Nixon White House TapesTape 719 › Conversation 719-004

Nixon, Haldeman & Ziegler on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

Thursday, May 4, 1972 · 9:06 AM–9:59 AM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  Ziegler, Ronald L.;  Bull, Stephen B.;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Connally, John B.Conversation719-004 onTape 719 (tape position 00:24:10–01:17:41)StartThursday, May 4, 1972 at 9:06 AMEndThursday, May 4, 1972 at 9:59 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 719-004 ↗

President Nixon met with his senior advisors, including H. R. Haldeman and Henry Kissinger, to navigate the intensifying North Vietnamese offensive and its implications for the upcoming Soviet Summit. The group deliberated on military strategies—including the possibility of a naval blockade—and analyzed the political risks of cancelling the summit versus the need to maintain a firm negotiating stance. A key action item involved coordinating with John Connally to assess the administration's response to these crises, while also addressing concerns regarding domestic political fallout, press coverage, and security preparations for the upcoming national political conventions.

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24:18Uh, I think you've got it right, Larry Harder or somebody.
24:20Your parents are, their responsibility to watch the militia work, honestly.
24:31Did I, uh, have a speaking hunch that that talk about looking at the burning of the American building in the South Bay of the Needs was incorrect?
24:40It was.
24:40He called outside.
24:44I had him last night at 10.30.
24:47He got to work.
24:49He tried to get
25:38I agree with the person, but I wouldn't give it up.
25:43You wouldn't?
25:44Why?
25:44On a eulogy, it's not a political speech, it's not a state speech, it's a personal statement.
25:52I'd rather think that if you let us out, I'd just give it up.
25:55I don't think it makes any difference to me, it's a big deal.
26:00I've made a couple of changes, I'm sure this has gotten on.
26:11I wouldn't give it to him, right?
26:13I can't log it, but he spoke to the FBI yesterday.
26:15I wasn't lying.
26:16You know, the judge is only minor, you know, science type of thing.
26:26The main point got across very well.
26:28Taking action, he wasn't even eager to have it.
26:32It was fine.
26:32He didn't have to pick the grass.
26:35It just don't look true.
26:39Oh, don't worry about the sign.
26:41No, I said that it's everything about the HBs, hires, and senators, and the press, pressing hell on opportunity to put the FBI through the wringer.
27:10But, hey, there is, of course, some that there's also more positive stuff.
27:17You mentioned they've all been out.
27:20And you've just got to follow up on it every goddamn hour and hour.
27:26Either you or put somebody else on it, because that's the time to do it.
27:31I mean, because, hey, it was, you know, he's busy as hell.
27:34And nobody, I mean, he was
27:44and they're doing it, but it doesn't change anything.
27:47The only way you change it is if, hey, where I am, sometimes wrong, call over there, or all of them here.
27:54Okay, that is the thing.
27:58I mean, it just, there's a lot of little, well, there's always going to be the little ones, but I'll just do the general saying.
28:04I'm saying that I just can't understand that tanks aren't supposed to be able to survive this kind of air attack.
28:20I want you to go over to see Conway.
28:28Give him a cold turkey.
28:34Get his cold turkey.
28:57The only other possibility.
28:58The only other possibility is he's been in the NSC.
29:00I don't know if it's true, but he did.
29:13See, I have no confidence in either Robert or Larry or something else.
29:16I'm not going to bother with that.
29:19Everybody else around has an independent mind.
29:28I was going to ask you if we have a reasonable comment, because I think his kind of judgment is what you're after.
29:36Now you and mainly Henry should make his decision on that, which Connolly would be for without
29:57You know he's hard with it
30:23You want to do this with communes before you get the Russian reply.
30:47Is that such a, that's a, could be, it may not be any factor at all.
30:51It could be a damn important factor.
30:54Might be better to have before we raise the lid.
30:58Call this morning, because he expected to call last night.
31:00I didn't get you.
31:01And in the afternoon, I was supposed to work on it.
31:06And thought it a big matter that you and Henry might go over and see him before he sees you.
31:13Now, I don't want to see him today.
31:15I've got to see him.
31:26Very, very important.
31:28The only thing about seeing today is to have you think about it.
31:37That may be a good idea.
31:38Then we add it.
31:39You know, you think about it over and over again.
31:43Right.
31:43I think we should see that.
31:46I just feel that, you know, this economy is not good.
32:18Well, Henry was feeling that.
