Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 726 › Conversation 726-001

Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Operation Linebacker

Friday, May 19, 1972 · 10:30 AM–11:42 AM ET · Oval Office · 1 hr 10 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Ziegler, Ronald L.; [Unknown person(s)]; Kissinger, Henry A.; Agnew, Spiro T. (Vice President); White House operator; Bull, Stephen B.; Moorer, Thomas H. (Adm.)Conversation726-001 on Tape 726 (tape position 00:03:06–01:13:20)StartFriday, May 19, 1972 at 10:30 AMEndFriday, May 19, 1972 at 11:42 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 726-001 ↗

President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman, Vice President Spiro Agnew, Henry Kissinger, and Admiral Thomas Moorer to coordinate administration responses to the Vietnam War and manage the public narrative surrounding the conflict. The discussion focused on the effectiveness of recent bombing campaigns and the blockade of North Vietnam, as well as the need to address internal military resistance regarding bombing targets. Nixon also received a briefing from Agnew on his recent diplomatic trip to Japan, Thailand, and South Vietnam, and coordinated plans for the Vice President to visit the recently wounded George Wallace.

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Position in tape: 00:03:06 – 01:13:20

part A, 3:19

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726b.mp3

On May 19, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Ronald L. Ziegler, unknown person(s), Henry A. Kissinger, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, White House operator, Stephen B. Bull, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:30 am to 11:42 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 726-001 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 726-1

Date: May 19, 1972
Time: 10:30 am - 11:42 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     Vietnam
          -Press coverage
                -Response
                -Spiro T. Agnew's speech
                      -Wording
          -New York Times
                -Kenneth W. Clawson response to Anthony Lewis column
                -North Vietnam propaganda
                -Ship movements
                -Administration response
                -Criticism of President's policies

     Henry A. Kissinger
         -Location
         -Jacob K. Javits
               -Dinner with Kissinger
               -Lack of support for President's policies
         -Dinner with Stewart J.O. Alsop
               -Joseph W. Alsop

      Pentagon
          -Bomb explosion
               -Suspects
               -"Weathermen"
               -Note
               -Telephone call
               -Washington Post

     Vietnam
          -Press reports on Soviet ships
                -Administration response
                     -Charles W. Colson
                     -Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                     -Robert J. McCloskey
                -Coverage
                     -St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Show the rest of the log (777 more lines)
                       -New York Times
                       -Washington Post
                       -Wire reports

     West Wing waiting room
          -Current situation
               -Shared with a secretary
          -Separate room for distinguished guests

Ronald L. Ziegler entered at 10:36 am.

     Agnew's trip
         -Meeting with press
                -Tone
                -Content
                -Report on Saigon and South Vietnam

     George C. Wallace
         -President’s visit
               -Wire reports
               -Ziegler’s press briefing

Ziegler left at 10:38 am.

     Public support for President
          -Meeting with unidentified black woman
                -Vietnam
          -Possible trips throughout US

     Soviet trip
          -Television reports
                 -Charles W. Colson
                 -Administration response
                 -Speeches
                 -Articles
          -Press speculation

     Wallace
          -President's visit
                -Handling
                -Discussion
                -President's Soviet trip

******************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 1m 59s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

**********************************************************************

     Kissinger
          -Location

Haldeman talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 10:38 and 10:48 am.

[Conversation No. 726-1A]

[End of telephone conversation]

          -Meeting with President and Agnew

     George S. McGovern

     Van Cliburn
         -Possible appearance
               -Soviet Union trip
         -Soviets' response
         -Carnegie Hall concert
               -Playing of Star Spangled Banner
               -Audience response
         -Possible appearance
               -President's dinner in Soviet Union
               -Parallel to dinner for Gen. Charles A.J.M. DeGaulle
               -Jascha Heifetz

     Radio Free Europe
          -Uses
                -Kissinger's views
                -Soviet Union
                -Poland

          -Kissinger
                -Meeting with President
                -The President’s view
                -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
          -Poland
          -Soviet Union
          -Mention of freedom
          -President's trip
                -News reports
                -Wording
          -Poland
          -Mention of freedom, religion
          -Kissinger
                -The President’s view
                      -Briefing books

     Agnew's schedule

Haldeman talked with Kissinger at unknown time between 10:38 and 10:48 am.

[Conversation No. 726-1B]

     Kissinger
          -Meeting with President and Agnew
               -Time
               -Message

[End of telephone conversation]

     Wallace
          -Harry S. Dent's analysis

     President's policies
          -Support
                 -Busing
                 -Welfare
                 -Vietnam
          -President's attitude
                 -Resignations

     Soviet trip
          -William P. Rogers
                 -Adele (Langston) Rogers

                      -Poland trip
                      -Soviet Union trip
                 -Future trips with President
                 -Adele Rogers's schedule

Kissinger entered at 10:48 am.

     President's message

Agnew entered at 10:48 am.

     Greetings

     Time

     Agnew's trip
         -Itinerary
                -Japan
                -Bangkok
                -Vietnam
         -Fundraiser
                -Tricia Nixon Cox
                -Leslie T. (“Bob”) Hope
         -Press briefing

Haldeman left at 10:51 am.

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnam offensive
               -Kontum
               -B-52 strikes
               -Number
               -Intelligence reports
               -North Vietnam attacks
               -Delays
               -Statements for Agnew
               -Loss
          -An Loc
               -Possible loss
          -Hue
               -Possible loss
          -An Loc
          -Kontum

      -Possible loss
      -Pleiku
-Casualties
-New York Times coverage
      -Lewis
      -The President;s view
-Blockade
      -Lewis column
            -Failure
      -New York Times article
            -Polish ship
            -East German ships
                  -Unloading difficulties in Haiphong
                        -Time in harbor
      -Polish ship
            -Date of arrival in Haiphong
      -Mining
            -Effectiveness
                  -Kissinger’s view
-Previous National Security Council [NSC] meeting
      -Melvin R. Laird
            -Pentagon
      -Rogers
      -Richard M. Helms
            -Intelligence community
      -Agnew
      -John B. Connally
      -Parallel To 1968 Report
            -The President’s view
            -Guerrilla war compared with mechanized war
            -Supply lines
                  -Sihanoukville
                  -Transport of war material to III and IV Corps
                  -Cambodia incursion
                  -Precision bombing of North Vietnam
-Blockade
      -Impact
      -Supplies
-Air strikes
      -Railroads
            -Destruction
      -Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL]
            -Destruction

