Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 727 › Conversation 727-005

Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Soviet Union Summit

Friday, June 2, 1972 · 9:45 AM–10:03 AM ET · Oval Office

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Kissinger, Henry A.; Bull, Stephen B.Conversation727-005 on Tape 727 (tape position 01:08:01–01:26:18)StartFriday, June 2, 1972 at 9:45 AMEndFriday, June 2, 1972 at 10:03 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 727-005 ↗

President Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, and Henry Kissinger met to refine the President’s strategy for an upcoming briefing with bipartisan Congressional leaders regarding the recent summit in the Soviet Union. The participants strategized on how to frame the success of the summit and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) while minimizing the political impact of congressional critics like Henry “Scoop” Jackson. Additionally, they reviewed positive public and media reactions to the President’s recent address and discussed the ongoing conflict in Vietnam.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 01:08:01 into the tape and ends around 01:26:18.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
1:10:13It'd be good to see John for a few minutes.
1:10:19But he doesn't.
1:10:20I was talking to him earlier.
1:10:21I want to see him because I've got to get a feeling of these fan things.
1:10:26He's, as I told you though, he's put most of the stuff in writing and there's no rest.
1:10:30I'll see him at 11.30 if we get the leaders to help me.
1:10:39Well, you still feel we did the right thing in Quebec?
1:10:42Yeah, I did.
1:10:43Based on the reaction to it, we got, there was all kinds of things that, in that, that are a little subtle.
1:10:52I'm forgetting about the speech.
1:10:53You had to give the speech in order to do the other things.
1:10:55The speech did some good.
1:10:56It did more good than you believe it did, I'm convinced.
1:11:01It was a better speech than you think it was.
1:11:05It's been played on the radio.
1:11:06It was played on the radio all night last night.
1:11:08I got up this morning and it's just, you know, they've been playing big chunks of it.
1:11:12And there's some very good things in it.
1:11:14And they're playing the good things, which is kind of interesting.
1:11:17They're playing the American must be strong, you know, we'll never do the other thing.
1:11:22They're playing the Vietnam honor.
1:11:25Yeah.
1:11:26And the world of honor and the tremendous applause.
1:11:29They're making the point that was the biggest...
1:11:33reaction of the evening and they're making the thing about america is a great country this is a great you know that we believe in america we believe in america yeah it's not bad and the reaction it's damn good and it's there was a i think it's good that pat had a nice reception and that's the whole point
1:11:54Well, you've gotten a lot of good woman reaction that's from there.
1:11:57I know we've been checking some of our women executives and people apparently have lines out, but apparently a part of Nicole's review thought it was a great message.
1:12:03She had all kinds of comments.
1:12:06Well, here's, this is the scandal.
1:12:07This is the vice president of U.S. Steel in New York, president of the Zabit Club, which is a big... She said, I thought there was great drama and theatrics with the helicopter landing and going into the Capitol.
1:12:18I thought it was a serious, well-written speech and one of the greatest campaign speeches I've ever heard.
1:12:23And, you know, puts it in that kind of spirit.
1:12:25But then she said, I thought the president was very believable and convinced.
1:12:28It had lots to say about Mrs. Nixon.
1:12:30Very impressed that Mrs. Nixon came out of the helicopter first.
1:12:34With warm applause.
1:12:35I think she's emerged in a working partner role, and her presence out of her shell is very appealing.
1:12:40Subconsciously, she makes the president more present.
1:12:44That's true.
1:12:49Well, you can do it.
1:12:50I'll do it this way.
1:12:52Well, that's beginning to match up with me, I think, by this evening, you know.
1:12:56Well, stay up for another hour and a half, will you?
1:12:58Oh, no, I'll be all right.
1:12:58You know, you must feel it, too.
1:13:01Yeah.
1:13:01I'm just beginning to... Well, after all the thing is, we've been through hell and hell.
1:13:07You know, I know everybody's tired.
1:13:11The one over there has got nothing to ask for.
1:13:17You and I are tired for different reasons.
1:13:20Well, the new essential of being a... Well, then, the whole thing Wednesday night afterward was probably the single most emotional meeting that I've attended since I've been in the White House.
1:13:44Oh, yeah.
1:13:45You've got these three...
1:13:47tough guys working the president over.
1:13:49It was a rogue.
1:13:50But it was good news.
1:13:53Well, I think it was the turning point of the discussion.
1:13:59I think probably what I tried to do today, Henry, is to say, look, the substance is all going to be presented.
1:14:05I'm not going to go into that, but I want to give you a larger framework.
1:14:07I want to tell you about the men.
1:14:09I want to tell you about... And I'm going to bring both China and Russia into it.
1:14:13China only in terms of why the Chinese...
