On May 11, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, William P. Rogers, Henry A. Kissinger, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:51 pm to 4:44 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 723-016 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Oh, sure.
They don't want to have it.
They don't want to have it.
People are better than the Russians.
Well, that's right.
And that old boy took along with some of them, right, and said, you know, don't give them a chance to manage your land or anything, you know.
Remember, he's one of those former communes, like, who don't say anything.
So I think that's the right thing to do.
Yeah, go.
We'll stop this way.
It's all right.
Okay.
I just got a good day.
Beautiful tree this spring.
Too bad you don't have a place here where you have a little privacy.
This isn't the place.
No, you can't really walk out of the lawn.
You can't see the fence.
You can't see it.
I don't think you've seen it.
You know, Johnson's such an exhibitionist.
He let me go down to the fence.
Just the babies and all that sort of stuff.
I didn't, uh...
I've been thinking about what I think is best.
First of all, I think
They, uh, that's what those, uh, sponsors here, you know, they want to be with us a thousand percent, but most of them aren't much in the way of character.
Well, Peterson and Flanagan are supposed to be putting it to them.
You know, because we've, we've had this problem.
The business council always, they talk about their great support of the president, and everything, everything's out of their meetings at that first.
I thought what I'd do is, it's almost what I did to the sub-captain, because that got a good emotional response.
Yeah, it's the emotional response.
And, uh,
And I just, I think if you could emphasize, Bill, that this was a very hard decision, as you said, and that we sat there, you were there, we sat there for three hours.
We heard every argument.
We could have done it either way, and that I rather did it the easy way.
I did it the hard way because I think it's the right way.
And also the political risk.
Bill Smalls will understand that.
If a little of that could get across to them.
That group was quite, interestingly enough, quite well covered.
because the people who are down there, it can affect their morale and the market.
The market's going to put the heat on them for some support of the president.
You can lay the backdrop.
You don't have to do that.
You don't need to do it.
That's the job.
You lay the backdrop and then let them.
I mean, it's so close.
It's the administration, the administration.
Really, what I'd like to just find out from you,
general attitude, because I testified open Monday and Tuesday in a public session once in the Senate, once in the House.
Yeah, that's what the question was.
But the big idea that I was going to make is that, which I had thought about, because I had thought earlier, I thought with this week, I thought that
It seems to me that it would be better if you would hold until Monday.
In other words, not until tomorrow.
Whatever you say, I don't know.
Let me tell you why.
I mean, I'd like to get your judgment on it.
The reason I have that feeling is this, that, as you know, it's somewhat surprising to lots of people whether the Russians still act.
They, you know, this...
Yeah, he said that his visit to the president was known in Moscow.
He said he was sitting here.
He said that.
So I don't know what that means, or did we just say something?
The Polish message today is,
Now, I am so suspicious of these people that I remember...
I remember what the Greenland did to Kennedy's Cuban Missile Crisis, because he lighted his teeth.
That's right.
But on the other hand, they've got a creative mind and a bold mind, and maybe they just set this up.
But we've got a position very, very low key here.
Not one word.
Kind of wasn't that kind of long.
He came in for what was supposed to be a courtesy visit, and he literally talked for 45 minutes.
45 minutes about every little thing about, you know, they'd already talked to this old Peterson change about, you know, and I said, what am I going to do about it?
We should have agreed on that.
We should have agreed on that.
But I said to him, what he said to me was irrelevant.
Because, you know, because he just repeated what he said.
But anyway, then, and post-Peterson, as you know, we're keeping a very tight rein on Peterson.
A very tight rein on us.
We don't want to give this away.
We must have in mind that if the Russians do turn hard, we sure as hell aren't going to have access to bank credits and all that sort of thing.
Our favorite nation, we could never quote it.
But we're not saying that.
We're just doing it.
The other thing is that I think that over the weekend,
We could acknowledge it.
Actually, the Russian response was not an official response yet, as I understand it.
They have a deliberate push.
It was an official response.
It was the government.
It was the government.
It was them who handed it to us.
Well, I think the question is whether we should give a quick and sort of noncommittal response, which we could do.
