Nixon White House TapesTape 726 › Conversation 726-011

Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Soviet Summit and Vietnam War

Friday, May 19, 1972 · 1:08 PM–1:27 PM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  Kissinger, Henry A.Conversation726-011 onTape 726 (tape position 02:31:28–02:48:42)StartFriday, May 19, 1972 at 1:08 PMEndFriday, May 19, 1972 at 1:27 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 726-011 ↗

President Nixon met with H. R. Haldeman and Henry Kissinger to refine talking points and press strategy for the upcoming Soviet summit, including plans for post-summit reports to the American public and the Senate. The discussion also addressed frustrations with bureaucratic resistance to the President's directives, specifically regarding psychological warfare and the procurement of equipment for South Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger further evaluated military operations in Vietnam, expressing dissatisfaction with the military's target limitations and their perceived efforts to avoid responsibility for the ongoing conflict.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 02:31:28 into the tape and ends around 02:48:42.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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2:33:00It's not going to be something that is totally false.
2:33:05Yeah, in front of us.
2:33:06They were at the meeting.
2:33:08Oh, yeah.
2:33:09I think we're going to see at one point Stacey was saying that they thought the sun was going to be on.
2:33:20In fact, remember, they made the point that they were saying we had made the strong move and the Russians had blamed.
2:33:29And all this stuff.
2:33:30Which Henry was it that we were back trying to turn down?
2:33:33Let's forget it.
2:33:33That was what I'm saying.
2:33:34Now, in regard to the other things, are you satisfied with what we're monitoring and good control in terms of Colson's activities?
2:33:40Okay, so I've been fighting back one by one with everybody going over it.
2:33:43No, no, no, I don't need that message.
2:33:45No, I don't need that.
2:33:46That one, Colson's right.
2:33:47How's that possible?
2:33:47But he's, he's people everywhere.
2:34:00Stick their hands up.
2:34:05Yep.
2:34:06I'm glad to see you closing in.
2:34:07It's all right.
2:34:09Well, you've got to be moving.
2:34:11It's a touch and go call, so whether that's a good thing to do out of the White House, but I think once in a while you almost have to.
2:34:17And that was so clear.
2:34:18Pay no attention to the little assholes in out here that say you just have to do things.
2:34:23there's most of the people i never would have to do anything you know that i mean do you ever see the papers coming here the hell they don't want to do anything no i think that's right
2:35:03Point two, I don't know whether we want to tell the leaders this much, do we?
2:35:10This is already cut down by half.
2:35:12No, no, no, I'm not talking about the length, but do we want to say that there will probably be agreements on Saturday?
2:35:21No, that was supposed to be taken out.
2:35:23I'll just say that we've had discussions.
2:35:26We don't know what's going to happen with these things, but we hope for the best.
2:35:34Good.
2:35:34And I'll say, Saul, I think we can't speak to some confidence.
2:35:39Well, not actually yet.
2:35:40I had a personal message from Kimiko saying that they have the impression Smith is dragging his feet, which is also my impression.
2:35:47And I'm just sending a score to the Smiths.
2:35:52He suddenly drew it.
2:35:54He must kill it.
2:35:55Well, he must kill it, but he's now suddenly the hardliner in this operation.
2:36:02I mean, after driving him for two and a half years, the issues have become so abstruse.
2:36:07I could explain them to you, but... Why he's always in the background?
2:36:13He's throwing in a lot of hedges which aren't in themselves bad.
2:36:18It's just his attitude has changed from being the soft guy to being the hard guy.
2:36:23But we'll get to that.
2:36:26Collusion?
2:36:27A lot of it.
2:36:30That's a existence.
2:36:33That is exactly a existence.
2:36:35Yes, that there is still an existence.
2:36:39We are hopeful, but not yet certain.
2:36:42At least when we come here, shall I say that?
2:36:50No.
2:36:51But it's maybe come up.
2:36:52If I say Vietnam, I've got to say that.
2:36:54It would.
2:36:56Yeah, that would be on the agenda.
