Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 726 › Conversation 726-011

Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Soviet Summit and Vietnam War

Friday, May 19, 1972 · 1:08 PM–1:27 PM ET · Oval Office · 17 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation726-011 on Tape 726 (tape position 02:31:28–02:48:42)StartFriday, May 19, 1972 at 1:08 PMEndFriday, May 19, 1972 at 1:27 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 726-011 ↗

President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman and Henry Kissinger to refine talking points and press strategy for the upcoming Soviet summit, including plans for post-summit reports to the American public and the Senate. The discussion also addressed frustrations with bureaucratic resistance to the President's directives, specifically regarding psychological warfare and the procurement of equipment for South Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger further evaluated military operations in Vietnam, expressing dissatisfaction with the military's target limitations and their perceived efforts to avoid responsibility for the ongoing conflict.

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Position in tape: 02:31:28 – 02:48:42

part B, 30:28

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On May 19, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:08 pm to 1:27 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 726-011 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 726-11

Date: May 19, 1972
Time: 1:08 pm - 1:27 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     Soviet Summit
          -Henry A. Kissinger
                -Leak
                      -State Department
                            -William P. Rogers
                                 -Statement at National Security Council [NSC] meeting
                -State Department statement
                            -Kissinger
          -President's departure for the Soviet Union
                -Control of Charles W. Colson's office
                -Meetings with Haldeman
                -Domestic activities

     Vietnam
          -New York Times article
               -Kenneth W. Clawson's rebuttal
               -White House involvement
               -President's attitude

     White House staff
          -Papers for President
               -The President’s view
          -Clawson's action

Kissinger entered at 1:11 pm.

     Soviet Summit
          -President's meeting with press
                -Talking points

Haldeman left at 1:12 pm.

-President's meeting with Congressional leaders
      -Topics of discussion
            -Exchange
            -Environmental controls
            -Health, cultural exchanges
Show the rest of the log (174 more lines)
            -Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT]
-SALT
      -Andrei A. Gromyko message to Kissinger
            -Soviet Union position
            -Gerard C. Smith's position
                  -Status of negotiation
                        -State Department
                        -Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Conclusion of talks
-President's meeting with Congressional leaders
      -Topics
            -Vietnam
            -Middle East
            -SALT
            -European Security Conference
-Press
      -Proper framework
      -Briefings
            -Frequency
            -Ronald L. Ziegler
            -Frequency
            -President's press briefing
            -Topics
                  -Limits of Summits
                  -Vienna, Camp David, Geneva, Glassboro
                  -Purpose
                  -Preparation
            -Contacts with Leonid I. Brezhnev
                  -Unresolved issues
                  -Frequency
            -Summit
            -Third nations
                  -Concerns
                  -US allies
                  -PRC
            -Treaties
                  -SALT
                  -Others

                            -Submission to Senate
                            -Report to American people
                                   -Television speech
                                   -Questions and answers [Q&A]
                                   -Televised arrival ceremony
                -President's speech upon arrival in Moscow
                -Toasts
                      -First toast
                            -The President’s view
                -Television speech to Soviet people
                -Location
                      -Kremlin

Vietnam
     -Psychological warfare
          -Implementation
                -Problems
                -Kissinger's position
                -President's orders
                -Haig's check on situation
                -[David] Kenneth Rush
                -Call from Kissinger
                -Melvin R. Laird and Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                -Activities
     -Equipment for South Vietnam
          -President's orders
                -Reasons
                -Implementation
                      -Laird's orders
                            -Service secretaries
          -Rush's program
                -Kissinger’s view
                -President's authorization
                      -Timing
                            -Laird

Helsinki talks
     -[Smith]
           -Kissinger’s view
           -NSC help

Soviet Summit
     -Press briefing

          -Rogers and Kissinger
               -Presence
     -Meeting with Congressional leaders
          -Rogers's presence
          -Press briefing
               -Kissinger's presence
                      -Rogers's attitude
               -Rogers's presence
                      -Talk with reporters
               -Kissinger's presence

