Conversation 726-001

On May 19, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Ronald L. Ziegler, unknown person(s), Henry A. Kissinger, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, White House operator, Stephen B. Bull, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:30 am to 11:42 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 726-001 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 726-1

Date: May 19, 1972
Time: 10:30 am - 11:42 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     Vietnam
          -Press coverage
                -Response
                -Spiro T. Agnew's speech
                      -Wording
          -New York Times
                -Kenneth W. Clawson response to Anthony Lewis column
                -North Vietnam propaganda
                -Ship movements
                -Administration response
                -Criticism of President's policies

     Henry A. Kissinger
         -Location
         -Jacob K. Javits
               -Dinner with Kissinger
               -Lack of support for President's policies
         -Dinner with Stewart J.O. Alsop
               -Joseph W. Alsop

      Pentagon
          -Bomb explosion
               -Suspects
               -"Weathermen"
               -Note
               -Telephone call
               -Washington Post

     Vietnam
          -Press reports on Soviet ships
                -Administration response
                     -Charles W. Colson
                     -Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                     -Robert J. McCloskey
                -Coverage
                     -St. Louis Post-Dispatch

                       -New York Times
                       -Washington Post
                       -Wire reports

     West Wing waiting room
          -Current situation
               -Shared with a secretary
          -Separate room for distinguished guests

Ronald L. Ziegler entered at 10:36 am.

     Agnew's trip
         -Meeting with press
                -Tone
                -Content
                -Report on Saigon and South Vietnam

     George C. Wallace
         -President’s visit
               -Wire reports
               -Ziegler’s press briefing

Ziegler left at 10:38 am.

     Public support for President
          -Meeting with unidentified black woman
                -Vietnam
          -Possible trips throughout US

     Soviet trip
          -Television reports
                 -Charles W. Colson
                 -Administration response
                 -Speeches
                 -Articles
          -Press speculation

     Wallace
          -President's visit
                -Handling
                -Discussion
                -President's Soviet trip

******************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 1m 59s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

**********************************************************************

     Kissinger
          -Location

Haldeman talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 10:38 and 10:48 am.

[Conversation No. 726-1A]

[End of telephone conversation]

          -Meeting with President and Agnew

     George S. McGovern

     Van Cliburn
         -Possible appearance
               -Soviet Union trip
         -Soviets' response
         -Carnegie Hall concert
               -Playing of Star Spangled Banner
               -Audience response
         -Possible appearance
               -President's dinner in Soviet Union
               -Parallel to dinner for Gen. Charles A.J.M. DeGaulle
               -Jascha Heifetz

     Radio Free Europe
          -Uses
                -Kissinger's views
                -Soviet Union
                -Poland

          -Kissinger
                -Meeting with President
                -The President’s view
                -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
          -Poland
          -Soviet Union
          -Mention of freedom
          -President's trip
                -News reports
                -Wording
          -Poland
          -Mention of freedom, religion
          -Kissinger
                -The President’s view
                      -Briefing books

     Agnew's schedule

Haldeman talked with Kissinger at unknown time between 10:38 and 10:48 am.

[Conversation No. 726-1B]

     Kissinger
          -Meeting with President and Agnew
               -Time
               -Message

[End of telephone conversation]

     Wallace
          -Harry S. Dent's analysis

     President's policies
          -Support
                 -Busing
                 -Welfare
                 -Vietnam
          -President's attitude
                 -Resignations

     Soviet trip
          -William P. Rogers
                 -Adele (Langston) Rogers

                      -Poland trip
                      -Soviet Union trip
                 -Future trips with President
                 -Adele Rogers's schedule

Kissinger entered at 10:48 am.

     President's message

Agnew entered at 10:48 am.

     Greetings

     Time

     Agnew's trip
         -Itinerary
                -Japan
                -Bangkok
                -Vietnam
         -Fundraiser
                -Tricia Nixon Cox
                -Leslie T. (“Bob”) Hope
         -Press briefing

Haldeman left at 10:51 am.

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnam offensive
               -Kontum
               -B-52 strikes
               -Number
               -Intelligence reports
               -North Vietnam attacks
               -Delays
               -Statements for Agnew
               -Loss
          -An Loc
               -Possible loss
          -Hue
               -Possible loss
          -An Loc
          -Kontum

      -Possible loss
      -Pleiku
-Casualties
-New York Times coverage
      -Lewis
      -The President;s view
-Blockade
      -Lewis column
            -Failure
      -New York Times article
            -Polish ship
            -East German ships
                  -Unloading difficulties in Haiphong
                        -Time in harbor
      -Polish ship
            -Date of arrival in Haiphong
      -Mining
            -Effectiveness
                  -Kissinger’s view
-Previous National Security Council [NSC] meeting
      -Melvin R. Laird
            -Pentagon
      -Rogers
      -Richard M. Helms
            -Intelligence community
      -Agnew
      -John B. Connally
      -Parallel To 1968 Report
            -The President’s view
            -Guerrilla war compared with mechanized war
            -Supply lines
                  -Sihanoukville
                  -Transport of war material to III and IV Corps
                  -Cambodia incursion
                  -Precision bombing of North Vietnam
-Blockade
      -Impact
      -Supplies
-Air strikes
      -Railroads
            -Destruction
      -Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL]
            -Destruction

                  -Percentage in Haiphong, Hanoi and Environs
                       -Photographs
            -Pumping stations
      -Hanoi
            -Power Stations
      -Rails
            -Bridges to PRC
                  -Effect
                       -Trucking of POL
                             -Problems
-Blockade
      -Use of PRC ports
      -Destinations
            -Haiphong
            -Vladivostok
            -Odessa
-Agnew's use of information
      -Report from French Ambassador
      -India-Pakistan War
      -Reports from North Vietnam
      -Sources
-Soviet Summit
      -Impact on North Vietnam
-Air strikes
      -Bridge destruction
            -PRC response
                  -Chou En-lai
      -Limits
            -American pilots in PRC
      -PRC response
            -Soviet ships
            -Overland movement to North Vietnam
-Blockade
      -Public support for President
            -Poll percentages
      -Soviet Summit
            -Impact
      -North Vietnam morale
      -US troop morale
            -Television reports
      -South Vietnam Morale
            -Improvements
            -US press reports

                -Nguyen Van Thieu
          -Impact on North Vietnam
     -North Vietnam offensive
          -Gains
                -Quang Tri
          -Limits
          -An Loc
          -Kontum
     -Impact of air strikes and blockade
     -Hue
          -US holding action
          -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. report
          -Kontum

