Conversation 735-007

TapeTape 735StartThursday, June 15, 1972 at 12:49 PMEndThursday, June 15, 1972 at 1:26 PMTape start time02:17:30Tape end time03:13:52ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  [Unknown person(s)]Recording deviceOval Office

On June 15, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:49 pm to 1:26 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 735-007 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 735-7

Date: June 15, 1972
Time: 12:49-1:26 pm
                                             15

                        NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. Feb-02)


Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     The President’s meeting with Luis Echeverria Alvarez
          -Length of meeting
          -The President’s re-election
          -Kissinger’s schedule

     Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] negotiations
          -Length of Congressional briefing
          -The President’s statement to Congressmen
          -Kissinger’s briefing
                -Content
                -J. William Fulbright
          -Senate ratification date
                -Timing
          -Kissinger’s briefing
                -Questions
                      -John C. Stennis
                      -Fulbright
                           -Melvin R. Laird
                                  -New strategic programs
                                       -The President’s view
                                       -Budget
                                       -Kissinger’s response

An unknown person entered and left at an unknown time after 12:49 pm.

     Refreshments

     SALT negotiations
        -Kissinger’s briefing
              -John Sherman Cooper
                    -Pace of arms build-up
              -Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson
                    -Numbers of Soviet Union missiles
                        -Limits
                    -Verification
                    -Light compared with heavy missiles
                        -The President’s meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev
                                -Missiles
                                -Silos
                                        16

                NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                Tape Subject Log
                                  (rev. Feb-02)


     -Administration support
     -Laird
           -Strategic programs
     -Effects of program
           -Savings
           -Anti-ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty
     -Stennis
     -Kissinger's briefing
           -Length limitations

Executive privilege
    -Thomas E. (“Doc”) Morgan's support for the President's position

Congressional briefing on SALT
    -The President’s comments
          -Quotation from [Thomas] Woodrow Wilson
          -Executive privilege
    -The President’s role in negotiations
          -Kissinger’s briefing
               -Donald M. Fraser’s question
               -Four issues settled with Brezhnev

Democrats
   -Foreign policy issues

People's Republic of China [PRC]
    -Kissinger's announcement
           -Publicity
                -Press coverage

Vietnam
     -Trip by Nikolai V. Podgorny
           -Press coverage
           -Expectations
           -Statement
                -Kissinger’s schedule
                -Contents
                -Joint statement with North Vietnamese
                -Le Duc Tho
                -End of war
     -Soviet Union
     -George H. Gallup poll
           -Copies of latest results
                                          17

                NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                Tape Subject Log
                                  (rev. Feb-02)


               -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
               -Presidential race
                   -George S. McGovern
                   -Hubert H. Humphrey
                   -George C. Wallace
               -Kissinger’s view
               -Chou En-lai
               -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
               -Transmission
                   -Haldeman
               -The President’s changes against McGovern

The President’s meeting with Echeverria
     -The President’s re-election
     -The President’s prestige in world

Vietnam
     -Mining of harbors
          -The President’s May 8, 1972 speech
          -Effect
          -Lyndon B. Johnson
          -Press coverage

SALT
   -Congressional action
         -Timing for ratification
              -Kissinger’s view
   -William P. Rogers’s statement
         -Gerard C. Smith’s departure
   -Future negotiations by Kissinger
         -Further agreements
              -Brezhnev
   -The President’s role in negotiations
         -Structure of treaty
         -Kissinger’s role
              -Verification Panel
              -National Security Council [NSC]
         -John Foster Dulles
         -Smith
              -Rogers
         -Chou En-lai
         -Brezhnev
         -Rank of negotiators
                                        18

                NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                Tape Subject Log
                                  (rev. Feb-02)


               -Kissinger’s role
          -Andrei A. Gromyko
               -Comparison with Kissinger
          -Rank of Secretary of State
     -Rogers
          -Relations with press
               -Dulles
               -Kissinger
               -Problems

Kissinger's briefing of Congressmen
     -Timing
           -Clark MacGregor
     -Fulbright
           -Kissinger’s statement
     -National television appearance
           -Timing
           -Newsmen
                 -Marvin L. Kalb
                      -Comparison with Howard K. Smith

The President's interview with Dan Rather

Kissinger's future briefings on SALT
     -Foreign relations committees

Congressional briefing on SALT
    -Kissinger
    -Rogers, Laird, Smith
    -Testimony
    -Question on secret agreements
          -Response
    -Three submarines
          -Construction
          -Missile systems
          -US position
          -Possible conversion
    -Defense program
          -McGovern’s program
               -The President’s view