32:19He spoke to a fellow couple of last night, and he's standing in ovations in answer to his questions.
32:23You know, he makes a really horrid tone.
32:28He can stir it up.
32:32It's a trompe-l'oeil here.
32:37The dead speak.
32:39Gordon Gray wanted to come over here.
32:43It may, frankly, be more worthwhile than some of the other things he does.
32:51While you're at it, make sure I'm going up
33:50And the fact that I'm amazed really that we're getting, that we're not getting worse.
33:55Right.
33:57Press reaction that we're getting.
33:59And it's, plus the guy over this week, you know, I'm sorry, the last weekend, the shit has to be, I mean, it's, hit the soft end of me.
34:10Yeah.
34:10It's a problem.
34:13But they're asking us, well, this move of the generals made a big story today, and it shows our fighting sense.
34:20That's a negative story, but it's not really.
34:24It's a positive story because it shows they aren't bogey on these.
34:26He's trying to fight with the guy who blew something, so he's pulling them out and putting a better man in.
34:31God, I wish I could get Abrams to help him.
34:36He was pushed through.
34:40But we ought to do it.
34:45Let me tell you about that.
35:15every argument against the blockade disappears.
35:19And we'll say we're going to blockade, we're going to keep the blockade on.
35:23And I don't know if Scott knows that.
35:25Of course, you have to go to finance some airstrikes.
35:27See, the blockade is like part of the main thing in one way, in airstrikes.
35:33You don't kill the system.
35:35You've got to do some talking to handle a blockade.
35:38You've got to keep runners out and so forth.
35:43You blockade and then you have to take out the railroads and the highways to keep them constantly upgraded.
35:51And the DOL, would you knock that out?
35:53Well, if you knock that out, of course, they don't have any storage.
35:56That's right.
35:57See, you have a blockade.
35:59You need to start with the helos.
36:01You strike the helo with a bomb and then blockade them.
36:05And let them set it.
36:09And then say we will let it blockade, and we get our field up into a ceasefire.
36:15And then we'll withdraw all tournaments and stop them.
36:22That's not a bad move, blockade.
36:25And then, of course, the cry babies will all start screaming here, like an iPhone showdown.
36:31But the Russians, because what do you do if they come through, or if they take the blood?
36:57We have to examine it in terms of whether it will work.
37:01You've got a very, very diverse opinion here.
37:04The Navy's always been for it.
37:32Well, anyway, that's one way to do it.
37:43Yeah.
37:43Okay, you want to cancel the penalty this afternoon?
37:45Well, I can cancel it that time.
37:46So we'll go ahead and see him today.
37:48And you need Henry and Trish, so we'll have to see them before the party happens.
38:15We wanted to get it voted this week.
38:39But the Democrats are holding off until Mansfield gets back.
38:43So it'll be next Tuesday and Wednesday.
38:47And our guys think we'll still beat Case Church.
38:50But we probably will lose the third Mansfield deal, which is to be out in Baltimore.
38:59All Americans out in Baltimore.
39:07If it doesn't happen, the mic gets back and the bird won't offer it next year.
39:53they're not asking you and they are mobilizing and sure they've got trying to state defense
40:22But I've also got a father who I think maybe more
40:58It's been shameful as hell.
41:00Unbelievable.
41:01I was going to indicate independently yesterday, without getting into what we've been talking about at all, McCrary and Scali and Moore and Chaffin and me going over just some general ideas and stuff.
41:14McCrary came up with the idea on a purely apparent site that it might be a very good move to
41:24drop Mrs. Nixon from the Russia trip, and make the point that this is a various line, is to make it sure Sleeves was in the wrong town, and that it's going to be a rerun of China, that you better let her ride on the China glory, not take her to Russia.
41:46Those are on the other side.
41:50And it's...
41:55You know, it was just a thought that I came up with as they are.
42:01He argued that she would pull out and she'd say, it looks to me like this ought to be solid business, and I think, you know, I don't want the Russians worrying about me and running me around sizing and all that.
42:12He says, McBurry's argument is that Mrs. Nixon pulling out was short of sacrificing something that would have been important to her career.
42:30and I'll make some money to it.
42:32Just keep fighting.
46:19They've come up with kind of a good idea that they've insisted on, which is a peace corps, not the peace corps, but a peace corps that would consist of volunteers in the armed forces.
46:43to be stationed down there, not as armed forces, but as civilian clothes from Kevin, Patrick, and just July 1.
46:51All the month of July, I'm going to stand on both conventions, the demonstrators and all that, rather than bring National Guard troops and policemen with tin helmets and all that.