Agnew's previous trip to Japan
    -Report to President
    -Japan
          -Reversion ceremonies
               -Agnew’s view
          -Eisaku Sato
               -Remarks
                      -References to US
                            -[Unintelligible]
          -[Emperor of Japan] Hirohito
               -Audience
          -Protocol for Agnew
          -Emperor Hirohito
               -Anchorage Visit
               -Possible visit to US
          -Support for the President’s Southeast Asia policies
               -Relations with US
                      -Sato
               -Takeo Fukuda
               -Kakuei Tanaka
                      -Fukuda
               -Liberal Democrats
               -Sato
                      -President's visit to PRC
                            -Impact on Japan
                      -Japanese-US ties
                            -Economic
               -Fukuda
                      -United Nations [UN] Security Council seat for Japan

                        -US position
                  -Possible successor to Sato
                        -Tanaka
            -Foreign Minister
                  -Agnew's meeting
            -Tanaka
                  -Agnew's meeting
      -Future leaders
            -Stance toward the US
                  -Sato's report
      -Liberal Democratic Party
            -Strength
            -Opposition
                  -Communist and Social parties
            -Demonstrations
                  -Reversion
                  -Police handling
-Indochina
-Lt. Gen. T.N.J. Suharto visit to Japan
      -Sato
            -View of Indochinese
            -Agnew’s response
      -Suharto compared with Thieu
            -Thieu
            -Ellsworth F. Bunker's view of Thieu
      -Sato
      -View of Indochinese leadership
-Vietnam
      -Meeting with Thieu, Bunker, and Abrams
      -Meeting with Bunker and Abrams
            -Tan Son Nhut
            -View of Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN] capacities
      -Thieu
            -Demeanor
            -Briefing on North Vietnam offensive
            -Response to North Vietnam
                  -Counter attacks
                        -Time
      -North Vietnam offensive
            -Strategy
                  -Territorial forces
                  -Political structure
                  -Quang-Tri

                -Hue
                -An Loc
                -Kontum
                -Pleiku
                -Coalition government
      -Thieu
            -View of mining
                  -South Vietnam capacities
                        -Timing
      -Air Strikes
            -Effectiveness
            -South Vietnam morale
            -North Vietnam supplies and morale
            -B-52s
                  -Impact
                  -Effectiveness
      -Kontum
            -North Vietnam Losses
                  -Intelligence reports
                        -North Vietnam regiments
            -Thieu, Bunker and Abrams view on retention
                  -Pleiku Road
-Military Region One
      -Gen. Ngo Quang Truong
      -South Vietnam defense
      -Strategy
      -Air strikes
            -Surface-to-air [SAM] missiles
                  -Movement
                  -Hanoi, Haiphong, demilitarized zone [DMZ]
-Air strikes
      -Commando operations in North Vietnam
            -The President’s view
            -Discussion in State Department
            -South Vietnam force
            -Discussion with Thieu
      -Meeting with Thieu
            -An Loc, Kontum, Hue
            -Strike into North Vietnam
                  -Thieu's position
      -Air strikes
            -Bridges
                  -Haiphong, Hanoi, Paul Doumer bridge

                     -Effectiveness
                     -POL
                     -Rail lines

The President signaled the White House operator at an unknown time between 10:51 am and
11:16 am.

[Conversation No. 726-1C]

[See Conversation No. 24-156]

                -Limits place on Air Force bombing

[The above portion of the office conversation took place simultaneously with Conversation No.
726-1C].

                     -Reaction by US Air Force [USAF]
                           -Kissinger’s view
                     -Air Force Chief of Staff
                           -Kissinger’s view
                     -Kissinger’s orders
                     -Adm. John S. McCain, Jr.

The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 10:51 am and
11:16 am.

[Conversation No. 726-1D]

[See Conversation No. 24-157]

[End of telephone conversation]

                     -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                          -Location
                     -Targets
                          -Buffer zone
                               -Restrictions
                                     -Hanoi area
                          -Reluctance
                               -Reasons
                     -Moorer
                          -Meeting with President and Kissinger
                          -Location

Stephen B. Bull entered at 11:16 am.

Bull talked with Moorer between 11:16 am and 11:17 am.

[Conversation No. 726-1E]

[See Conversation No. 24-158]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Moorer
         -Location
         -Meeting with President and Kissinger

Bull left at an unknown time at or before 11:17 am.

     Agnew's trip
         -Vietnam
                -Air strikes
                -M-36s

[The above portion of the office conversation took place simultaneously with Conversation No.
726-1E]

     Vietnam
          -Air Force
                -Limits
                      -President's orders
                -The President’s view
                -Responsibility
                -Problems
                -Gen. John D. Ryan
                      -Replacement
                      -The President’s view
                -The President’s view
                -Attitude
                      -Compared with the Israeli Air Force

Moorer entered at 11:17 am.

     Greetings

Vietnam
     -Air strikes
           -Limits
                 -Comments from South Vietnam and Pearl Harbor
                       -Reports to Agnew
           -Ryan
                 -Replacement
                 -The President’s view
                       -Ryan’s son
           -President's orders
           -Restrictions
                 -Reasons
                 -Hanoi
                       -Distance
                       -Duration
           -Air Force
                 -Reasons For Performance
                       -The President’s view
                       -Press reports
                       -Reports to Agnew
           -Commanders
                 -Replacements
                       -Air Force Chief of Staff
           -President's orders
                 -Ryan
                 -McCain
           -Retrictions
                 -Reaction
                       -Reasons
           -Air Force
           -Performances
                 -Moorer’s view
                 -Reason
                 -The President’s view
           -Israeli Air Force
           -B-52s
                 -Location
                 -Abrams's report
           -Attitude
           -Support of President
           -Ryan
                 -Possible resignation
                       -The President’s view

                -Hanoi
                     -POL
                -Comments to Agnew
                -Restricted areas
                     -Implementation
                           -Date
                -Changes
                     -Moorer's responsibility
                     -Time
                     -Methods

Moorer left at 11:22 am.

     Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Raids
                -President's orders
                -Attitude
                -Weather
                -Number of sorties in past week
                -Ceiling
          -Blockade
                -Reaction
                -Laird, Defense Department, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency
                      [CIA]
          -Air strikes
                -Air Force
                      -Changes
                            -Ryan
                            -Moorer
                -Restrictions
                      -Implementation
                            -Date and duration
                      -PRC border
                            -Bridges
                      -Hanoi
                            -Soviet Embassy
                            -Power plant

     Kissinger
          -Meeting with Congressional Leaders
               -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]

     Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Authorization
                      -Power plants
                      -Hanoi
                      -Haiphong
                      -Restrictions
                      -Number of targets
                            -Time
                -Reason for action
                      -Losses
                            -B-52s
                            -Hanoi area
                                  -SAMs
                                  -Air Force responsibility
                                        -Compared with US Navy and Haiphong
                      -Air Force
                -Hanoi
                      -President's orders
                      -Haiphong targets compared with Hanoi targets
                -B-52 strikes
                -President's orders
                -Abrams's attitude

     Kissinger
          -SALT meeting

Kissinger left at 11:25 am.

     Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Air Force responsibility

     Agnew's trip
         -Vietnam
                -Abrams
                     -South Vietnam bombing
                     -The President’s view
         -Thailand
                -Leaders
                     -Attitude towards blockade
                -US air bases
                     -Economic benefits

         -North East insurgency
               -US military aid
                     -Helicopters
                          -Congress
                                -Funds
                          -Agnew talk with Laird
                          -Need for action
                          -Agnew report to President
                     -Armored vehicles
                          -Number unused
                          -Significance
                     -Small unit communications equipment
         -Drug traffic
               -Opium
               -Lester L. Wolff
                     -Opium Destruction Program
                          -Credit
                          -Thais
                          -PRC
         -Military briefing by Agnew
         -Support for President's policies
         -Leonard Unger
               -Views on Vietnam
               -Replacement
               -The President’s view
               -Beliefs
     -Ambassador Bunker
         -Attitude toward President's policies
         -Attitude toward Thieu

Vietnam
     -Agnew's press briefing
          -President's policies
                -Success
                      -Vietnamization
          -North Vietnam offensive
                -Failure
                      -US Pacification Program
                      -Reason
          -President's policies
                -Success
     -Soviet Summit
          -Soviet attitude toward North Vietnam

          -Settlement
                -Failure
                      -Consequences
                           -Destruction of Hanoi
                           -Civilian casualties
    -Air strikes
          -Hanoi power plant
          -Report to Agnew at Guam
          -B-52s
    -McCain
          -Possible retention
          -Son [John S. McCain, III]
                -POW
          -Extension of command
    -Abrams
          -Agnew’s view
          -Meeting with Agnew
          -Attitude toward air strikes
          -Strategy
                -An Loc
                -Kontum
                -South Vietnam morale
                -Targets
                      -Thieu's position
    -President's policies
          -Blockade
          -North Vietnam bombing
    -B-52s
          -Use in South Vietnam
          -Number
          -Limitations
          -Carriers
          -Marine squadrons
                -Number
                -Japan
                -Thailand

Agnew's trip
    -Japan
    -Thailand
    -Consultations
           -Leaks
    -Japan

         -South Vietnam, Saigon
         -Agnew's report to press
              -Success

    Wallace
         -President's previous visit
         -Possible Agnew visit
               -Timing
         -Condition
               -Paralysis
                     -Extent
                     -Doctor's reports
               -Attitude
         -President's visit
               -American flag
         -Possible Agnew visit
               -President's suggestion
               -Agnew's statement
               -Call to Cornelia Wallace
               -Arrangements
               -Dr. William M. Lukash
               -Purpose

    Agnew's schedule
        -Rest
        -A dinner
              -Tricia Nixon Cox
              -John Wayne, Francis A. (“Frank”) Sinatra, Hope, James (“Jimmy”) Stewart
              -Fundraiser

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 22s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5

**********************************************************************

     Wallace
          -Gun control legislation
                -Herbert L. (“Herblock”) Block cartoon
                -Sick society
                -President's proposed legislation
          -Advocates
          -Sick society
          -Assassination attempt on Franklin D. Roosevelt and [Mayor Anton Cermak]
          -Assassination attempt on Harry S. Truman
                -Blair House
                -Killing of Secret Service agent
          -Shooting in House of Representatives
          -Price of free society
          -Dictatorships
                -Soviet Union
                      -Firearms
          -Sick society
                -Rebuttals
                      -Roosevelt
                      -Truman

     John B. Connally
          -Plans
               -Return to Texas
                    -Brother

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 7
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 2m 48s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 7

**********************************************************************

     Agnew
         -Press briefing

[This conversation continues on Conversation No. 726-2]