Kissinger's schedule
     -PRC
                                       19

                NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                 Tape Subject Log
                                   (rev. Feb-02)


          -Hawaii
               -Departure time
          -Shanghai
          -Guam
               -Stopover
               -Jet lag
               -Peking

Vietnam
     -US air action
           -PRC
     -Gen. John D. Lavelle
           -Possible role for the President
           -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
           -The President’s orders to Laird
                 -Bombing
           -Laird’s orders
           -The President’s view
           -Retirement
           -Laird’s role at Defense Department
                 -Handling of case
                 -The President’s critics
                     -Compared with My Lai
                 -Authority to bomb North Vietnam
                     -Missile sites
                     -Demilitarized zone [DMZ]

The President’s meeting with Echeverria
     -Business investment in Latin America
           -The President’s view
     -Stability
     -Chile
           -Salvador Allende Gossens
           -Investment capital flight
     -Latin American attitudes
     -Mexican Foreign Minister [Emilio Rabasa Mishkin]
           -Meetings with Kissinger
           -Dobrynin
           -Future meeting with Kissinger
     -Salinity of Colorado River
           -The President’s comments

Kissinger’s schedule
                                                20

                       NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                        Tape Subject Log
                                          (rev. Feb-02)


           -Visit to Acapulco


*****************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6
[Personal returnable]
[Duration: 13s        ]


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 6

*****************************************************************


      Kissinger's briefing on SALT
           -Question on the President's role in negotiations
                 -Smith

