentic spokesman of the administration.

Is there any way that you can find out if he did that or not?

I know it came out the same.

There was all these fire talks.

I mean, for example, I think Rogers himself has been talking to Gertzman, not about this, but for example, last week there was a long article in the New York Times by Gertzman of what I allegedly did in Moscow.

Now, I don't even know Gertzman.

No one on my staff talked to Guzman, but that had a telling article.

It said, Kittinger came to Moscow because suddenly a letter arrived from Brezhnev asking that he be put on the next plane.

Now, there's only one man in town who's ever been told that.

That's right.

We told him that as well.

Exactly.

So that was a dead giver letter.

Haig spotted that, and I hadn't spotted that.

You see, any one of my staff has done it, my staff doesn't believe it, but assuming my staff, there were only two people who would have done it, my staff or us.

My staff couldn't do it because they knew it wasn't historic.

So this had to come from Rogers.

So then you had all these ceasefires.

Then they suddenly said, Kissinger's May 31st plan is going to get accepted.

Murray Mathers came up with that.

Yeah, I saw that.

And so you had all... Well, my reason I think Rogers had to muster was that opposite.

When I told him Sunday morning, they were going to meet in the press, he said, I don't know what to say about the May 31st.

I said, I don't know who he's talking about.

What do you mean?

And you see, another music thing, because the May 31st plan, for a while he was accusing me also of selling out the country.

That was, was the first.

And he said that had too many discrepancies, and how was he going to explain it?

Well now, you see, nobody even remembers the May 31st plan.

I have never even mentioned it.

And it's a minor deal, it's a minor thing, so these guys are now, it's really,

It's a very interesting study for me to see how these facts are answered.

Because I haven't been talking to anybody.

I saw that Saidi article.

I didn't talk to Saidi.

I talked to Schechter.

But Schechter apparently gave this stuff to Saidi.

No, no, but you told me to play sector and not to play sector.

Sure, which is right.

Getting to time is much more important than mine.

Getting to Roger, however, that whole bet on Doug and all that punch, that had to be a breathing half-space.

I don't know if you think Roger did it himself.

That he didn't do, but the goods went south.

Who do you think did it himself?

I don't know.

But that did not happen, I don't know what Bob did, but this could not have happened by accident.

Because the only contact I had with the press last week was the briefing before your speech, which was totally innocuous and totally in line with your speech.

The United States is not giving credit to the U.N.

I don't know that the country would sell it so much for it.

I mean, get him out of our hair.

Everything depends on how this comes out now.

I think he's not going to be in a safe environment after this.

But it's a tawdry performance.

I think it's a possibility to do the two days trial and go forward with the Moscow trip.

I don't exclude that as a possibility.

That's the other, the only thing I think we ought to consider.

I just want to consider it well, and frankly, if they cancel the summit, then we'll say, so be it.

We'll continue to try.

Well, that puts you into a weaker position.

A weaker, I agree, I agree.

It's better for you to postpone the summit and say that that will always improve.

I've been saying that all along now.

And, uh, so, uh,

Well, we've got it all in mind.

Now, can I suggest that with regard to the thing tomorrow...

I haven't had anyone present a speech yet because I wanted to make sure you didn't want to do it.

Well, I think it should be prepared in terms of, with the options, so I can go either way.

And as you said, the situation is developing very fast.

And, you know, with your two-conclusion idea,

Could you do that?

Yeah, but I don't think you should go on television.

I mean, I designed to have a speech there in case, so that I can make that decision at the latest possible time.

Done.

I don't want to make it today.

No, you don't have to.

See?

But I had to have a speech during preparation on the way, and so you might say that I'm going to go on just to make up a speech in Russian perfectly, if you know what I mean, and so forth and so on.

You see my point?

Done.

Some remarks.

Could you make it up so that it doesn't, yeah?

Lord, Lord.

You can trust my people.

They won't believe you haven't.

Lord, that's fine.

Oh, I'm not concerned about that.

As long as I'm good, it's all good.

Just let the Lord go.

Will you let the Lord go?

I get Lord, and the Son of God is good at that.

The Son of God, too.

I said, Lord, the Son of God.

Let them get up here after a bit.

Along the lines you talked about last night.

Fair enough.

Good.

And I'll do this.

You could just say that, and I would be, I'd say, look, one option that you're presenting to the President of the Chancellor's Center, and therefore you want a speech, just tell him.

Good?

Good.

I'll get that done.

Bye.

With regard to what we do tomorrow, what's tomorrow?