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yes, that's the whole point.
But the question is how hard we want him to hit.
And that partly depends on how hard he's set up to hit.
I was debating this morning, and I decided not to raise it to get in the tape on the New York Times on this Tony Lewis stuff, but Ken Klassen did it in a damn hard way yesterday.
He said they were serving as a mouthpiece for M.A.S.A.
and propaganda.
Yeah, he put it out on his own name and did it just damn hard.
Yeah.
He said they were a conduit of enemy propaganda.
The reference to the ship movement is entirely untrue, but in answer to a query the Times was told in advance by the U.S. government that no ship was entered or left.
That truth was worth a single paragraph in the story of many column inches.
The Times said briefly USA said the story was false.
The Times prefers its own brand of truth.
Both these stories at times are totally incorrect.
If you don't see a correction, you have yet to see a story saying we were misled, we were duped, we were wrong.
My question is, why?
I'm afraid that it was an optimistic report on the state of the... Well, that's what I had in mind.
Yeah.
Well, that was the general plan.
Right.
That was the general plan.
Well, you ought to get hard on the critics, not the townhouse.
That's the one thing that we aren't getting across, because we can't break through on it.
Don't you agree?
It doesn't get through much.
And it's clear to him from being over there how much criticism in this country
He eats the other side and hurts our side.
Is Henry available this morning or is he moving?
Henry's down at this meeting.
He's getting by.
I don't know.
Hey, Bob, when you first saw this guy, I didn't know how to live with him for the last time.
But to show you, Bob, how you really got to get this after this damn trip was over, it's possible he's going to change.
You know where they held the U.S. last time?
Christ would be better than Chavis.
About that he fell.
Chavis is never with us.
Not even, not part of it.
But never, never, never.
And he's always out with those other people.
And never with our people.
It's a broad day.
It's a waste.
When he was out with Stuart also the night before, he had both outsourced.
It's a small thing, but...
Oh, we make a little bit, but we don't, no, there's many things, but I think once, you know, it gets harder to make a little share of it all.
I don't know if they caught anybody, but they had notes.
There was a note there that was a phone call to the Washington University.
Oh, they were saying the violence and all that.
I shouldn't say that.
I said, for Christ's sake, you cannot let a story lie to the effect that ships are coming in and out.
You can't let that lie.
He said, well, McCloskey answered it.
I said, screw McCloskey.
It's got to be answered in a very mild way.
Except, well, God.
Except that it didn't carry as a big story.
It argued that you don't want to answer this as a big story.
I
It's this sort of thing.
Well, thank you.
Listen, you know, you've got to get that waiting room thing worked out.
You haven't been able to do it.
I see you said it out there with the secretary.
You can't work it out so you can get a separate waiting room for a distinguished guest.
That's good.
You said it with the secretary.
Hell no.
I think a man should be able to sit around and look at himself and work it out.
Yeah, I just want to say two things.
Vice President, you don't want to.
You know, it's an easy one to keep you focused on the report on the trip that you keep an eye on.
It can be a good one.
What do you want?
This one or the other?
This one.
It could be a common one, I guess.
What's going on in Saigon and South Vietnam and basic attitudes on the other side.
Your visit will always explain it.
That's the first.
That's a common fashion issue.
The wires.
There's nothing for me to add to that.
I just thought I'd say it right first.
But the quotes are good.
All of them said good luck on the trip to Russia.
So that's the end of the interview.
Oh, sure.
Well, what I meant is that they're a long time.
They've been there for a good reason.
Well, it was our fault.
I'm sorry.
There's nobody admitting how wrong they were.
In some ways, we never did it out of the air.
They said he was something for something and all that.
Once again, they set themselves up by their knee for a reaction that they couldn't cope with.
Because life's a good way to do it.
Yeah.
Try to find my way back.
It's still in my imagination.
If you want to do it, we'll pursue it.
It turns out it's going to be in Russia at least.
I think Moscow at the time.
He's, as you know, a huge favorite of the Russians.
I'd like to give him some attention because, you know, he opened his concert at Carnegie Hall by playing the Star Spangled Banner the other night.
And there's a big news story about it.
It says many in the full house were startled and some annoyed when Mr. Clyburn opened the program with the Star Spangled Banner.
One woman on the stage, Bob Seger, pointed and refused to rise, and few listeners were rude enough to hiss.
All right.
All right.
You know, he's super for us.
That's what we have.
That's the Russian thing.
That's a little strange.
But if we get it, he'll say, just say we wanted that for dinner.
That's done.
Okay.
That's, then we're not importing entertainment, we're just using it.
And you've got a great start, like we did in the Duggala dinner when we had, at Hyatt that's playing.
Henry has insisted that we not use Radio Free Europe for any promotional stuff in either Russia or Poland.
But I don't want to run.
I know that.
But I mean, Poland is a different thing.
I don't know.
He just says nothing must be done to use it.
I can ask him to cover this with you.
Oh, he's just going to call me.
or, you know, you have to reconsider our Poland, or just say, oh, Russia, under no circumstances, but for Poland, don't you really discontinue our radio free program?
I don't want them to say freedom.
I just want them to put out low-key the fact the president's coming to give men to that program.
That's what the kind of broadcast I want.
The president is coming.
Oh, it's like you're touching a terrier.
That's all.
There should be nothing.
It should be pure news.
Pure English, is that what you mean?
Okay.
We were talking about going beyond that in Poland, you know, the thing of...
I don't want to stir up a revolution, but the president's coming, and he is a friend of both.
We're the American people, the Polish people.
That's all.
Nothing more.
No religion.
Nothing else.
You're coming in.
You're coming in.
Yeah, I'm just waiting.
Yeah, the vice president is waiting for you to come over and come in with the vice president.
Your office didn't just tell you?
Okay.
Okay.
Okay.
I don't know.
I suppose so.
I'm tired of the pro-luxury people.
I'm tired of the pro-welfare people in all the races.
Basically, they don't represent my views.
I'm tired of the people that, you know, when you do something to be a cop, like the assholes quit.
I've heard you people quit.
I know they won't.
They might be
I wish they'd get the hell out.
I know they're not dead, but I do really feel strongly about it.
There'll be problems with Rogers at the moment, I see.
Yeah, I think I have one.
I think Mrs. Rogers is going to pull up with that.
I don't give a shit about that.
Perfectly all right.
Perfectly all right.
But not the rest of them.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I'm sorry to keep you waiting.
We got a call that happened before.
Well, you must be tired.
You must be tired to sit here this time.
Before we go...
I want us to believe that we have the day to give up.
The attack on Khantoum hadn't come yet.
It was first that they put in 57 B-52 strikes in the immediate surroundings of Khantoum within five miles of Khantoum.
It looked almost completely covered.
And at this point, I've just had a meeting with the intelligence people.
You can't say it's by design that they're holding off that attack because it's going to show up.
So, again, we expect to lose Khaktoum whenever they attack.
But, exactly as you said, we've said it's going to happen.
And, look, I wasn't so good about it, but...
It's too late.
It's too late.
It's too late.
We are now getting a really high-lastic voice of enormous casualties on the other side.
Is there any way you can get Tony Lewis reporting on this?