47:01I'm going to give these, this Peace Corps, what do they
47:12They volunteer and begin a special training for a couple weeks ahead of time, ride training and all that stuff.
47:19Get them to work with the kids and keep the things centered down.
47:23I don't know if you want it centered down.
47:39In fact, it seems to me that we take the burden of, I'd rather leave it.
47:43Let the Democratic mayor and the Democratic governor.
47:46We don't need to give them any trouble, any help on this, is that clear?
47:51Particularly not to the Democratic convention.
47:53Let it blow first, and we'll know for hours.
47:56Let the goddamn governor.
47:59Good God, he probably went out of this one now.
48:01He's going to, well, this is my plan, as you said, was, isn't this our group here?
48:06No, no, no, this is from Miami.
48:49That's all.
48:50And also, they think you've got some public support.
48:54You still get your phone around?
48:56Yes, I know I was on the phone with Tom, but I mean, what can I do to make it work?
49:01But you could see Bob's in there on his wagon and not until after the funeral.
49:079.30, he gets to leave at 10.30.
49:08It's probably better to go after the funeral anyway.
49:10Yeah, he's on the phone now, right here.
49:24What time does that fit?
49:30I'm talking about 12.
49:36Let's see.
49:37You'll be here, right?
49:3911.45.
49:39All right, follow up.
49:43Is that okay?
49:44We'll come over there as soon as we get back.
50:00I told Bob about it.
50:01We were just talking about the very same thing.
50:02He said there would probably be a discussion.
50:05I want to be sure.
50:07You know, how about Michelin?
50:11I can wait for tomorrow.
50:15I'm just not bothered.
50:17You know, he's the only other one whose judgment I would have any interest in.
50:31Can you can you meet with Mitchell?
51:14And I said, I'm going to present your case, which as I told you, we didn't believe him, as strongly as he indicates, but he feels it has to be presented.
51:24It must be presented.
51:24It's as strong as you can.
51:27And I said, I'm going to present the other case as strongly as he can.
51:32And then I want Conley to take on it today.
51:35I was about to say, I'm quite a fool to hit the Russian reply.
51:37I should know Conley's first judgment is never very good.
51:40It's too impulsive.
51:42You know how he is.
51:44I should let him sleep one of a day.
51:46One of a day.
51:48Right on.
51:48I think it's the right way to proceed.
51:54For a while, but what a good reception you had last night.
51:58By God, you know, one thing about us...
52:02We go down, we go down with the old guns blazing, aren't we?
52:05And I'm not sure we're going to go down.
52:07I think something out there is going on.
52:10We think, God damn it, you know, you're at the end of that and also maybe, I don't mean yours, but whoever said that.
52:17But, you know, you said that's what the papers showed.
52:23I mean, you were relating with others about it.
52:36people in those divisions up here, they would be consolidated in the division, and they would be knocking off Ant-Loc.
52:42Hell, listen, what is more important than that?
52:44Ant-Loc is essentially more important than, than, than, than, than Foo, Foo Bee, or whatever the crack of it is.
52:52Contum.
52:53Contum.
52:53What do you mean by Contum?
52:55I mean...
52:57The handlocked, you see there, they don't have enough artillery.
53:00I mean, they couldn't get that much artillery and tanks out there.
53:04But of course, these goddamn South Vietnamese had still not opened their own to handlock.
53:07Oh, I asked King today about it.
53:10He said they were always, always...
53:11I don't believe that.
53:14I mean, I don't... No, he didn't say it in any confident way.
53:18He said, I don't know, it's like he was pissed off or something.
53:23They're moving.
53:24In fact, they're pulling the airport brigade out of Antlat.
53:31That's not a bad idea.
53:32And pulling another airport brigade out of Khantoum and sending them up to Hue.
53:38That is a good idea.
53:40In other words, give up Khantoum.
53:43Yeah, but Khantoum is lost anyhow.
53:48So that, I think, is a good idea.
53:49Well, can we get out?
53:55That's in circle.
53:58But that's a lousy division up there.
54:00We've just got to recall that it was maldeployment.
54:07If they had put those two divisions up there and put them back to MK, then they wouldn't have had to have the airport up there.
54:14Then they could have had the airport.
54:16The thing is, I told Al today that now we've got the Air Force thinking in goddamnit terms, which really
54:25It's the best analogy, but it's a mistake maybe.
54:29But nevertheless, Khang Tu and all the rest of Khang Tri are nothing compared to Hue.
54:36Hue is like Verdun, and it must be held in the last few weeks, and therefore put everything in there and have it out in Hue.
54:47But Hue could be held.