                  -Percentage in Haiphong, Hanoi and Environs
                       -Photographs
            -Pumping stations
      -Hanoi
            -Power Stations
      -Rails
            -Bridges to PRC
                  -Effect
                       -Trucking of POL
                             -Problems
-Blockade
      -Use of PRC ports
      -Destinations
            -Haiphong
            -Vladivostok
            -Odessa
-Agnew's use of information
      -Report from French Ambassador
      -India-Pakistan War
      -Reports from North Vietnam
      -Sources
-Soviet Summit
      -Impact on North Vietnam
-Air strikes
      -Bridge destruction
            -PRC response
                  -Chou En-lai
      -Limits
            -American pilots in PRC
      -PRC response
            -Soviet ships
            -Overland movement to North Vietnam
-Blockade
      -Public support for President
            -Poll percentages
      -Soviet Summit
            -Impact
      -North Vietnam morale
      -US troop morale
            -Television reports
      -South Vietnam Morale
            -Improvements
            -US press reports

                -Nguyen Van Thieu
          -Impact on North Vietnam
     -North Vietnam offensive
          -Gains
                -Quang Tri
          -Limits
          -An Loc
          -Kontum
     -Impact of air strikes and blockade
     -Hue
          -US holding action
          -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. report
          -Kontum

Agnew's previous trip to Japan
    -Report to President
    -Japan
          -Reversion ceremonies
               -Agnew’s view
          -Eisaku Sato
               -Remarks
                      -References to US
                            -[Unintelligible]
          -[Emperor of Japan] Hirohito
               -Audience
          -Protocol for Agnew
          -Emperor Hirohito
               -Anchorage Visit
               -Possible visit to US
          -Support for the President’s Southeast Asia policies
               -Relations with US
                      -Sato
               -Takeo Fukuda
               -Kakuei Tanaka
                      -Fukuda
               -Liberal Democrats
               -Sato
                      -President's visit to PRC
                            -Impact on Japan
                      -Japanese-US ties
                            -Economic
               -Fukuda
                      -United Nations [UN] Security Council seat for Japan

                        -US position
                  -Possible successor to Sato
                        -Tanaka
            -Foreign Minister
                  -Agnew's meeting
            -Tanaka
                  -Agnew's meeting
      -Future leaders
            -Stance toward the US
                  -Sato's report
      -Liberal Democratic Party
            -Strength
            -Opposition
                  -Communist and Social parties
            -Demonstrations
                  -Reversion
                  -Police handling
-Indochina
-Lt. Gen. T.N.J. Suharto visit to Japan
      -Sato
            -View of Indochinese
            -Agnew’s response
      -Suharto compared with Thieu
            -Thieu
            -Ellsworth F. Bunker's view of Thieu
      -Sato
      -View of Indochinese leadership
-Vietnam
      -Meeting with Thieu, Bunker, and Abrams
      -Meeting with Bunker and Abrams
            -Tan Son Nhut
            -View of Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN] capacities
      -Thieu
            -Demeanor
            -Briefing on North Vietnam offensive
            -Response to North Vietnam
                  -Counter attacks
                        -Time
      -North Vietnam offensive
            -Strategy
                  -Territorial forces
                  -Political structure
                  -Quang-Tri

                -Hue
                -An Loc
                -Kontum
                -Pleiku
                -Coalition government
      -Thieu
            -View of mining
                  -South Vietnam capacities
                        -Timing
      -Air Strikes
            -Effectiveness
            -South Vietnam morale
            -North Vietnam supplies and morale
            -B-52s
                  -Impact
                  -Effectiveness
      -Kontum
            -North Vietnam Losses
                  -Intelligence reports
                        -North Vietnam regiments
            -Thieu, Bunker and Abrams view on retention
                  -Pleiku Road
-Military Region One
      -Gen. Ngo Quang Truong
      -South Vietnam defense
      -Strategy
      -Air strikes
            -Surface-to-air [SAM] missiles
                  -Movement
                  -Hanoi, Haiphong, demilitarized zone [DMZ]
-Air strikes
      -Commando operations in North Vietnam
            -The President’s view
            -Discussion in State Department
            -South Vietnam force
            -Discussion with Thieu
      -Meeting with Thieu
            -An Loc, Kontum, Hue
            -Strike into North Vietnam
                  -Thieu's position
      -Air strikes
            -Bridges
                  -Haiphong, Hanoi, Paul Doumer bridge

                     -Effectiveness
                     -POL
                     -Rail lines

The President signaled the White House operator at an unknown time between 10:51 am and
11:16 am.

[Conversation No. 726-1C]

[See Conversation No. 24-156]

                -Limits place on Air Force bombing

[The above portion of the office conversation took place simultaneously with Conversation No.
726-1C].

                     -Reaction by US Air Force [USAF]
                           -Kissinger’s view
                     -Air Force Chief of Staff
                           -Kissinger’s view
                     -Kissinger’s orders
                     -Adm. John S. McCain, Jr.

The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 10:51 am and
11:16 am.

[Conversation No. 726-1D]

[See Conversation No. 24-157]

[End of telephone conversation]

                     -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                          -Location
                     -Targets
                          -Buffer zone
                               -Restrictions
                                     -Hanoi area
                          -Reluctance
                               -Reasons
                     -Moorer
                          -Meeting with President and Kissinger
                          -Location

Stephen B. Bull entered at 11:16 am.

Bull talked with Moorer between 11:16 am and 11:17 am.

[Conversation No. 726-1E]

[See Conversation No. 24-158]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Moorer
         -Location
         -Meeting with President and Kissinger

Bull left at an unknown time at or before 11:17 am.

     Agnew's trip
         -Vietnam
                -Air strikes
                -M-36s

[The above portion of the office conversation took place simultaneously with Conversation No.
726-1E]

     Vietnam
          -Air Force
                -Limits
                      -President's orders
                -The President’s view
                -Responsibility
                -Problems
                -Gen. John D. Ryan
                      -Replacement
                      -The President’s view
                -The President’s view
                -Attitude
                      -Compared with the Israeli Air Force

Moorer entered at 11:17 am.

     Greetings

Vietnam
     -Air strikes
           -Limits
                 -Comments from South Vietnam and Pearl Harbor
                       -Reports to Agnew
           -Ryan
                 -Replacement
                 -The President’s view
                       -Ryan’s son
           -President's orders
           -Restrictions
                 -Reasons
                 -Hanoi
                       -Distance
                       -Duration
           -Air Force
                 -Reasons For Performance
                       -The President’s view
                       -Press reports
                       -Reports to Agnew
           -Commanders
                 -Replacements
                       -Air Force Chief of Staff
           -President's orders
                 -Ryan
                 -McCain
           -Retrictions
                 -Reaction
                       -Reasons
           -Air Force
           -Performances
                 -Moorer’s view
                 -Reason
                 -The President’s view
           -Israeli Air Force
           -B-52s
                 -Location
                 -Abrams's report
           -Attitude
           -Support of President
           -Ryan
                 -Possible resignation
                       -The President’s view

                -Hanoi
                     -POL
                -Comments to Agnew
                -Restricted areas
                     -Implementation
                           -Date
                -Changes
                     -Moorer's responsibility
                     -Time
                     -Methods

Moorer left at 11:22 am.

     Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Raids
                -President's orders
                -Attitude
                -Weather
                -Number of sorties in past week
                -Ceiling
          -Blockade
                -Reaction
                -Laird, Defense Department, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency
                      [CIA]
          -Air strikes
                -Air Force
                      -Changes
                            -Ryan
                            -Moorer
                -Restrictions
                      -Implementation
                            -Date and duration
                      -PRC border
                            -Bridges
                      -Hanoi
                            -Soviet Embassy
                            -Power plant

     Kissinger
          -Meeting with Congressional Leaders
               -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]

     Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Authorization
                      -Power plants
                      -Hanoi
                      -Haiphong
                      -Restrictions
                      -Number of targets
                            -Time
                -Reason for action
                      -Losses
                            -B-52s
                            -Hanoi area
                                  -SAMs
                                  -Air Force responsibility
                                        -Compared with US Navy and Haiphong
                      -Air Force
                -Hanoi
                      -President's orders
                      -Haiphong targets compared with Hanoi targets
                -B-52 strikes
                -President's orders
                -Abrams's attitude

     Kissinger
          -SALT meeting

Kissinger left at 11:25 am.

     Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Air Force responsibility

     Agnew's trip
         -Vietnam
                -Abrams
                     -South Vietnam bombing
                     -The President’s view
         -Thailand
                -Leaders
                     -Attitude towards blockade
                -US air bases
                     -Economic benefits

         -North East insurgency
               -US military aid
                     -Helicopters
                          -Congress
                                -Funds
                          -Agnew talk with Laird
                          -Need for action
                          -Agnew report to President
                     -Armored vehicles
                          -Number unused
                          -Significance
                     -Small unit communications equipment
         -Drug traffic
               -Opium
               -Lester L. Wolff
                     -Opium Destruction Program
                          -Credit
                          -Thais
                          -PRC
         -Military briefing by Agnew
         -Support for President's policies
         -Leonard Unger
               -Views on Vietnam
               -Replacement
               -The President’s view
               -Beliefs
     -Ambassador Bunker
         -Attitude toward President's policies
         -Attitude toward Thieu

Vietnam
     -Agnew's press briefing
          -President's policies
                -Success
                      -Vietnamization
          -North Vietnam offensive
                -Failure
                      -US Pacification Program
                      -Reason
          -President's policies
                -Success
     -Soviet Summit
          -Soviet attitude toward North Vietnam

          -Settlement
                -Failure
                      -Consequences
                           -Destruction of Hanoi
                           -Civilian casualties
    -Air strikes
          -Hanoi power plant
          -Report to Agnew at Guam
          -B-52s
    -McCain
          -Possible retention
          -Son [John S. McCain, III]
                -POW
          -Extension of command
    -Abrams
          -Agnew’s view
          -Meeting with Agnew
          -Attitude toward air strikes
          -Strategy
                -An Loc
                -Kontum
                -South Vietnam morale
                -Targets
                      -Thieu's position
    -President's policies
          -Blockade
          -North Vietnam bombing
    -B-52s
          -Use in South Vietnam
          -Number
          -Limitations
          -Carriers
          -Marine squadrons
                -Number
                -Japan
                -Thailand

Agnew's trip
    -Japan
    -Thailand
    -Consultations
           -Leaks
    -Japan

         -South Vietnam, Saigon
         -Agnew's report to press
              -Success

    Wallace
         -President's previous visit
         -Possible Agnew visit
               -Timing
         -Condition
               -Paralysis
                     -Extent
                     -Doctor's reports
               -Attitude
         -President's visit
               -American flag
         -Possible Agnew visit
               -President's suggestion
               -Agnew's statement
               -Call to Cornelia Wallace
               -Arrangements
               -Dr. William M. Lukash
               -Purpose

    Agnew's schedule
        -Rest
        -A dinner
              -Tricia Nixon Cox
              -John Wayne, Francis A. (“Frank”) Sinatra, Hope, James (“Jimmy”) Stewart
              -Fundraiser

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 22s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5

**********************************************************************

     Wallace
          -Gun control legislation
                -Herbert L. (“Herblock”) Block cartoon
                -Sick society
                -President's proposed legislation
          -Advocates
          -Sick society
          -Assassination attempt on Franklin D. Roosevelt and [Mayor Anton Cermak]
          -Assassination attempt on Harry S. Truman
                -Blair House
                -Killing of Secret Service agent
          -Shooting in House of Representatives
          -Price of free society
          -Dictatorships
                -Soviet Union
                      -Firearms
          -Sick society
                -Rebuttals
                      -Roosevelt
                      -Truman

     John B. Connally
          -Plans
               -Return to Texas
                    -Brother

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 7
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 2m 48s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 7

**********************************************************************

     Agnew
         -Press briefing

[This conversation continues on Conversation No. 726-2]

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Yes, that's the whole point.
But the question is how hard we want him to hit.
And that partly depends on how hard he's set up to hit.
I was debating this morning, and I decided not to raise the tag, get in the tape on the New York Times on this Tony Lewis stuff, but Ken Klassen did it in a damn hard way yesterday.
He said they were serving as a mouthpiece for a man who stayed in his home and made propaganda.
Yeah, he put it out on his own name and did it just in a hard way.
Yeah.
He said they were a conduit of any kind of propaganda.
The reference to the ship movement is entirely untrue, but in answer to a query the Times was told in advance by the U.S. government that no ship was entered or left.
That truth was worth a single paragraph in the story of many column inches.
The Times said briefly USA said the story was false.
The Times prefers its own brand of truth.
Both of these stories are totally incorrect.
If you don't see a correction, you have yet to see a story saying we were misled, we were duped, we were wrong.
My question is, why?
that it was an optimistic report on the state of the... Well, that's what I had in mind.
Yeah.
Well, that was the general plan.
Right.
That was the general plan.
Well, everybody ought to get hard on the critics, not the communists.
That's the one thing that we aren't getting across because we can't break through one.
I should agree.
It doesn't get through much.
These suspicions are, it's clear to him from being over there how much criticism in this country.
each the other side hurts our side is henry available this morning is
Christ used to be better than Chavis.
About that he fell.
Chavis is never with us.
Not even, not part of it.
But never, never, never.
And he's always out with those other people.
And never with our people.
It's a goddamn sin.
It's a piece of waste.
When he was out with Stuart also the night before, he had both outsides.
Well, it's a small thing, but...
Oh, we make a little of it, but we don't... No, there is mayonnaise, but I think once it gets hotter, it's a little sugar and all that.
I don't know if they caught anybody, but they had notes.
There was a note there.
There was a phone call to the Washington University.
Oh, they were violence and all that.
I shouldn't say that.
I said, for Christ's sake, you cannot let a story lie to the effect that ships are coming in and out.
You can't let that lie.
He said, well, McCloskey answered it.
I said, screw McCloskey.
It's got to be answered at a very high level.
Don't you agree?
Except, well, God, except that it didn't carry into the big story.
It argued that you don't want to answer this, that it's a big story.
I
It's this sort of thing.
Well, thank you.
You know, you've got to get that waiting room thing worked out if you haven't been able to do it.
I see you said it out there with the secretary.
You can't work it out so you can get a separate waiting room for a distinguished guest.
You don't think that's good?
You said to the secretary, hell no.
I didn't imagine you'd be able to sit here and go by yourself and tell them to work it out.
Yeah, I just want to check two things.
Vice President, I should know more about it.
What's going on in Saigon and South Vietnam?
The, uh, your business is always slanted.
That's the first.
That's the common fashion issue.
The wires.
There's nothing for me to know about that.
I just thought I'd say it right in person.
But your quotes are moving.
I had a chance to see that if there were some way we could be out, but after you find it, the second point is that all of them said good luck in the trip to Russia.
Oh, sure.
Well, what I meant is, it's been a long time.
They've been doing it for a good reason.
Well, it was our fault.
I'm sorry.
There's nobody admitting how wrong they were, of course.
In some ways, we never did it out of the air.
They said it was something for something at all.
Once again, they set themselves up by their knee for a reaction that they couldn't cope with.
Because life is a good way to do it.
Yeah.
I'm trying to find my way back.
It's still in my imagination.