Vietnam
     -Air strikes
           -Behavior of military
                 -The President’s view
           -Restrictions
                 -Agnew
                       -Report
                       -The President’s view
                 -Military authority
                 -Implementation
                 -Reasons
           -Effects on North Vietnam
                 -Haig's report
           -Possible riots
                 -Reports
                       -Ambassadors
                             -Indonesia, France, Poland
     -Psychological warfare
           -Leaflet drop
                 -Hanoi Area
                 -US bombing
                 -Timing
                 -Content
                       -President's previous speech
                             -Warnings of bombing
           -Timing
     -North Vietnam offensive
           -North Vietnam
                 -Concerns of commanders
                 -Threat of collapse
           -Prospects for success
           -Delays

-US military command
     -Abrams
           -Future
                 -Laird
     -Gen. John D. Ryan
           -The President’s view
           -Future
     -Gen. John W. Vogt, Jr.
           -Future
           -Experience
     -Army
           -[Forename unknown] Davis
           -Gen. Bruce Palmer
     -Haig
           -Promotion
           -Work with President
     -Laird
           -Replacement
                 -The President’s view
-US war efforts
     -Air strikes
           -Agnew's report
                 -Limits
                 -Railroad Bridge
           -Restricted targets
                 -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer's list
           -Effect
                 -Railroads
           -Military's authority
                 -Lyndon B. Johnson stories
                 -Extent
           -B-52 strikes on North Vietnam
                 -Timing
                 -Intensity
           -B-52 employment
                 -Advantages
                 -Number
                       -Assignment to Vietnam from Europe
                       -Impact
                            -Agnew's conversation
                 -Comparison with F-4s
                 -Psychological effect
                 -Number in Europe

                             -Number to Vietnam

Kissinger left at 1:27 pm.