54:50Yes, if they get that other division up there, I think they can hold it.
54:53I don't think they can hold it now.
54:56If they have the Airborne up there and the 1st Division up there.
54:58I also feel that they get around the clock one out there.
55:04They're beginning to do that now.
55:06They're now using flares and they're flaming a lot of trucks, seeing that.
55:20I just think the Air Force lies.
55:22I do too, but they, you know, how did it happen?
55:28It just has, it cannot be that this Air Force never hits anything.
55:33And give them 20 trucks a day, that's 100 trucks a day.
55:37You mean 11 World War II, however, the Strategic Air Force?
55:55Well, these folks, he said, are pretty good at close-ground support.
55:58If you give us bothers or a shed, why don't we have airplanes that are flying 100 feet from the ground?
56:04Like the Germans.
56:04Remember the Germans?
56:05They just knocked the shit out of them.
56:08And what do we have?
56:09Helicopters for that purpose, not for our pride's sakes.
56:12The helicopter wasn't made for that purpose, Henry.
56:15We've got helicopters.
56:16Everything in this respect we're doing is just...
56:20I mean, our Air Force, when this is over, has to be redesigned.
56:23And the Army?
56:25And the Army.
56:25And the Navy?
56:27The Navy is closest to being right.
56:29All right.
56:31The Navy is...
56:31I've been right.
56:32I have a memorandum.
56:33It's a fixed missile.
56:37Do you remember what it did?
56:39Yeah.
56:40Do you remember the three destroyers?
56:43Oh, yeah.
56:43One of the little land posts.
56:45Yeah.
56:49I think they're going to get our carriers down there.
56:56Well, not down there, but I mean in the war with the Soviets.
57:00They wouldn't dare to sink one of our carriers down there.
57:04They know we'd go crazy.
57:05I think, Mr. President, what we ought to consider
57:17uh it is uh it's just they have put it to us but it's just no good way of losing it your first instinct was right i i asked myself what maybe i should have bothered to leave that total throat you to the world but wouldn't have done it any good because these guys i told you you're an associate
57:47The only backup position that you could take with the Soviet would be
58:28And I don't think it was in all their words to say that we have to have a, that we cannot have an anti-fancy between now and the end of the summer.
58:39If they'll stop their fancy, we'll stop them from coming.
58:44Now, that's probably the only question for them.
58:56I mean, I'm just thinking that after the Soviet, there's an argument that means for us, it gives us what we would need, the ideal vision that right after the summit, we'd blast the shit out of them.
59:06And, of course, the weather works that.
59:09Yeah, that is region one.
59:11But, uh...
59:11I don't care where, but I mean, some of that we don't have to consider any other region.
59:15We can just throw it all in region one.
59:20No, that's a possibility.
59:21You see what I'm saying?
59:24You see, I look back at what I think Laird is setting us up for in terms of the recrimination.
59:38Mr. President, we have a good record on that because all he recommended was that we bomb the missile sites.
59:53The missile sites are a waste of effort.
59:57That was the basis of our rejecting it.
59:59Not before China, he didn't recommend anything after China.
1:00:03He recommended that we hit the missile sites.
1:00:06The missile sites don't affect the operations in the south.
1:00:07We wanted to hit the supply dumps.
1:00:10Yeah.
1:00:11I'm just telling you what I think he said, too.
1:00:18Oh, yeah.
1:00:21We have him on record, but that isn't what he recommended.
1:00:24On the other side, they don't...
1:00:27Looking back on our own record, I think they did.
1:00:36I mean, much is wrote on China that perhaps that was a mistake.
1:00:39Well, no, Mr. President, before China, they weren't building up in that area.
1:00:42They were building up in the B-3 front, and we made a massive strike in there.
1:00:44Yeah, I think our telegrams went off.
1:00:47Go ahead.
1:00:48I think our television was totally wrong, but I don't think they ever intended to attack in February.
1:00:53I don't think they ever intended to attack on the B3 front first.
1:00:57I think they deliberately misled us.
1:01:00After China, the big build-up in the Panhandle started in March, for those four weeks.
1:01:07Now, it's easy now in that respect to say we should have found it.
1:01:11The most we were ever able to do was three days.
1:01:15We were never able to do more than three days at a time.
1:01:18Did that make any sense?
1:01:22No, because you know very well when we did five days in December... Oh, the North!
1:01:26We're talking about the North.
1:01:31Three days wouldn't have made any difference.
1:01:34We've been bombing them for two weeks and we haven't stopped their supply chain.
1:01:42I suppose that's the only other thing we can say.
1:01:45We should have done it sooner.
1:01:50The Ubers did not get in on the last weekend.