— 2 min 52 s with no transcribed speech —

If you want to do it, we'll pursue it.
It turns out it's going to be in Russia at least, and I think Moscow at the time.
as you know, a huge favor of the Russians.
I'd like to give him some attention because, you know, he opened his concert at Carnegie Hall by playing the Star Spangled Banner the other night.
And there's a big news story about it.
It says many in the full house were startled and some annoyed when Mr. Clyburn opened the program with the Star Spangled Banner.
One woman on the stage, Bob Seger, pointedly refused to rise and few listeners were rude enough to hiss.
All right.
All right, you know, he's super for us.
I'm very proud.
That's what we have.
That's the Russian thing.
That's a little strange, but if we get a strange shovel, he'll say, just say we want it there for the dinner.
That's done.
Okay.
That's, then we're not importing entertainment.
We're just using it.
And you've got a great start, like we did at the DeGaulle dinner when we had, at Ike's place.
Henry has insisted that we not use Radio Free Europe for any promotional stuff in either Russia or Poland to exploit the...
But I don't want to rush it.
I know that.
But I don't mean...
I mean, Poland is a different thing.
My God.
I don't know.
He just says nothing must be done to use it.
I can ask him to cover this with you.
Oh, he's just...
or, you know, you have to reconsider our Poland, or just stay on Russia under no circumstances, but for Poland, don't we discontinue our radio free program?
I don't want them to say freedom.
I just want them to put out low-key the fact the president's coming to do, mention that to him or not.
That's what the kind of broadcast I want.
The president is coming to Poland such and such a day.
Terrier, that's all.
This would be nothing.
It would be pure news.
Pure English, is that what you mean?
Okay.
We were trying to go beyond that in Poland, you know, the thing of...
I don't want to stir up a revolution, but the president's coming, and he is a friend of both.
Really, the American people are foolish people.
That's all.
Nothing more.
No religion.
Nothing else.
You're coming in.
You're coming in.
Yeah, I'm just waiting.
Yeah, the vice president is waiting for you to come over and come in with the vice president.
Your office didn't just tell you?
Okay.
Okay.
I don't know.
I suppose so.
I'm tired of the pro-luxury people.
I'm tired of the pro-welfare people in all areas.
Basically, they don't represent my views.
I'm tired of the people that, you know, when you do something to be a cop, I say, assholes, quit.
I've heard you people quit.
I know they won't.
They might be
I wish they'd get the hell out.
Unless they get supported in Australia.
I know they're not many, but I really feel strongly about it.
You have any problems with Rogers at the moment?
Yeah, I do.
I have one.
There he is.
So you think that Mrs. Rogers is going to pull up with that?
I don't give a shit about that.
It's perfectly all right.
Perfectly all right.
But not the rest of them.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
These goddamn people out there are going to have to be pranked.
They should bring him in.
Good morning.
I'm sorry to keep you waiting.
We got a, we got a call that happened.
We had a call, a little bit of a call.
Well, you must be tired.
You must be tired.
You should be sitting here this time.
Before we go...
that.
Yeah.
Yeah.
The attack on Khantoum hasn't come yet.
I'll just stick to one with a demonstration position first.
They put in 57 B-52 strikes in the immediate surroundings of Khantoum within five miles of Khantoum.
It looked, they were showing me every five-side, it looked as if it was almost completely covered.
And at this point, I've just had a meeting with the intelligence people.
You can't say that it's by design that they're holding off that attack because it's getting so close.
So, again, we expect to lose Khaktoum whenever they attack.
But, exactly, as you said, we've said it before on Monday, it's going to happen.
And Locke, I wasn't so good about it, but...
Are we too late?
That lock I don't think is so likely, but Khantoum, I think it's still possible.
But the doctors know that if we take it or not, it outruns them soon enough.
They can't really go anywhere from Khantoum anymore.
It's too late.
Go from there to Pleiku.
Go from there to Pleiku.
You've been to Pleiku, haven't you?
No, I haven't.
I was there.
And we are now getting really quite a lot of reports of enormous casualties on the other side.
Anyway, you should get Tony Lewis reporting to this.
The New York Times coverage of this, if you do the drill at all.
Oh, yes, that's a lot.
Disgraceful.
It's straight in the communist mind.
The son of a bitch, Lewis, wrote that the volcano wasn't working and that it might end up dead.
ship that had been in there at the time that we posted, and the bastards still ran.
I'll tell you.
That's true.
There's an East German boat that he mentioned.
That has been in there since April 7th and hasn't been able to unload because of our British bombing attacks, which knocked out some of the port facilities.
And therefore there has been a tremendous pileup of ships in Haifang Harbor anyway, and it just got up to the dark last week.
It's true, it just started unloading last week, but it's been inside the harbor since April 7th.
Holy shit got inside the harbor on May 2nd.
No shit has come either in or out since May 10th.
And there's just no way they could do it unless they started sweeping over to the front line.
We'll lap them again.
We'll lap them and we'll put in pressure marks which can't be swept.
So my thing is totally effective.
It's not 100% effective.
All day long.
Just remember that.
Because I didn't know these subjects.
Not Sam.
I know that my thing is totally effective.
Not on him.
Let me talk.
You were in Tennessee meeting that day, and you know how the thing comes up.
You mean, you know, basically, they're representing the military point of view, and that is the military point of view.
You're a pastor.
Why?
Because they said in 68, there had been a study showing it wouldn't work.
First, I think that was wrong.
But that's true.
That's right.
That's right.
Uh, we did not have the precision, uh, uh, uh, uh, authority for the air force with regard to the, with regard to taking on the
All these things make a difference.
So what we have done now, we've cut off totally supplies from the city.
They're eating, we're chewing them up in the south.
And the railroads, the railroads are systematically being taken out.
And in addition to that, our army in the north is now directly
Those things that are essential to keep the war machine going.
Oil.
Everything.
You can do that.
It's hard to tell what they've got on the ground, but we think we've got it.
The P.O.P.O.L.
supplies, we've got, I don't know, 60 to 80 percent of the Hanoi.
We destroyed nearly 100 percent of another big P.O.L.
farm 20 miles south of Hanoi that was burning for four days.
And they showed pictures in which the fire on the third day was worse than on the second.
It was totally out of control.
We've knocked out all the pumping stations by which they've moved the oil through the pipe.
Every rail bridge on one of the rail lines into China has been knocked out.
And four out of five of the rail bridges on the other line have been one train moving into Vietnam.
for the last two weeks.
So now if they're talking about moving shot by truck,
But, well, it can be done, but they are... Well, and on top of that, Mr. President, to move VOL by truck is one hell of a job.
They don't have the tractor trucks.
No ship.
They were saying, remember, that they could easily go into Chinese ports.
Not one ship has yet been rerouted into Chinese ports.
Those eight ships that were allegedly heading for Haipan...