Oh, in that, yeah, yeah.

Putting that in this context, I would prefer, if you could work it out, I don't think that's a big enough deal.

A big enough deal to, you know, rather, to go for the walkout that, in other words, if we're going to borrow land in trouble, I'd rather do it on a Monday or as a result of a strategy.

And do it then, rather than tomorrow, twice.

You see what I mean?

Now, if you could find a way where he could, you, I think you were approaching here the other day, where he simply says, you haven't presented anything, and I'm not coming to another meeting until you do, or, you know what I mean, but where he does not.

There are three ways.

There will be three choices he has.

One is to accept the meeting for the following week.

The second is to say he cannot accept it.

He'll let them know soon he is not with it.

But he will reserve the decision if he will let them know truly is not this.

And then come or not come.

And the third is to say, I will not come until you have something new to say.

Well, if I could suggest, I think the second, while it is a softer response, a softer response to the person, the third is nevertheless quite an honest response to the enemy.

Yeah, well, we can do it.

The basic strategic decision we have to make as a president is this, because we face it all along.

Well, what I meant is, you know, what I meant is the walking out of the thing poses a negotiating trap, period, with the Mainz people.

There is a, if our decisions are just to go ahead and bomb,

I think I would just as soon let them go to the negotiating track.

You see the point?

Well, what will happen is if they get a fix in the parish, once they catch on to the fact that you feel as you do, or if they think you feel as you do, that you're afraid to leave the table, then the next thing is going to be that they'll start operating on the farm.

And then, before you know it, they will have walked out saying,

And they'll have you in the charging position saying they won't talk now until the time is set.

All right.

And how can you state the third position in a way that leaves just a crack open?

That's what perhaps I see all those points.

Well, we may not have a real choice.

If they make a proposal tomorrow, as I am inclined to believe, they will because they don't want to keep you from farming.

And I think they're going to make publicly the proposal tomorrow that they made to me privately, yes.

They do?

They mean that we have to walk out?

Well... Or do you?

Maybe not then.

You can't then.

Then...

It's a hell of a thing to say we're studying the proposal to overthrow... No, no, no, no, no, no.

We reject this proposal.

But what we can say is we reject this proposal.

We will consider whether there are elements in it that you could check the replacement of fuel altogether.

And we will be in touch with you through liaison officers if there's any sense in another meeting.

Uh or what would you or how else would you handle?

You just say this is this is such a this post was so painfully unacceptable on the space to be rejected and we're not going to come to another meeting until we'll uh until uh our authority as an officers we find that you have something else to offer.

Maybe that's right.

You've got something else to offer.

That's uh we're we're we'll be glad to have another meeting but not on these terms.

You might say, we consider this proposal an ultimatum.

You know what I mean, or... What he can do... Just get the language carefully done, that's all so that we can...

He can go through the whole ritual.

See, I think that, painful as it is, Mr. President, see, as far as the doves are concerned, you're down the tube anyway.

There is nothing you can do to make them happy, or even play with them.

And as you know, I have been desperately trying to keep the summit alive, even when you had more severe doubts than I did, for precisely the reasons you're advancing here.

because I saw the great political and strategic advantage of keeping your opponents confused, of preventing a full-scale onslaught.

I was not dying to get this attack on Hanoi and Haiphong, as you know, and you said in many tables on that subject and talked again about it, again for precisely,

That reason, and I tell you candidly, if they had come with anything at all yesterday, I would have urged you to play it through the summit.

Right.

But they haven't come with anything.

And that would have been my recommendation to you.

So I'm not...

When will we get the message back?

Let me put it this way.

The immediate decision is now in the Thursday meeting.

So I think you'll get a message back within 48 hours.

Well, then...

You see, my point is... You won't get a message back in time for the Thursday meeting.

I just would like to write about the Thursday meeting.

Let me say, you go ahead and give me some instructions.

Except that I feel that I should be written in such a way that there's a tiny correction, you know, that we're ready to discuss or something like that.

So that it doesn't appear that we're... You see my point?

Not discuss that proposal, but whenever they've got another... Well, we can make them go through the whole interview.

Are they prepared to discuss ending the offensive?

Are they prepared to discuss mutual de-escalation?

Are they prepared to discuss circumstances in which a ceasefire could, you know, we know they will be checked off.

Are they prepared to discuss Christmas and withdrawal issues?

And it will turn out they'll say no to all of them.

They say no to all of them.