1:01:55That didn't affect the metal.
1:01:56It was no battle with the turrets.
1:01:58All it did was weaken your negotiating hand.
1:02:02No.
1:02:02I think last week, first of all, Mr. President, they didn't use us.
1:02:05I was in favor of killing them last weekend.
1:02:07Oh, you know, a migration.
1:02:10I was strongly in favor.
1:02:11Moorer came to us and pleaded not to do it because they needed the assets in the battle for country.
1:02:19The great danger was... You've got more...
1:02:22The great danger was that if you ordered them to attack Hanoi and Haiphong last weekend, that you were then going to put yourself in the position of...
1:02:33Speaking of this case, I think I will reverse my thought about these Americans on the ground.
1:02:44But do you think we could use some of our helicopter gunships and so forth and so on, in other words,
1:03:01I think Mr. President, it would have been a good thing to hit them.
1:03:05It wouldn't have affected the negotiation on Tuesday.
1:03:09They are not going to negotiate until the defendant has run its course.
1:03:13It doesn't make any difference because they've got too much riding on it.
1:03:16They've got their whole army in a foreign country.
1:03:21And there's just too much riding on it for them.
1:03:29Have we got a property report yet on them?
1:03:55Do you agree with him or not?
1:03:57I just can't tell.
1:04:00I honestly can't tell.
1:04:01I think he may probably have gotten a bad rap, but these goddamn newsmen are there.
1:04:06But it's exactly like Ted in his respect, Mr. President.
1:04:10If we, if here we are on May 4th or 5th or whatever today, it's June 15th.
1:04:19If we can make them lose two or three divisions out of the way, they've lost the war.
1:04:25That basically has to change.
1:04:27They just won't be able to fight anymore again for two years.
1:04:46Would you mind getting Thompson out there?
1:04:51Yeah.
1:04:52On the spot.
1:04:58But we need to cool this.
1:05:00We should actually experiment to get out of here.
1:05:05Well, I'm not sure we shouldn't send him out again.
1:05:07I guess, frankly, we're not satisfied with the reporting.
1:05:12We can't make decisions based on what the goddamn haters call us and stuff.
1:05:16But we can't get him out fast enough.
1:05:17Well, let's set an effective summit decision anyway.
1:05:19Do you think it's well worth it to be out there?
1:05:22No.
1:05:34We'll see.
1:05:37Come to?
1:05:38Come to.
1:05:38Weekend, of course.
1:05:41When will it come?
1:05:42Tomorrow, next day.
1:05:43It hasn't been attacked yet.
1:05:46I think within 48 hours of whenever it's attacked.
1:05:49I would guess by the weekend.
1:05:52But then, that will be the 7th.
1:05:55Then it will take them two or three weeks to get down to Flagstaff.
1:05:57Or maybe they'll catch Flagstaff, too.
1:06:00But by then, it's the end of the season.
1:06:02Yeah.
1:06:11Well, did we ever send that message out?
1:06:39I said, give up the territory.
1:06:40You've never heard of that.
1:06:42You sent a message to that asshole.
1:06:47That was the second day.
1:06:48You said, give up your country.
1:06:50I didn't mention this at all.
1:06:53No, no, but you said it.
1:06:54And you said it to Moro.
1:06:56You didn't say it to me.
1:06:57Moro was sitting here when you told me.
1:07:00Give up territory.
1:07:03And, uh...
1:07:14I think we should do it, probably.
1:07:18I'm reaching the point that I may be going too far, of even thinking of putting some Marines ashore in Vinn.
1:07:26I think the major problem now is the Vindicata and Ward.
1:07:33But that may be going too far.
1:07:47Well, that would shake them completely at the end of all of this, say, foreign troops.
1:07:52But we ought to look whether we can put some salary in the media.
1:07:56Well, that I can do for a minute.
1:07:58I don't mind furnishing the... We have the landing craft, for instance, used in South Vietnam.
1:08:09Even if they could go up there for 12 hours and just stay there.
1:08:13Right.
1:08:13Just stay there as long as you can.
1:08:15It's got to be a plan.
1:08:32Well, they should walk out and say, we'll come back.
1:08:38Oh, yes.
1:08:38Oh, yes.
1:08:38Provided he does it in a way that they simply
1:09:00I agree with you.
1:09:03Now, Porter does have the tendency to put things in a little bit of extreme ways.
1:09:11Yeah, I know.
1:09:12Okay.
1:09:12I have another point.
1:09:13I think you should get permission
1:09:29see what they could use.
1:09:30I have an idea that might shape the Russians pretty good, that we could get some more air force or something into there.
1:09:37I don't know, I don't understand.
1:09:39I'm just thinking of... Well, let's take it easy on that, because the Israelis are pretty wild, and if they get it, I mean, they may be like the noise, but we're concerned we may not be able to hold them.
1:09:50But... No, but we should do it after the...
1:09:55Things get a little worse.