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They said that the summit was not going to be sunk.
That is totally false.
Yeah, in front of us.
They were in front of us at the meeting.
Oh, yeah, at the meeting.
Because they were...
I think you'll see at one point, Stacey was saying that they thought the summit was going to be on.
In fact, they were going...
Remember, they made the point that they were saying we had made the strong move and the Russians had blamed...
and all this stuff.
Which Henry was it that we were back trying to turn down?
I forget.
That was what I was saying.
Now, regarding the other things, are you satisfied with what we're monitoring and good control in terms of Colson's activities?
Okay, so I've been fighting back one by one with everybody going over it.
No, no, no.
I don't need that message.
No, I don't need that message.
I don't need the Colson's right-of-sac responsibility to not refuse some of these people and everything.
Stick their heads up.
Yep.
I'm glad to see you, Clawson.
It's all right.
Well, you've got to be rude.
It's a touch-and-go call as to whether that's a good thing to do out of the White House, but I think once in a while you almost have to do that.
I was so clear about paying no attention to the little assholes in out here that say you just have to quiet down to do things.
Most of the people around here wouldn't have to do anything.
You know that.
I mean, have you ever seen the takers who come in here?
The hell?
They don't want to do anything.
No, I think that's right.
I mean, we've got to do it.
So we did.
And it's a good move.
i don't have
Point two, I don't know whether we want to tell the leaders this much, do we?
This is a cut down plan.
But do we want to say that there will probably be agreements?
No, that was supposed to be taken out.
I'll just say that we've had discussions.
We don't know what's going to happen on these things, but we hope for the best.
Good.
And I'll say, Saul, I think we can't speak to some confidence.
Well, not actually yet.
I had a personal message from Kermito saying that they have the impression Smith is dragging his feet, which is also my impression.
And I'm just sending a score to the Smiths.
uh he suddenly must kill him well did he not kill it but he's now suddenly the hardest liner in this operation i mean after driving up for two and a half years the issues have become so obscure i could explain them to you but
He's throwing in a lot of hedges which are not in themselves bad.
It's just his attitude has changed from being the soft guy to being the hard guy.
But we'll get back to you.
Collusion.
A lot of it.
That's an existence.
Yeah.
That is exactly an existence.
Yes, that they're still having some rough go.
In the final days of souls, we are hopeful, but not yet certain.
That's right.
At least when we come in, shall I say that?
Yeah.
Maybe come up.
Let's say Vietnam, I've got to say.
Yeah.
Yeah, that would be on the agenda.
Europe.
Oh, European security.
I mean, the European Security Conference.
European issues.
European issues.
Yeah.
Not these assholes, but trying to set the press in a proper frame.
Let me just think.
I don't know what to say.
Should we tell them that they're going to be briefed twice a day?
Are they going to be briefed twice a day?
They were taking control of him.
I'll just say that we'll get a daily briefing.
I'll say a daily briefing.
I think it's a mistake to commit ourselves to twice the time.
Okay.
Why don't you just talk off the top of your head as to what you want me to say to the press.
I would say to the press that we have, that this summit is the culmination of two years.
Here's what I was going to say.
We have .
That I have noted, and I think the very justifiable criticism of .
I am one of the British .
We have the spirit of Vienna, the spirit of Camp David, the spirit of Geneva, the spirit of Glasgow.
That's one of the reasons why we have not, up to this point, had a top meeting.
We felt that we had to have something concrete come out of it, not just the spirit.
As a result of this, I would say that this is the best prepared
Now, having said that, I would not want to leave.
I would not want to raise your hopes too high.
Because, basically, there are a number of unresolved issues.
I have been in correspondence with Mr. Breschner very extensively.
I've been in extensive contact with Mr. Breschner.
I've had extensive contact.
through messages as well.
And we have done this in certain senses.
We now, however, come to the point that we have to make decisions, decisions that affect both countries, affect their vital interests.
And they can only be made at the highest level.
And the future piece of the earth.
And I think we
against third countries.
It's all of their allies and others.
And we will, of course, submit a design.
and the only area where it reached such a treaty is in the area of Salt Lake, is that correct?
No, but there are a lot of treaties.
Several of these would be treaties?
Yes.
Most of the others would be treaties.
Of course, any treaty would be submitted to the Senate.
And I'll give the full report to the American people.
Do you want me to report when I return?
I think on this one you might consider to reach television states.
And not really Q&A, you say?
I do what you did on arrival last time, I do this time on television.
No, I think it'd be, you can have a night at Eiffel Ceremony, but I think there's something to be said for having the American people see you, not talk about Vietnam.
That's right.
Oh, can I tell them, I'm sorry to you, that I will be making telegraphs, and there will be, if we will have the usual number, the first, the first one,
And also that I am making a speech to the Russian people on television.
From the Kremlin.
If not, from the Kremlin.
From the Kremlin.
If not, agree to that.
Henry, you hope that you can turn a new page or start a new period, or maybe you'll say that at the end.
I'm not going to get into rhetoric.
I'm just going to talk.
I think that's enough.
In the meantime, I must say, I and Henry, I told you, I told you, John, again,
own masses.
And first of all, I know you think that I was bugging you too much with the psychological warfare.
No, no, no, Mr. Perry.