Then we can say, well, I see no reason for another meeting next week until you're prepared to discuss some of these proposals.

And whenever you are, we'll get together again.

That's all right.

Can you do it that way?

Sure.

That's all that I had to say.

I would put it in a position where we're ready to have discussions, but they come up with a totally unacceptable proposal.

Fair enough.

If indeed they come up with a proposal.

And if they don't come up with a proposal, then you should go through the ritual anyway.

And then say, well, under the circumstances, you have nothing to offer here.

You see, what they may well come up with, and what I think they will come up with, is that you have to go, that the concentration camps have to be open, that freedom of the press has to be allowed.

All of this sounds great to the New York Times.

Oh, it should, yes.

The practical consequence of it, though, is that the Zygon thing will come apart.

That's right.

He rejects that totally.

And...

Now, ask between whether we postpone the summit or do the two-day strike.

Well, can we, I mean, just ask if we haven't got 24 hours to think about that.

Oh, yes, we have more than that.

Oh, not much.

Oh, yes, yes, we'll put the two-day strike off until Saturday.

I don't think, I have never had the sense of urgency about the two-day strike that others have had because Hanoi and Haiphong aren't going to go away.

You'll

In other words, we shouldn't do it over the weekend anyway.

Well, I think we should do it fairly soon if we're going to do it.

There's something to be said for not doing it on Saturday so that it doesn't catch the weekly news magazine.

But we can do it Sunday, Sunday and Monday.

Why don't you analyze for me what you think of it so that I get to just take a minute as to what you think we've gone through in some of the things, what the two-day strike thing has done.

First, I don't need to go into it.

I know the risks of the Soviet advancing in some of the times.

Get that out of the way.

What does it do in terms of the war?

It has some benefits.

Well, the two-day strike has a number of military benefits.

They're not in themselves decisive, but when a country is stretched as thin as they are now,

anything that impedes.

I mean, they have, for example, changed the whole pattern of unloading gasoline in Haiphong as a result of the other strikes.

Secondly, it tells Hanoi that you may just go crazy, press too hard.

Thirdly, it really puts it to the Russians in the sense that you are saying, all right, you can't do the summit if you want to, and leave the choice up to them.

Now, there's a certain

and so in other words you should think the decision of cancelling the summit to them which isn't easy for them we have an intercept of a passionate conversation with Gus Hall which he praises to Hall and my visit very much and in fact gives him a pretty objective account of but it repeats how eager they are for the summit that they are under a lot of pressure from other communist parties to cancel it

A little longer, closer to your arrival in Moscow, you do the two-day strike, the tougher it is for them.

And, you see, the thing that worries me so much about the visit is for you to give them credits while they're trucks and guns.

But if you don't give them credit, they're going to be very cool.

And to sign these common principles.

God, you know, it's a tragedy.

We had a tremendous breakthrough all along this run.

We've worked three years to get it.

And next to you, I'm the one most reluctant to give it up.

And give us a month of relative peace and quiet.

But... Would you work?

Yeah.

No question.

But I will compare, and for a week after, it's two weeks after.

And also, we have to realize that the end of the sun comes at a time.

And others can be escalated in weather and all other factors.

Well, can we take our 24 hours now?

We can, but we don't have to make a decision.

I want you to go forward, though, if you will, on things.

Now, it is following up and seeing if we get more tanks and more guns.

Yes, and we're moving 72 more planes out there.

More planes, good.

It turns out it isn't too effective to put more B-52s out because

But it repeats how eager they are for the summit, that they are under a lot of pressure from other communist parties to cancel it.

A little longer, closer to your arrival in Moscow, you do the two-day strike, the tougher it is for them.

But you see, the thing that worries me so much about the visit is

for you to give them credits while they're trucks and guns.

But if you don't give them credits, they're going to do very good.

And to sign these common principles.

God, you know, it's a tragedy.

We had a tremendous breakthrough all along the front.

We've worked three years to get it.

And next to you, I'm the one most reluctant to give it up.

And give us a month of relative peace and quiet.

But... Would you work to prepare this?

No question.

I will prepare, and for a week after, it's two weeks after the procedure.

And also, with economy, I have to realize the end of the sun comes at a time.

Providing it's not a good time, where another is going to be escalated.

I mean, weather and a lot of other factors.

Well, can we take our 24 hours now?

But we can't, we don't have to make a decision.

I want you to go forward, though, if you will, on things.

It is following up and seeing if we get more tanks.

Yes, and we're moving 72 more planes out there.

More planes, good.

