Conversation 723-010

TapeTape 723StartThursday, May 11, 1972 at 3:09 PMEndThursday, May 11, 1972 at 3:24 PMTape start time01:26:56Tape end time01:42:37ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  [Unknown person(s)]Recording deviceOval Office

On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:09 pm to 3:24 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 723-010 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 723-10

Date: May 11, 1972
Time: 3:09 pm - 3:24 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Vietnam
          -Soviet Union response to the blockade
               -Kissinger’s previous meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                    -Leonid I. Brezhnev message
                          -Content
                          -Meanings
                          -Wording
                          -Major point
                                -Soviet ships
                                      -US attacks
                                      -Interference
                                      -Kissinger’s reassurance

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 3:09 pm.

     Refreshments

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 3:24 pm.

     US-Soviet Union relations
         -Brezhnev's message
               -Soviet Summit
                    -Reply by Dobrynin
                          -US statements

                                   (rev. Jan-02)

     -German Treaty
           -Dobrynin references
           -US position
     -Soviet Summit
           -Cancellation
                 -Timing
                 -Likelihood
                       -Kissinger’s view
           -Dobrynin's assessment of diplomatic moves
                 -President's letter
           -Comparison to Cuban missile crisis
                 -Public statements
     -President's peace proposals
     -Soviet Summit
           -Impact on North Vietnam

Vietnam
     -North Vietnamese offensive
          -US countermeasures
                -Effect
          -President's trip to Soviet Union
          -Kissinger's trip to Peking
     -Blockade
          -Press response
                -Ronald L. Ziegler's report
                      -World War III predictions
                -President's meeting with Nikolay S. Patolichev
                      -Significance
                             -Politburo decision
          -Mining
          -US air strikes
                -Cessation in Hanoi and Haiphong
                      -Time
                      -Damage
                      -Timing
                             -Soviet Summit
                -Soviet ships
                      -Instructions to Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                             -Reason
          -Soviet Response
                -Soviet Summit
          -Demonstrations

                                  (rev. Jan-02)

               -Inspiration
          -William P. Rogers
               -Forthcoming meeting with the President
                     -Time
                     -Substance
                           -Peace proposals
                           -Instructions for Rogers
               -Comments before Soviet Summit
                     -Soviet Summit
                           -Rogers's knowledge of Polish response

President's forthcoming meeting with Rogers
     -Time
     -Substance of discussion
            -Soviet response to blockade
     -State Department
            -Statement
                  -Release
                       -Time

Vietnam
     -Blockade
          -Soviet response
               -Tone
               -US response to Soviet note
                     -Timing
                            -Delivery
                     -Study
               -Dobrynin
                     -Attitude
     -Soviet Summit
          -Dobrynin's stake
          -Kissinger's forthcoming meeting with Dobrynin
          -Soviet note
               -US response
                     -Time
          -German Treaties
               -Ratification
                     -Soviet moves
                     -Time
          -Cancellation
               -Likelihood

                                         (rev. Jan-02)

                            -Kissinger’s view
                      -Polish response
                            -Interpretation
                      -Timing
                            -Press response
                            -German Treaty vote