In fact, they won't compare, which is good for any time.
Or just delay.
I think maybe a delay will make it look as if we were thinking of something.
There isn't a hell of a lot to say, because their statement was fairly mild.
Well, did you think it was?
Yeah.
All the people around here are telling stuff that was mild, too.
What I think we ought to do, Mr. President, I'll have drafted and sent over to you responses which are quite appropriate.
and decide how they should maybe just have Ron hand it out, or Bob McCluskey hand it out, or wait until later.
Your view is that it should not be, they'll have it.
It's the right level.
Every, every has to be a new ship, because he said that would help.
I can, I don't really say that.
They didn't do it at their high level.
Well, they just made an announcement.
They opened an announcement, that's all.
in a period of time.
I think the thing is, if you were maybe having to work out the drill there, so what level and how I think we could wait until they hand it to us officially and then in a low-key way reply to it.
I don't understand why they didn't hand it to us before they published it.
I think, frankly, they're not eager for a reply.
I don't think they want a long debate with us on it.
You know, actually, I don't know.
Do you think they may
I mean, you just don't know.
I mean, it's mild enough in one way.
On the other hand, it would be perfectly good.
John works in life.
They're going to take some other actions.
In other words, they can play both ways.
They can.
We'll soon know.
I would say that's my guess, is that they...
that they would consider it a rather risky business.
I mean, in terms of their own interests to wait until, say, Tuesday or Wednesday of next week to cancel the summit.
I think they're going to do it.
I think they have to do it tomorrow or Saturday.
Well, they could provoke something.
They could send minesweepers down and challenge us, I suppose.
be challenged, and then they could call it off.
Or if we committed them to go ahead in the mine troopers, then it would look as if we'd back down.
I think one of the things we've got to be sure about, and I spoke to Henry's wife earlier, if we're not going to answer, then I think we've got to get all our people to keep quiet, because it's going to be a hell of a temptation to say they blame today, this is a winter, or some silly thing like that.
Don't come out here at all.
There is a hell of a lot of leaking going on right now.
I was saying to him, Bob, I've never seen it like that.
I said, where the hell is it coming from?
But God, the whole radio this morning is full of it, and it all says White House sources, too.
There was NBC and CBS.
Nobody here is talking to anybody.
Well, I mean, you have.
Where is this coming from?
I have checked.
No one in my office has talked to anybody.
No, I don't know whether any of the public...
relations people have, or whether they're just making it up.
I don't know what the situation is.
No one has any of that.
David's working on that.
Well, the whole point of this, the main thing is, is that obviously you've got to get Scali and all, and just anybody, I know everyone wants to say a thing, and I'll say, oh, you control all that.
You see, you see, you see that, you see that.
Well, that's a simple story to be okay with.
uh you know it was going to very few people it was about as easy as we had after the nsc with john connie and all the details well we can we'll we will we'll handle that i mean as for people outside
But I agree with Bill completely.
We ought to all keep quiet now for a couple of days.
I got my State Department bill.
We had 20 meetings and everybody kept quiet.
I'm going to go to Camp David so it's going to be on circulation.
three specific things I'd like to talk about.
I mean, one is the Security Council has turned off.
That doesn't have a chance.
It never did.
And the Russians are against it, and the Chinese are against it.
It doesn't make any sense to begin with.
I think we shouldn't appear to be negative on it.
I mean, we've got to make it clear that somebody else has turned it down.
But I don't think you have to worry about that.
It's even a possibility.
On the incidence of sea negotiations,
They've come to an impasse based on a Russian position that we've got to talk about fixed distances.
This is something you decided some time back.
The Defense Department has been against it for a few reasons that I don't think are very good.
The Russians say that they're going to know by 6 o'clock whether we'll talk about it.
My own recommendation is we ought to talk about it.
We have our own... John Warner.
Yeah.
We have our own...
It's really a matter of whether we have some limitations on how close we can come to their ships with our planes and how close we can come to their ships with our ships.
Now, what we've suggested to the State Department is that we have at least some discussions about that and not have any limitations that are not already imposed by ourselves on ourselves.
