Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 723 › Conversation 723-007

Nixon, Ziegler & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit

Thursday, May 11, 1972 · 11:02 AM–11:21 AM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Ziegler, Ronald L.; [Unknown person(s)]; Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation723-007 on Tape 723 (tape position 00:58:43–01:18:50)StartThursday, May 11, 1972 at 11:02 AMEndThursday, May 11, 1972 at 11:21 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 723-007 ↗

President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Ronald Ziegler met to discuss the political fallout and public messaging strategy following Nixon's decision to mine North Vietnamese harbors. The group analyzed the unexpectedly mild reactions from the Soviet Union and China, concluding that a Soviet summit remains highly likely despite the escalating conflict. Nixon and Kissinger also reviewed military operations in South Vietnam, with the President proposing the strategic use of tank deployments based on his study of World War I tactics.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 00:58:43 into the tape and ends around 01:18:50.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
58:43There was substantive conversation about our online problems, trade, trade, including agriculture, industrial products, and so forth.
58:50I think we might have better information.
59:01They may answer for that.
59:04It's fucked up now, but it shows we're still working on it.
59:10Yeah, Mr. Fishman.
59:17The activation of the mines is what we find.
59:24You know, we call them in for this or that.
59:37It's amazing.
59:39They didn't raise anything about the summit.
59:41That's what I'll be asked.
59:48All right, sir.
59:49All right.
1:01:02talking to Al Haig, our posture throughout the day is going to be we're proceeding as he suggested.
1:01:08We're proceeding with the planning.
1:01:11If we heard anything from the Soviets regarding something, gentlemen, nothing's changed on what we said before.
1:01:16We're proceeding with our plans.
1:01:18We're proceeding with our plans.
1:01:20And also, I would say here, basically, that we're proceeding with our, this is part of a lot of bilateral discussions that are going on.
1:01:28And I was very, as an arms invitation,
1:01:33Great.
1:01:58No, actually, it is preparatory.
1:02:04We did talk about the possibility of our meeting with the secretary and all the rest, with the assumption that there would be a meeting.
1:02:15But I don't want to do that.
1:02:17I don't want to sound.
1:02:18So I say, no, the purpose was not to discuss the summit.
1:02:21It was to discuss trade.
1:02:23But however, it was a very constructive meeting.
1:02:24You could say that it was a very constructive meeting.
1:02:28And that various expansion projects have been made during a visit to the ministry on an expansion of trade in terms that are beneficial to both countries.
1:02:50Good, that's good.
1:02:51Then they'll say, well, did, uh, bring in, mention anything about the mining?
1:02:54No.
1:02:55No, there was, uh, Vietnam was not discussed.
1:02:58It did not come up.
1:02:59That's, that hasn't, that hasn't treated me good.
1:03:02There was no discussion about Vietnam at all.
1:03:05Fine.
1:03:06It's almost not discussed.
1:03:10This is good enough.
1:03:13I just went on.
1:03:15You could say this, that, uh,
1:03:17particularly following up on Dr. Kissinger's and Dr. Kissinger's comments.
1:03:20He's just trying to get some guidance from the address.
1:03:29I think it should have been no more than a courtesy call.
1:03:31Mark, Mark.
1:03:34Well, I didn't say anything.
1:03:35This was just part of our ongoing discussions on trade.
1:03:40And I think until there's maybe a final move, I think we should just say it was a courtesy call.
1:03:48Why don't you just say it was a courtesy call that the, that Mr. Greshner received the second stanza and he was there.
1:04:07Why don't you say it?
1:04:09Just say that it is agreed that the Soviet leaders received our representatives and the President received their representatives on their hair.
1:04:21Vietnam?
1:04:24Just we don't comment?
1:04:26Well, if he says no comment, then it's trying to be... Well, on Vietnam, I'd say no comment.
1:04:32But on any other subject... No, just don't get into it.
1:04:34And if he asks about the sun... We're proceeding with our plan.
1:04:38Well, I don't want you to say that.
1:04:41Well, that's what Alice had to say.
1:04:44If you change that today, it's an extraordinary... No, I say I have nothing new to announce on it.
1:04:49I just say I have nothing new to announce on what I said previously about some period.
1:04:54It's just cold, but that's better.
1:04:56Good.
1:04:57To me, it's big for itself anyway.
1:04:59I mean, if you... Did you see the water?
1:05:01No, but if you were in Hanoi today and saw a picture of the president laughing with his...
1:05:06But the Soviet Minister of Commerce, he wouldn't be through with the answer.