2:36:59Europe?
2:36:59Oh, European security.
2:37:01I mean the European Security Conference.
2:37:05European issues.
2:37:05European issues.
2:37:06But obviously not without people from our allies and so on.
2:37:12In other words, I'm not alone.
2:37:23Not these assholes, but trying to set the press in a proper frame.
2:37:35Let me just think.
2:37:36I don't know what to say.
2:37:38Should we tell them that they're going to be briefed twice a day?
2:37:42Are they going to be briefed twice a day?
2:37:45I'll just say that we get a daily briefing.
2:37:46I'd say a daily briefing.
2:37:52I think it's a mistake to commit ourselves to twice a day.
2:38:04I would say to the press that we have, that this summit is a culmination of two years.
2:38:19We have countries that I have noted, and I very much like the British of some degree, like many of you ladies and gentlemen.
2:38:32I am one of the British of some degree.
2:38:36We have the spirit of Vienna, the spirit of Camp David, the spirit of Geneva, the spirit of Glasgow.
2:38:43That's one of the reasons why we have not at this point had a top meeting.
2:38:48We felt that we had to have something concrete come out of it, not just the spirit.
2:38:54As a result of this, I would say that this is the best prepared
2:38:59Now, having said that, I would not want to leave, I would not want to raise your hopes too high, because basically, there are a number of unresolved issues.
2:39:13I have been in correspondence with Mr. Brezhnev very extensively.
2:39:18I've been in extensive contact with Mr. Brezhnev.
2:39:22I've had extensive contact with Mr. Brezhnev.
2:39:27through messages as well.
2:39:32And we have done this in certain senses.
2:39:35We now, however, come to the point that we have to make decisions, decisions that affect both countries, affect their vital interests.
2:39:44And they can only be made at the highest level.
2:39:48And the future of the Earth.
2:39:51And I think we should
2:39:57We've not done anything against third countries.
2:39:58We've done this with some of their allies and others.
2:40:01Some of them have done it.
2:40:02In Chinese, they don't need to hear it.
2:40:04And we will, of course, submit an assignment
2:40:24The area where we started the treaty is in the area of Salt Lake, is that correct?
2:40:28No, but there are a lot of treaties.
2:40:30Several of these will be treaties?
2:40:31Yes.
2:40:32Most of the others will be treaties.
2:40:34Of course, any treaty will be submitted to the Senate.
2:40:37And I'll give a full report to the American people.
2:40:39Do you want to make a report when you return?
2:40:42I think on this one you might consider to brief television states.
2:40:47And not bill the Q&A, you say?
2:40:51I do what you did on arrival last time, I do this time on television.
2:41:07No, I think it'd be, you can have a night at idle ceremony, but I think there's something to be said for having the American people see you not talk about Vietnam.
2:41:17That's right.
2:41:22Oh, can I tell them, I'm sorry to hear you, that I will be making telegraphs, and there will be, if we don't have the usual number, you tell us the arrival status and so forth.
2:41:34First, the first one,
2:41:35that the first family will be subsidized.
2:41:39And also that I am making a speech to the Russian people on television.
2:41:47From the Kremlin.
2:41:48From the Kremlin.
2:41:49From the Kremlin.
2:41:50If I agree to that.
2:41:57You hope that you can turn a new page or start a new period, or maybe you'll say that at the end.
2:42:05I'm not going to get into rhetoric.
2:42:07I'm just going to talk.
2:42:09I think that's enough.
2:42:14In the meantime, I must say, I and Henry, I told you, I told you time and again,
2:42:28their own masses.
2:42:29And first of all, I know you think that I was bugging you too much with the psychological warfare.
2:42:35No, no, no, Mr. Perry, you were 1,000% right.
2:42:38I had been naive.
2:42:39I thought there was a presidential order.
2:42:41They had all agreed to it in my place.
2:42:44So I thought it was being done.
2:42:46So when you went after Haig this week, I thought his answer that he would get was, this is in full swing.
2:42:52I was shocked and outraged.
2:42:55that they had done nothing.
2:42:56So I then went after Raj.
2:42:57I said, how could that happen?
2:42:59Well, it turns out that Blair and Abrams had been in collusion.