I thought a little list would be helpful because if you get into speeches or a Q&A,
We had the report from the French Empire.
We had the report.
Did you see that?
No, no, because it was given to us by the French Empire.
No, no, but we had absolute sources from North Vietnam.
Well, you might say that you had a source that was totally reliable from Vietnam and so reported.
Well, the fact that it's going on is already unbelievably tough on them.
So, they are... Have you had any complaints from the Chinese for the strike at 17 miles from China?
No.
It's 12 miles.
We knocked the bridge down yesterday.
But our understanding from Joe was that we just wouldn't go over the border.
He didn't... We weren't worried about that.
Well, we've kept it 20 miles from the border, and I think we'd better stop it now.
Well, that's the only bridges we're knocking off.
Yeah.
The thing is about, you know, they've got two American pilots in China already.
If they get over that border, they're going to get knocked down.
That's the other thing.
Well, they're not going across the border.
I don't know if I'm mistaken, but I think the Chinese are more rapid ideologically, but it's fascinating that so far they haven't done a thing.
They have no Soviet ships or any other ship in the Chinese ports.
As far as we can tell, there's no additional overland movement from China.
Of course, there can't be any because we've not got all the things that I think is terribly important before we go into the other things that you want to cover.
I'm terribly important in just this.
Well, you'll be getting through here to the polls and everything else that it's all a majority and imagine through the tree one of the American groups that will be done.
That's point one.
So that was good.
Second, it did not, despite the fact that most of the columnists and commentators, the left, they said it would sink the summit and bring on World War III, has not done so.
Third, the other thing is that it has had a devastating effect on morale in our Vietnam.
foreign, it has had a very good effect on the morale of our 60,000 Americans there.
That has been shown on American television.
The one point that it's not been gotten from us is the fact that it has had on the morale of the South Vietnamese.
They are fighting better than the rest.
And after your brief visit and so forth, I mean, whatever you said out there,
You can get across a little of the fact that they know, that they got the big flip out of this.
If you believe another, that's the point.
That's the point we have gotten across, because nobody believes you.
But actually, Mr. President, if by the end of June...
These guys have not done much better than now.
It will be a disastrous defeat for them.
They have put their whole bloody field army into this field now for seven weeks.
And they've taken farm trees.
They've advanced 22 miles into South Vietnam.
That's all it is on that side.
And now it's four miles.
Can't do maybe 30 miles, but across jungles.
Our threat is creating this famine.
Or did we?
Or did we.
In the panic now of the reporting, it's getting to be a little better.
And if we can hold the way, and Abrams sent in a report for you today.
Yeah, he's got it.
He's not as bad as I am on that.
But now it's your view.
Well, what I do to save time, I brought some points.
And I'd like you to agree just to start with Japan.
Sure.
And move through the other places.
Sure.
First of all, the original ceremonies
taken very seriously by the Japanese, and they were handled with very dignity, and I thought extremely tastefully that Sato was quite moved in his remarks.
As a matter of fact, he actually broke down at one point in his remarks, and he was very complimentary to the United States.
The audience with the emperor was very good.
He was doing a ceremonial thing.
He wanted to talk a lot about Japanese-American relationships.
These three, they gave the Japanese room everything in protocol they could.
A lunch with the emperor, a dinner with the prime minister, the whole works.
He appreciated that accurate visit.
And also, he wants to come here.
I said, I'm sure that we want him to come, compatible with your schedule.
He's really back in our office.
All the 10 of these leaders expressed strong support for the U.S. policies in the Southeast Asia.
strong statement.
And I had a chance to talk to Tanaka informally, and they seem to be keeping him one step behind Fukudan in such a way.
He's a fighter.
Yeah.
I think he's a very slow call.
Yeah.
Fukudan is the guy that's going to do this.
Yeah.
Yeah.
But they're all alive.
The whole party is alive, pro-U.S. very strongly, and they wanted everybody to know that.
The Sato assured me that the Japanese concern over the shock when we were visited to the PRC was history.
that our future and their future needs to be aligned.
And we welcome our desire to play an increasing part in the economic role in the area.
Fukuda made a very strong pitch for U.S. support for a permanent Japanese seat on the U.N. Security Council, one of our systems.
He said the nuclear powers and the great powers, the great economic powers was the point he made.
You should also have a voice.
I thought we generally supported their desire.
to achieve the goal.
As I said to the guys who are still the frontrunners, the Tanaka's moved up fast.
I had a formal meeting with the foreign minister, but only a brief contact with the Tanaka.
But I'm pretty positive, based on my conversation with Sato, that any – either one of these men would continue to follow a very pro-U.S. policy.
I don't think we have any worries in that respect.
And the party is very well off because the Communist Party and the Socialist Parties are even more fragmented than ever before.
Good, good.
They had a lot of demonstrations on Reversion Day, but the police are extremely adaptive.
Very, very nicely done, not in a harsh way, but they handled them well.
One thing about what I said that was surprising was that somewhat
Unsolicited.
It really didn't fit in the context of what we were talking about.
He was supposed to be the investment architect, which was going on concurrently with my ending as I came in.
And he contrasted the leadership, the qualities of the end of China people with Samarkand, a very unfavorable end of China people.
I jumped in there and I supported him rather strongly.
I said that this man's had a very difficult domestic situation to deal with.
He has made general successes in the face of most difficult circumstances.
I noted Ambassador Bunker's high, continuing high confidence in him because, you know, Sato always thanks a lot of Bunker, you know, not only Sato, but we have confidence in you also.
But that sort of surprised me.
He's not a great admirer of anybody in the Chinese.
He feels there's a breakdown of leadership.
And in Vietnam,
And I spent about an hour and a half or two in the most intensive military briefing.
Bunker Havers being present.
Two Bunker Havers all present in the military.
And then I spent another hour, hour and a half or so with Bunker Havers by themselves out of Thompson.
They all seem confident of the elementability of the arm of the contained .
She looks extremely well.
And he's not at all shaky or erratic.
He's very calm.
He did the briefing military district by district in a most logical way.
He's very well up on the situation.
His theory is, and I seem to subscribe to this, that when they started this invasion, they had in mind that they would be able to stretch it over about a nine-month period, that they would not, under any circumstances, withdraw to the sanctuaries for replenishment.
But the idea was to move in and get the territory and hold it, at the same time trying to destroy the main forces of the South Vietnamese.
