Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 723 › Conversation 723-010

Nixon & Kissinger on Vietnam War and US-Soviet Relations

Thursday, May 11, 1972 · 3:09 PM–3:24 PM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; [Unknown person(s)]Conversation723-010 on Tape 723 (tape position 01:26:56–01:42:37)StartThursday, May 11, 1972 at 3:09 PMEndThursday, May 11, 1972 at 3:24 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 723-010 ↗

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to evaluate the Soviet Union's moderate response to the U.S. naval blockade and mining of North Vietnamese ports. They discussed managing diplomatic communications regarding the upcoming Moscow summit, specifically ensuring that Soviet interests and the German Treaty were handled without jeopardizing the President's scheduled visit. Kissinger provided updates on his recent interactions with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, and the two agreed to keep the State Department and Secretary of State William P. Rogers largely uninformed of these sensitive negotiations to maintain control over the administration's Vietnam policy.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 01:26:56 into the tape and ends around 01:42:37.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
1:27:08It's not translated.
1:27:09He read it to me.
1:27:09He was translating it, but...
1:27:12And it says, Colton, you do prevent irrevocable theft.
1:27:18So I said, Anatole, this can mean one of two things.
1:27:21It can either mean that you're telling the president to stop what he's doing, in which case it's useless, or you're telling him not to do anything additional, in which case we can talk.
1:27:35And he said, well, I have the second that
1:27:41that that is the correct interpretation.
1:27:43And I said, all right.
1:27:44I talked to the president before.
1:27:48What is it that bothers you?
1:27:50He said, well, there must be no more attacks on our ships.
1:27:55And he said, our ships on the high seas mustn't be interfered with.
1:28:00So I said, all right.
1:28:01Let me promise you this.
1:28:03One, we will do nothing in addition to what we are already doing.
1:28:08Which is why they are planning .
1:28:11Two, there'll be no attacks on Soviet ships.
1:28:15Three, there'll be no interference from Soviet ships on the .
1:28:17Then I said, I noticed he says nothing about the summit.
1:28:26He said, well, you didn't ask us about the summit, and we saw no need to make a new decision.
1:28:33And I said, well, should we ask you about the summit?
1:28:38Why put us into an embarrassing position?
1:28:40You have already stated publicly you're proceeding with the summit.
1:28:45If our people wanted to do anything, they would have said so.
1:28:52So I think we should just assume it's going to be done.
1:28:55I said, well, should we say publicly?
1:28:56You said just keep saying we're assuming the summit will be done.
1:29:04Well, we've got them where they are.
1:29:05They're sure they're dying about that German treaty.
1:29:08Did he mention it?
1:29:10Yes.
1:29:10We could give them a little support.
1:29:14When did he?
1:29:16Oh, yeah.
1:29:17I said, you know, let me tell you, if you can't focus on it this week, we would have understood it.
1:29:24If you do it next week, I hope you realize that's an aggravation of the situation.
1:29:28He said, let me understand.
1:29:33I think it's on.
1:29:36It's tough to ask him, do you in the light of our acts proceed with the summit?
1:29:44That would be unwise.
1:29:45He said, I told him, should we ask you the question?
1:29:50He said, Henry, you have handled a bad situation in the best possible way.
1:29:54He referred to your letter incidentally, favorably.
1:29:59It's a very calm letter.
1:30:03No, I think he focused that, I know.
1:30:04Do you think he expected we would interfere with their ships?
1:30:13I think it's like the Cuban missile crash, Mr. President, where they constructed a victory by saying they got a promise from us not to invade, which we had no intention to do anyway.
1:30:24That's right.
1:30:27And this way... Also, they got those, they got the turkeys.
1:30:31Yeah, but that they never said publicly.
1:30:34They never said this publicly.
1:30:37Publicly, they said they achieved what they wanted because they got out and out from it.
1:30:42Now, another thing he said, he asked me a lot of questions about your peace proposal.
1:30:46And he said, how can we put it in the best possible way to annoy?
1:30:52And I was evasive.
1:30:53And he said, look, when the president talks to Gresham about it, if we could, it would be a little more concrete.
1:31:07And I know they just might decide that it's time to squeeze them.
1:31:13Oh, I think they don't even have to squeeze them, Mr. President.
1:31:16They, if that thing comes off, they've had it.
1:31:24They may have had it anyway, because if no one can tell me that they can send all this farming, plus the 12th Division of Handler, 12th Division of Ventura, plus having their fourth line, I mean, that has never happened before.
1:31:43Plus having their two strongest allies, because you realize if we go to Moscow, I'll go to Peking at the end of June.
1:31:51But Ron says the town is dying.
1:31:54The press is absolutely dying.
1:31:59Yeah, they were charging in here, saying this was the day World War III started, the mines were activated.
1:32:12And instead, you see the Russian Minister of Foreign Trade.
1:32:16And he said, let me tell you, the fact that he came in here was a public bureau decision.
1:32:38We might consider telling them on Monday we should continue bombing now.
1:32:46That's starting Thursday, they won't bomb in the Hanoi High Farm area.
1:32:52Because we'll have knocked out the British by then and the
1:32:57We'll have had a whole solid week of farming in there, then.
1:33:05I don't think we... Whatever you want to use, then use it.
1:33:08I think Monday I should come, and then starting Thursday morning, our time, there'll be no farming.
1:33:12It's an annoying high-flying area.
1:33:13Land to the south.
1:33:15Land to the south.