It turns out it isn't too effective to put more B-52s out because two F-4s can carry as much as one of these B-52s.

So we're moving 72 more F-4s out there.

The other thing is that if you could, and you prepare the quarter message, I'll, I, I, every comment, you just do it.

And just so that the quarter message leaves

But if you have the options, but be sure it goes through the ritual.

Would you have even the thing you did there with that, but they're not going to get those same answers.

How come?

And how does the speech begin, right?

How do we go forward with the speech?

I canceled it.

I totally canceled that Saturday and Sunday.

So I got today, Saturday and Sunday for thinking purposes.

Now I have a chap coming in in five minutes who wants to be designated for going to Japan the weekend after this.

You just say that the view of the situation here, you can't go.

And the other thing to have in mind is this, which you have to keep perspective at this time.

It's natural, isn't it?

The other side has some problems, which we hope to make worse.

And without being polyamorous, if we have to go right, we'll go right.

And frankly, I will do it knowing that we'll probably lose the election.

But frankly, the hell with it.

The main thing is that we've got to do

See, the thing on that, they're not going down.

The thing on the Ohio president can't go down with this kind of soldier.

— 1 min 17 s with no transcribed speech —

We have to balance.

We have to listen to the lead.

We have to consider what we're doing.

But I think also essentially, and you see, I am very coldly.

I think if there are ways we could do it both, we should.

If there isn't, I hope that the best situation would be to some end.

That is why the bombs in the north may be a risk worth taking.

Unless they cancel the second time.

And then we get possibly they cancel them.

All right.

So they cancel them.

Maybe that's not too bad either.

So you expected that?

I sort of expect that now, yeah.

But let's see what happens if they come up with it.

Because they may call for a ceasefire.

Well, what do we say then?

No.

No, if you had the means, you want to agree to that, don't you?

Yeah.

These principles and trade in the Middle East from a strong president would be great.

China was great because no one questioned that you were tough and strong.

But you weren't getting around to Vietnam at that time.

And not by Chinese equipment.

Yeah.

The other thing I was going to say, look, I haven't argued this goal to be 1,000%.

I'm just trying to think of, I'm trying to think of this, I'm trying to think also, and really, really the argument that is made that falls and that the canceling of the summit in and of itself would be a good thing.

clearly apartment that's affected Vietnam.

So basically, what we have to realize, if we can't run out of Vietnam, we're down to two spaces.

You understand?

A chance to save it if we have the summit.

A little margin, but it's so marginal it's making it.

But my point is, though, that with the summit,

by asking the summit if it has any effect on keeping us from getting around to Vietnam, which I don't think it really has.

But I think the main one you're really getting to is the summit in and of itself, and I always think that I am in view of the situation in Vietnam.

That's the point.

That's the thing that's worried me.

Like I said, tipping the glasses and all that sort of thing.

At this point, there's Russian tanks in there.

That's right.

It's not a strong sign of tipping the glasses.

I look at this call and all this.

Why are Russian tanks running around in Vietnam?

Well, let's say, let's say the minute before your job is turned gray, it's the census then.

So, the scenario goes like this.

We cancel a summit.

And then, every week, we lose the summit.

We said we'd do it anyway.

Right.

And then, two syllables, and what happens?

Well, it's just one of those things.

Well, then, you see, take it the other way.

Supposing you're Bonsignor and I find that they can't do this.

And then at least you've maintained your plan.

You just keep going anti-communist and accuse your opponents of first having screwed up the peace talks.

Yeah, I have said that in the motion of the leader today.

I said that the responsibility... And they made it inevitable that the thing collapse.

And...

Now they want to sell out the direction.

You'd probably lose, you may well lose the election then.

Why not?

But you might not.

Well, I just think we have to see what we're up to.

So you get back to Vietnam again, don't you?

There, could I ask one other thing?

The situation in the South,

Generally speaking, there is not a very substantial opposition, but you involved the others, obviously.

Not yet.

And more, is it something about the big men?

Oh yes, big men is trying to organize, get itself into a reserved position.

And they'll all begin to do it as the situation gets worse.

Is that presented to us?

Well, I consider, I tell you, if they had made any sort of proposition yesterday, I don't, I consider it too expendable.

I agree.

That isn't the problem.

No, what they're asking for is to not just replace him, but they want to impose conditions that would lead to a communist government.

That's right.

And that's, again, their plan.

That's right.

Can I ask this question on the timing of the cancellations?