We have limitations.
I don't like to...
The problem is, this was looked at very carefully, and the problem with it is the intelligence people, for reasons which may or may not be good, are violently opposed to these, to fixed limitations, partly because of some penetrations of the waters which are in any event illegal, and I mean, and partly...
They say .
Anyway, my people say that that's exaggerated.
First of all, I think we have rules ourselves that we don't permit our planes to fly closer than 300 feet to another ship.
It's just dangerous as hell.
And I thought it was that why not at least talk to them about the restrictions that we have on ourselves?
Not by disclosing it, but well, if we don't have the
Could we get, I mean, let's talk to them about it.
The issue is really, if you talk to them about it, you've already given me that.
Could we get a position within our government and get a paper to you which gives the arguments in a more systematic way, because I'm not in detail up on that, and I'm not sure what the bill is.
Well, I think they'll agree to extend it 24 hours.
I think they would if we'd say we let them know.
If we tell them, we'll let them know by tomorrow.
Let me see it so that I can speak.
Because my main problem is going to be keeping the military happy, the military intelligence people, and so get me something so that I can say at least right there.
I think that the Russians have a good point, because they say, well, we're not going to talk about it.
What?
There's no point of having a rule of reason.
Hell, that's what we have now.
Why not have some limitation, at least talk about how many feet we should separate from each other?
All right, let's do that.
And the other thing, really, the thing I'd like to talk to you about, Mr. President, is get your views on the possibility of negotiations in the future on Vietnam.
Now that you've talked about Indochina so much, in all your statements, and particularly the last one,
In other words, we talked about ceasefire all over China.
Now, it really is more appropriate to, if you're going to have negotiations dealing with that subject, to bring in the others.
Cambodia and Laos.
Now, the British, as you know, have been very supportive.
They've issued another good statement, and so did Trudeau, by the way.
Trudeau did?
Oh, yes.
I know that came to your attention.
And Belgium did, and we did.
Even Malaysia has.
But the question I think that is worth your consideration, and we don't have to decide it, but just think about it, is whether we should be actively attempting to find a formula for a Geneva-type convention, which is negotiated by Great Britain and Russia.
This is what the British are being forced to do.
Well, at some point, I'm not sure how you do it.
If you decide to do it, we can talk about it later.
But whether that's a good concept or not, instead of Paris, and particularly with the British being exactly as they are, it would include a Geneva-type conference.
It would probably include the British, the French, the Russians, the Chinese, the United States.
lost Cambodia and to Vietnam, something in that.
I'm just thinking about the point.
Now, the British have already proposed it.
The Russians have resisted it.
Although the last, Alec Hume just made his proposal to the Russian ambassador, who said he wanted to take it over.
That discusses his government.
The British are also talking to the Chinese about it.
Now, I think that we don't have a problem publicly.
I think the real problem is, is this something we would like to do, to accomplish?
Is this a... Tell you what I'd like to do, I'd like to...
I think a lot depends upon
what does happen, and we should know that in three days, certainly on Russia land, if the Russian thing goes forward, then I think we might have a few things which tentatively might be under consideration.
I just have a feeling that we should not move over the next three or four days in any of those directions.
I think what I'd like to do
we can is to keep it all, to keep a posture where we're taking a very strong position.
We've made a very forthcoming offer for a negotiated settlement.
And I would not try to spell it out too much at this point.
Like they say, well, what is a ceasefire?
Is it in place?
Is it a withdrawal?
And all the rest.
And that's why it's so important that we're at this point getting into the conference business because
I think they caught Mel on that a little bit.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Well, anyway, what we want to do, I'd rather just eat them because that's going to be, if they do bite.
Well, I wasn't really talking about making a public comment about it or anything of that kind.
I'm really talking about it's a possibility even when you go to the Soviet Union.
Of course, if there's something else that you're working on, you know it.
No, I don't know.
I don't even know where we're going.
No, but I mean, anyway.
It seems to me that this is something we ought to think about as a possibility for you to discuss, it seems to me.
At the summit?
Yeah, at the summit.
Or it might be something that will come out of the summit.