1:33:21What did I say?
1:33:23That's just a personal...
1:33:26Now, I've got to give the strictest instructions to Morton that no, there can be no risk with any relationship.
1:33:39No fortificatives can be hit of any kind.
1:33:43We don't need it now, Mrs. Benson.
1:33:45No, we don't.
1:33:54Mr. President, you can never be sure, but if anyone had told us, or had told me, I don't know about you, or Monday, we'd be sitting here Thursday night without a Russian press campaign, without a Russian cancellation of the seminar we'd have thought is smoking crime.
1:34:15I think there is, I must say, though, I think the demonstration may be somewhat simulated by some of them.
1:34:22I have no doubt about that, but still, that's minor leaks, huh?
1:34:39Well, let's talk about what we say to Roger and Steve.
1:34:43What time is he coming in?
1:34:43He's coming in here at 4 o'clock.
1:34:51I would tell him that you now want to keep Sagan.
1:34:55You want no controversy with the Russian regime on their legal position.
1:34:59Let it be put out by their legal department.
1:35:03You don't want to elevate it to his level.
1:35:05You don't think we should have the press conference.
1:35:07You don't want the terms spelled out.
1:35:10You just want to cool it.
1:35:14No, we need vagueness of respect to that.
1:35:23He's again picking off the juicy plum for himself in that foreign amounts.
1:35:32Of course he didn't drink of it.
1:35:34He never even dreamt of it.
1:35:35He didn't even know of it until we serviced him.
1:35:50Right.
1:35:51Just, I'd keep him quiet now until after the summit.
1:35:55He can only rock the boat.
1:36:00He doesn't know there is an answer.
1:36:01You can tell him until there is a Russian answer.
1:36:03What if he is?
1:36:04Yeah.
1:36:05We will look bad if he is too soft.
1:36:08We will look bad if they're tough.
1:36:11And he doesn't know there's an answer, and he won't know there's an answer.
1:36:13He has one foolish answer.
1:36:16Yeah.
1:36:17Is that what I delivered today?
1:36:20They gave us a private message first, and then they did it for him the other day.
1:36:26He doesn't know what triggered the photo shoot.
1:36:38Maybe I'll try to get him over here a little bit sooner, by 4 or 4, and then we can get out of here real soon.
1:36:41Is that all right?
1:36:43Oh, yeah.
1:36:44I'll get you over there, too.
1:36:51I think, Mr. President, the way to put it to Rogers is to say we want to keep it quiet now.
1:36:58We don't want to wait until there's a more formal Russian position.
1:37:03We don't want to mail us to a formal Vietnam position.
1:37:06We want to keep it like that, that our proposals have had enough emphasis on the Kurds and that it be wasted.
1:37:15We'll look at it again Monday.
1:37:28Well, I'd say, I would frankly think that it would be unwise for us to put out anything.
1:37:38Let's have an answer.
1:37:39They took three days to make a statement.
1:37:40Why do we have to shoot back at them?
1:37:45Let's put our hands out Monday.
1:37:50Sure.
1:37:59I, frankly, they have given us the most moderate reply possible.
1:38:04Now, why argue with me?
1:38:10I'll do it Monday or Tuesday, frankly.
1:38:14And I do it in a very low-key way.
1:38:15If they ask us tomorrow, say, we're still studying the Soviet Union.
1:38:20In fact, they've never delivered the note to us.
1:38:22They've just made a public statement.
1:38:24It's not been formally delivered.
1:38:26Why do we have to comment on something of which we don't have an official text?
1:38:34But even if they have, we can spend two days studying it.
1:38:55Green is obviously on edge of it, isn't he?
1:38:57Yeah, me, man.
1:38:58Green is obviously on edge of it.
1:39:00A little bit.
1:39:00I'm quite as comfortable to hear you.
1:39:03He knows it.
1:39:07Oh, it's a tough deal.
1:39:08It's tough for him.
1:39:09He wants this to come off.
1:39:18Oh, yeah.
1:39:18I think the way you handled it was just right.
1:39:20You said we're not going to do any more, but we're not going to do any less.
1:39:25Yeah.
1:39:26And then I got in a hurry and switched ships.
1:39:30Then Monday, I forgot to tell him that the Saudi insurgents said there'd be no more attacks on the Hanoi.
1:39:46That helps us with Hanoi, too, when they see what we can do with Russia.
1:39:52By that time, Mr. President, they had worked it over for ten days.
1:39:59You think Monday is the time to do that, Hugh?
1:40:02Well, yeah, probably so.
1:40:06You know, some women just don't tell right today.
1:40:10I wouldn't think either.
1:40:10They won't do a damn thing until the children treat each other that way.
1:40:15You don't think so?
1:40:15They want a statement from you.
1:40:18Well, we'll get it if it's, you know.
1:40:22When does that happen?
1:40:24We haven't had that.
1:40:24I guess Tuesday would be a good time to have that.
1:40:26Monday or Tuesday.
1:40:30Until then, they won't do it there.
1:40:33But if we give them that, it has to be a straight quid pro quo, don't you think?
1:40:41They won't cancel it now.
1:40:42There's nothing in it for them to cancel the day before you go there.
1:40:45Oh, you mean next week then, huh?
1:40:49Yeah.
1:40:49But if they...
1:40:51I suppose you could interpret this one another way, because you know their Polish name, this guy today.
1:40:58Well, you could do, but it could be a way to set us up for an embarrassment.
1:41:02Yeah, that's a hell of a premise.
1:41:06Yeah, it's a risk for them, isn't it?
1:41:07You see, if they had canceled the summit last week, they would have had all of our press with them.
1:41:14We'd be canceled.
1:41:15I mean, why?
1:41:17Tuesday morning or Wednesday, even today.
1:41:20But it's not going to be long until the day you're packing to leave.
1:41:24I don't think.
1:41:30I agree with you.
1:41:31I agree with you.
1:41:31I just, I mean, they lose a big advantage.
1:41:35In the meantime, my lawyer is, and they wish to lose the truth, really, than in the upper house.
1:41:44See, the upper house isn't holding until the 19th.
1:41:49We'll call you in case he can come in.
1:42:28That would be a good way to turn it.