     President's meeting with Rogers

Kissinger left at 3:24 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

It's not translated.
He read it to me.
He was translating it, but...
And it says, Colton, you do prevent irrevocable theft.
So I said, Anatole, this can mean one of two things.
It can either mean that you're telling the president to stop what he's doing, in which case it's useless, or you're telling him not to do anything additional, in which case we can talk.
And he said, well, I have the second that
that that is the correct interpretation.
And I said, all right.
I talked to the president before.
What is it that bothers you?
He said, well, there must be no more attacks on our ships.
And he said, our ships on the high seas mustn't be interfered with.
So I said, all right.
Let me promise you this.
One, we will do nothing in addition to what we are already doing.
Which is why they are planning .
Two, there'll be no attacks on Soviet ships.
Three, there'll be no interference from Soviet ships on the .
Then I said, I noticed he says nothing about the summit.
He said, well, you didn't ask us about the summit, and we saw no need to make a new decision.
And I said, well, should we ask you about the summit?
Why put us into an embarrassing position?
You have already stated publicly you're proceeding with the summit.
If our people wanted to do anything, they would have said so.
So I think we should just assume it's going to be done.
I said, well, should we say publicly?
You said just keep saying we're assuming the summit will be done.
Well, we've got them where they are.
They're sure they're dying about that German treaty.
Did he mention it?
Yes.
We could give them a little support.
When did he?
Oh, yeah.
I said, you know, let me tell you, if you can't focus on it this week, we would have understood it.
If you do it next week, I hope you realize that's an aggravation of the situation.
He said, let me understand.
I think it's on.
It's tough to ask him, do you in the light of our acts proceed with the summit?
That would be unwise.
He said, I told him, should we ask you the question?
He said, Henry, you have handled a bad situation in the best possible way.
He referred to your letter incidentally, favorably.
It's a very calm letter.
No, I think he focused that, I know.
Do you think he expected we would interfere with their ships?
I think it's like the Cuban missile crash, Mr. President, where they constructed a victory by saying they got a promise from us not to invade, which we had no intention to do anyway.
That's right.
And this way... Also, they got those, they got the turkeys.
Yeah, but that they never said publicly.
They never said this publicly.
Publicly, they said they achieved what they wanted because they got out and out from it.
Now, another thing he said, he asked me a lot of questions about your peace proposal.
And he said, how can we put it in the best possible way to annoy?
And I was evasive.
And he said, look, when the president talks to Gresham about it, if we could, it would be a little more concrete.
And I know they just might decide that it's time to squeeze them.
Oh, I think they don't even have to squeeze them, Mr. President.
They, if that thing comes off, they've had it.
They may have had it anyway, because if no one can tell me that they can send all this farming, plus the 12th Division of Handler, 12th Division of Ventura, plus having their fourth line, I mean, that has never happened before.
Plus having their two strongest allies, because you realize if we go to Moscow, I'll go to Peking at the end of June.
But Ron says the town is dying.
The press is absolutely dying.
Yeah, they were charging in here, saying this was the day World War III started, the mines were activated.
And instead, you see the Russian Minister of Foreign Trade.
And he said, let me tell you, the fact that he came in here was a public bureau decision.
We might consider telling them on Monday we should continue bombing now.
That's starting Thursday, they won't bomb in the Hanoi High Farm area.
Because we'll have knocked out the British by then and the
We'll have had a whole solid week of farming in there, then.
I don't think we... Whatever you want to use, then use it.
I think Monday I should come, and then starting Thursday morning, our time, there'll be no farming.
It's an annoying high-flying area.
Land to the south.
Land to the south.
What did I say?
That's just a personal...
Now, I've got to give the strictest instructions to Morton that no, there can be no risk with any relationship.
No fortificatives can be hit of any kind.
We don't need it now, Mrs. Benson.
No, we don't.
Mr. President, you can never be sure, but if anyone had told us, or had told me, I don't know about you, or Monday, we'd be sitting here Thursday night without a Russian press campaign, without a Russian cancellation of the seminar we'd have thought is smoking crime.
I think there is, I must say, though, I think the demonstration may be somewhat simulated by some of them.
I have no doubt about that, but still, that's minor leaks, huh?
Well, let's talk about what we say to Roger and Steve.
What time is he coming in?
He's coming in here at 4 o'clock.
I would tell him that you now want to keep Sagan.
You want no controversy with the Russian regime on their legal position.
Let it be put out by their legal department.
You don't want to elevate it to his level.
You don't think we should have the press conference.
You don't want the terms spelled out.
You just want to cool it.
No, we need vagueness of respect to that.
He's again picking off the juicy plum for himself in that foreign amounts.
Of course he didn't drink of it.
He never even dreamt of it.
He didn't even know of it until we serviced him.
Right.
Just, I'd keep him quiet now until after the summit.
He can only rock the boat.
He doesn't know there is an answer.
You can tell him until there is a Russian answer.
What if he is?
Yeah.
We will look bad if he is too soft.
We will look bad if they're tough.
And he doesn't know there's an answer, and he won't know there's an answer.
He has one foolish answer.
Yeah.
Is that what I delivered today?
They gave us a private message first, and then they did it for him the other day.
He doesn't know what triggered the photo shoot.
Maybe I'll try to get him over here a little bit sooner, by 4 or 4, and then we can get out of here real soon.
Is that all right?
Oh, yeah.
I'll get you over there, too.
I think, Mr. President, the way to put it to Rogers is to say we want to keep it quiet now.
We don't want to wait until there's a more formal Russian position.
We don't want to mail us to a formal Vietnam position.
We want to keep it like that, that our proposals have had enough emphasis on the Kurds and that it be wasted.
We'll look at it again Monday.
Well, I'd say, I would frankly think that it would be unwise for us to put out anything.
Let's have an answer.
They took three days to make a statement.
Why do we have to shoot back at them?
Let's put our hands out Monday.
Sure.
I, frankly, they have given us the most moderate reply possible.
Now, why argue with me?
I'll do it Monday or Tuesday, frankly.
And I do it in a very low-key way.
If they ask us tomorrow, say, we're still studying the Soviet Union.
In fact, they've never delivered the note to us.
They've just made a public statement.
It's not been formally delivered.
Why do we have to comment on something of which we don't have an official text?
But even if they have, we can spend two days studying it.
Green is obviously on edge of it, isn't he?
Yeah, me, man.
Green is obviously on edge of it.
A little bit.
I'm quite as comfortable to hear you.
He knows it.
Oh, it's a tough deal.
It's tough for him.
He wants this to come off.
Oh, yeah.
I think the way you handled it was just right.
You said we're not going to do any more, but we're not going to do any less.
Yeah.
And then I got in a hurry and switched ships.
Then Monday, I forgot to tell him that the Saudi insurgents said there'd be no more attacks on the Hanoi.
That helps us with Hanoi, too, when they see what we can do with Russia.
By that time, Mr. President, they had worked it over for ten days.
You think Monday is the time to do that, Hugh?
Well, yeah, probably so.
You know, some women just don't tell right today.
I wouldn't think either.
They won't do a damn thing until the children treat each other that way.
You don't think so?
They want a statement from you.
Well, we'll get it if it's, you know.
When does that happen?
We haven't had that.
I guess Tuesday would be a good time to have that.
Monday or Tuesday.
Until then, they won't do it there.
But if we give them that, it has to be a straight quid pro quo, don't you think?
They won't cancel it now.
There's nothing in it for them to cancel the day before you go there.
Oh, you mean next week then, huh?
Yeah.
But if they...
I suppose you could interpret this one another way, because you know their Polish name, this guy today.
Well, you could do, but it could be a way to set us up for an embarrassment.
Yeah, that's a hell of a premise.
Yeah, it's a risk for them, isn't it?
You see, if they had canceled the summit last week, they would have had all of our press with them.
We'd be canceled.
I mean, why?
Tuesday morning or Wednesday, even today.
But it's not going to be long until the day you're packing to leave.
I don't think.
I agree with you.
I agree with you.
I just, I mean, they lose a big advantage.
In the meantime, my lawyer is, and they wish to lose the truth, really, than in the upper house.
See, the upper house isn't holding until the 19th.
We'll call you in case he can come in.
That would be a good way to turn it.