Conversation 726-011

TapeTape 726StartFriday, May 19, 1972 at 1:08 PMEndFriday, May 19, 1972 at 1:27 PMTape start time02:31:28Tape end time02:48:42ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On May 19, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:08 pm to 1:27 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 726-011 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 726-11

Date: May 19, 1972
Time: 1:08 pm - 1:27 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     Soviet Summit
          -Henry A. Kissinger
                -Leak
                      -State Department
                            -William P. Rogers
                                 -Statement at National Security Council [NSC] meeting
                -State Department statement
                            -Kissinger
          -President's departure for the Soviet Union
                -Control of Charles W. Colson's office
                -Meetings with Haldeman
                -Domestic activities

     Vietnam
          -New York Times article
               -Kenneth W. Clawson's rebuttal
               -White House involvement
               -President's attitude

     White House staff
          -Papers for President
               -The President’s view
          -Clawson's action

Kissinger entered at 1:11 pm.

     Soviet Summit
          -President's meeting with press
                -Talking points

Haldeman left at 1:12 pm.

-President's meeting with Congressional leaders
      -Topics of discussion
            -Exchange
            -Environmental controls
            -Health, cultural exchanges
            -Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT]
-SALT
      -Andrei A. Gromyko message to Kissinger
            -Soviet Union position
            -Gerard C. Smith's position
                  -Status of negotiation
                        -State Department
                        -Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Conclusion of talks
-President's meeting with Congressional leaders
      -Topics
            -Vietnam
            -Middle East
            -SALT
            -European Security Conference
-Press
      -Proper framework
      -Briefings
            -Frequency
            -Ronald L. Ziegler
            -Frequency
            -President's press briefing
            -Topics
                  -Limits of Summits
                  -Vienna, Camp David, Geneva, Glassboro
                  -Purpose
                  -Preparation
            -Contacts with Leonid I. Brezhnev
                  -Unresolved issues
                  -Frequency
            -Summit
            -Third nations
                  -Concerns
                  -US allies
                  -PRC
            -Treaties
                  -SALT
                  -Others

                            -Submission to Senate
                            -Report to American people
                                   -Television speech
                                   -Questions and answers [Q&A]
                                   -Televised arrival ceremony
                -President's speech upon arrival in Moscow
                -Toasts
                      -First toast
                            -The President’s view
                -Television speech to Soviet people
                -Location
                      -Kremlin

Vietnam
     -Psychological warfare
          -Implementation
                -Problems
                -Kissinger's position
                -President's orders
                -Haig's check on situation
                -[David] Kenneth Rush
                -Call from Kissinger
                -Melvin R. Laird and Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                -Activities
     -Equipment for South Vietnam
          -President's orders
                -Reasons
                -Implementation
                      -Laird's orders
                            -Service secretaries
          -Rush's program
                -Kissinger’s view
                -President's authorization
                      -Timing
                            -Laird

Helsinki talks
     -[Smith]
           -Kissinger’s view
           -NSC help

Soviet Summit
     -Press briefing

          -Rogers and Kissinger
               -Presence
     -Meeting with Congressional leaders
          -Rogers's presence
          -Press briefing
               -Kissinger's presence
                      -Rogers's attitude
               -Rogers's presence
                      -Talk with reporters
               -Kissinger's presence

Vietnam
     -Air strikes
           -Behavior of military
                 -The President’s view
           -Restrictions
                 -Agnew
                       -Report
                       -The President’s view
                 -Military authority
                 -Implementation
                 -Reasons
           -Effects on North Vietnam
                 -Haig's report
           -Possible riots
                 -Reports
                       -Ambassadors
                             -Indonesia, France, Poland
     -Psychological warfare
           -Leaflet drop
                 -Hanoi Area
                 -US bombing
                 -Timing
                 -Content
                       -President's previous speech
                             -Warnings of bombing
           -Timing
     -North Vietnam offensive
           -North Vietnam
                 -Concerns of commanders
                 -Threat of collapse
           -Prospects for success
           -Delays

-US military command
     -Abrams
           -Future
                 -Laird
     -Gen. John D. Ryan
           -The President’s view
           -Future
     -Gen. John W. Vogt, Jr.
           -Future
           -Experience
     -Army
           -[Forename unknown] Davis
           -Gen. Bruce Palmer
     -Haig
           -Promotion
           -Work with President
     -Laird
           -Replacement
                 -The President’s view
-US war efforts
     -Air strikes
           -Agnew's report
                 -Limits
                 -Railroad Bridge
           -Restricted targets
                 -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer's list
           -Effect
                 -Railroads
           -Military's authority
                 -Lyndon B. Johnson stories
                 -Extent
           -B-52 strikes on North Vietnam
                 -Timing
                 -Intensity
           -B-52 employment
                 -Advantages
                 -Number
                       -Assignment to Vietnam from Europe
                       -Impact
                            -Agnew's conversation
                 -Comparison with F-4s
                 -Psychological effect
                 -Number in Europe