Is it worth considering, now, Chris D. E. Cullen, to have him do this, then have the bombing go forward?

Well, not have the bombing go forward.

I mean, have him just continue to fight the battle in the South, and do our very best to

And that was some cancellation at the end of the next week rather than the beginning.

What's the advantage of that?

The advantage of it?

It gives us more time to assess whether Vietnam might survive.

Maybe we won't know any more then than now.

You see my point?

I am greatly affected by that if we have some feelings.

The other problem, though, is supposing the way has fallen by the end of next week.

Then it will look like a petulant reaction to a defeat.

I think it's going to look that way anyway.

I mean, they played a defeat by it so heavily, and I don't think we can have any illusions about the petulant reaction to the defeat.

So the fall of Rey, I don't think it's going to make that much sense.

Would you not agree?

I think, you know, it doesn't have to be Monday.

It can be Tuesday.

I think if we're going to cancel it, we'd better do it early rather than late.

And we won't know, Al, of a lot.

Well, that's the answer, then.

We won't know of a lot.

And we'll lose.

We know we'll lose Kuntu.

See, supposing it gets all unstuck, I don't see how you can go to Russia then, in my view.

I couldn't agree more.

But, you know, the other argument is you could use it to divert attention from the disease.

If you go to Washington, then what the hell can you agree on?

That's the point.

You can't agree to get your credits.

You can't agree to... See, the whole idea, you see, of agreeing, of having you sign health agreements, science agreements, what do the others want of the summit?

They want to show that you and Prajnap are ordering the world.

When you do it as equals, it's risky enough because it's going to hurt us enormously in Europe.

has heard us with the Chinese.

What's the risk we're taking on the assumption that you can recover from it in the next election, after the next election?

By turning hard.

And that's how I've justified it.

But basically, Shakespeare isn't wrong in his assessment of what this detente is doing to our allies.

Now, if a strong president does it, somebody to whom you can say, look how you've stood in all the crises,

But it's somebody who's been humiliated or at least been challenged in South Asia by the Russians.

And that is the most vital area where we have 50,000, I mean vital from the point of view of our national center.

If it is not about strategic interest.

And he still does it.

That's something I think, Mr. President, that's going to be hard to recover from.

And who is then going to be led to respect you?

I mean, I shouldn't talk this way, but I'm...

I mean, the hogs...

They're not going to like it.

It does.

A strong president, the reason you're coming here.

It's about the real heart of the question.

It's good to talk it out in this way.

The real heart of the question is that what I'm getting at is it really isn't about Vietnam.

Because if it were, we have to realize.

It's about what you said at the end.

It's about the president.

That's right.

The real why here is that

is that the canceling of the summit, or the buying, neither may prove to have too much of an effect on the outcome in Vietnam, so scrub both of those things.

The real reason we have to cancel the summit, if we do cancel the summit, is that we cannot go to the summit while Russia and Jackson guns are kicking the shit out of us in Vietnam.

But we cannot make an agreement with people that are doing that.

So we don't meet with a bunch of outlaws.

It's like going to Rockefeller or going to the person you're going to ask to meet with those goddamn people.

Right?

That's my sense, Mr. President.

But great reluctance and knowing how we may get a turn in the situation.

We may get an answer from President that we can live with.

I doubt it.

Well, our answer, our decision on the speech and so forth should be made, it seems to me.

You don't have to make it before Friday or Saturday.

Let's get the speech ready.

I'll get the speech ready.

I'll get the speech ready and I'll work on it.

And I should make a decision as to whether to give it or not Monday.

And it'll be either Monday night or Tuesday night.

And have in mind the fact that, and then we can have a strike, in the case of no main speech, we can have a strike on Tuesday or Wednesday or Thursday of next week.

That's it.

That's my point.

I think in any event that we should...

Tell Abrams, you see, that's good, just at the other point, that he can have these assets.

Sir, don't worry about this.

Abrams, pardon me, I'll talk to Mora.

We can wait with that till tomorrow morning.

He hasn't got his execute order.

Okay.

What I'm getting at is this.

I don't think we should get over the weekend.

That's fine.

Let's make a final decision with regard to canceling this on a brief Monday.

I want the speech, or I don't prepare the speech, because getting the speech and writing it will help me get my own thinking in the right time of day.

Nixon, Kissinger & Sanchez on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

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Also recorded on May 3, 1972

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Nixon, Kissinger & Sanchez on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

AI Summary

Audio

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Transcript (AI-generated)

Also recorded on May 3, 1972

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