You see, the conference in 54 dealt, in a sense, with the same issues.
It dealt with the issue of ceasefire.
And they discussed the matter for four or five months, and then there was a ceasefire.
And they had the problem of regrouping, and whether it would be in place or not, and that type of thing.
Now, if we were looking for a device to gain some time, and somewhat a safe, face-saving device, strictly for the Russians, and you give a statement, because that does put them on the spot.
If they do anything now, it's going to appear that they did it as a result of your strong stand, which probably, from their standpoint, looks as if there would be nothing down.
if they're looking for some kind of a device to get a little time and still go ahead with the acceptance of your proposal, which is certainly fair, I don't know how anybody can expect you to do more, that the Geneva-type conference, not necessarily exactly that, but the Geneva-type conference makes some sense.
Furthermore, the Paris negotiations as a forum are not very appropriate because Laos and Cambodia are not involved at all.
So the Geneva-type conference, which included both Laos and Cambodia.
And in a sense, it turned out pretty well, because they even permitted French troops to stay in Laos and Cambodia and South Vietnam.
Small contingents, but still some troops.
So that there are a lot of analogies which would be appropriate for this type of thing.
And my suggestion really is that we think about it, not say anything about it, as far as
The British will be asked about that.
I'm sure they'll be asked, wouldn't they, about it?
And then I just think we can say, well, the President's made it clear that he's prepared to take part in a conference, and he sets out a speech, and not get tied down to a section.
I actually haven't given any thought to what you've got any reaction to.
I said we'd like to look at any proposal.
I think we ought to think about it.
There's only one reason I'd like to give it a little thought.
It's that the British have been damn good.
It's a little different from 54, because the French, for example, now, at that time, they were invincible.
Now they are sort of a negative, but it's real.
I think we ought to study it.
I think it's worth considering because we could let the British take the lead and talk to the French.
If we proposed to the French, they'd be negative because they wouldn't have anything to do with this.
But the British are quite
You know, they couldn't have a better ally.
And if we indicated to them that this was something that was desirable,
I will say this.
It certainly should indicate that we are not simply taking a negative approach on anything.
When it started with that problem, it was the second that we had been down this negotiation.
It was so long, and so long, that we were playing figures on what pessimistic about it.
But we'd like to...
I think we ought to look at it.
I'll look at it.
For sure.
Can I raise another thing that's related to it that I'd like to hear you think about?
Our supporters on the Hill are very anxious to see if they can't get something where they can vote for us.
Now, as I understand, Bob, they said they'd have to wait for a month before they had the guidance.
My immediate reaction is that I don't think you could get me to support it.
It would not be down.
You see, if they heard...
First, it would be very easy to say, well, people in Hill want to support what I offer.
Fine.
But the real question is cutting off funds after four months.
It's not a proposition.
Now, to cut off the funds after four months, then you'd have to have in some kind of like offensive action or something like that.
Because all those funds, I think, are very great to lean on.
Well, that proposal, I don't think that's the problem with this proposal.
The problem is whether we accept the principle of cutting off the funds.
This proposal is exactly, the very proposal is exactly the one that you made, except it says that if this happens, if there's a ceasefire, and the prisoners are released, and we have a regard to it, that they're after.
They'll find shelter.
They'll find shelter.
But that puts you in a position, potentially, of not being able to...
take any defensive action after the ceasefire, after the troops are withdrawn, after the POWs are returned, and they resume?
Well, let's go.
They have said, at least they tell us, that they will
I think we ought to play a very, very firm line with them through the weekend.
I don't want to start on that now, because I think that we've hit a very heavy price.
We now certainly have an RFE that's pretty well-shaped.
I think that we have, that I think that we should not be moving away.
in any perceptible way from the very strong position that I've taken on the negotiating side.
If it appears that we are backing down on negotiations that I have, the problem that I have, say, with the funding, it would worry me.
It would be the fact that I have the software.
I can't believe it.
You see what I mean?
If you just leave it where we are, you know this caused a little trouble.
He didn't say it publicly, but that four-month thing didn't go very good, too.
But he took it, right?
I wrote that in myself at the last moment.