                             -Number to Vietnam

Kissinger left at 1:27 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

It's not going to be something that is totally false.
Yeah, in front of us.
They were at the meeting.
Oh, yeah.
I think we're going to see at one point Stacey was saying that they thought the sun was going to be on.
In fact, remember, they made the point that they were saying we had made the strong move and the Russians had blamed.
And all this stuff.
Which Henry was it that we were back trying to turn down?
Let's forget it.
That was what I'm saying.
Now, in regard to the other things, are you satisfied with what we're monitoring and good control in terms of Colson's activities?
Okay, so I've been fighting back one by one with everybody going over it.
No, no, no, I don't need that message.
No, I don't need that.
That one, Colson's right.
How's that possible?
But he's, he's people everywhere.
Stick their hands up.
Yep.
I'm glad to see you closing in.
It's all right.
Well, you've got to be moving.
It's a touch and go call, so whether that's a good thing to do out of the White House, but I think once in a while you almost have to.
And that was so clear.
Pay no attention to the little assholes in out here that say you just have to do things.
there's most of the people i never would have to do anything you know that i mean do you ever see the papers coming here the hell they don't want to do anything no i think that's right
Point two, I don't know whether we want to tell the leaders this much, do we?
This is already cut down by half.
No, no, no, I'm not talking about the length, but do we want to say that there will probably be agreements on Saturday?
No, that was supposed to be taken out.
I'll just say that we've had discussions.
We don't know what's going to happen with these things, but we hope for the best.
Good.
And I'll say, Saul, I think we can't speak to some confidence.
Well, not actually yet.
I had a personal message from Kimiko saying that they have the impression Smith is dragging his feet, which is also my impression.
And I'm just sending a score to the Smiths.
He suddenly drew it.
He must kill it.
Well, he must kill it, but he's now suddenly the hardliner in this operation.
I mean, after driving him for two and a half years, the issues have become so abstruse.
I could explain them to you, but... Why he's always in the background?
He's throwing in a lot of hedges which aren't in themselves bad.
It's just his attitude has changed from being the soft guy to being the hard guy.
But we'll get to that.
Collusion?
A lot of it.
That's a existence.
That is exactly a existence.
Yes, that there is still an existence.
We are hopeful, but not yet certain.
At least when we come here, shall I say that?
No.
But it's maybe come up.
If I say Vietnam, I've got to say that.
It would.
Yeah, that would be on the agenda.
Europe?
Oh, European security.
I mean the European Security Conference.
European issues.
European issues.
But obviously not without people from our allies and so on.
In other words, I'm not alone.
Not these assholes, but trying to set the press in a proper frame.
Let me just think.
I don't know what to say.
Should we tell them that they're going to be briefed twice a day?
Are they going to be briefed twice a day?
I'll just say that we get a daily briefing.
I'd say a daily briefing.
I think it's a mistake to commit ourselves to twice a day.
I would say to the press that we have, that this summit is a culmination of two years.
We have countries that I have noted, and I very much like the British of some degree, like many of you ladies and gentlemen.
I am one of the British of some degree.
We have the spirit of Vienna, the spirit of Camp David, the spirit of Geneva, the spirit of Glasgow.
That's one of the reasons why we have not at this point had a top meeting.
We felt that we had to have something concrete come out of it, not just the spirit.
As a result of this, I would say that this is the best prepared
Now, having said that, I would not want to leave, I would not want to raise your hopes too high, because basically, there are a number of unresolved issues.
I have been in correspondence with Mr. Brezhnev very extensively.
I've been in extensive contact with Mr. Brezhnev.
I've had extensive contact with Mr. Brezhnev.
through messages as well.
And we have done this in certain senses.
We now, however, come to the point that we have to make decisions, decisions that affect both countries, affect their vital interests.
And they can only be made at the highest level.
And the future of the Earth.
And I think we should
We've not done anything against third countries.
We've done this with some of their allies and others.
Some of them have done it.
In Chinese, they don't need to hear it.
And we will, of course, submit an assignment
The area where we started the treaty is in the area of Salt Lake, is that correct?
No, but there are a lot of treaties.
Several of these will be treaties?
Yes.
Most of the others will be treaties.
Of course, any treaty will be submitted to the Senate.
And I'll give a full report to the American people.
Do you want to make a report when you return?
I think on this one you might consider to brief television states.
And not bill the Q&A, you say?
I do what you did on arrival last time, I do this time on television.