1:09:57The way to play their actions is, if we break the summit, is to keep holding on to a lot of the things they want in front of them as a partnership.
1:10:10In bilateral relations, it would be in our interest to avoid this, to keep them from going ape, and only after they've gone ape should we play this race.
1:10:25I mean, it's not in our interest to have the Russians go away against us.
1:10:32I think if we cancel the summit, it should be in a very gentle way.
1:10:36I mean, a very gentlemanly way that says all of it is still open.
1:10:42We'll meet when we cannot meet while Russian tanks and Russian guns are shooting at Americans.
1:10:57I mean, let's make quite a direct letter, a message from me to your line saying that the Russians have been, have not, say not only in this but in other areas, have proved to be not trustworthy, see that we nicely live in Vietnam, and that what we do know in Vietnam is not directly against them, but against the Russians.
1:11:20We can make small, good points with that.
1:11:24Mr. President, we have come back from every crisis stronger and have become stronger.
1:11:28Well, we have to be quite, quite aware of that.
1:11:30There's one difference in the other crisis.
1:11:40There was always been the service majority before us.
1:11:47This time, they can't spend the
1:11:54ever been made in the history of this office, and the people are going to be terribly, terribly put down because of it.
1:12:03So let's face that.
1:12:10We have to realize, other than Kansan, that people are going to be disappointed.
1:12:15A few hogs will get a lot of wires favored, and that will be hog wire, which is not a majority.
1:12:22And in the meantime, it will unleash our political enemies to hell.
1:12:28They will pass, probably, resolutions that would just knock the hell out of us, make fun of the cutoffs and everything else.
1:12:35We've got to figure that will happen.
1:12:38We've got to figure, I guess what I mean,
1:12:57Captain, perhaps you may not remember.
1:12:59I remember.
1:13:00The crew shot.
1:13:02Very ill, everybody called Kennedy.
1:13:04Floated for the last two weeks, but he helped them all the way.
1:13:07Sorry.
1:13:10The Republicans will do the same on me.
1:13:12Well, they may or may not.
1:13:14It depends.
1:13:16Well, they will for the reason that we will take a bad, bad ball, we call it, to pick your eyes.
1:13:20We're going to get squeals and this and that and the other thing.
1:13:26And as they see the possibility of a Democrat winning, they'll say, now we wish this time to get right down to two.
1:13:32I mean, I'm just looking at the worst of both worlds.
1:13:34That's one of the things they might do.
1:13:36And let's not have any illusions about that.
1:13:38You see, you and I, we talk about those things that I'm going to talk about with Dr. Guter today, patriotism, loyalty, principle, and the rest.
1:13:46And we say we hope to God that there's enough of that in the country.
1:13:50Well, there certainly is enough to support the bombing in the north in order to involve a disaster.
1:13:57Whether there is enough to support
1:14:04See, it's the whole thing.
1:14:05Yeah, but I'm not sure.
1:14:06The whole China thing was important from this one standpoint on.
1:14:11The American people are suckers getting to know you, all that bullshit.
1:14:15There are people and people.
1:14:17Yeah, but for precisely that reason, to go there under these circumstances and to cater to that group is just...
1:14:26It isn't that group.
1:14:31But therefore, to bring it off, you would have to do enough of what they want there to have a plausible case.
1:14:39That you brought these, which means you'd have to give credits, you'd have to sign the joint statement of principle, to which I've already agreed, to moralize something subject to corrections.
1:14:56by some, and even the Russians.
1:14:58And we agree we're going to put this kind of a venture into Vietnam.
1:15:03Only when we are strong, not in the present context.
1:15:07If we go all the way to Vietnam, sure.
1:15:14I think we will pay.
1:15:15Why don't you take your speech?
1:15:19My speech?
1:15:20Oh, the speech for you.
1:15:22Tomorrow.
1:15:22No, not by this afternoon.
1:15:23By noon, hopefully.
1:15:25Don't say that, because you and I are going to meet at 3 o'clock, so give them until this evening at 7 o'clock.
1:15:41Okay.
1:15:52He said, you know, he liked the possibility to do this.
1:15:56No, I didn't get all the rations, so they'll, uh, their only, I believe, the minimum condition for a son, basically, is that, uh, as well as for the child.
1:16:06There's, there must not be an offensive over Moscow for the, for ten days before, and during the period after that, the families.
1:16:18The public themselves,
1:16:28Yeah.
1:16:30But that's okay.
1:17:31America's pride has always been its people, a people of good men left by the millions, of great men left by the remarkable ones, and once in a long while, of giants, who stand ahead in the shoulders of their country, setting a high and noble standard for us all.