I said, I've got to put in four months.
In fact, I almost did three months, but I just knew that would come around.
We've gone through this every year with the legislative people, because once you go this way, then you're going to get congressmen coming in and going to
improve what you start out with.
What this proposal says, in effect, is let the president settle it, but we trust him so little that we're going to cut out his funds and deprive him of all options after four months.
They can then break the ceasefire on the 120th birthday in an ambiguous way, and you'll be in the position of having to decide
what you legislated with respect to, I think, particularly with regard, I think the most important thing now is the thing that you mentioned.
The main thing about this is the main important truth.
Now that we get across to Vietnam, we must do nothing, nothing for the purpose of getting the support of the farmers, nothing for the purpose of getting the support of the country, which in any way weakens our ability to make this win.
If this, for example, has a bad morale effect in the South, the other piece, I would, I have the damn confidence to go against it.
And I just stood up there.
Well, I assume that's what I'm worried about.
I don't know.
I think we, well, I'm just trying to, I know that you're just, they'll all be talking to you.
And I think if we could take the line, look, we made a very bad proposal here.
And I don't think we could appoint a second president again on this.
I have no difficulty with that.
I think, just to be sure you understand, Stennis and Byrd, I'm not saying what Kennedy said.
Stennis and Byrd are saying, we recognize that.
We don't want to do it that way.
We really want to say something that's totally consistent with what the president's done.
We don't want to make it worded any way we want.
Now, I agree with you.
This is probably not the time even to talk about it.
And I think we can argue .
The only reason we don't have any option, because they're going to be talking about it starting tomorrow.
The only reason my race, if we're being raised by case,
Stennis and Bird are different, and I don't think we should be unreasonable with him.
Stennis has been a hell of a good soldier, and he's, you know, he's having some... No, he doesn't want to do it.
He's trying to get something that he can vote for, and he's trying to get something that's totally consistent with your position.
And I think that what they have a feeling, I think, about is that they have a feeling that we are just kicking the teeth no matter what they do.
The only text I've seen did have a punch cut out in it.
Yes, but I mean... No, I mean the text, the supported text.
No, no, the text which was brought to us
as an elected supporter.
That's not what the president wants to do.
The one you've seen is a burden for us.
I don't think we have to do it now.
I don't agree with this, but one argument that's raised the other way is that you could have a unanimous vote
in the Senate in favor of a resolution that laid out all the specifics of your thing and said, put in that it is the sense of the Senate so that it didn't make it legislation.
or the sense of the Congress, that no funds shall be used for after 120 days after the President, after all that time.
The argument for that would be the value to you of a unanimous Senate vote in support of the President's policy.
I never got against it.
It's worth being good.
By getting the argument against is what it does with regard to
I have one overriding concern, and that is coming all the way to Vietnam.
I mean, that's all right against public opinion here, and public opinion here is a problem.
But if anything erodes our ability to pull off the Vietnam thing,
It's all about the children.
The main thing is to keep that on the Senate.
You've got congressional action one way or another.
You can get the House Armed Services Committee now.
If we have it, it's going to be anything.
Another thing, Mr. President, is we've got to get funds for it.
Well, I'm trying to find money.
But we don't get the appropriations.
If we don't get the funds, we don't have it.
Well, anyway, we can certainly think this one over at the weekend.
I do think that we've got to think very hard and long before the utility head makes tennis.
Oh, absolutely.
He's got to be very, like, center-serving because he's a key man.
Well, I think it's a better topic.
Well, I think it's a better topic.
But I'd like to say that from what we're doing now on Monday, I think the best thing to do is to keep everybody just discredited in the speculation about the point of position, and to stay in that position.
And I think it's going to be more of a talk by Bobby, and then by myself.
He mentioned to spread some vote over the weekend.
Do we have any other military action from the weekend that we missed?
Oh, I just had to tell him about it.
I meant it, but I'm sure it's about to be here.
I don't think they're going to just continue to get the railroad through.
That's, the actions now are limited to what you said, the railroad, the POL.
We finished the, we finished the...
The railroad, the plumbing seems to be fairly successful, if you know what I mean.