On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:09 pm to 3:24 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 723-010 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 723-10

Date: May 11, 1972
Time: 3:09 pm - 3:24 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Vietnam
          -Soviet Union response to the blockade
               -Kissinger’s previous meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                    -Leonid I. Brezhnev message
                          -Content
                          -Meanings
                          -Wording
                          -Major point
                                -Soviet ships
                                      -US attacks
                                      -Interference
                                      -Kissinger’s reassurance

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 3:09 pm.

     Refreshments

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 3:24 pm.

     US-Soviet Union relations
         -Brezhnev's message
               -Soviet Summit
                    -Reply by Dobrynin
                          -US statements

     -German Treaty
           -Dobrynin references
           -US position
     -Soviet Summit
           -Cancellation
                 -Timing
                 -Likelihood
                       -Kissinger’s view
           -Dobrynin's assessment of diplomatic moves
                 -President's letter
           -Comparison to Cuban missile crisis
                 -Public statements
     -President's peace proposals
     -Soviet Summit
           -Impact on North Vietnam

Vietnam
     -North Vietnamese offensive
          -US countermeasures
                -Effect
          -President's trip to Soviet Union
          -Kissinger's trip to Peking
     -Blockade
          -Press response
                -Ronald L. Ziegler's report
                      -World War III predictions
                -President's meeting with Nikolay S. Patolichev
                      -Significance
                             -Politburo decision
          -Mining
          -US air strikes
                -Cessation in Hanoi and Haiphong
                      -Time
                      -Damage
                      -Timing
                             -Soviet Summit
                -Soviet ships
                      -Instructions to Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                             -Reason
          -Soviet Response
                -Soviet Summit
          -Demonstrations

               -Inspiration
          -William P. Rogers
               -Forthcoming meeting with the President
                     -Time
                     -Substance
                           -Peace proposals
                           -Instructions for Rogers
               -Comments before Soviet Summit
                     -Soviet Summit
                           -Rogers's knowledge of Polish response

President's forthcoming meeting with Rogers
     -Time
     -Substance of discussion
            -Soviet response to blockade
     -State Department
            -Statement
                  -Release
                       -Time

Vietnam
     -Blockade
          -Soviet response
               -Tone
               -US response to Soviet note
                     -Timing
                            -Delivery
                     -Study
               -Dobrynin
                     -Attitude
     -Soviet Summit
          -Dobrynin's stake
          -Kissinger's forthcoming meeting with Dobrynin
          -Soviet note
               -US response
                     -Time
          -German Treaties
               -Ratification
                     -Soviet moves
                     -Time
          -Cancellation
               -Likelihood

                            -Kissinger’s view
                      -Polish response
                            -Interpretation
                      -Timing
                            -Press response
                            -German Treaty vote

     President's meeting with Rogers

Kissinger left at 3:24 pm.
  • 723-009 3:03 PM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:03 pm and 3:09 pm.
  • 723-011 3:24 PM · 26 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:24 pm and 3:25 pm.
  • 723-012 3:25 PM · 13 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:25 pm to 3:39 pm.
  • 024-079 3:39 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 3:39 pm.
  • 024-080 3:39 PM · 40 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan) Nixon talked on the telephone from 3:39 pm to 3:40 pm.
  • 723-013 3:39 PM · 32 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Thelma C. ("Pat") (Ryan) Nixon met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:39 pm and 3:40 pm.
  • 723-017 3:39 PM · 40 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at 3:39 pm.
  • 723-014 3:40 PM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:40 pm and 3:45 pm.

Conversation 723-010, May 11, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/723-010 (accessed October 9, 2026).