Kissinger left at 1:26 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I tell you, I love my Mexican friends, but they do go on.
They do go on.
That's not it.
But he's a nice guy, though.
He's all for it.
So he told me later he wanted to help only because it's essential to be re-elected with a big, broad-based support.
But that is the view that I'm going to...
Well, how did you finish?
Because they had to get back.
But that was tough as well, because they were running out of questions.
But they got there 15 minutes late.
There was nothing they could do about that at all.
But they were all very complimentary about your presentation and about my statement.
Why don't you think it was enough?
I think it was more than enough, Mr. President.
Because frankly, if you get on with too many questions, what kind of, let me ask you, I'll take a look at your statement so that I'll have it in mind, but what kind of questions did you get a chance to answer?
Your mind and my work show similarly now that I had a big section on who won, which was...
I know I should say that because of what Brandon said the other night.
No, no, it was very important, but it was amusing because I had exactly the same.
I said a number of you had questions, and I said, who won?
I said, well, the president already covered it, so I didn't read the part I had written, which was the same, almost the same that you had said, namely that neither side wins.
Neither side wins.
One has the best interest in changing the situation.
So the thing, most of the questions
Uh, well, almost everyone who got up said he was for the agreement and complimented us.
Did Fulbright understand anything?
Yeah, Fulbright, he was very complimentary.
Yeah.
Incidentally, did you notice what I saw on the data there?
I said that we'd like to have it done.
Yeah, that was good.
We don't want it before that.
But then, by saying the person
I thought it was very important to tell them then, because, uh, and then to say, we've got to go ahead and not, want to go ahead and not go, were impossible.
And the other thing, come on, so they don't know.
That was, uh, that worked well.
And, uh, most of the questions were, there were the two groups of questions, of course, the Stennis people, who were asking questions to elicit support for the military program.
The Fulbright question saying,
I don't see why Laird had to come in with an additional strategic program just after Saul.
I mean, he could have insisted on getting everything in that book.
Did you notice that I suddenly compromised that a bit, did I say?
I didn't, too.
I followed exactly what you said.
I said I am not indicating what programs.
I mean, I'm not indicating.
I'm simply saying that there must be some ongoing programs, you know, that
We can't get started on that, Larry.
We can't.
Well, for Laird to say that it's all obliged to us to spend more money, that's a little harder to defend.
That you spend a lot of money when you have an agreement, you spend even more when you...
I mean, you spend a lot of money without an agreement, you spend a lot more without an agreement, with an agreement, that's just nuts.
He knows better than that.
That's perverse.
How did you handle that?
Well, I said the strategic program was admitted before the agreement.
It was the item for which we asked almost an outage to become operational after the three.
Therefore, they had to be carried away just to be affected by the follow-on agreement.
And therefore, we need... And therefore, we need to see the follow-on agreement.
And so that they listened to them.
Cooper asked me a weeping question along that line, and I said, look, Senator, the way we have, what the President's trying to do is to find, he realizes that if we disarm unilaterally, there's no solve because the Soviets will then get it to, get it without.
If we rearm so fast that the Soviets think we're just using solve as a means to get an edge, then, uh,
we won't have any salt because they'll go into the pigry island.
So we have to navigate between those two.
That's what the president is doing.
Very good.
Very good.
It's interesting that I buzzed it up because I was worried about that.
And I thought that if you didn't buzz it, that I'd better.
I know that Larry left us on a witness there.
It's bad.
Well, I buzzed it up.
And that was the second question.
The third was the usual stuff about,
the usual technical stuff.
How do you calculate this or that?
And Jackson asked a complicated question that put in properly one or two other complaints.
And I really whacked.
I mean, I was very nice to him.
I said, it's a very good question.
And therefore, I want to tell you why he's done it.
What his question was, there's no upper limit put on the Soviet missiles.
It's put in terms of what's under construction.
So what if the Soviets suddenly say they have 400 more?
And I pointed out that we had confidence in our means of verification.
I went through the whole process of how we had studied it.
Then he said, well, also, we would agree.
Then he said about light and heavy missiles, that's not specified, so that gave me a chance to dabble the others.
Well, I went through, I said, now this happens to be a subject in which the President and President spent three hours.
That's the kind of thing they want to do.
I bet they sat there with their mouths open on that.
Now you take the Zalo dimension problem,
And I could give them all that garbage.
No one would remember the word about it.
You know the thing that you might say?
You might say this, that I remember one thing that you, when you were giving your mullah, when you would get out and see the movie stars and so forth, you could say that Drashnet drew pictures of the silos.
And he drew it on a white sheet of paper with a red pencil in it.
Do you remember?
He had a pencil.
And they loved that.
It's called the red pencil.
That was good.
That was good.
No, that's the sort of thing a movie got people with love.
And then you went on to the technical things.
What do you think it's going to be based on this thing?
Well, the other departments now have to follow our line.
They can't deviate from it.
But do they have enough of the lines?
Is Laird going to go, you're only shaping the lines?
Oh, yeah.
And I made a pretty tough defense of his position, but I did it in a more elegant way than he does.
Well, why in the hell does he say that this makes it necessary for us to spend more?
Now, if he says that we must continue our programs until we negotiate it, because otherwise they have no incentive, that's the way I would say it and the way you say it.
That's perfectly understandable.
Well, then you can even say that we have to do some more things if you say it in the right way.