I think so, yeah.
But the other thing, the other action, I was very concerned about,
B-52 strikes, which is 75 in the handlock area today, 75 in the contour area tomorrow, 75 in the next amount.
And that's what I'm asking, who is going to shave it?
Whether handlock can save the nose, contour the nose.
I don't know whether the 21st Division, which is five miles away from these consoles, may not be so terrified by the people.
That's it.
That's why I say that.
They will not agree.
But anyway, what I meant is, no, we're not that.
We actually see that we're over the hump insofar as actions that might irritate Russia or anybody else.
We have a line.
We are a line.
if you're not getting any place like the... naturally in the dock areas, the ships are still there.
But this gives the Air Force exactly what they need to be able to go.
Now specifically, you're going to need to dock those damn railroads up and get the DOL on those two things.
And this is one of the only other pilots that we can holler at.
Is that right?
Yes, there are no...
Everything that's going to be hit has been discussed in West, and Alex knows about it.
There's no increase, except for these B-52 strikes, which are the same.
The main thing is, it seems to me that we must use the ultimate power at the time that we have the most support, because support erodes the time that it's on.
And before it's on, somebody does come and stop.
And also, because the psychological impact of the meetings will be in all our favor if they think that maybe
What do you think about, on Monday, putting the V on the Congress for endangering the summit in case they take some action?
That's not a bad thing to say.
Look, why don't you lay off now?
Everything seems to be moving along all right.
If Congress acts.
Adversely, it may have some effect, but not nothing.
It really goes to you.
Well, I think you could say, you know, the way I think of it, you know, what it says, you could put it rather in a general sense.
You could say the President is not in charge of everything.
You know, we are a decent country.
We've been, you know, we've been breaking our backs negotiating with the sovereign government.
Negotiating, this is the course we've pursued.
We prefer.
But the Senate must think very, very carefully, or the Congress, before taking any action which undercuts the president's ability to negotiate.
We're willing to negotiate.
And whenever the Congress acts, all it does is an incentive for them to not negotiate.
Well, that's it.
I would say a couple things to sign.
To sign?
Yeah.
What's that one?
What?
And that Geneva summit conference was just so lovely that I received a hand from the British branch of Cambodian countries that had no interest or knowledge in Russian, Chinese banking.
Oh, no, you handled it perfectly right.
The thing about this, I told Bob to raise it, but I thought I'd already raised the bill.
I was sure, so I'm guessing that people are already worried about him.
Let me say it.
My reaction at the present time is that I want you to think about the problem at the Senate.
Do you understand that?
I think I will, Senator.
I want you to talk about the issues you have now.
What I do is that, by God, I have told Bob, and I, and him, and I, they go with it, they write it in court, and we must rely, even at the cost of public support for this country, even at the cost of Senate support, congressional support, which undercuts our firm, strong, if you want to describe it, ferocious... Mr. President, you've shaken, for example, all the newsmen at their teeth, practically dropping out of their mouths with the Russian side.
Next week,
You, every day, are more visibly preparing for this summit.
Who in God's name is going to pass a resolution?
I can't believe it.
Well, but the thing is, I would, next week, I would hardline it because you've got ten days while you are in Moscow.
Hanoi must be shaking to its...
to its core.
I mean, here they are on the morning that the mines activate.
Three hours after the mines activate, the Russian foreign trade minister comes to the White House, and I don't know whether you know what he said to the NBC News.
They captured him in front of the Soviet embassy, and they said, did you discuss the summit?
He said, why should I have?
He said, well, is the summit still on?
He said, was there any question about it?
He said, well, they said to him, well, what about it?
He said, the only ones that seem to have any questions about it is you.
I have one.
Really?
Yeah.
It's on all the tickets.
That's great.
That's great.
Jerry Schechter said, you guys had this all worked out ahead of time.
And...
And, uh, so...
They can still say this.
They can still say this.
Well, I thought the bill was quite about the brilliant mind of the Kennedys.
Mr. President, first of all, I'm not sure that... Mr. President is perfectly capable of lying.
Oh, sir, so am I.