On May 4, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Ronald L. Ziegler, Stephen B. Bull, Henry A. Kissinger, and John B. Connally met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:06 am to 9:59 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 719-004 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 719-4
Date: May 4, 1972
Time: 9:06 am – 9:59 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     Some carpenters

     President's meeting with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
          -Instructions to Haldeman
                 -Melvin R. Laird
                      -Responsibility in public relations
                            -Burning of US building in South Vietnam
                                 -News story

Ronald L. Ziegler entered at 9:07 am.

     J. Edgar Hoover
          -President's eulogy
                -Review
                -Nature of statement
                -Press coverage
                -Distribution time

     L[ouis] Patrick Gray, III’s previous meeting at the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]

                                        (rev. Jan-02)

           -Press coverage of FBI
           -Congressional criticism

     Hoover eulogy
         -Distribution

Ziegler left at 9:09 am.

     Vietnam
          -Press reports
                -Haig
                -Ziegler
                -Department of Defense interviews
                -Briefing for John B. Connally
                     -Henry A. Kissinger's attendance

     Advice on response to North Vietnam offensive
         -Connally
         -National Security Council [NSC]
         -William P. Rogers, Laird
               -The President’s view
         -Charles W. Colson, Clark MacGregor
         -Connally
         -John N. Mitchell
         -Kissinger
               -Poll
                     -Results
         -Soviet Summit
               -Kissinger's advice
                     -Timing of North Vietnam offensive
                           -Appearance of US weakness
               -Briefing with Connally
                     -Haldeman and Kissinger
                     -Timing
         -Connally
               -Call from Haldeman
               -Briefing with Haldeman, Kissinger
                     -Time
                     -President's meeting with Kissinger
                     -Importance
                           -Forthcoming Soviet response
                     -Mitchell

                                   (rev. Jan-02)

Kissinger's previous speech at the Metropolitan Club
     -Reception
     -Speaking ability
     -Importance
           -Gordon Gray

Vietnam
     -Press reports
     -North Vietnam offensive
           -South Vietnam response
                 -Shakeup of command
           -US command
                 -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                       -President's discussion with Kissinger
     -Soviet Summit
           -Cancellation
           -Blockade
     -Military targets
           -Coordination with blockade
     -Blockade
           -Cessation
                 -Conditions
                       -Prisoners of war [POWs] release
                       -Ceasefire
                 -Criticism
                       -Conflict with Soviets
                 -US military evaluations
                       -Navy
                       -Haig
                       -The President’s view
                             -Army
     -Connally
           -Briefing
                 -Time
           -President's schedule
                 -Kissinger

FBI
      -Hoover
      -Gray

                                        (rev. Jan-02)

    Vietnam
         -End-the-war amendment
              -John C. Stennis amendment
              -Delay on vote
              -Clifford P. Case-Frank F. Church amendment
              -Robert C. Byrd-Michael J. Mansfield amendment
              -Presentation to Senate
                    -Mansfield
                    -Byrd
              -Content
              -Mobilization of supporters
              -President's response
         -John A. Scali
              -Leak at State Department
              -Contacts with press
         -Kenneth W. Clawson
         -Richard A. Moore
         -Rogers
              -The President’s view

    Haldeman's meeting with John R. (“Tex”) McCrary, Scali, Moore
         -Soviet trip
              -Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
                     -Cancellation of her trip
                     -Analogy to People's Republic of China [PRC] trip
                          -Itinerary
                     -McCrary
                          -Haldeman’s view

    White House staff
         -Instructions for Haldeman
         -Colson

    Connally
        -Meeting

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 3m 2s ]

                                          (rev. Jan-02)

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6

**********************************************************************

     Forthcoming election
          -National conventions
               -Plans for security
                     -Organization

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 9:07 am.

     Kissinger
          -Meeting with the President

Bull left at an unknown time before 9:30 am.

     Forthcoming election
          -Republican National Convention
               -Plans for security
                    -Term of service
                    -Advantages over National Guard and police
                    -Personnel
                    -Training

     Democratic convention
         -Plans for security
               -Reubin O. Askew
               -Miami Beach mayor
         -White House help
               -John D. Ehrlichman
               -Egil (“Bud”) Krogh, Jr.

     Vietnam
          -"Hawks"
                -Fears of secret administration plans
                -Knowledge of public support for the President
          -Poll

Kissinger entered at 9:30 pm.

                                       (rev. Jan-02)

     Vietnam
          -Kissinger's talk with Connally
                -Time of meeting
                     -Haldeman
                     -Arrangements

Haldeman talked with Connally at an unknown time between 9:30 and 9:35 am.

[Conversation No. 719-4A]

     Meeting
          -Time
          -Place

[End of telephone conversation]

     Vietnam
          -Advice
               -Mitchell
                    -Value
          -Meeting
               -Time
               -Kissinger's schedule
                    -Meeting with Mitchell
                    -Time

Haldeman left at 9:35 am.