1:05:21I think we've won.
1:05:23The polls had said you were going to go forward.
1:05:27The polls would never say that.
1:05:29Why didn't you ask them?
1:05:31No, no.
1:05:32They did it very cleverly.
1:05:35uh i called that battery yesterday because of you know particularly speaking to this clown you know he's just a thug but your brain was picking that up you know
1:05:50It really was true.
1:05:51Last time I read most of Churchill's tragedy.
1:05:54But the point was, I said, look at World War II and how we, you know, the problems we had with the polls and all the rest of it.
1:06:05I said, now we've got to not worry about these other things.
1:06:08We've got to make the big play, and I can do more than my ministers and everything else works out.
1:06:13I think he's really got the ability to have their tongues out.
1:06:15The funny thing is, Mr. President,
1:06:17I've noticed on a number of occasions, even when I haven't had a chance to talk to you, you say the same thing.
1:06:25When I was in Moscow, for example, I told Brezhnev...
1:06:29The big play.
1:06:30Not the big play, now, that is, what you said on the wartime.
1:06:33I said what we really need is to get the spirit we had in wartime for peace signs.
1:06:39Well, I said the same thing.
1:06:40I said we work together in peace to build our new countries.
1:06:44You know, this is another very subtle thing.
1:06:47I said we're the most powerful Islamic countries in the world as well as the most powerful in the world.
1:06:58What do the polls say?
1:07:00I had called the polls yesterday to tell him on your behalf
1:07:07to let the government know that we would take extraordinary care about their ships.
1:07:12I just figured maybe we could get a reading from them.
1:07:17I said I want them to know that their ships can be part of that.
1:07:22So they came in today and they said they appreciated that communication from you because it would be tragic if anything happened to their ships.
1:07:33And they said,
1:07:38He said Poland will make a public declaration which will take into account the serious nature of the situation, but which will also be very moderate, since Poland does not wish to make difficulties in connection with the pending visit of the President.
1:07:54It does not wish to have a negative influence on the favorable development of Polish-American relations which shall develop from that visit.
1:08:03Well, they quickly...
1:08:05They will not cancel it.
1:08:08The chances are now...
1:08:10I said there were 10% that they would go on.
1:08:14Now I say there are 72% that you'll be able to go forward.
1:08:16It's almost too late for them to cancel it.
1:08:19Their governmental statement, Mr. President, is so...
1:08:32Rob was saying in the press that there was all moaning around World War III this morning.
1:08:45Bullshit.
1:08:46What in the name of Christ?
1:08:47I love it.
1:08:49There may be other things, but World War III is about us.
1:08:51Is this heading to the Lord Jesus?
1:08:52It's unbelievable.
1:08:54Mr. President, this has been one of the masterful diplomatic campaigns.
1:08:57Your letters, of course, people don't know that.
1:08:59The Chinese made an official statement last night
1:09:03which was milder than the statement they made when we found Hanoi.
1:09:07They said it's a serious escalation of the war that Chinese people condemned, and they will continue to support Vietnam.
1:09:14They didn't say they'll run the blockade.
1:09:16We warned the Americans, no attack on you, no attack on American imperialism.
1:09:22In the letter to Zhou Enlai, we put in a little proof that, Prime Minister, of course you will use phrases like imperialism.
1:09:30But you will remember when I saw you in Shanghai, I told you that we could not yield to military actions, but we would be generous in our peace, sir.
1:09:38This is which, as a great salesman, you will keep in mind, we are sure.
1:09:43And so we played back to your conversation to him.
1:09:45And America, we didn't use the good materials at the time.
1:09:50And the Chinese criticism, if I were in particular.
1:09:56The Russian criticism.
1:09:58The Russian criticism.
1:10:00is almost the minimum they can do.
1:10:03I mean, they condemn the action.
1:10:06They say the United States must, as he said, the Soviet government resolutely condemns the blockage of power.
1:10:13Well, they condemn the bombing, too.
1:10:15This is confusing a lot of people.
1:10:19Just a picture of this.
1:10:21Mr. President, a picture of this.
1:10:22The weak Chinese response.
1:10:26The Chinese have no interest.
1:10:27You see this week with the press all over the air.
1:10:30Mr. President, when you go to Moscow, the Moscow trip goes on.
1:10:35The press is destroyed.
1:10:36The Democrats are destroyed.
1:10:39What the hell are the Democrats going to say?
1:10:44Then you come back from Moscow, the blockade is still in effect.
1:10:47You have the goddamn agreement signed that we're going to do what in God's name.
1:10:53I mean, we are home free then.
1:10:54Here we go.