2:43:02Similarly, for five weeks, you've been bugging us all, and correctly, to pour equipment into South Vietnam, partly for psychological reasons.
2:43:11It had not been done.
2:43:12From now, Raj, to his enormous credit, why wasn't it done?
2:43:15Because Blair had given orders to all the service secretaries
2:43:18to keep it away from Russia.
2:43:21Well, Russia is now coming with a good program.
2:43:25And if you authorize it today, before Laird comes back, we'll get it done.
2:43:32Everybody has agreed on it now.
2:43:34So what we have is a government which is unbelievable.
2:43:40We have a negotiator sitting in Helsinki who instead of throwing his hat in the air, we're doing his work for him.
2:43:46We're not taking credit for it.
2:43:51He's just dragging his feet so that he can prove he was the tough guy.
2:43:58So we have just a massive series of problems.
2:44:01You know, it might be better to have Rogers and you come to this thing than I come to the next one.
2:44:08What do you think?
2:44:11Whatever you want, Mr. President.
2:44:13I think he can come.
2:44:14If there's a chance.
2:44:15Otherwise, I think he's unavailable.
2:44:17He'll be over here anyway for the congressional leaders.
2:44:20He'll feel a front if he wasn't there.
2:44:22And he'll suspect I was.
2:44:24Yeah.
2:44:27I think it should come.
2:44:28And I'm going to get the hell out of there.
2:44:31He got a gas with these guys anyway.
2:44:33But then you can do there, too, because he got attacked.
2:44:36You know, I don't know how the hell we've done this thing with the kind of son of a bitch sabotage.
2:44:47Like this thing that Daniel's got.
2:44:50And I, of course, always want.
2:44:52Why didn't he?
2:44:54You know, he's just a whiner.
2:44:57But God damn it, Henry.
2:44:58We have given the military carte blanche practically.
2:45:02And what the Christ does it matter what they've got now?
2:45:04They are covering their asses in case anything goes wrong out there.
2:45:09But I'm having hate put together for you.
2:45:12We are getting massive reports now.
2:45:15The Indonesian ambassador has now reported from Hanoi that there's a threat of riots, that the population is extremely disturbed.
2:45:23Now, I cannot believe that when the Indonesian ambassador, the French ambassador, the Polish ambassador separately report to their governments these things, that there's something going on.
2:45:37You cannot leave without saying, what the hell is leaving from?
2:45:43Well, let's say, Mr. President, if they do it, let them do it tonight, but not after we leave.
2:45:47All right.
2:45:47Do it tonight, Mr. President.
2:45:48How can they prepare it?
2:45:53Leave the city.
2:45:55Leave the city.
2:45:57It's going to be bombed.
2:45:59That's the kind of stuff to put out.
2:46:03Scare them.
2:46:14and then not for 10 days, and after that better.
2:46:17But in serving teams in North Vietnam, that, we try to do it for a long time.
2:46:21It creates more trouble for the next 10 days.
2:46:24But I think we've got these archives now where the air is short.
2:46:29For the first time, I suppose, we're going to continue the story of deep trouble.
2:46:35And if you consider the position of these commanders
2:46:53I don't think you can.
2:46:54He's being told his obedience too much.
2:46:57In fact, I don't know anybody that would intervene.
2:47:25I think if you put in, in the army, I put in deadliest from your, for I extend the honor of who survived the chief of staff for two years without having anything in front of him.
2:47:38If it ain't twice as cheap, I think you'll be all right over there.
2:47:45The main thing is you can layer it all up in there.
2:47:50The fight is, we've fought this thing about all this period of time.
2:47:56and to hear Ed come in and say that we were limiting the strike areas, and that wouldn't have been the world could be if you'd figure out what in the world they must have meant about that railroad bridge that they said they couldn't go back to.
2:48:08Now that... Sure, sure, that's more.
2:48:10In all of North Vietnam, Mr. President, I've checked the list, and more have been confirmed.
2:48:15There are only four dockings taken out yet.
2:48:22which happens to be in the airfield at Illinois.
2:48:25It may have been built in the middle of Illinois.
2:48:30It docks in Hyde Park Airships, and there is a railway station right near the docks in Hyde Park, but you consider that no train is moving on it.