But you can't say, we just made a disarmament agreement, therefore let's spend more money.
Well, let's face it.
It does, it does cut the spending of the ATM program, as we know.
And it does pave the way for the
for a more comprehensive agreement.
So it will save money.
How do you answer the saving money question?
Well, I think we hope to make significant savings in the follow-up agreement.
But we cannot do it now.
how far behind we fell as a result of the sixes.
You said that?
Oh, yes.
I also put it in my statement.
Good.
How far were you behind?
In some categories.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Dennis liked it very much.
He made a very complimentary... Everybody made complimentary statements before they asked a question.
They did?
Yeah.
And the few had to leave, and they got up and apologized, saying they had subcommitted meetings of the Arts Services Committee.
Well, you know, maybe it's just as well, Andy, that we did have a limitation on the time.
Oh, no, no.
It was not allowed, Steve.
Otherwise, they would have gotten in the nitpicking crap, which does us no good.
And now you've covered it.
Doc Morgan, the public statement, supported you on executive privilege.
Today?
Yeah, at the meeting.
How'd he say it?
He said, I've tried to, I want you to know I support the president on executive privilege.
Are you willing, though, to meet with my committee privately over here?
I said, of course.
That was said for the press.
Well, I think we got across a few points.
What I was really trying to do was to set you up in a way that they were...
I thought your opening statement was outstanding.
I liked the Wilson quote at the end.
I thought it was very well done.
It's a nice little quote.
I remember years ago, my clients are the children.
He said that just before he had his stroke.
I thought it was beautiful.
My clients are the next generation, the future generation.
But I would say, what I was going to say to you, I think it's very important to get across that we decline executive privilege, but in a nice way, and say that we want to be available to answer questions.
But another thing I thought was important to get across, because I know you were going to talk about the presidential role, was that little segment, why?
presidential role in this case.
And that there are two reasons.
This is just that it comes across departments.
Many of them come across departments.
But also, in dealing with the Soviet system of government, decisions involving the survival of the country are made at the highest level and discussed at the highest level.
Some trackers, a Democrat said, well, what did he do in Moscow?
Fraser, I think, of Minnesota.
Then what did he do in Moscow?
The whole story was leaked before Moscow, and that gave me a chance to really do like it.
I was going to say, first of all, you have to, it isn't just a question of what did he do in Moscow, you have to consider the fact that every, every breakthrough negotiation was in the private channels with the President and President.
So, so, secondly, there were four major issues and I just went through them.
Sorry.
That led, that were unsettled
President set up a good part of the night, his associates, and I put myself personally into it.
That was good.
I'm glad to see you.
That kind of a question is a damn good one to get, though.
It was impressive.
Terrific.
Terrific.
You know, if I had volunteered it, they would have said he's self-serving.
If I had nothing in answer, they would have said he's flattered.
Sure.
But here's Fraser asking the question.
It may not have been Fraser, but it was not a friendly question.
Was not asked in a friendly way.
Right.
Oh, well, they're hurting, don't you think?
The Democrats?
Yeah.
I mean, everybody... Did you see the enormous blade or something in the press?
I didn't see the TV coming.
I didn't see it, but I saw it.
Of course, it's raised expectations, but that's all right.
You won't shoot them down.
When do you get back?
A week from driving.
That's about right.
With regard to how the issue is stated.
We won't make a statement.
Oh, you might say something about solidarity.
Oh, yes, last month or something.
Oh, there is your joint statement.
But that doesn't mean anything.
We've got so deep to be in Moscow.
I think they're putting the arm under their thumb.
Because at the airport in Hanoi, in Delhi, Podconi said there must be a rapid end of the war now.
He said that?
Yeah.
Picked up by every newspaper.
Well, the Soviet press is barely mentioning Vietnam these days.
Let me ask you something.
I told Haldeman to get to you for only your use, because of matter of discretion.
And I wouldn't do it later than this through a sanitary source.
Two copies of that last Gallup poll showing a commanding lead over Montgomery, of course, country.
I didn't see them.
Well, it's not a race.
It's a 25th lead.
That came out last Sunday.
That came out last Sunday, yeah.
And with Wallace in the race, it's a 14-point game over McGovern.
So what I'm getting at is that these people who you want to play, he's going to be around line with Joe and I.
And I'm sure Grady doesn't need to see it.
He's probably read it and already mentioned it back.
But...
That was on Sunday papers.
You didn't get copies?
Of course I couldn't have them.
I wasn't prepared.
I have to get a haul of Sunday copies.
Oh, it will be next Sunday.
No, it was pretty last Sunday.
All the congressmen and senators, of course, they're all in favor of that.
The problem is, of course, it's so high that it now has to
They'll look, whatever goes on.
But what is your feeling as to why the Mexican president would talk about it's necessary to get you reelected?
I mean, he thinks we will be, and it's relaxing.
I think, Mr. President, that other countries know that you are the only Syrian leader.
They'd rather deal with a Syrian man even if he's tougher.
You think so?
Oh, yeah.
No question about it.
That was very interesting to me.
There's no question that around the world you have the highest prestige now among the non-communist leaders anyway.
And it has nothing to do with whether the people agree with you or not.
There's one thing that has helped, that has given you another boost, is that made decision.
Even in Chicago?
Of course it would.
How people don't even know we mined the harbors.
I mean, this was something Johnson was terrified of.
It's disappeared from the newspapers.
Sure.
Sure, yes.
What is the situation as to how you see this thing playing out?
Is the story, as a result of the debate, going to become negative?
Well, maybe the United States did lose, or they said they had a thing on salt in the Congress.
Oh, no.
I don't know.
I think they were all kind of pissed.
No, today.
Oh, I need this story to take time, but I'm speaking when the sons of bitches come back from the convention.