1:10:59But the heroic aspect of your decision was that you not only thought there was a chance that they'd cancel, you did it with the certainty that they'd cancel.
1:11:18My staff members were all in favor of the decision and convinced it would lead to a cancellation.
1:11:27I think right now he may have changed his mind.
1:11:33It's going to be a hell of a blow to him.
1:11:40But that's something else again.
1:11:42Mr. President, what you have suffered, and what you have had to go through, and that you did this alone in an enlightened year,
1:11:54knowing all the Russians had to do is go the other way, as you would have had the most horrible summer.
1:12:01You did it for the sake of the country.
1:12:03I was in the executive office building with you when you said on innumerable occasions you're doing it for the next president.
1:12:12You know it makes logic, but you cannot do the wrong thing by the country.
1:12:16And the disgrace that these chiefs
1:12:19establishment people who like to talk to you about you in terms of trickiness and being just a politician.
1:12:27I've seen you in Cambodia, on India-Pakistan, that you were willing to go to the edge of nuclear war on this.
1:12:35So everything down the drain for the country.
1:12:38I mean, everything personal down the drain.
1:12:40Now, it is now, I think, the chance that I'll be on board that they will not cancel the summit.
1:12:51I have a little report on the military situation.
1:13:00Yes.
1:13:01That's right.
1:13:02It's still quite a military one.
1:13:05On the 13th, it would be tomorrow night, our time.
1:13:09There's going to be a massive 75-plane B-52 strike north of Kuwait, and then we're going to land 2,000 Marines behind.
1:13:18South Vietnamese Marines.
1:13:19South Vietnamese Marines.
1:13:21Can I make one suggestion to you, and I don't know whether you want to push it ahead or not, or the military?
1:13:29As you know, I have become virtually an expert on World War I, too, because I read a lot of them.
1:13:38To me, it was just, instead of seeing the truth, it was also very interesting.
1:13:43You must remember, did you study World War I much?
1:13:47Do you remember 1918?
1:13:47You know, Turkey was a great attack.
1:13:51In 1918, the French were 300 Renault tanks.
1:13:53You know, they fought this long goddamn war, 300 Renault tanks, without artillery, without bombardment advance.
1:14:02Made a fantastic breakthrough in one place.
1:14:04The British did it in another.
1:14:06Those were two of the actions which helped to, maybe the Germans were lost anyway, but they helped to, you know, to crumple the whole line.
1:14:13The Americans, when they came, they did all this tank thing.
1:14:16Now, can I ask you one careful question?
1:14:20I realize the big tanks are gone.
1:14:25But why not take about, do we have 1,000 small tanks?
1:14:28About 300.
1:14:28All right.
1:14:29Take 300 of them there and have them make just one offensive, positive run.
1:14:35You see, we've, I just feel, and you never know what's going to happen.
1:14:38You know what I mean?
1:14:40Do we have that kind of...
1:14:41Right now, there's a massive attack on Antlon, Mr. President.
1:14:44It started again yesterday.
1:14:47They're throwing 75 P-52s.
1:14:48I thought that was Antlon.
1:14:50Well, it started this morning, aren't they?
1:14:54You know, when did the 75s start hitting?
1:14:56This morning, aren't they?
1:14:57They are hitting, aren't they?
1:14:59And their attack started last night, so it's about, it's too early.
1:15:03When did the 75s start hitting?
1:15:08Not really, but it's worked out well.
1:15:10I mean, we didn't anticipate that we were going to hit there anyway, just to... Well, if they don't have any effect, then I don't know what AFR can do.
1:15:20But just as soon as that situation is stabilized and we've done this operation in a way, then we should do a major offensive move.
1:15:29And I will run it past, I will mention it tomorrow, by the way.
1:15:33But I think we've got this thing now.
1:15:35If we can keep everything...
1:15:37When do they, when do they, what do we do?
1:15:40We just can't wait, wait a fair pleasure.
1:15:43I think we just go ahead with the summit.
1:15:47Well, should you tell Raymond that or, I guess you don't say anything, but we are not going to let those guys have any option.
1:15:56It won't count.
1:15:57It's not Thursday, Henry.
1:15:58Did you realize I've got to start studying for the day, I think.
1:16:01I would start studying this weekend, but I would not raise any question about it.
1:16:06I think it's a mistake.
1:16:08Well, I never do.
1:16:10I think we should just stay cool about it.
1:16:13I don't think they're going to do it.
1:16:16Why not?
1:16:17You think they knew this meeting was going to take place today?
1:16:21Mr. President, there is no chance that a Soviet minister would call on you without Central Committee approval.
1:16:30He talked as if he implied the summit was going on.
1:16:34I think the summit will go on.
1:16:38At any rate, I will start studying.
1:18:38Second, over and in.