The New York Times coverage of this, can you do the job at all?
Oh, yes, I've got a lot, and it's disgraceful.
It's straight to the communist mind.
The son of a bitch, Lewis, wrote that the bomb cave wasn't working and that it might end up dead.
But in fact, what the East German ship proves is exactly
That's true.
There's an East German boat, which he mentioned.
That has been in there since April 7th and hasn't been able to unload because of our first bombing attacks, which knocked out some of the port facilities.
And therefore, there has been a tremendous pileup of ships in Highmont Harbor anyway, and it just got up to the dock last week.
It's true, it just started unloading last week, but it's been inside the harbor since April 7th.
Polish ships got inside the harbor on May 2nd.
No ship has come either in or out since May 10th.
And there's just no way they could do it unless they started sweeping over to the construction.
We'll land them and we'll put in pressure marks which can't be swept.
So, my name is totally effective, is it not?
100% effective.
All day long.
Just remember that.
I didn't know that you said that.
I know that my name is totally effective.
Let me, let me talk.
You were in Tennessee meeting that day, and you know how the thing comes up.
You mean, you know, basically, they're representing the military point of view, and that is the military point of view.
Why?
Because they said in 68, there had been a study showing it wouldn't work.
First, I think that was wrong.
But that's true.
That's right.
That's right.
Uh, we did not have the precision, uh, uh, uh, uh, authority for the air force with regard to the, with regard to taking on the railroad.
All of these things make a difference.
So what we have done now, we've cut off the shape of the building.
We have cut off totally supplies from the city.
They're eating, we're chewing them up in the south, you know, whatever that is, and they're having to eat oil and so forth.
And the railroads, the railroads are systematically being taken out.
And in addition to that, our army in the north is now directly in,
It's hard to tell what they've got on the ground, but we think we've got at least 50%
P.O.L.
depot, disappeared P.O.L.
supplies.
We cut, I don't know, 60 to 80 percent of the Hanoi.
We destroyed nearly 100 percent of another big P.O.L.
farm 20 miles south of Hanoi that was burning for four days.
And they showed pictures in which the fire on the third day was worse than on the second.
It was totally out of control.
We've knocked out all the convict stations by which they've moved forward through the time.
Every rail bridge on one of the rail lines into China has been knocked out.
And four out of five of the rail bridges on the other line of China, there hasn't been one train moving into Vietnam.
for the last two weeks.
So now we start talking about moving shot by truck.
But, well, it can be done what they are.
But, well, and on top of that, Mr. President, to move POL by truck is one hell of a job.
They don't have the track of trucks.
No ship.
They were saying, you remember, that they could easily go into Chinese ports.
Not one ship has yet been rerouted into a Chinese port.
Those eight ships that were allegedly heading for Haipan
I thought a little list would be helpful because if you get into speeches or a Q&A,
We have the report from the French ambassador.
We have the report.
Did you see that?
No, no, because that was given to us by the French ambassador.
We have something.
It's good.
No, no, but we have absolute sources from North Vietnam.
Well, you might say that you have a source that's totally reliable from Vietnam.
It's so important.
They use non-attributive remarks.
But there is now... And I think you're going to be shaken even more by the results of the Moscow Summit.
So the fact that it's going on... Well, the fact that it's going on is already unbelievably tough on them.
So they are... Have you had any complaint from the Chinese for the strike at 70 miles from China?
No.
It's 12 miles.
We knocked the bridge down yesterday.
But our understanding from Joe was that we just wouldn't go over the border.
He didn't...
He wasn't worried about that being that... Well, we've kept it 20 miles from the border, and I think we'd better stop it now.
Well, that's the only bridges we're knocking on.
Yeah.
The thing is about, you know, they've got two American pilots in China already.
If they get over that border, they're going to get knocked down.
That's the other thing.
Well, they're not going across the border.
I don't know if I'm mistaken, but I think the Chinese are more rapid ideologically, but it's fascinating that so far they haven't done a thing.
I mean, they have no Soviet ships or any other ship in the Chinese ports.
As far as we can tell, there's no additional overland movement from China.
Of course, there can't be any because we've not got overland.
Well, the thing that I think is terribly important before we go into the other things that you want to cover, and terribly important is just that
getting through here to the polls and everything else that it's a solid majority and a magnitude of two of the three to one of the American groups is what we've done.
That's point one.
So that was him.
Second, it did not, despite the fact that most of the columnists and commentators, the left, they said it would sink the summit and bring on World War III, has not done so.
Third, the other thing is that it has had a devastating effect on morale in our Vietnam.
foreign, it has had a very good effect on the morale of our 60,000 Americans there.
That has been shown on American television.
The one point that has not been gotten across is the fact that it has had, on the morale of the South Indonese, they are fighting better than the rest.
And if after your brief visit and so forth, I mean, whatever you said out there,
You can get across a little of the fact that they know that they've got to take a lift out of this.
If you believe another, that's the point.
That's the point.
We haven't gotten across because nobody believes you in this, you know.
But actually, Mr. President, if by the end of June...
These guys have not done much better than now.
It will be a disastrous defeat for them.
They have put their whole bloody field army into this field now for seven weeks.
And they've taken farm trees.
They've advanced 22 miles into South Vietnam.
That's all it is on that side.
And now it's four miles.
Can't do maybe 30 miles, but across jungles.
Our threat is creating this panic.
Or did we?
Or did we.
The panic now will be reported.
It's getting to be a little better.
And if we can hold the way, Abrams sent in a report for you today.
Yeah, he's got it.
He's not as bad as I am on that.
But now that's your view.
Well, what I do to save time, I brought some points, and I'd like to, if you agree, just to start with Japan.
Sure.
And move through the other places.
Sure.
First of all, the reversion ceremonies were...
taken very seriously by the Japanese, and they were handled with very dignity, and I thought extremely impatiently that Sato was quite moved in his remarks.
As a matter of fact, he actually broke down at one point in his remarks, and he was very complimentary to the United States.
The audience with the emperor was very good.
He was doing a ceremonial thing.
He wanted to talk a lot about Japanese-American relationships.
And these three, they gave the Japanese everything in protocol they could.
A lunch with the emperor, a dinner with the prime minister, the whole works.
He would be appreciated at the Anchorage visit.
And also, he wants to come here.
I said, I'm sure that we want him to come, compatible with your schedule.
He's really back in our office.
All the 10 of these leaders expressed strong support for the U.S. policies in the Southeast Asia.
And I had a chance to talk to Tanaka informally, and they seem to be keeping him one step behind Fukudan in such a way.
He's got a fighting, you know, I think he's a very slow ball.
Yeah, Fukudan is the guy that's going to do this job.
Yeah.
But they're all alive.
The whole party is alive, pro-U.S., very strongly, and they wanted everybody to know that.
The Sato assured me that the Japanese concern over the shock with your visit to the PRC was history and
that our future and their future are extremely aligned.
And they welcome our desire to play an increasing part in the economic role, increasing economic role in the area.