And he is perfectly de-questioning if they want to cancel the summit.
Now, you can say that the German treaty prevents them from canceling the summit.
If that's so, they can't cancel it before the 19th.
No.
Now, then, supposing they cancel you on the 20th while you're on the way, what have they then gained by it?
I think that all American people, if you then turn around and come back and turn on them, you have everybody with you.
It's one thing if they had turned on you this week, they could say, be it now.
But next week, when you have done nothing in addition, when you can tell them you've given them these assurances, they've received it all,
We went ahead preparing it.
For them to flush their whole policy down the drain and make you a hero in the process is almost inconceivable to me.
This week, they had a good possibility of doing it.
Next week, they would pay an additional price, which is a burden.
Moreover, if I...
If they haven't canceled it by Monday...
And I don't see how they can now cancel it before Monday because we've got the Brezhnev answer, which is a very...
He read it.
He doesn't know that.
No, he doesn't even know there was a letter.
So we've got the Brezhnev answer.
It's mine.
I've worked out with Sabrina three principles which she's accepted.
We won't do anything other than what we're already doing.
We won't attack Soviet ships.
We won't attack Soviet ships.
and we won't interfere with Soviet force, and we won't interfere with Soviet ships on the high seas.
I said to Sabrina, this letter can be interpreted in two ways, that we can't do anything, that we have to stop what we are doing, or that we shouldn't do anything efficient.
The first we can do, the second we can do.
He said, interpret it the second way.
Now, this is a record of total treachery if they
And also being totally treacherous of me is a hell of a lot more dangerous than being totally treacherous of Kennedy.
Yes, but what's in it for them, Mr. President?
In the case of Kennedy, they were sneaking missiles into Cuba.
In this case, they're just cutting off the summit.
And what do they gain by waiting for a day?
Well, you can say they're gaining the German treaty.
In the German treaty, they could get into a war thing of wanting to go to the maximum humiliation of the President, which would be to cut him off while he isn't rude.
But I think it would help, but that would, if on Wednesday morning the Russians had put out a statement saying we were preparing good faith for the sun, the Vietnamese people are an oppressed people, the Americans are bombing it and we will not receive the raper of America, of Vietnamese, you know.
They haven't done that.
They have not started a press campaign against you, no meetings of indignation.
So that's the other thing you knew was going to happen.
It was a great stir.
They have stirred up demonstrations in this country.
Sure.
You'd expect them to do that.
Oh, no, you'd expect them to.
That's right.
But they haven't been terribly effective in doing that, and that must have registered on them, too.
I mean, that must be an attempt to see whether they could do it.
But they haven't done a big thing in Russia.
They haven't attacked you in their press.
And in other words...
They've been in very low gear.
Now, you know I expected them to cancel the summit, so I'm not...
But I expected them to do it in direct relation to your action.
Is it that way?
Can I ask this?
What in the hell is this institute who you think has... Bill refers to the police, but I didn't read the papers this morning.
Well, the story that bothers him the most is the Semple story, and that leak was common.
That had to be common.
But I'm not going to tell whether or not there's any.
I don't think we should tell Russia.
I think it's better for them to think someone in the White House did it.
Yeah.
Then there was the Marvin Cowell.
That's the other thing that he's obsessed with, is the Marvin Cowell story.
Nobody in the White House wants to tell where they fired.
It says White House sources, and I can't imagine that that was State Department using White House, setting White House.
It has to be, Mr. President.
Nobody here talks about it.
Nobody here talks about it.
Everybody over there does.
He never comes over here, either.
Well, there's the Cowell line.
Oh, that the Russians, that the White House glumly expects the Russians to cancel the summit and sees that there's no alternative for the Russians but to cancel the summit.
Now, that was yesterday evening.
Now, any of us who knew anything in the White House yesterday, we're beginning to be very optimistic.
Incidentally, are you really sure in this instance that none of our side of the press times are going to come for the best of anything?
I'm pretty sure because if they had, they wouldn't have taken that line, they would have taken the other line.
Nobody should ever take the line around here.
But that's it, they weren't.
Everything we were pumping out was the other way.
