Conversation 723-007

TapeTape 723StartThursday, May 11, 1972 at 11:02 AMEndThursday, May 11, 1972 at 11:21 AMTape start time00:58:43Tape end time01:18:50ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Ziegler, Ronald L.;  [Unknown person(s)];  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, unknown person(s), and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:02 am to 11:21 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 723-007 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 723-7

Date: May 11, 1972
Time: 11:02-11:21 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Ronald L. Ziegler.

      President's previous meeting with Nikolay S. Patolichev
           -Ziegler's statement
                  -Meeting description

                                         (rev. Jan-02)

                -Trade relations
                     -Agriculture
                     -Industrial products

     Vietnam
          -Blockade
               -President's decision
                     -Press commentary

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 11:02 am.

     President's previous meeting with Soviet trade representatives
          -Ziegler's briefing
                 -Soviet summit
                      -Questions

     Refreshment order

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 11:08 am.

     President's previous meeting with Soviet trade representatives
          -Ziegler's statement
                 -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s suggestion
                 -Bilateral discussions
                       -Arms limitation
                       -Trade
                 -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                 -Purpose of meeting
                       -Trade
                 -Wording of statement
                       -Progress
                             -Trade expansion
                 -Vietnam discussion
                       -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 11:08 am.

                -Wording of statement
                    -Kissinger’s view
                    -Brezhnev, Aleksei N. Kosygin, Maurice H. Stans
                          -Exchange of representatives
                    -Vietnam topic

                                        (rev. Jan-02)

                            -Ziegler's comment
                      -Soviet Summit
                 -New announcements
                 -Significance for North Vietnam

Ziegler left at 11:10 am.

     Soviet summit
          -Poland’s prediction
                -Significance
                -Kissinger’s call to Jerzy Michalowski
          -President’s meeting with Patolichev and Dobrynin
          -US-Soviet relations
                -President’s comments on World War II alliance
                      -Winston S. Churchill’s experience
                      -Kissinger’s meeting with Brezhnev
                      -Adolph Hitler
          -Kissinger’s call to Michalowski
                -Ships in Haiphong
                      -Polish response
                            -Significance
          -President’s trip
                -Likelihood of cancellation
          -Press comments
                -Alarmist
                      -Ziegler’s reports
                      -The President’s view

     Vietnam
          -Blockade
               -President’s letters to Brezhnev and Chou En-lai
               -People’s Republic of China [PRC] statement
                     -Tone
                     -Wording
               -Message to Chou En-lai
                     -US goals
               -PRC statement
                     -Restraint
               -Soviet statement
                     -Wording
               -PRC statement
                     -Kissinger’s view

                              (rev. Jan-02)

           -Press reaction
-Soviet summit
     -Political repercussions
           -Press
           -Democrats
     -Agreements
           -Benefits for president
-Blockade
     -Decision
           -Kissinger’s view
     -Kissinger staff's assessment
     -William P. Rogers
           -Soviet summit
     -President’s previous decision
           -Risks
                  -Election
                  -Soviet response
           -Motives
           -Previous decisions
                  -Cambodia
                  -India-Pakistan war
                  -Risks
     -Soviet summit
           -Likelihood of Cancellation
-North Vietnam offensive
     -Military region one
           -B-52 strike
                  -Time
                  -Extent
                  -Location
           -South Vietnam marine landing
                  -Number
     -World War I and II
           -President’s expertise
                  -Suggestion for Haig and military
           -Tanks
                  -Use in World War I
     -US tanks
           -Use in South Vietnam
                  -The President’s suggestion
     -An loc
           -B-52 attacks

                                          (rev. Jan-02)

                              -Time
                              -Impact
                                   -Forthcoming Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG]
                                         meeting
                                   -Kissinger’s view
                 -Hue
                      -Use of President's suggestions
                            -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
           -Soviet summit
                -President’s preparations
                      -Kissinger meeting with Dobrynin
                -Likelihood of Cancellation
                      -Kissinger’s view
                            -Previous meeting with Patolichev
                                 -Significance
                -President's preparations