then disrupt the territorial forces and the political structure, and then go to the bargaining table in firm possession of strong points such as concrete, clay, analog, and to mandate a coalition of governments that would be able to control through their very sophisticated disruptive processes and then get control of the country that way.
Now, he says because of the mining operation and because of the bombing, the enemy's had to reassess his capabilities, and he estimates he can only maintain a four-month proposition at the absolute top.
Starting in April?
Yeah.
Four months, that's all.
I mean, starting at the event that started those four months?
Four months, that's all.
So there's only two more months.
He feels that...
The bombing has been tremendously successful, and as you just pointed out, it has not only been successful in a military sense, but it has totally reversed the South Vietnamese morale.
The people there are looking optimistically at the situation.
The bombing had money.
The bombing had money.
The knowledge of the North Vietnamese that nothing's coming down the pipeline, the quantity that it did is adversely affecting that.
But the one point he wanted to make, if there's anything that is really going, is the B-52.
The B-52 is the workforce that's really going to jail for it.
And they feel in Khartoum that the reason this attack hasn't come is because the losses have just been incredible in terms of what we've dumped in.
We had intelligence reports from two regiments that come into assembly areas.
All three, if I say all three, I mean two bunker neighbors.
I feel there is a chance that the continent, which is the weakest of all, can be held, particularly since the road to Claypool is now open again.
In District 1, they're just amazed with what Trump has been able to do since they put him up there.
His defense is mobile.
It involves strikes to keep the enemy off balance, and it's been tremendously successful.
Meanwhile, again, the air has forced an evacuation of the SAM missiles.
back from below the DMC, not only from above the DMC, but most of them on the way back to Haiphong, and had a way to protect against strikes there.
So yesterday, for example, the Air Force general in Guam, as I came through, told me they only had three sandbars, and told me yesterday all that would be done.
Did they discuss with you at all the possibilities of there having a
No.
This is finally important.
You see, Henry, the reason it's important is one, that the assholes around here in the State Department and others understand.
If you have, for example, a negotiation
at a time that North Vietnam occupies, I don't care if it's only 22 miles to South Vietnam, then you have the second partition.
If, on the other hand, South Vietnam has anything in North Vietnam, you've got something to do there.
And I realize it may be impossible,
If there's just some way to just have some force there.
I'm thinking of the negotiating thing, not another project.
They could just have somebody sitting in the den or, you know, just sitting around.
Then we say, all right, we'll get out of here.
You can get out of there.
Otherwise, what you're going to negotiate is to negotiate where you're going to settle based on the current military situation, which is all you can ever negotiate anyway.
He didn't much choose who the other dude was.
They're going to, they're, they're, they need to really make certain they can, they can hand-to-hand-lock and come to them and weigh the physical forces right now and meet the flexibility.
I got the impression that he would resist any kind of strike in the north at this time.
Now, going back to the, the
As Henry just pointed out, they're all aware that they've knocked down these two bridges, the one from Hong Kong and the one south of Hanoi, the Lume Bridge.
It's been extremely effective.
There's a haunted bridge across, alongside the Lume Bridge, but it's not really been able to carry the P.O.L.
but heavy stuff.
And the, the rain hasn't been quite very well.
Apparently,
The attitude that I understood was some remorse over the fact that they're going to get the limits put on bombing.
The fact that they can't.
What do they know?
Those sons of bitches of the Air Force, they're talking about it.
If we hit it once more, I'm going to recommend to the President to fire that bastard of a chief of staff of the Air Force.
There are no limits on the bombing of the Air Force.
We cannot go for the next two weeks inside of 10 miles.
For the last week, these bastards, we've told them to bomb, to take out the target inside the 10-mile circle because we had promised the Russians while we were in Moscow we wouldn't bomb inside Hanoi.
They asked us not to bomb above the 20th parallel.
We rejected it.
They asked us not to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong.
We rejected it.
They said you cannot bomb the capital of an allied country.
You said you might not offer Russian aid?
And of course, now who's that?
Who'd you get this from?
But these bastards, it's an outrage.
These bastards are thinking only of their own alibis for the week, Mr. Vice President.
I have told those guys to bob inside that circle to take care of these targets.
I think he's in my office.
I think he's in my office.
I think he's in my office.
or something that was inside the buffer zone that they could have really done it right, but they couldn't go back because they were restricted.
What is that?
What is that?
There are two circles, but there are only two restrictions.
One is the 10-mile area around Hanoi for the next two weeks.
The other one is a 20-mile...
The other one is a 20... No, no.
Inside that 10-mile zone, they can hit any target that we've approved, which includes the bridges.
And?
Inclusive air.
Well, let's get more rain here, you get my order.
Where is Mark?
I think he's in my office waiting for me.
Well, the operator can't find him.
He's usually quite competent.
He's in my office, I think.
I'm certain he's in my office.
Is he in?
Ask him where he is.
I hear a voice.
Air Force, Ryan today, he's out, out, out, out.
I mean, they've been pitching it on, and I've been, I've not been telling it to the president, because I've not forgotten.
They say they've never had such a, they've got total freedom to bomb and place it on.
And they know it, and they are going to be accused.
They're the ones who are going to be accused.
They're scared, they're scared to go ahead and seal it.
They're going to do 5,000, the goddamn Israelis will fly it up.
Your colleagues in the military in Vietnam and Pearl Harbor, they are complaining that we have put such limited restrictions on them in terms of what they can bomb.
They are unable to do an effective job.
And I want to tell you something.
And I've said this before and I'm going to say it again.
Ryan has got to get off his goddamn ass or he's out.
I'm tired of him anyway.
killed and all that sort of thing.
But let me say, you know, I ordered that goddamn Air Force time and time again to do anything and they can't.
You know what I know, that they do not have restrictions.
The only restriction they've got is the one with 10 miles of Hanoi at the present time, which they didn't have before.
And the Air Force didn't do a goddamn thing for the last three days, as you know.
Not one goddamn thing, nor Vietnam.
Because the little bastards were afraid that they might not, they might lose a plane because they couldn't see.
military ship or there's gonna be a new
What the hell is the matter with these people?
Why are they whining?
Because they're afraid to go in and do the job that they've been ordered to do?
What in the hell is the matter with them now?
that they have been able to go back.
I've taken it, I've really taken it out.
They were told they couldn't go back.
Now that is absolutely false.
That is absolutely false.
Not only have they been able,
because they're afraid that the weather isn't good enough.
They've got to have 5,000-foot ceilings.