Fukuda made a very strong pitch for U.S. support for a permanent Japanese seat on the U.N. Security Council, one of our systems.
He said that the nuclear powers and the great powers find that the great economic powers, which is the point he made, should also have a voice.
I thought that we generally supported their desire.
to achieve the goal.
As I said, Bukidan is still the frontrunner in six weeks.
Sato, the Tanaka has moved up fast.
I had a formal meeting with the foreign minister, but only brief contact with the Tanaka.
But I'm pretty positive, based on my conversation with Sato, that any – either one of these men would continue to follow a very pro-U.S. policy.
I don't think we have any worries in that respect.
And the party is very well off because the Communist Party and the Socialist Parties are even more fragmented than ever before.
Good, good, good.
And so they have a lot of demonstrations on Reversion Day, but the police are extremely adaptive.
Very, very nicely done, in a harsh way, but they handle them well.
One thing I thought I said that was surprising was that somewhat
Unsolicited.
It really didn't fit in the context of what we were talking about.
He was speaking about Suharto's visit, which was going on concurrently with my ending as I came in.
And he contrasted the leadership, the qualities of the Indo-China people in Suharto.
A very unfavorable one.
Okay.
An unfavorable Indo-China.
I jumped in there and I supported him rather strongly.
I said that this man's had a very difficult domestic situation to deal with.
He has made general successes in the face of most difficult circumstances.
I noted Ambassador Bunker's high, continuing high confidence.
I mean, because Sato always thanks a lot of Bunker.
I'm not told that Sato, we have confidence in you also.
But that sort of surprised me.
He's not a great admirer of anybody in the Chinese.
He feels there's a breakdown of leadership.
And in Vietnam,
And I spent about an hour and a half or two in the most intensive military briefing.
Bunker Abrams being present, and I spent two, two Bunker Abrams all present over the period.
Yeah.
And then I spent another hour, hour and a half or so with Bunker Abrams.
Right.
By themselves at Thompson.
They all seem confident of the elementability of the arm that contained me back at the station.
Chu looks extremely well.
He's not at all shaky or erratic.
He's very calm.
He did the briefing military district by district in a most logical way.
He's very well up on the situation.
His theory is, and I seem to subscribe to this, that when they started this invasion, they had in mind that they would be able to stretch it over about a nine-month period, that they would not, under any circumstances, withdraw to the sanctuaries for replenishment.
But the idea was to move in and get the territory and hold it, at the same time trying to destroy the main forces of the South Vietnamese.
then disrupt the territorial forces and the political structure, and then go to the bargaining table in firm possession of strong points such as concrete, clay, analog, and demand a coalition of government which they would be able to control through their very sophisticated destructive processes and then get control of the country that way.
Now, he says because of the mining operation and because of the bombing, the enemy's had to reassess his capabilities, and he estimates he can only maintain a four-month proposition at the absolute top.
Starting in April?
Yeah.
Four months, that's all.
I mean, starting when the offensive started?
Yeah, starting when it started.
So they call it a four-month.
He feels that...
The bombing has been tremendously successful.
And as you just pointed out, it has not only been successful in a military sense, but it has totally reversed the South Vietnamese morale.
The people there are looking optimistically at the situation.
The bombing of the mine.
The bombing of the mine.
The knowledge of the North Vietnamese that nothing's coming down the pipeline, the quantity that it did is adversely affecting that.
But the one point he wanted to make, if there's anything that's really going, is the B-52.
The B-52 is the workforce that's really going to jail for it.
And they feel in Khartoum that the reason this attack hasn't come is because the losses have just been incredible because of what we've done.
We had intelligence reports from two regiments that had come into assembly areas.
I'm ready to drive away at the rampant load.
All three, uh, on the bus L3, I mean, uh, to Bunker Havens.
I feel there is a chance that Khantoum, which is the weakest of all, can be held, particularly since the road to Pleiku is now open again.
In District 1, they're just amazed with what Truong has been able to do since they put him up there.
His defense is mobile.
It involves strikes.
to keep the enemy off balance, and it's been tremendously successful.
Meanwhile, again, the air has forced an evacuation of the SAM missiles back from below the DMZ, not only from above the DMZ, but most of them are on the way back to Haiphong, and that's the way to protect against strikes there.
So yesterday, for example, the Air Force general
Did they discuss with you at all the possibilities of them having a commando or even larger operation in North Vietnam?
No.
This is finally important.
You see, Henry, the reason it's important is one of the two.
If you have, for example, a negotiation at a time that North Vietnam occupies, I don't care if it's only 22 miles to South Vietnam, then you have the second partition.
If, on the other hand, South Vietnam has anything in North Vietnam, you've got something to do there.
And I realize it may be impossible,
If there was just some way to just have some force there.
I'm thinking of the negotiating thing, not another project.
If they could just have somebody sitting in the van or just sitting around.
Then we'd say, all right, we'll get out of here.
You can get out of there.
Otherwise, what you're going to negotiate is to negotiate where you're going to settle based on the current military situation, which is all you can ever negotiate anyway.
He didn't much choose who it was.
They're going to – they're – they need to really make certain they can handle that line and come to them and weigh in the physical forces right now and meet the flexibility.
I've got the impression that he would resist any kind of strike in the north at this time.
As Henry just pointed out, they're all aware that they've knocked out these two bridges, the one from High Palm and the one south of Pennwood, the Loomé Bridge.
It's been extremely effective.
There's a cotton bridge across, alongside the Loomé Bridge, but it's not really been able to carry the P.O.L.
but heavy stuff.
And the, the rain hasn't cut very well.
Apparently,
The attitude that I understood was that there's some remorse over the fact that they're going to get the limits put on bombing.
The fact that they can't.
What are they going to do?
Those sons of bitches of the Air Force.
They're talking about it.
If we hit it once more, I'm going to recommend to the President to fire that bastard of a chief of staff of the Air Force.
There are no limits on the bombing.
He cannot go for the next two weeks inside of 10 miles.
And for the last week, these bastards, we've told them to bomb, to take out the target inside the 10-mile circle because we had promised the Russians while we were in Moscow we wouldn't bomb inside Hanoi.
They asked us not to bomb above the 20th parallel.
We rejected it.
They asked us not to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong.
We rejected it.
They said you cannot bomb the capital of an allied country.
Now who's that?
Who'd you get this from?
It's an outrage.
These bastards are thinking only of their own alibis for the week, Mr. Vice President.
I have told those guys to bob inside that circle to take care of these copies.
I think he's in my office.
I think he's in my office.
or something that was inside the buffer zone that they could have really done right, but they couldn't go back because they were restricted.
What is that?
What is that?
There are two circles.
There are only two restrictions.
One is the 10-mile area around Hanoi for the next two weeks.
The other one is a 20-mile...
The other one is a 20... No, no.
Inside that 10-mile zone, they can hit any target that we've approved, which includes the bridges.