On May 19, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:08 pm to 1:27 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 726-011 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 726-11

Date: May 19, 1972
Time: 1:08 pm - 1:27 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     Soviet Summit
          -Henry A. Kissinger
                -Leak
                      -State Department
                            -William P. Rogers
                                 -Statement at National Security Council [NSC] meeting
                -State Department statement
                            -Kissinger
          -President's departure for the Soviet Union
                -Control of Charles W. Colson's office
                -Meetings with Haldeman
                -Domestic activities

     Vietnam
          -New York Times article
               -Kenneth W. Clawson's rebuttal
               -White House involvement
               -President's attitude

     White House staff
          -Papers for President
               -The President’s view
          -Clawson's action

Kissinger entered at 1:11 pm.

     Soviet Summit
          -President's meeting with press
                -Talking points

Haldeman left at 1:12 pm.

-President's meeting with Congressional leaders
      -Topics of discussion
            -Exchange
            -Environmental controls
            -Health, cultural exchanges
            -Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT]
-SALT
      -Andrei A. Gromyko message to Kissinger
            -Soviet Union position
            -Gerard C. Smith's position
                  -Status of negotiation
                        -State Department
                        -Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Conclusion of talks
-President's meeting with Congressional leaders
      -Topics
            -Vietnam
            -Middle East
            -SALT
            -European Security Conference
-Press
      -Proper framework
      -Briefings
            -Frequency
            -Ronald L. Ziegler
            -Frequency
            -President's press briefing
            -Topics
                  -Limits of Summits
                  -Vienna, Camp David, Geneva, Glassboro
                  -Purpose
                  -Preparation
            -Contacts with Leonid I. Brezhnev
                  -Unresolved issues
                  -Frequency
            -Summit
            -Third nations
                  -Concerns
                  -US allies
                  -PRC
            -Treaties
                  -SALT
                  -Others

                            -Submission to Senate
                            -Report to American people
                                   -Television speech
                                   -Questions and answers [Q&A]
                                   -Televised arrival ceremony
                -President's speech upon arrival in Moscow
                -Toasts
                      -First toast
                            -The President’s view
                -Television speech to Soviet people
                -Location
                      -Kremlin

Vietnam
     -Psychological warfare
          -Implementation
                -Problems
                -Kissinger's position
                -President's orders
                -Haig's check on situation
                -[David] Kenneth Rush
                -Call from Kissinger
                -Melvin R. Laird and Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                -Activities
     -Equipment for South Vietnam
          -President's orders
                -Reasons
                -Implementation
                      -Laird's orders
                            -Service secretaries
          -Rush's program
                -Kissinger’s view
                -President's authorization
                      -Timing
                            -Laird

Helsinki talks
     -[Smith]
           -Kissinger’s view
           -NSC help

Soviet Summit
     -Press briefing

          -Rogers and Kissinger
               -Presence
     -Meeting with Congressional leaders
          -Rogers's presence
          -Press briefing
               -Kissinger's presence
                      -Rogers's attitude
               -Rogers's presence
                      -Talk with reporters
               -Kissinger's presence

Vietnam
     -Air strikes
           -Behavior of military
                 -The President’s view
           -Restrictions
                 -Agnew
                       -Report
                       -The President’s view
                 -Military authority
                 -Implementation
                 -Reasons
           -Effects on North Vietnam
                 -Haig's report
           -Possible riots
                 -Reports
                       -Ambassadors
                             -Indonesia, France, Poland
     -Psychological warfare
           -Leaflet drop
                 -Hanoi Area
                 -US bombing
                 -Timing
                 -Content
                       -President's previous speech
                             -Warnings of bombing
           -Timing
     -North Vietnam offensive
           -North Vietnam
                 -Concerns of commanders
                 -Threat of collapse
           -Prospects for success
           -Delays

-US military command
     -Abrams
           -Future
                 -Laird
     -Gen. John D. Ryan
           -The President’s view
           -Future
     -Gen. John W. Vogt, Jr.
           -Future
           -Experience
     -Army
           -[Forename unknown] Davis
           -Gen. Bruce Palmer
     -Haig
           -Promotion
           -Work with President
     -Laird
           -Replacement
                 -The President’s view
-US war efforts
     -Air strikes
           -Agnew's report
                 -Limits
                 -Railroad Bridge
           -Restricted targets
                 -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer's list
           -Effect
                 -Railroads
           -Military's authority
                 -Lyndon B. Johnson stories
                 -Extent
           -B-52 strikes on North Vietnam
                 -Timing
                 -Intensity
           -B-52 employment
                 -Advantages
                 -Number
                       -Assignment to Vietnam from Europe
                       -Impact
                            -Agnew's conversation
                 -Comparison with F-4s
                 -Psychological effect
                 -Number in Europe

                             -Number to Vietnam

Kissinger left at 1:27 pm.
  • 726-005 12:19 PM · 23 min — President Richard M. Nixon and George P. Shultz met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:19 pm to 12:49 pm.
  • 726-006 12:49 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:49 pm and 12:51 pm.
  • 726-007 12:51 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:51 pm to 12:55 pm.
  • 726-008 12:55 PM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon, William J. Porter, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:55 pm to 1:04 pm.
  • 726-009 1:04 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:04 pm and 1:08 pm.
  • 726-010 1:04 PM · 4 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:04 pm and 1:08 pm.
  • 024-159 1:58 PM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 1:58 pm and 3:20 pm.
  • 339-021 1:58 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 1:58 pm and 3:20 pm.

Conversation 726-011, May 19, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/726-011 (accessed September 18, 2026).