I don't believe anybody talked to them, but if anybody had, then I can't believe they would have given it that line, they would have given the opposite.
Our line was, we are preparing for the summit.
It's up to them to see whether they want to cancel it.
We see no reason to cancel it.
We said low-key.
We told them not to say anything about the summit, except the specific line that we told Ron to say, which was we're going ahead with preparations and to refuse to go beyond that.
It is not inconceivable, Mr. President, that next Friday they're going to
cancel the summit but it would be such a mean eddy move uh so inconsistent another thing that breeden said is he said you asked he said of course you didn't ask us the question so we so no reason to give you the answer i said well i'm not a little bit glad to ask you the question he said no why make us make a formal decision in response you have said publicly you're continuing your preparation for the summit our leaders know you have said this
Our leaders haven't cancelled it.
Why, that's the issue.
And I think that's right.
And their guys, they're sure at the bureaucratic level they're going ahead because our advance, we have, you know, the advance team in Moscow.
They've been there for a week.
They're going over every kind of language.
They're arguing about where the car can drive and going through what rooms are going to be assigned to who and where the... Our switchboard is set up.
We've got to complete it.
You've got a hotline right now on the White House board in Moscow.
I can get it then faster than I get in my office.
It's conceivable that they'll cancel you on Monday.
I would say after Monday the chances go from 70% by 5% to 10% every day.
So anyway, we don't have to worry about it.
In the meantime, the strategy over the weekend, for everybody to pipe down, we can.
Yeah.
And you, uh, it's about a year.
You can go over and, uh... You've got to have your tell them to comment on the other matter.
Do that, John.
Okay.
I just sort of had my problems.
And I think in the meantime, all of you and Henry, if you could pull in on everybody here, I would only suggest that, so that the congressional people know that Henry took the time to march and spent some time with Stennis.
I'll call Stennis.
I'll talk to him.
I'll meet him.
And just say, and say, Senator, let me just tell you right now, there's a lot going on.
It would be terribly helpful if you could just pipe it down.
to dance this idea, though, of Congress wanting to play a part and a role.
God damn it to hell, why don't we support the president once?
That's their excuse for cutting us out.
They don't want to support us.
Every time, all the leaders who say they want to support us, that's what Frank Church says he wants to do.
Share responsibility with you.
They help you in one of two conditions.
It's either when they think you're down,
or when they think you might be doing so well that they want to get some of the credit.
And right now they don't know which of the two is right.
They know it's one or the other.
They know there's going to be a fiat show or a success.
They know it isn't going to be in Madrid.
But the main thing right now is we're not going to do anything in any way of discounts, downgrades,
reduces the enormous threat that hangs over North Vietnam right now.
Absolutely.
That is the key to this whole thing.
That's why we can't... And really... That's why you don't want any more talk, I would think, about the peace operation elsewhere.
That's right.
And Mr. President, if the bloody thing collapses now in South Vietnam, you have done... You can get out of there from a position of strength.
But I don't think it's going to collapse.
I think what's going to happen now is that there is as good a chance that the North Vietnamese will collapse in the South as there is of the South Vietnamese collapsing.
How will they reform when they're collapsing?
Well, for example, today they captured a regimental commander in Nha An Loc.
That has never happened.
Yeah, a North Vietnamese regimental commander.
Thank you.
that they're taking him to Saigon to have a discussion with him.
Actually, I think he's going to have a very happy weekend, isn't he?
Like the Godfather, we had a gang with him.
The gang, the father always said, they'd say, how are you going to do this with him?
And he made some weird, some outrageous proposition.
He says, we're making him a proposition he will not be able to refuse.
I think the proposition he made was, we can't refuse.
Anyway, don't.
Oh, I think, Mr. President.
Do you want to get out on some stuff?
I think, well, I'm going to sign it out now, sir.
You got a point?
I think we're basically almost over the top.
I'll say that minister is, if he's wrong, he certainly doesn't look like an answer.
Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. Minister, I'm never going to say it on the list.
Yeah, but he said it's NBC.
That's even worse, because he's on the public record with that.
There's no publication in Moscow.