Kissinger left at 11:21 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

There was substantive conversation about our online problems, trade, trade, including agriculture, industrial products, and so forth.
I think we might have better information.
They may answer for that.
It's fucked up now, but it shows we're still working on it.
Yeah, Mr. Fishman.
The activation of the mines is what we find.
You know, we call them in for this or that.
It's amazing.
They didn't raise anything about the summit.
That's what I'll be asked.
All right, sir.
All right.
talking to Al Haig, our posture throughout the day is going to be we're proceeding as he suggested.
We're proceeding with the planning.
If we heard anything from the Soviets regarding something, gentlemen, nothing's changed on what we said before.
We're proceeding with our plans.
We're proceeding with our plans.
And also, I would say here, basically, that we're proceeding with our, this is part of a lot of bilateral discussions that are going on.
And I was very, as an arms invitation,
Great.
No, actually, it is preparatory.
We did talk about the possibility of our meeting with the secretary and all the rest, with the assumption that there would be a meeting.
But I don't want to do that.
I don't want to sound.
So I say, no, the purpose was not to discuss the summit.
It was to discuss trade.
But however, it was a very constructive meeting.
You could say that it was a very constructive meeting.
And that various expansion projects have been made during a visit to the ministry on an expansion of trade in terms that are beneficial to both countries.
Good, that's good.
Then they'll say, well, did, uh, bring in, mention anything about the mining?
No.
No, there was, uh, Vietnam was not discussed.
It did not come up.
That's, that hasn't, that hasn't treated me good.
There was no discussion about Vietnam at all.
Fine.
It's almost not discussed.
This is good enough.
I just went on.
You could say this, that, uh,
particularly following up on Dr. Kissinger's and Dr. Kissinger's comments.
He's just trying to get some guidance from the address.
I think it should have been no more than a courtesy call.
Mark, Mark.
Well, I didn't say anything.
This was just part of our ongoing discussions on trade.
And I think until there's maybe a final move, I think we should just say it was a courtesy call.
Why don't you just say it was a courtesy call that the, that Mr. Greshner received the second stanza and he was there.
Why don't you say it?
Just say that it is agreed that the Soviet leaders received our representatives and the President received their representatives on their hair.
Vietnam?
Just we don't comment?
Well, if he says no comment, then it's trying to be... Well, on Vietnam, I'd say no comment.
But on any other subject... No, just don't get into it.
And if he asks about the sun... We're proceeding with our plan.
Well, I don't want you to say that.
Well, that's what Alice had to say.
If you change that today, it's an extraordinary... No, I say I have nothing new to announce on it.
I just say I have nothing new to announce on what I said previously about some period.
It's just cold, but that's better.
Good.
To me, it's big for itself anyway.
I mean, if you... Did you see the water?
No, but if you were in Hanoi today and saw a picture of the president laughing with his...
But the Soviet Minister of Commerce, he wouldn't be through with the answer.
I think we've won.
The polls had said you were going to go forward.
The polls would never say that.
Why didn't you ask them?
No, no.
They did it very cleverly.
uh i called that battery yesterday because of you know particularly speaking to this clown you know he's just a thug but your brain was picking that up you know
It really was true.
Last time I read most of Churchill's tragedy.
But the point was, I said, look at World War II and how we, you know, the problems we had with the polls and all the rest of it.
I said, now we've got to not worry about these other things.
We've got to make the big play, and I can do more than my ministers and everything else works out.
I think he's really got the ability to have their tongues out.
The funny thing is, Mr. President,
I've noticed on a number of occasions, even when I haven't had a chance to talk to you, you say the same thing.
When I was in Moscow, for example, I told Brezhnev...
The big play.
Not the big play, now, that is, what you said on the wartime.
I said what we really need is to get the spirit we had in wartime for peace signs.
Well, I said the same thing.
I said we work together in peace to build our new countries.
You know, this is another very subtle thing.
I said we're the most powerful Islamic countries in the world as well as the most powerful in the world.
What do the polls say?
I had called the polls yesterday to tell him on your behalf
to let the government know that we would take extraordinary care about their ships.
I just figured maybe we could get a reading from them.
I said I want them to know that their ships can be part of that.
So they came in today and they said they appreciated that communication from you because it would be tragic if anything happened to their ships.
And they said,
He said Poland will make a public declaration which will take into account the serious nature of the situation, but which will also be very moderate, since Poland does not wish to make difficulties in connection with the pending visit of the President.
It does not wish to have a negative influence on the favorable development of Polish-American relations which shall develop from that visit.
Well, they quickly...
They will not cancel it.
The chances are now...
I said there were 10% that they would go on.
Now I say there are 72% that you'll be able to go forward.
It's almost too late for them to cancel it.
Their governmental statement, Mr. President, is so...
Rob was saying in the press that there was all moaning around World War III this morning.
Bullshit.
What in the name of Christ?
I love it.
There may be other things, but World War III is about us.
Is this heading to the Lord Jesus?
It's unbelievable.
Mr. President, this has been one of the masterful diplomatic campaigns.