You were 1,000 percent right.
I had been naive.
I thought there was a presidential order.
They had all agreed to it in my place.
So I thought it was being done.
So when you went after Haig this week, I thought his answer that he would get was, this is in full swing.
I was shocked and outraged.
that they had done nothing.
So I then went after Raj.
I said, how could that happen?
Well, it turns out that Laird and Abrams had been in collusion.
Similarly, for five weeks, you've been bugging us all, and correctly, to pour equipment into South Vietnam, partly for psychological reasons.
It had not been done.
From now, Raj, to his enormous credit, why wasn't it done?
Because Laird had given orders to all the service secretaries
to keep it away from Russia.
Well, Russia is weak to its credit.
We've now come in with a good program.
And if you'd authorize it today, before Laird comes back, we'll get it done.
Everybody's agreed on it now.
So what we have is a government which is unbelievable.
We have a negotiator sitting in Helsinki who, instead of throwing his hat in the air, we're doing his work for him.
We're not taking credit for it.
He's just dragging his feet so that he can prove he was the tough guy.
So we have just a massive series of problems.
You know, it might be better to have Rogers and you come to this thing than I come to this other thing.
What do you think?
Whatever you want, Mr. President.
I think he can come.
If there's a chance.
Otherwise, I think he's on a bill.
He'll be over here anyway for the congressional leaders.
He'll feel a front if he wasn't there.
And he'll suspect I was.
Yeah.
I think it should come.
And I'm going to get the hell out of there and let him sit there.
He got gassed with these guys anyway.
But then you can do there, too, because he got attacked.
You know, I don't know how the hell we've done this thing with the kind of son of a bitch of sabotage.
Like this thing that Daniel's got.
And I, of course, always want to.
Why didn't he come?
You know, he's just a whiner.
But God damn it, Andy.
We have given the military carte blanche practically.
And what the Christ is the matter with the goddamn police?
They are covering their asses in case anything goes wrong out there.
But I'm having hate put together for you.
We are getting massive reports now.
The Indonesian ambassador has now reported from Hanoi that there's a threat of riots, that the population is extremely disturbed.
Now, I cannot believe that when the Indonesian ambassador, the French ambassador, the Polish ambassador separately report to their governments these things, that there's something going on.
You cannot leave without saying, what the hell is leaving from?
Well, let's say, Mr. President, if they do it, let them do it tonight, but not after we leave.
All right, do it tonight, Mr. President.
How can they prepare to leave?
I want to know.
You've got to put out terror stories.
Leave the city.
Leave the city.
It's going to be bombed.
That's the kind of stuff to put out.
Scare them.
and then not for 10 days, and after that, better, but in serving teams in North Riemann, that, we try to do it for a long time, it creates more trouble for the next 10 days, but I think we've got these guys out there, for the first time, I suppose, in the history of deep trouble.
And if you consider the position of these commanders, living themselves, knowing nothing,
in the best of circumstances.
But they're not going to win themselves.
Their advantage must be six weeks behind.
I'm not going to put it in.
I don't think you can.
He's being told his obedience too much.
I was back there the only way to put it
We fought this thing about all this period of time.
And to hear Andrew come in and say that we were limited in strike areas, and that wasn't in the world.
Can you figure out what in the world it must have been about that railroad bridge that you said we couldn't go back to?
Now that... George, George, that's more.
In all of North Vietnam, Mr. President, I've checked the list, and more have been confirmed.
There are only four dockings taken out of it.
which happens to be in the airfield in Illinois.
The airfield in the middle of Illinois.
The docks in Hyde Park.
And there is a railway station right near the docks in Hyde Park, but you consider that no train is moving on it.
See, I don't want this parade of stories about the military that came out after Johnson's bombing when they said,
God damn it, we have unleashed them.
You've unleashed them.
There is no restriction whatsoever.
I want to take the two strikes up there the day we get back.
Thank you.
But that's what you did.
Please.
Why?
Why is it impossible to reinvigorate some RVs?
I know the answer.
I know their planes can do it as well, but they can't.
They can't fly as high and the rest.
I think the B-52 was half the load, which was worth, I think, 100 out of Europe.
And that never shocked me, in fact, on the other hand.
I was getting it done.
When Agnew was talking, and it's quite right, they said the F-4 can do it, but the F-4 can't fly.
The psychology of the 52 strike.
Now, we've got 4,000 52s in Europe, right?
Okay.
Okay, thank you.
Are we seeing this?
Should be fine.
We'll see about that.
We'll be staying here.
  • 726-005 12:19 PM · 23 min — President Richard M. Nixon and George P. Shultz met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:19 pm to 12:49 pm.
  • 726-006 12:49 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:49 pm and 12:51 pm.
  • 726-007 12:51 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:51 pm to 12:55 pm.
  • 726-008 12:55 PM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon, William J. Porter, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:55 pm to 1:04 pm.
  • 726-009 1:04 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:04 pm and 1:08 pm.
  • 726-010 1:04 PM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:04 pm and 1:08 pm.
  • 024-159 1:58 PM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 1:58 pm and 3:20 pm.
  • 339-021 1:58 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:58 pm and 3:20 pm.

Conversation 726-011, May 19, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/726-011 (accessed November 2, 2026).