The goddamn Israelis fly in 1,000-foot ceilings.
Now, tell them to get off their goddamn ass and do the job.
And I, like, for example, I want some 52s to get there.
Oh, no, April's season's in the South.
Why can't I find a bookkeeping in the South?
But for Christ's sakes, why does the Air Force constantly undercut us and bitch when they've never been back as they're back today?
Tell them to do the job.
Now, I agree with you.
Ryan is going to have a resignation on this.
I'll fire his ass out of here unless he gets a discipline on that now.
Is that clear?
Yes, Mr. President, when I know that they just finished, I'm going to ask them.
Why are they saying to the Vice President of the United States that the President is limiting what they can do?
Now, why are they saying that?
I don't know.
They are complaining about the restricted area.
There are no restricted areas.
There are none.
What the hell is restricted?
I guess they're talking about that 10-mile limit.
No, no, no.
The 10-mile limit only goes into effect tomorrow morning.
But bullshit, they just told you.
I mean, you've got to get your story a little bit straighter, too.
They told you they didn't get the, they didn't go back and get the railroad.
There has been absolutely no restriction on the railroad.
There will be no limit until tomorrow morning.
Now, let's get this straight, and I want to shake up this goddamn office.
Now, you shake it up.
That's your job.
And get it done fast.
And it's nice and neutral.
I know the one they're talking about.
And the sons of bitches said for four days, we can't fly because of the weather.
They have a long, long sortie in North Vietnam this week.
You know why?
Because they say the weather is too bad.
Now, let's get the damn story straight.
You've got to hear these people.
That's why Laird turned a half-assed attitude.
He didn't have meaning.
Because the goddamn military has been, I mean, rather than saying,
give us an opportunity.
They're afraid to be wrong.
I have to make that decision alone.
The military is against it.
The State Department is against it.
The CIA was against it.
No, it's time that we quit bitching about what we're doing and put the beat on there.
Now, listen, if more is asked, too, more is not to start shaking people up.
I'm just tired of hearing this kind of crap.
The Vice President is only wondering...
And there's a restriction that they can't get closer than 20 miles to the Chinese border.
But there are only two bridges in there, of which we've taken special permission to knock one out, which they have restored.
or he'd leave because we don't want to have the bomb drop on the Russian embassy, let's face it.
We'd be pleading with them this week to knock out every target in Hanoi this week.
For example, I was raising hell this morning after the congressional group on this whole thing.
Just to give you an example, Mr. Vice President, we've been bugging them this week to take out all the targets in Hanoi and leave Haiphang for next week because there are no restrictions on Haiphang.
So when I get my morning briefing, I find they have hit 20 targets in Haiphang the day before yesterday.
Because they're closing, you know, there's more to get out.
I'll give you the reason for that.
And I said, God damn it, we've got to win this thing.
And you've got to risk some plans, including B-32s.
And it's tough.
It's tough.
They'll have a hell of a sense.
There's two reasons.
There's your disreason.
There's the fact that Hanoi has to give to the Air Force.
Hanoi has to give to the Navy.
And the Air Force won't fly.
And the Air Force has also the battlefield, so they stage it differently.
But instead of having an integrated plan, when we tell them, we've got to get the Hanoi targets this week because for a week you can't get them, they go merrily away, hitting high farms, and don't go anywhere.
But it's unfair.
You were the one that made them fly up north to begin with.
They didn't want to do it.
flatly refused to go until I ordered him to go.
Every B-52 strike in the north, you ran down their throats.
They didn't want to do it.
We've had to order it from here against tables from the airports and the papers telling us not to do it.
I mean, they have so much for that, you can go ahead and do whatever you want with your stalling and all that kind of stuff.
The, uh, well, they can get out, because they're more sensitive about getting off their ass and doing it, and that's all.
They understood the defense very strongly.
If I'd known this background, I would have understood it better.
Putting most of their body and capability in the sound.
Yeah.
He doesn't understand the need to do the dark, the psychological, or anything.
There's just no psychologist.
Moving on to the pilot.
The pilot leaders were very interested in the current situation, and they're very reassured by this strong action.
I think that's very important.
I thank them for the quick action on the top of the airspace and some of the things that we're doing.
We really love it.
This helps them, too, economically.
This is a big thing for them.
They say they don't want our people here, but they love it.
They felt pretty confident.
They figured out where they were staying.
They felt pretty confident.
Yes, they did.
Now, they're working on this in certainty in the Northeast.
But all of a sudden, they're having other problems.
Diane and Diego, and they do their desire to work.
But they want to help.
They want to help.
They want...
come to land you can leave yourself and you say you and i talk and god damn i don't know what we're going to do about it if they if they can use it let's get over there because you see what we could do if we've got it there and then something pops up in vietnam you gotta cease fire let that go over and knock off the vietnamese i expect when you follow up with this you say that we discussed it
of excuses, and he just said, we want our, that you are going to report directly to me on it.
Another thing they asked for was, are we going to be a president?
We're going to be a president of all of these towns.
We've got so many of those around the world sitting around us.
That's easy.
That is a thing they can do without any question.
And a small unit of communication is important.
And I buttered him a little bit on this.
I said I'd try to help him get the true facts across.
This congressman, Lester Wolfe, made him really angry about taking credit for the burning of that opium, which had really a long time of program that was going on between the Thai and the Chinese who worked pretty well
They appreciate that impact on Vietnam.
I gave them a full military briefing.
And they're still free.
They're 100%.
I don't have to worry about that.
They don't want to be on the losing side.
The only thing I have, Unger's a damn good ambassador.
But I get the feeling he talks to me one way and talks another way.
I don't think he's hawkish.
And Unger, what he does is he does.
He talks hawkish to me.
Nah, he's not.
He won't do that.
He won't do it.
He's got to go.
He's not good.
No, no, no.
He's a clever career guy, but on the other hand, Hunker doesn't believe in what we believe.
And Burr and a few ambassadors do.
Hunker's on a few.
Hunker.
Hunker does too.
He's not being biased.
I got him a sign.
I said, he's still in the same confidence as you.
Yeah.
The main thing is that if you could get across to the press, in fact,
Now, if they go through this all motion, the fact that this proves the animation doesn't work, you can say this is the proof that it does work.
After all, the anarchy of the maids are invading now, and the invasion thing has got to come to be true.
to destroy the pacification program through their internal congregations, through their subversion, and so forth, because the people of South Vietnam don't want communism.
I think another thing is, firstly, the thing is, if this is going to work, that's the main thing now.