On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, unknown person(s), and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:02 am to 11:21 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 723-007 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 723-7

Date: May 11, 1972
Time: 11:02-11:21 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Ronald L. Ziegler.

      President's previous meeting with Nikolay S. Patolichev
           -Ziegler's statement
                  -Meeting description

                -Trade relations
                     -Agriculture
                     -Industrial products

     Vietnam
          -Blockade
               -President's decision
                     -Press commentary

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 11:02 am.

     President's previous meeting with Soviet trade representatives
          -Ziegler's briefing
                 -Soviet summit
                      -Questions

     Refreshment order

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 11:08 am.

     President's previous meeting with Soviet trade representatives
          -Ziegler's statement
                 -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s suggestion
                 -Bilateral discussions
                       -Arms limitation
                       -Trade
                 -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                 -Purpose of meeting
                       -Trade
                 -Wording of statement
                       -Progress
                             -Trade expansion
                 -Vietnam discussion
                       -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 11:08 am.

                -Wording of statement
                    -Kissinger’s view
                    -Brezhnev, Aleksei N. Kosygin, Maurice H. Stans
                          -Exchange of representatives
                    -Vietnam topic

                            -Ziegler's comment
                      -Soviet Summit
                 -New announcements
                 -Significance for North Vietnam

Ziegler left at 11:10 am.

     Soviet summit
          -Poland’s prediction
                -Significance
                -Kissinger’s call to Jerzy Michalowski
          -President’s meeting with Patolichev and Dobrynin
          -US-Soviet relations
                -President’s comments on World War II alliance
                      -Winston S. Churchill’s experience
                      -Kissinger’s meeting with Brezhnev
                      -Adolph Hitler
          -Kissinger’s call to Michalowski
                -Ships in Haiphong
                      -Polish response
                            -Significance
          -President’s trip
                -Likelihood of cancellation
          -Press comments
                -Alarmist
                      -Ziegler’s reports
                      -The President’s view

     Vietnam
          -Blockade
               -President’s letters to Brezhnev and Chou En-lai
               -People’s Republic of China [PRC] statement
                     -Tone
                     -Wording
               -Message to Chou En-lai
                     -US goals
               -PRC statement
                     -Restraint
               -Soviet statement
                     -Wording
               -PRC statement
                     -Kissinger’s view

           -Press reaction
-Soviet summit
     -Political repercussions
           -Press
           -Democrats
     -Agreements
           -Benefits for president
-Blockade
     -Decision
           -Kissinger’s view
     -Kissinger staff's assessment
     -William P. Rogers
           -Soviet summit
     -President’s previous decision
           -Risks
                  -Election
                  -Soviet response
           -Motives
           -Previous decisions
                  -Cambodia
                  -India-Pakistan war
                  -Risks
     -Soviet summit
           -Likelihood of Cancellation
-North Vietnam offensive
     -Military region one
           -B-52 strike
                  -Time
                  -Extent
                  -Location
           -South Vietnam marine landing
                  -Number
     -World War I and II
           -President’s expertise
                  -Suggestion for Haig and military
           -Tanks
                  -Use in World War I
     -US tanks
           -Use in South Vietnam
                  -The President’s suggestion
     -An loc
           -B-52 attacks

                              -Time
                              -Impact
                                   -Forthcoming Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG]
                                         meeting
                                   -Kissinger’s view
                 -Hue
                      -Use of President's suggestions
                            -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
           -Soviet summit
                -President’s preparations
                      -Kissinger meeting with Dobrynin
                -Likelihood of Cancellation
                      -Kissinger’s view
                            -Previous meeting with Patolichev
                                 -Significance
                -President's preparations

Kissinger left at 11:21 am.
  • 723-006 11:01 AM · 31 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:01 am and 11:02 am.
  • 723-008 11:21 AM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:21 am and 11:22 am.
  • 024-071 11:22 AM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:22 am and 11:32 am.
  • 024-072 11:22 AM · 15 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 11:22 am and 11:32 am.
  • 338-037 11:22 AM · 18 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 11:22 am and 11:32 am.
  • 024-073 11:32 AM · 25 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson talked on the telephone from 11:32 am to 11:33 am.
  • 338-038 11:32 AM · 34 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 11:32 am and 11:33 am.
  • 024-074 11:34 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone from 11:34 am to 11:35 am.

Conversation 723-007, May 11, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/723-007 (accessed October 9, 2026).