And?
Inclusive air.
Let's get more rain here, you get my order.
Where is Mark?
I think he's in my office waiting for me.
Well, the operator can't find him.
They're usually quite competent.
Well, he's in my office, I think.
I'm certain he's in my office.
I mean, when we requested it, you know, they put those, what is it, 10-36, right?
Is he in?
I was asking where he is.
Air Force, Ryan today, he's out, out, out, out.
They've been pitching it on, and I've been, I've not been telling it to the president.
So, for God's sake, they've never had such good, they've got total freedom to bomb and place it on.
And they know it, and they are going to be used.
They're the ones who have it.
We have people thinking that, uh, they're scared, they're scared to go ahead and seal it.
They're going to do 5,000, and God damn it, it's greatly supplied, uh,
Your colleagues in the military in Vietnam and Pearl Harbor, they are complaining that we have put such limited restrictions on them in terms of what they can bomb.
They are unable to do an effective job.
And I want to tell you something.
And I've said this before and I'm going to say it again.
Ryan has got to get off his goddamn ass or he's out.
I'm tired of him anyway.
for the son killed and all that sort of thing.
But let me say, you know, I ordered that goddamn Air Force time and time again to do anything they can.
4,000-foot ceiling.
You know what I know, that they do not have restrictions.
The only restriction they've got is the one with the 10 miles of Hanoi at the present time, which they didn't have before.
And the Air Force didn't do a goddamn thing for the last three days, if you know.
Not one goddamn thing in North Vietnam.
Because the little bastards were afraid that they might lose a plane because they couldn't see.
or there's going to be a new challenge.
What the hell is the matter with these people?
Why are they whining?
Because they are afraid to go ahead and do the job that they've been ordered to do?
What in the hell is the matter with them now?
I really don't know.
but they have been able to go back.
I've taken it, I've really taken it out.
They were told they couldn't go back.
Now that is absolutely false.
That is absolutely false.
Not only have they been able,
because they're afraid that the weather isn't good enough.
They've got to have 5,000-foot ceilings.
We've got to have Israelis fly at 1,000-foot ceilings.
Now, tell them to get off their goddamn ass and do the job.
And I, like, for example, I want some 52s to get there.
Oh, no, Abrams needs them in the South.
I've got my bookkeeping in the South.
But for Christ's sakes, why does the Air Force constantly undercut us and bitch when they've never been back as they're back today?
Tell them to do the job.
Now, I agree with you.
Ryan is going to have a resignation on this.
I don't fire his ass out of here unless he gets a discipline on that now.
Is that clear?
Yes, Mr. President, I just finished.
I'm in Austin.
Why are they saying to the Vice President of the United States that the President is limiting what they can do?
Why are they saying that?
I was not sure.
They are complaining about the restricted air.
There are no restricted air.
There are not.
Nothing else is restricted.
I guess they're talking about that 10-mile limit.
No, no, no, it wasn't there.
The 10-mile limit only goes into effect tomorrow morning.
Bullshit!
They just told you!
I mean, you've got to get your story a little bit straighter, too.
They told you they didn't go back and get the railroad.
There has been absolutely no restriction on the railroad.
There will be no limit until tomorrow morning.
Now, let's get this straight.
I want to ship this goddamn object.
Now, you shape it up.
That's your job.
And get it done fast.
And it's nice and neutral.
They were ordered to go back again that way, and I know the one they're talking about.
And the sons of bitches said, for four days, we can't fly because of the weather.
Every day this week, we've been studying this.
They have a long, long sortie in North Vietnam this week.
You know why?
Because they say the weather is too bad.
So it's up there.
Now, let's get the damn story straight.
You've got to hear these people.
That's why Laird turned a half-assed attitude.
He didn't have meaning.
Because the goddamn military has been, I mean, rather than saying,
give us an opportunity.
They're afraid to be wrong.
I have to make that decision alone.
The military is against it.
The State Department is against it.
The CIA was against it.
Now, it's time that we quit bitching about what we're doing and put the beat on there.
Now, listen, it's Moore's ass, too.
Moore has got to start shaping people up.
Now, I'm just tired of hearing this kind of crap.
But there are only two bridges in there of which we've taken special permission to knock one out.
or he'd leave because we don't want to have a bomb drop on the Russian embassy, let's face it.
We'd be pleading with them this week to knock out every target in Hanoi this week.
For example, I was raising hell this morning.
I said the congressional group on this whole thing.
Just to give you an example, Mr. Vice President, we've been bugging them this week to take out all the targets in Hanoi and leave Haiphang for next week because there are no restrictions on Haiphang.
So when I get my morning briefing, I find they have hit 20 targets in Haiphang the day before yesterday.
And because they're closing, you know, there's more to get done.
And I said, God damn it, we've got to win this thing.
And you've got to risk some plans, including B-52s.
And it's tough.
It's tough.
They'll have a hell of a sense.
There's two reasons.
There's your disreason.
There's the fact that I know I have to give to the Air Force.
I know I have to give to the Navy.
And the Air Force won't fly.
And the Air Force has also the battlefields, so they stage it differently.
But instead of having an integrated plan, when we tell them, we've got to get the Hanoi targets this week because for a week you can't get them, they go merrily away hitting high barns and don't go anywhere.
But it's unfair.
You were the one that made them fly up north to begin with.
They didn't want to do it.
flatly refused to go until I ordered him to go.
Every B-52 strike in the North, you ran down their throats.
They didn't want to do it.
We've had to order it from here against tables from the Air Force and the papers, telling us not to do it.
I mean, yeah, so much for that.
You can go ahead and do whatever your stalling is all about.
The, uh, well, they can get out, because they're more sensitive to start getting off their ass and doing it, and that's all.
Abrams did defend very strongly.
This is the last minute.
If I'd have known this background, I would have understood it better.
Putting most of his body and capability in this cell.
Yeah.
He doesn't understand the need to do the dark psychological thing.
There's just no psychologist.
Moving on to the pilot, and the pilot leaders were very interested in the current situation, and they're very reassured by this strong action.
I think this is very important.
I thank them for the quick action on the top of the airspace and some of the things that we're doing.
We really love it, and this helps them, too, economically.
This is a big thing for them.
They say they don't want our people here, but they love it.
They felt pretty confident that they could figure it out.
They felt pretty confident.
Yes, they did.
Now, they're working on this in certainty in the Northeast.
It's not always a problem.
It's not a problem.
Diane and Dave, they do their desire to work, but they want to know what they want.
They want to know what they want.
You come to land, you can leave yourself.
You say you and I have talked.
And God damn, I don't know what we're going to do about it.
If they can use it, let's get over there.
Because you see, what we could do, if you've got it there and then something pops up in Vietnam and you get a ceasefire, let that go over and knock off the Vietnamese.
I expect when you follow up with this, you say that we discussed it.
of excuses, and he just said, if you want to, if you are going to vote directly to me, I'm going to vote.
Another thing they asked for was, are we going to be a president?
We're going to be a president.
We're all in these towns and sometimes we're going to be a president.
We've got so many of those around the world sitting around us.