1:14:17want a relationship with them because of their crime.
1:14:21Why did the Soviet Union want that relationship with them?
1:14:23We just have to be sure they don't go out and blab.
1:14:25I'm not going to say the Soviet wanted it because they're against China.
1:14:30Not for that reason.
1:14:32But the Soviet wanted it for other reasons.
1:14:35Right.
1:14:40What do you want to cover?
1:14:42That's entirely up to you.
1:14:44I don't feel like there's a lot to cover.
1:14:47Well, I could cover the sort of thing about the meetings that you can't.
1:14:53I mean, you can't very well cover how the meetings were conducted the way I can.
1:15:02I think you should, too.
1:15:04This one has one.
1:15:05No, I think you should.
1:15:07You should lay out the context.
1:15:10the big picture that you're talking about, but then Henry should start with a, let me give you a little background on how these meetings were conducted, how your president represented you, without going too long into the crime.
1:15:25But this is built, and they understand it, and the process of building it is a monumental, personal thing, which is the very interesting thing that comes out of all this.
1:15:34It's, they're not, and they're talking more about
1:15:39the importance of the personal accomplishment, what you did, the way you worked and how you did, than they are about the substance of the... You see, the way I could do this is to say, why the summit?
1:15:51I mean, why could certain things work at the summit that couldn't work anywhere else?
1:16:01And that way... Well, I would say in two ways.
1:16:05First of all, the imminence of the summit.
1:16:08enabled the President to take a personal hand on a number of issues.
1:16:13And I'll give them that Incidents at Sea example, which is a very trivial example of an agreement.
1:16:19And yet if you could go on and say how we broke the impasse on...
1:16:25And secondly, how you broke the impact.
1:16:28That's exactly what I was going to say.
1:16:29How you broke the impact of so- And then you might say, for example, in the field where we did not reach our goals.
1:16:35And then I think this may not be bad on the least.
1:16:38I said we, the president, narrowed the difference.
1:16:40We got it down.
1:16:41But we wouldn't give on the matter of the industry.
1:16:44We're going to have to negotiate.
1:16:45I think they'd love to hear that.
1:16:46So that was point one.
1:16:47Then point two was that a number of issues were left.
1:16:51that literally were irresolvable, except at the highest level.
1:16:58And then thirdly, the whole statement of principles problem, for example.
1:17:02You wouldn't even have known how to start, except at the highest level.
1:17:08You couldn't say, well, let's let our ambassadors work out an humane team sitting down.
1:17:12Inconceivable.
1:17:13Well, the point which I've made to the press, which all of them, or all of them, Mike Franklin, I know you should remember, but I said, look,
1:17:20Under the best of circumstances, you have to consider one diplomatic notice, 20 minutes of the presidential talk.
1:17:27You add up 43 hours that the president spent with these people, and that means... 43 hours, yeah.
1:17:35I mean, altogether, that's what the draft figured out.
1:17:38But whatever it is, it would be 60 to 100 diplomatic notes, each of which take two to three weeks to get a reply to, and this is without the personal impact...
1:17:51But she'd never get the reading from the notes.
1:17:54That's right.
1:17:54She didn't get them face-to-face.
1:17:57So that's what I said what you have to consider.
1:17:59It's a four-year proposition.
1:18:01And then so many other things happen at the interval that you never get it done.
1:18:04He said, on the other hand, I drew a distinction between Sunday meetings that are not well-prepared, where then the principals get together, create a deadlock and make the situation worse, compared to some
1:18:18which had been narrowed to a point where the principles could act with maximum effectiveness.
1:18:24And that's sort of the theme.
1:18:25And then I thought I could get a view of the high points of the agreement.
1:18:33But the Russians are on an all-out propaganda campaign at home saying what a terrific achievement this was.
1:18:40It was Brezhnev and Grebsko in which Brezhnev complains that
1:18:47to Kretschner, saying, God damn it, these Americans, you remember that afternoon, President and President, and Kitschner hit me about exactly the things we are worried about, you know.
1:18:58The arms.
1:18:59No, with the missiles, I am.
1:19:00Yeah, yeah.
1:19:02And Kretschner makes all the arguments against what Jackson is making to us, saying, how do we know the Americans won't put modern missiles on diesel submarines and President, saying, you idiots.
1:19:13If they, why would they scream about outputting missiles on diesel submarines?
1:19:19If they wanted to do it, Gretchen would say, well, you know, Gretchen, that they're going to scrap the diesel submarines, which is true.
1:19:26What do you want me to get across to them then?
1:19:28What do you want?
1:19:30About SALT?
1:19:32About SALT, I'm just going to say it.
1:19:34I'm going to say, look, when I got brought up, there was a 10-to-1 advantage for the United States, and we came in, and the advantage had been wiped out.