And it's going to be a lot more domestic.
Let me tell you one thing.
If you get through the Russian thing, if you imagine there might be a negotiation involving all of this, because the Russians are here.
They respect the South.
I have no confidence in them or whatever.
If they don't, then the middle of the handle is get it right in the chops.
That's the way it's going to be.
And we're not going to be too damn worried about our civilian casualties.
We're going to blame them anyway.
They didn't get that power station on us.
We were supposed to be good on that.
That's what they told me on the block.
They had to go.
That's what they call it?
Well, it's called .
Yeah.
He's very upset about us coming to retirement.
He says, right now, please don't take me out of here.
We're not going to.
We're going to keep you.
I've got to stay here.
I think the guys, they're all the fighters.
Your son is a prisoner of war, you know.
Yeah.
And he's a little fighter.
He's on our side.
But as a matter of fact, we decided to extend him just for your information tonight.
All right.
He's very emotional about this.
He wants to, but he says we can't let any of these places collapse.
And then he says we can move the bomb.
He wants to stabilize these areas.
Of course, she agrees with that strategy.
But you also agree to the strategy.
He doesn't question the mining strategy.
No, he doesn't question the bombing of the North.
He just says that we've got to make that.
He wants all 52s.
He wants until he's sure he's got it.
You know, we checked around to see if we could get some RB-52s, but it takes too long to get them made over.
You see, B-52s are not made.
They're made here.
They're made here.
No.
God, I wish we could put another hundred in there.
We could, but...
But I get to the second question, and it's really tricky.
Another carrier is going to arrive, and it says, we ordered three more squadrons, Marine squadrons, in from Japan three days ago, too.
They all ended up there.
But they have the time.
But thank God for women.
And I go around just pushing them all over the place.
Well, the Japanese situation was excellent.
I was going to see any problem there.
I was going to see any problem in time.
And they were a little worried about consultation.
And I told them, I said, that's the way things are.
You might say that you saw a very different South Vietnam and a very different Saigon in Saigon than you had been led to believe by what you had seen on television and in the press in the United States.
I think, would that be all right?
That we just ought to go there, that they are confident, they're fighting for their country, they don't want communism, and they're going to win.
All right, John, let's stick it to them.
Let me suggest one other thing.
I went out to see Wallace this morning, you know.
I think in about three or four, three, three, three, four days, it'd be nice to see one of, you know, guys in their house, sort of that.
And I just go out there, and we never know what's going to happen before it's on.
He's got to get into that, and he's got to be careful.
That's pretty great.
That's what we, that's what the doctors want me to do.
I think he knows it.
The spirit is good.
He has an American flag and roses on there.
And I said, I've got it.
old flag flying high.
He says, I will.
He saluted me.
He said, I'm going to salute my commander in chief.
I said, well, get out.
But if you could go out and have a talk, you might see him.
You know, I've chatted with him.
I've suggested that you come out.
What I would do is maybe talk to him since he's not a son of mine.
My son might have said, what you might do, you might give us as well as a call and say, perhaps I'm not here Tuesday.
You'd have to just come out and check with him.
And to work it out, the way to work it out is to call Lukash.
He's the White House doctor that's assigned to them.
And Lukash will talk to their doctors out there, work out the time and so forth.
I would just go out and see him and get people in the hospital, maybe, and keep his spirits up.
All right.
Gets to sleep.
Give my best, my God, I did it.
I just noticed about Trisha, so she was doing it pretty hard.
They said, well, Frank's about her job, Lane.
Oh, they're all going to be there.
I don't think Lane's done that.
Jimmy Stewart?
No, there are other people.
There are a lot of those people that are great watchers.
They're great watchers.
It's a fun restaurant.
It's a fun restaurant.
Yeah.
It's a good beginning.
I don't know if she ever played on the lawless thing with the attitude that the only thing to do is to legislate against guns.
I said to her, her blog has a thing about the sick American society and politics of the gun.
Now, what the hell do you want?
One gun out of 200 million people shoots a man.
By the way, they fight a whole damn society.
So you're not, anybody that wants to get it, I'll get one.
I'll just be back there and...
Well, and we've got good gun control legislation pretty well in there, but what do they want to do, just disarm the populace and leave, disarm the good folks and leave the arms and hands to the criminals?
I can give you the cup.
It's a cup out on the idea that they do more to stimulate violence.
Got it.
Did they say this when somebody shot at Franklin D. Roosevelt and killed the mayor of Chicago?
Did they say this when somebody shot at Harry Truman in front of Blair House and killed the Secret Service Station?
Did they say this when somebody shot at the House of Representatives?
Did they say it then?
I mean, we always have it there.
Again, that's one of the costs of a free society.
There aren't many people running around.
And you cannot guard against it.
If you want freedom, the only way you can guard against it is to have the people totally subtracted.
Now there's, let me say, it's very interesting to note that those societies in which the people have no firearms are the big dictatorships.
Get right over there.
None of the Russian citizens have gotten a firearm.
Not that I mean, I don't, I've never owned a gun, but by God, you just can't go that far, that's all.
But, but, more, more in the NDR, the Truman thing, to them.
And say, where were you published at?
And do you think they were sick of that?
Do you know what I mean?
What's, uh, John, how long have I been in the military?
No, he's gonna go back to Texas and he's gonna try to help his brother.

— 3 min 1 s with no transcribed speech —

You won't try.
You won't try.
You won't try.
I don't mind.
I don't mind.
Yeah.
I don't mind.
You won't try.
You won't try.
You won't try.
  • 024-156 10:51 AM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:51 am and 11:16 am.
  • 024-157 10:51 AM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 10:51 am and 11:16 am.
  • 024-158 11:16 AM · 18 sec — Stephen B. Bull, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and President Richard M. Nixon talked on the telephone from 11:16 am to 11:17 am.
  • 024-103 11:17 AM · 7 sec — unknown person(s), White House operator, Stephen B. Bull, and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman talked on the telephone at 11:17 am.
  • 726-012 11:27 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at 11:27 am.
  • 726-002 11:42 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, Stephen B. Bull, and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House at 11:42 am.
  • 726-003 11:42 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:42 am to 11:45 am.
  • 726-004 11:45 AM · 34 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, unknown person(s), Henry A. Kissinger, Ronald L. Ziegler, and John D. Ehrlichman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:45 am to 12:19 pm.

Conversation 726-001, May 19, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/726-001 (accessed November 2, 2026).