No, I think it'd be, you can have a night at idle ceremony, but I think there's something to be said for having the American people see you not talk about Vietnam.
That's right.
Oh, can I tell them, I'm sorry to hear you, that I will be making telegraphs, and there will be, if we don't have the usual number, you tell us the arrival status and so forth.
First, the first one,
that the first family will be subsidized.
And also that I am making a speech to the Russian people on television.
From the Kremlin.
From the Kremlin.
From the Kremlin.
If I agree to that.
You hope that you can turn a new page or start a new period, or maybe you'll say that at the end.
I'm not going to get into rhetoric.
I'm just going to talk.
I think that's enough.
In the meantime, I must say, I and Henry, I told you, I told you time and again,
their own masses.
And first of all, I know you think that I was bugging you too much with the psychological warfare.
No, no, no, Mr. Perry, you were 1,000% right.
I had been naive.
I thought there was a presidential order.
They had all agreed to it in my place.
So I thought it was being done.
So when you went after Haig this week, I thought his answer that he would get was, this is in full swing.
I was shocked and outraged.
that they had done nothing.
So I then went after Raj.
I said, how could that happen?
Well, it turns out that Blair and Abrams had been in collusion.
Similarly, for five weeks, you've been bugging us all, and correctly, to pour equipment into South Vietnam, partly for psychological reasons.
It had not been done.
From now, Raj, to his enormous credit, why wasn't it done?
Because Blair had given orders to all the service secretaries
to keep it away from Russia.
Well, Russia is now coming with a good program.
And if you authorize it today, before Laird comes back, we'll get it done.
Everybody has agreed on it now.
So what we have is a government which is unbelievable.
We have a negotiator sitting in Helsinki who instead of throwing his hat in the air, we're doing his work for him.
We're not taking credit for it.
He's just dragging his feet so that he can prove he was the tough guy.
So we have just a massive series of problems.
You know, it might be better to have Rogers and you come to this thing than I come to the next one.
What do you think?
Whatever you want, Mr. President.
I think he can come.
If there's a chance.
Otherwise, I think he's unavailable.
He'll be over here anyway for the congressional leaders.
He'll feel a front if he wasn't there.
And he'll suspect I was.
Yeah.
I think it should come.
And I'm going to get the hell out of there.
He got a gas with these guys anyway.
But then you can do there, too, because he got attacked.
You know, I don't know how the hell we've done this thing with the kind of son of a bitch sabotage.
Like this thing that Daniel's got.
And I, of course, always want.
Why didn't he?
You know, he's just a whiner.
But God damn it, Henry.
We have given the military carte blanche practically.
And what the Christ does it matter what they've got now?
They are covering their asses in case anything goes wrong out there.
But I'm having hate put together for you.
We are getting massive reports now.
The Indonesian ambassador has now reported from Hanoi that there's a threat of riots, that the population is extremely disturbed.
Now, I cannot believe that when the Indonesian ambassador, the French ambassador, the Polish ambassador separately report to their governments these things, that there's something going on.
You cannot leave without saying, what the hell is leaving from?
Well, let's say, Mr. President, if they do it, let them do it tonight, but not after we leave.
All right.
Do it tonight, Mr. President.
How can they prepare it?
Leave the city.
Leave the city.
It's going to be bombed.
That's the kind of stuff to put out.
Scare them.
and then not for 10 days, and after that better.
But in serving teams in North Vietnam, that, we try to do it for a long time.
It creates more trouble for the next 10 days.
But I think we've got these archives now where the air is short.
For the first time, I suppose, we're going to continue the story of deep trouble.
And if you consider the position of these commanders
I don't think you can.
He's being told his obedience too much.
In fact, I don't know anybody that would intervene.
I think if you put in, in the army, I put in deadliest from your, for I extend the honor of who survived the chief of staff for two years without having anything in front of him.
If it ain't twice as cheap, I think you'll be all right over there.
The main thing is you can layer it all up in there.
The fight is, we've fought this thing about all this period of time.
and to hear Ed come in and say that we were limiting the strike areas, and that wouldn't have been the world could be if you'd figure out what in the world they must have meant about that railroad bridge that they said they couldn't go back to.
Now that... Sure, sure, that's more.
In all of North Vietnam, Mr. President, I've checked the list, and more have been confirmed.
There are only four dockings taken out yet.
which happens to be in the airfield at Illinois.
It may have been built in the middle of Illinois.
It docks in Hyde Park Airships, and there is a railway station right near the docks in Hyde Park, but you consider that no train is moving on it.