1:19:43And we hadn't done something.
1:19:44We had to go, we had two choices, to go for a crash program and build it.
1:19:49which I think the American people would have had great concern about, or have a limitation?
1:19:56I wouldn't even get to that.
1:19:57I would say there was no trash program or building we could have done.
1:19:59We had the joint piece of staff.
1:20:02We said, can you do a trash program on submarines?
1:20:05I had three meetings with them, Mr. President.
1:20:09And they said, no, we cannot do it.
1:20:13But I can do that better than you, if you want to.
1:20:19I mean, you can just say, when we came in, this is the situation.
1:20:24It works every year.
1:20:25I've started a number of programs.
1:20:27ABM, Ounce, B1.
1:20:30each of which had enormous congressional opposition.
1:20:34All of you gentlemen know it takes 10 years from the time you start a program until it is operational.
1:20:45And then I'd say we had two choices.
1:20:48We had only one choice.
1:20:49What we have done is broken the momentum of their agreement.
1:20:53You don't have a problem with the Doves?
1:20:55No.
1:20:58You won't have any problems with the hogs after two weeks, I guarantee you.
1:21:02I'll work them over.
1:21:03Except Scoop.
1:21:04He's kind of himself on the line.
1:21:06Yeah, but Scoop, I think, is being partisan on this.
1:21:08Sure.
1:21:08I mean, the things Scoop is saying, why the hell didn't he say them two years ago or one year ago?
1:21:14They were equally true.
1:21:16They had nothing to do with the agreement.
1:21:17Well, the whole cigarette deal stuff, of course, that's an old...
1:21:21Well, the secret deal, Mr. President, the way to hit that is this.
1:21:24You can say there are a number of interpretative agreements, statements, which I will be glad to explain to them, all of which will be submitted by agreement with the Soviet Union.
1:21:35You, and just for your information, you have written a letter to President in which you are saying, I want you to know we had no plans to build those three extra submarines to which we are entitled during the period of the briefs.
1:21:50This is nothing but the literal truth.
1:21:52We have no such plans.
1:21:55That's not an agreement.
1:21:56You can change your plans anyway, but the fact of the matter is you have no such plans.
1:22:02The Navy doesn't want them.
1:22:04And nothing in the agreement forces you to exercise your option.
1:22:10That's only an option.
1:22:12That's not something that you're supposed to do.
1:22:16But I must say, incidentally,
1:22:19I talked to some people who heard your speech.
1:22:20Apparently on television it came over extremely well.
1:22:25Yes.
1:22:25I thought you were speaking a little too fast, quite honestly, sitting in the chamber.
1:22:32But on television people told me it sounded very effective.
1:22:36If you get a little echo in the chamber, it's harder to keep up with the speech.
1:22:41It's harder to hear it than it is on TV.
1:22:43Especially up where we're sitting.
1:22:45It's up in the balcony.
1:22:47You get that bounce.
1:22:49But what I found fascinating is the point you made to me yesterday, Mr. Gretzmann.
1:22:54I think the biggest signal of loss you got was on that hawk-like statement of Vietnam.
1:22:57Vietnam, that's right.
1:22:59And it's being played that way, personally, it's being played that way.
1:23:03It seems prescient, but it's... Now, the North is different.
1:23:08Gromyko gave a first interview yesterday.
1:23:12He's so soft on Vietnam, it's not to be believed.
1:23:20I don't know what the Dan-North Vietnamese do now.
1:23:23I think the North Vietnamese, I'll tell you what I think they'll have to do.
1:23:26They'll start one.
1:23:28Both of them will be defensive on the way.
1:23:30And if they don't, they don't have a reward.
1:23:34They've pulled back from Khantung.
1:23:44What is the situation?
1:23:47Is the meeting ready yet?
1:23:49Well, I don't want to get back.
1:23:50Just find out.
1:23:51I'm going to ask him over there so that I won't be late.
1:23:59Okay.
1:24:05Do you hear what the New York Times defenders did?
1:24:11I don't know.
1:24:12Some people ran a two-page, a vicious two-page ad calling for the impeachment of Nixon.
1:24:17In the New York Times?
1:24:18Oh, it was placed in the New York Times.
1:24:19It was placed in some other places, too.
1:24:21And it's signed by a lot of fellow travelers and some communists.
1:24:25And we're going to try and sign with the government supporters and all that stuff.
1:24:29It's the usual, you know, cordial salon type bunch of people.
1:24:33Oh, yeah.
1:24:33But, uh...
1:24:36The Printing Union refused to print the ad because they said it was stabbing our boys in Vietnam and they wanted no part of it.
1:24:44They delayed the printing of the paper by 15 minutes by refusing to delay the edition of the paper.
1:24:49It made a symbolic walkout type thing, which is very kind of fascinating.
1:24:54Haydn thinks that we can win the war in less than two months.
1:24:58Win it, not that we should have to go here.
1:25:01That's a little exaggerated.
1:25:05All right.
1:25:06I'd like to do it.
1:25:07I think these guys are exaggerating themselves.
1:26:05I don't know.
1:26:06He's got a holiday.
1:26:07He's in a barber shop.
1:26:08He's involved.
1:26:09He's involved in a barber shop.
1:26:12He's working.
1:26:13He just came in one.