     Soviet Summit
          -Forthcoming briefing of Connally
                -Haldeman's role
                -Kissinger's role
                -Connally's judgment

     Vietnam
          -Kissinger's reception at The Metropolitan Club
          -Administration efforts
                -The President’s view
          -North Vietnam offensive
                -Failure
                -Comparison with Dien Bien Phu

                             (rev. Jan-02)

      -An Loc
            -Importance
      -Kontum
      -An Loc
            -Artillery
            -Haig
      -South Vietnam response
            -Hue
      -Kontum
            -Prospect of loss
                  -Quality of South Vietnam division
                  -An Khe
      -Hue
            -President's conversation with Haig
                  -Quang Tri
            -Importance
                  -Comparison to Verdun
            -Military action
            -Air Force reports
                  -The President’s view
      -Air strikes
            -Effectiveness
            -World War II
                  -Strategic and Tactical air [TACAIR] bombing
            -Use of helicopter
-US military forces
      -Performance
      -Reorganization
      -Styx missile
            -Use by Israeli destroyer
      -US carriers
            -Vulnerability
-Negotiations
      -Le Duc Tho
      -Nguyen Van Thieu
      -Soviet Summit
            -Back-Up position
            -Relation to offensive
-Air strikes
      -Timing
      -Intensity
      -Location

                             (rev. Jan-02)

-Recriminations
     -President's PRC trip
     -Laird's recommendations
-Previous air strikes
-US intelligence
     -The President’s view
     -North Vietnam intentions
-Previous offensive
     -US air strikes
            -Duration
            -Effects
            -Moorer's position
                  -Quang Tri
                  -Hanoi, Haiphong
     -Helicopter gunships
            -Hue
                  -The President’s suggestion
     -Impact on negotiations
            -North Vietnam stakes in offensive
     -Reports
            -Saigon
            -Hue
                  -Haig's assessment
            -Press coverage
                  -Comparison with Tet offensive
     -North Vietnam capabilities
     -Evaluations
            -Sir Robert Thompson
            -Haig's mission
            -Abrams
            -Accuracy
     -Kontum's future
     -Pleiku
            -North Vietnam advances
            -Defensive withdrawals
                  -An Khe
     -Loss of territory
            -Duong Hoi, Quang Tri, Tannenberg
            -President's advice to unknown person and Moorer
     -Blockade
     -Implementation
            -Submarines

                                 (rev. Jan-02)

     -US policy
          -Major goal
                -Kissinger’s view
          -Possible invasion of North Vietnam
                -US troops
                -South Vietnam troops
                      -US equipment
     -Negotiations
          -William J. Porter
          -North Vietnam demands
                -Impending US walk-out
                -Thieu
                -Porter
                      -Kissinger’s view

Middle East
    -Kissinger meeting with Yitzhak Rabin
          -Transfer of F-4s to Israel
                -Effect on Soviet Union
          -Israelis
                -Kissinger’s view
                -US influence

Soviet Summit
     -Possible cancellation
          -US response
                -Israelis
          -Reasons
                -PRC
          -President's message to Chou En-Lai
                -Assurances
          -President's speech
                -Public response
                      -Resolutions in Congress
                -Soviet propaganda
                      -Joseph C. Kraft
                      -1960 election
                            -Nikita S. Khrushchev And John F. Kennedy
                -Soviet feeling about the President
                      -Democratic challenge
     -US bombing
          -Public support

                                         (rev. Jan-02)

                     -PRC trip
                           -US support
                     -The President’s view
                     -Vietnam negotiations
           -Soviet Summit
                -Kissinger's draft for President's speech
                     -Time of delivery to President
                     -Time of Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG] meeting
                -US conditions
                     -North Vietnam offensive
                           -Cessation period
                -Cancellation
                     -Risks
                     -Record

Kissinger left at 9:59 am.
  • 719-001 8:43 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 8:43 am and 8:45 am.
  • 719-002 8:45 AM · 13 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:45 am to 8:57 am.
  • 719-003 8:58 AM · 7 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Rose Mary Woods, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:58 am to 9:02 am.
  • 023-150 9:30 AM · 38 sec — H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, White House operator, President Richard M. Nixon, and John B. Connally talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:30 am and 9:35 am.
  • 719-005 9:59 AM · 29 sec — President Richard M. Nixon met in the Oval Office of the White House at 9:59 am.
  • 719-006 9:59 AM · 22 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:59 am and 10:03 am.
  • 719-007 9:59 AM · 23 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:59 am and 10:22 am.
  • 719-008 10:22 AM · 8 min — H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:22 am to 10:31 am.

Conversation 719-004, May 4, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/719-004 (accessed September 18, 2026).