Your letters, of course, people don't know that.
The Chinese made an official statement last night
which was milder than the statement they made when we found Hanoi.
They said it's a serious escalation of the war that Chinese people condemned, and they will continue to support Vietnam.
They didn't say they'll run the blockade.
We warned the Americans, no attack on you, no attack on American imperialism.
In the letter to Zhou Enlai, we put in a little proof that, Prime Minister, of course you will use phrases like imperialism.
But you will remember when I saw you in Shanghai, I told you that we could not yield to military actions, but we would be generous in our peace, sir.
This is which, as a great salesman, you will keep in mind, we are sure.
And so we played back to your conversation to him.
And America, we didn't use the good materials at the time.
And the Chinese criticism, if I were in particular.
The Russian criticism.
The Russian criticism.
is almost the minimum they can do.
I mean, they condemn the action.
They say the United States must, as he said, the Soviet government resolutely condemns the blockage of power.
Well, they condemn the bombing, too.
This is confusing a lot of people.
Just a picture of this.
Mr. President, a picture of this.
The weak Chinese response.
The Chinese have no interest.
You see this week with the press all over the air.
Mr. President, when you go to Moscow, the Moscow trip goes on.
The press is destroyed.
The Democrats are destroyed.
What the hell are the Democrats going to say?
Then you come back from Moscow, the blockade is still in effect.
You have the goddamn agreement signed that we're going to do what in God's name.
I mean, we are home free then.
Here we go.
But the heroic aspect of your decision was that you not only thought there was a chance that they'd cancel, you did it with the certainty that they'd cancel.
My staff members were all in favor of the decision and convinced it would lead to a cancellation.
I think right now he may have changed his mind.
It's going to be a hell of a blow to him.
But that's something else again.
Mr. President, what you have suffered, and what you have had to go through, and that you did this alone in an enlightened year,
knowing all the Russians had to do is go the other way, as you would have had the most horrible summer.
You did it for the sake of the country.
I was in the executive office building with you when you said on innumerable occasions you're doing it for the next president.
You know it makes logic, but you cannot do the wrong thing by the country.
And the disgrace that these chiefs
establishment people who like to talk to you about you in terms of trickiness and being just a politician.
I've seen you in Cambodia, on India-Pakistan, that you were willing to go to the edge of nuclear war on this.
So everything down the drain for the country.
I mean, everything personal down the drain.
Now, it is now, I think, the chance that I'll be on board that they will not cancel the summit.
I have a little report on the military situation.
Yes.
That's right.
It's still quite a military one.
On the 13th, it would be tomorrow night, our time.
There's going to be a massive 75-plane B-52 strike north of Kuwait, and then we're going to land 2,000 Marines behind.
South Vietnamese Marines.
South Vietnamese Marines.
Can I make one suggestion to you, and I don't know whether you want to push it ahead or not, or the military?
As you know, I have become virtually an expert on World War I, too, because I read a lot of them.
To me, it was just, instead of seeing the truth, it was also very interesting.
You must remember, did you study World War I much?
Do you remember 1918?
You know, Turkey was a great attack.
In 1918, the French were 300 Renault tanks.
You know, they fought this long goddamn war, 300 Renault tanks, without artillery, without bombardment advance.
Made a fantastic breakthrough in one place.
The British did it in another.
Those were two of the actions which helped to, maybe the Germans were lost anyway, but they helped to, you know, to crumple the whole line.
The Americans, when they came, they did all this tank thing.
Now, can I ask you one careful question?
I realize the big tanks are gone.
But why not take about, do we have 1,000 small tanks?
About 300.
All right.
Take 300 of them there and have them make just one offensive, positive run.
You see, we've, I just feel, and you never know what's going to happen.
You know what I mean?
Do we have that kind of...
Right now, there's a massive attack on Antlon, Mr. President.
It started again yesterday.
They're throwing 75 P-52s.
I thought that was Antlon.
Well, it started this morning, aren't they?
You know, when did the 75s start hitting?
This morning, aren't they?
They are hitting, aren't they?
And their attack started last night, so it's about, it's too early.
When did the 75s start hitting?
Not really, but it's worked out well.
I mean, we didn't anticipate that we were going to hit there anyway, just to... Well, if they don't have any effect, then I don't know what AFR can do.
But just as soon as that situation is stabilized and we've done this operation in a way, then we should do a major offensive move.
And I will run it past, I will mention it tomorrow, by the way.
But I think we've got this thing now.
If we can keep everything...
When do they, when do they, what do we do?
We just can't wait, wait a fair pleasure.
I think we just go ahead with the summit.
Well, should you tell Raymond that or, I guess you don't say anything, but we are not going to let those guys have any option.
It won't count.
It's not Thursday, Henry.
Did you realize I've got to start studying for the day, I think.
I would start studying this weekend, but I would not raise any question about it.
I think it's a mistake.
Well, I never do.
I think we should just stay cool about it.
I don't think they're going to do it.
Why not?
You think they knew this meeting was going to take place today?
Mr. President, there is no chance that a Soviet minister would call on you without Central Committee approval.
He talked as if he implied the summit was going on.
I think the summit will go on.
At any rate, I will start studying.
Second, over and in.