Conversation 721-006

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Well, I think the reason I put him on, Mr. President, is because he took another negative line at the WETEC last night.

I then pulled him back after that.

And I think if you don't have him for five or ten minutes, people will say you did it without an intelligence briefing.

What is he going to agree on?

I don't know.

I don't know what the impact of such an operation could be on all of Cleveland.

Oh, I believe you don't have anything.

No, I've had more of those.

Describe the operation for ten minutes and then end.

What's, uh, what's the last thing you want to do?

That won't work.

It turned out he was really quite emotional.

I gave him a mantra in hell.

I said, let me tell you one thing.

If you ever talk this way to the president, you'll need another job that evening.

Because you're our intelligence officer.

We don't need you for policy judgment.

You know it.

But he's emotional now.

Well, he said he's seen these things as long as he's here and they never work.

Well, the CIA line is thinking shift everything to rail.

Now, against this, you have to consider that 2.2 million tons came in through Haiphong last year, and only 300,000 came in over rail.

That means 85% of their imports would have to be diverted from sea to rail.

It would take time.

It's theoretically possible, but between something that's theoretically possible and that's practically feasible, requiring the cooperation of the Soviet Union and Communist China,

the rerouting of all supplies, the assembly of rolling stock, and all of that in the face of anti-air attacks.

I just thought, if it weren't known that he was opposed to it, I mean, we have to be very careful.

We will have, when we go through with this, a murderous problem with the bureaucracy.

I mean, this is worse almost than Cambodia.

I had a really, I didn't bother you with it, emotional session

with these WANDAX people last night.

We've got to get Johnson out of it because he's had a massive heart attack, Mr. President.

He's going to live through it.

He's excellent, and this is no reflection on his policy views, but I really don't see how we can have a man who's just recovered from a massive heart attack.

What did you ask one man in Russia for?

Russia for?

But you'll have to be ready to have heads rolled, because if you do this, and then it fails, that'd be the worst of everything.

The only way we can make it stick is through ferocity.

On the other hand, you have until, say, two to call it off.

You know, I'm just trying to...

If you hear... Not my strength.

The Vice President feels it's going to be to complicate the election.

Of course.

On the other hand, he says he hates to do it.

On the other hand, he sees no alternative.

Your whole credibility and the credibility of this country will be down the drain if we just sit so finally by.

So he's reluctantly for it, which is about the way you can't do it, too.

I didn't want to bother him.

Alec Johnson violently against it, from which I assumed that they're all against it, except Morder and Rush.

Connolly is... What were their options?

What were their options?

Of course, they'll give you a lot of arguments.

They'll say, first, everything will depend anyway on the South Vietnamese.

Because nothing you do up there is going to affect that battle for less before three months.

If they can hold three months, that's a defeat already for the North Vietnamese.

So I think basically they do nothing except bomb and, you know, just continue what we're doing.

We take the desk.

And that's the position they take.

Laird, I think, might go a little further.

I think Laird would almost such as soon have to shout at his enemies, give up the ghost, and then say, he'd say, these sons of bitches, we did everything for them in the past that wouldn't fight.

Roger, it is so hard to predict because you apply it in terms of what will do me most damage and give him most publicity, so... Yeah, it's a lot of ratings.

It's hard to know, but...

The first one, in fact, you should be very mindful of.

It's also supposed to be, it should have some effect on the battle in South Vietnam right now.

After this emotional meeting yesterday, I got my fellow necropontist in again.

And I got in, what's his name, the chief assistant of health.

I said, all right, you've heard of all of this.

Are you still for this operation?

They both said yes.

Their argument is the North Vietnamese are at the absolute limit of their manpower now.

to reorient 2.2 million tons of supplies, even if it were possible.

It may be beyond them.

To fight a 15-division campaign, plus a bombing campaign, plus a blockade, may overstress their command and control system.

Thirdly, the shot in the arm for the shoddily of the needs, which is intangible.

Fourthly,

that if we do it now, before there's a debacle in Vietnam, we'll have a negotiating card if there is a debacle for our prisoners.

Well, the whole point that I'm making is that the perfectly candid way to do this is that I put it in the speech.

We've got a negotiating card for the prisoners, and also a negotiating card if there is a debacle for 60,000 Americans.

there is a ball of strong argument, because there may be a debacle when it comes.

This is a hell of a negotiation.

I know this.

Incidentally, you put in that paragraph I asked Andrews to write that I talked to you about.

I just thought we needed a slightly more positive characterization of your peace proposal in there, so it didn't just get lost.

I understand.

You cut it down, and there's another.

You've raised it, and I don't like it.

We shouldn't say fled right by the wall.

Well, but we can probably...