No, I mean, you know, it rumbles down the street.
That's what goes on.
That's easy.
That is a thing they can do without any question.
And small human communications.
And I buttered a little bit on this, and I said I'd try to help get the true facts across.
This congressman, Lester Wolfe, made him really angry about taking credit for the burning of that OEM, which had really a long time of program that was going on between the Thai and the Chinese, and it worked out pretty well.
They appreciate it.
I came back from Vietnam.
I gave them a full military brief.
And they're still free.
They're 100%.
I don't have to worry about it.
They don't want to be on the losing side.
The only thing I have, Unger's a damn good ambassador.
But I get the feeling he talks to me one way and talks another way.
I don't think he's really as hawkish.
And Unger?
Well, he does.
He does.
He talks hawkish to me.
He's not.
He's not.
He's a clever career guy, but on the other hand, Hunker doesn't believe in what we believe.
And very few ambassadors do.
Hunker doesn't do.
Hunker.
Hunker doesn't do.
He's not being biased.
I got it in my side.
I said, he's still in the same confidence as you.
Yeah.
The main thing is if you can get across to the present factor.
I feel that it's more important to turn to the psychology of something.
Now, if they go through this all motion, the fact that this proves the animation doesn't work, you can say this is the proof that it does work.
After all, the anarchy of the maids are invading now, and the invasion thing has got to come to be true.
to destroy the pacification program through their subversion and so forth because the people of South Vietnam don't want communism.
I think another thing is that, firstly, the thing is that this is going to work.
That's the main thing now.
And it's going to – I'm optimistic that if we get through the Russian thing here, if you can imagine, there might be a negotiation involving all of this because the Russians are – they respect the Assad party.
I have no confidence in them, whatever.
If they don't, then the middle of Hanoi is going to get it right in the chops.
That's the way it's going to be.
And we're not going to be too damn worried about our civilian casualties.
We're going to blame them anyway.
That's right.
They didn't get that power station on us.
We were supposed to be good on that.
That's what they told me on the block.
They had to go.
What?
That's what they call it, well, it's called, well, it's called, yeah.
He's very upset about us coming to retirement.
He says, right now, please don't take me out of here.
We're not going to.
We're going to keep you.
I've got to stay here.
I think the guy is a fighter.
His son is a prisoner of war, you know.
And he's a little fighter.
He's on our side.
But as a matter of fact, we decided to extend him.
Just for your information tonight.
He's very emotional about this.
Particularly this bomb, the bomb allocation.
He's very defensive.
He's got to crush out of this attack on that block and continue because that's where the...
He wants to, but he says we can't let any of these places collapse.
And then he says we can move the bomb.
He wants to stabilize these areas.
Of course, she agrees with that strategy, apparently.
But you also agree to the strategy.
He doesn't question the mining strategy.
No, but he doesn't question the bombing of the North.
He just says that we've got to make that.
He wants all 52s.
He wants them until he's sure he's got them.
You know, we checked around to see if we could get some RB-52s, but it takes too long to get them made over.
You see, B-52s are not made.
They're made here in the beer box.
You know, God, we should put another hundred in there.
We could, but...
But I get to the second question, and it's really funny.
Another carrier, you know, arrived in the States.
We ordered three more squadrons, Marine squadrons, in from Japan three days ago, too.
They all ended up there.
But then I was the witness, and I told them, and I'm just pushing them all over the place.
Well, the Japanese situation was excellent.
I was getting a problem there.
I was getting a problem at the time.
And they were a little worried about consultation, and I told them, I said, you've got to do these things.
You might say that you saw a very different South Vietnam and a very different Saigon in Saigon than you had been led to believe by what you had seen on television and in the press in the United States.
I think, would that be all right?
That we just ought to go there, that they are confident, they're fighting for their country, they don't want communism, and they're going to win.
All right, confidence.
Stick it to them.
Let me suggest one other thing.
I went out to see Wallace this morning, you know.
I think in about three or four, three, three, four days, it'd be nice to be one of, you know, guys in an hospital that, and I just go out there, and we never know what's going to happen before falling.
He's got to get into that, and he's got to be paralyzed.
That's pretty good.
That's what we hear.
That's what the doctors want to hear.
I think he knows it.
The spirit is good.
He has an American flag and roses on there.
And I said, I've got it.
old flag flying high.
He says, I will.
He saluted me.
He said, I'm going to salute the commander in chief.
I said, well, get out.
But if you could go out and have a talk, you might see him.
You know, I chatted with him.
I suggested that you come out.
What I would do is maybe talk to him since he was not a son of mine.
My son might have said, I don't know what you might do.
He might give us as well as a call and say, perhaps I'm not here Tuesday.
You know, just come out and shout at them.
And work it out.
The way to work it out is to call Lukash.
He's the White House doctor that's assigned to them.
And Lukash will talk to their doctors out there, work out the time and so forth.
I would go out and see him.
I'd get people in the hospital and they may even shoot his parents up.
All right.
Gets to sleep.
Give my best, my God.
I did it.
I just told this about Tricia, so she's doing it, and I agree hard with you there.
They said, Bob, old Frank's about your job, Lane.
Oh, they're all going to be there.
I don't think Lane's done that.
Jimmy Stewart?
No, there are other people.
There are a lot of those people that are great watchers.
They're a great watcher.
It's a fun restaurant.
It's a fun restaurant.
Yeah.
It's good to get them to work.
I don't know if she ever made on the Wallace thing with the attitude that the only thing to do is to legislate against guns.
Her blog has a thing about the sick American society and politics of the gun.
Now, what the hell do you want?
One nut out of 200 million people shoots a man.
By the way, they like a bullpen society.
So you're not...
Anybody that wants to get a gun gets one.
Let's get back to our...
Well, anyway, we've got good gun control legislation pretty well in there, but what do they want to do, just disarm the populace and leave, disarm the good folks and leave the irons and hands to criminals?
I can get the cop, get the cop out on the idea that they do more to stimulate violence.
Got it.
Did they say this when somebody shot at Franklin D. Roosevelt and killed the mayor of Chicago?
Did they say this when somebody shot at Harry Truman in front of Blair House and killed a Secret Service agent?
Did they say this when somebody shot at the House of Representatives?
Did they say it then?
I mean, we always have it there.
Again, that's one of the costs of a free society.
There are many people running around, and you cannot guard against it.
If you want freedom, the only way you can guard against it is to have the people totally subtracted.
Now, there's, let me say, it's very interesting to note that those societies in which the people have no firearms are the big dictatorships.
Yeah, right over there.
None of the Russian citizens have gotten a firearm.
Not that I mean, I don't, I've never owned a gun, but by God, you just can't go that far, that's all.
But, but more, more in the NDR, the Truman thing, to them.
And say, wherever you follow that, did you think we were sick of that?
Do you know what I mean?
What's, uh, John, how am I going to do this?
He's going to go back to Texas and he's going to try to help his brother.
Shut up.
You won't try.
You might try.
I don't mind.
You might try.
You might try.
You might try.