On June 2, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:45 am to 10:03 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 727-005 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 727-5

Date: June 2, 1972
Time: 9:45-10:03 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 2m 25s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

*****************************************************************

     The President’s schedule
          -John D. Ehrlichman
               -Meeting with bipartisan Congressional leaders

     The President’s trip to Soviet Union
          -Speech by the President
               -Haldeman’s view
               -Media coverage
                      -Points stressed
                            -Vietnam
                            -American strength
               -Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
               -Women's reactions
               -Charles W. Colson's view
                      -Helicopter
               -Vice President of US Steel Corporation
                      -Assessments

Kissinger entered at 9:50 am.

                      -Reaction
                           -Mrs. Nixon's impression

     Kissinger's schedule

     Pace of trip
          -Kissinger
          -Advancement
          -William P. Rogers
          -Strategic Arms and Limitation Treaty [SALT]

     -Meeting with Soviet leaders
          -Negotiations
               -Kissinger’s view

The President's schedule
     -Meeting with congressional leaders
          -The president's strategy
          -Points to discuss
                 -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                 -Soviet Union
          -Kissinger’s briefing
                 -Negotiations
          -The president's input
                 -Kissinger’s role
                       -Background
          -The President's image

Briefings on the President's previous trip to the Soviet Union
      -Kissinger's briefing
            -Function of summit
                  -The President's role
            -Incident at sea agreement
            -SALT
            -Middle East
            -Negotiations
                  -Effect of President’s involvement
                  -Statement of principles
                  -Jacob D. Beam and Andrei A. Gromykko
            -Input to press
                  -Max Frankel
            -Time the President spent in meetings
                  -Compared to diplomatic notes
            -Summit meetings
            -Agreements
            -Soviet statements on summit success

**************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[National Security]
[Duration: 2s ]

    SOVIET UNION

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

**************************************************************************

              -Leonid I. Brezhnev
              -Andrei Grechko
                    -Negotiations
                          -Undersea Long-range Missile System [ULMS]
                          -Missiles
                          -Submarines
         -The President's input
              -SALT
              -Submarine program
                    -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                          -Kissinger
              -Anti-ballistic missiles [ABM]
              -ULMS
              -B-1 bombs
              -Congressional opposition
              -Effect of negotiations
         -Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson's reaction
         -The President's input
              -Letter to Brezhnev
              -Submarines

    Media
        -Reaction to the President's congressional address
             -Kissinger’s view
             -Haldeman’s view
             -Vietnam statement by the President

      Vietnam
           -Gromyko
           -North Vietnamese action
                -Hue
                -Kontum

An unknown woman entered at an unknown time after 9:50 am.

      The President's schedule
           -Meeting with Congressional leaders

The unknown woman left at an unknown time before 10:03 am.

      Advertisement for the President's impeachment
          -New York Times
                -Signers
                      -McGovern supporters
                -Printers’ reaction

An unknown man [Stephen B. Bull?] entered at an unknown time after 9:50 am.

      The President's schedule

      Advertisement for the President's impeachment
          -Printers' union reaction

      Vietnam War
           -Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s view

The President, et al., left at 10:03 am.
  • 025-006 11:49 PM · 10 sec — Edward R. F. Cox and the White House operator talked on the telephone on an unknown date, sometime between 11:49 pm on June 1, 1972 and 8:30 am on June 6, 1972.
  • 727-001 8:25 AM · 34 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:25 am to 9:11 am.
  • 727-002 9:11 AM · 27 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:11 am and 9:45 am.
  • 727-003 9:11 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:11 am and 9:45 am.
  • 727-004 9:11 AM · 5 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:11 am and 9:45 am.
  • 727-006 10:03 AM · 31 sec — unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:03 am and 12:08 pm.
  • 727-007 12:08 PM · 1 min — unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:08 pm and 12:25 pm.
  • 727-008 12:25 PM · 38 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, Alexander P. Butterfield, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, Ronald L. Ziegler, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:25 pm to 1:03 pm.

Conversation 727-005, June 2, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/727-005 (accessed October 9, 2026).