See, they won't bring it to the floor.
Oh, Mr. President, how can they?
They have to support it, because if they say the United States lost, then we will drag out their record on military budgets, and we can prove where we stood and where they stood.
and to put us into that position.
I think the federal can have solved the proof in August.
By the 1st of September?
That's right.
By the Republican convention.
That's not right.
And you see, earlier, Goddard said- And he had announced the following.
You notice what Roger said about Smith leaving?
That's right.
I hope he's- I hope that they shouldn't be the illusions.
He should leave.
I mean, I thought we couldn't take him another five minutes, as far as I'm concerned.
By September 10th, it's just when Gretchen wants me back in Moscow.
Well, he wants me to come down to the Crimea.
But if you're looking... Much better.
But it gets us a great, you know, if we announce at the end of August I'm off to Moscow, that's the start of the... And at the end of that, we could come back and get the... Maybe it's a little weird, you know, but beyond that, we could get...
We at least could announce the follow-on solar arrangements.
Solar, solar, solar.
I'm sorry, I have an association.
Oh, yeah.
That's right.
So if we get this agreed to, say, by the Republican convention, then we announce it on September 1st.
You know what I actually think, getting back to why the presidential intervention here.
You and I both know the real reason.
the reason why we got that confidence in our negotiator, or in the departments, right?
So what happened?
Well, I don't know.
But you were, what we, the reason, it's all a question of a man, the reason we put you in the damn verification panel and took the whole damn thing to the NSC.
You could have left, if Delos, for example, had been Secretary of State, you could have left the GM.
He was a great negotiator.
You couldn't leave this to Roger.
You couldn't leave it to that asshole Smith.
But I just didn't understand it.
Well, you couldn't leave it to Smith.
And so was the other mistake.
But the other thing that's really true, Henry, let's face it, with Joe and I, or with Reshnick, do you think for one moment that they're going to talk to secretaries of state?
They never have.
They'll talk to me because I'm really an exception of you.
I don't have any rank.
Yeah.
But you see, it's really true that the Soviet leaders, I mean, look at, look at, if you take Romiko, Romiko has more authority and consciousness.
But on the other hand, Romiko would be the first to say that he has, he can't do anything sort of independently, you know what I mean?
Oh, absolutely.
And, uh, and Greta knows that you have much more authority
will be independently, because he knows you're, to be candid with him, are much closer to mine, thinking that Romingo is to his.
What I mean is, that's the beauty of the presidential advisory.
I don't think you could use the Secretary of State for this kind of operation.
Do you?
No.
Not at all.
With the Congress.
I mean, this is a great issue.
Not unless he has a totally, totally different relationship with you and his really simultaneously presidential advisor.
And it's sort of like the rank of Secretary of State is a handicap.
But then, of course, the way Roger doesn't seem to throw away with traveling with a lot of press, all of it makes it much harder to deal with that.
He's made a mistake in that respect, you know.
Dolls didn't do that.
He never really held on to press.
And I get more publicity by never taking press.
When Bill goes, Henry, he takes a big plane.
He loads the thing with grass.
He breathes on it.
He has a, you know, all that other thing.
But it's just, I guess it's a way that they do it, isn't it?
Yeah, but it's a stupid way of doing it because these foreign governments really prefer to have a confidential relationship.
They know when they talk to me that it will never get out.
We should not have a single leave on any conversations.
Yes, I mean, you went right straight through, didn't you?
Yes, I stopped only while the guns were being fired.
Yeah, because it was too long.
That was just a minute.
It went very well.
Because I felt that because of the assurance of time, it was better.
Oh, there was no break.
To go right ahead and get the damn thing done.
Yeah, there was no break at all.
At one point...
But I guess we thought we might have a break, but we didn't have one.
Oh, sir.
First they were making formal statements of their own, but Fulbright was quite constructive and said at the end, his only regret is that the country couldn't hear my statement.
He would have liked to have had it on national television.
Yeah, yeah.
But that was the correct decision, though.
I think so.
No question.
There will be a time to be on national television, but not before the committee.
And not before it is ready.
It's better to do it otherwise.
To do it with... To do it with...
Frankly, if I ever did it, I would like to do it with some race inducement.
Somebody should try.
You've got to get decent questions, Henry.
You may as well go.
I'd much rather have somebody... Don't go.
...that somebody like Howard Case... Yeah, you're right.
You're right.
You give me a polite question, and I'll give you a dull program.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I'd rather it was a setup for you.
He looked like a ferret if he asked any questions.
Isabel, do you feel, based on what we've done in the Congress, that he wouldn't be an author anymore?
That's right.
I mean, that's right.
I mean, exactly.
That's a lot more camaraderie now in the city we've got.
But that's all right, too.
Well, I might, at some point, meet with the two foreign relations committees separately.
Yeah.
Tristan was asked if they'd like that, maybe at the end of July, if you think it's a good idea.
Yeah, I'd let them take the initiative.
It's just tough for them to attack, I'd say.
That's why this meeting was important, so that we didn't just see if Rogers
And Laird and Smith had gone up there and just carried it all along.
Inevitably, they would have built the phony issue, why doesn't Kissinger justify it?
What is the secret agreement?
Nobody raised any secret agreements there.
Yeah, that question was asked.
And I gave an answer which included your letter, too.
Well, I went through all the understandings.
And somebody had asked me earlier whether we were going to build those three submarines.
I said, there's a good chance that we won't,
We'll subsume them beyond this program, and we may keep the titles, but we might change our minds later.
But our present intention is...
So then when somebody asked me about the secret things, I said, well, I gave you everything that's mutually agreed to.
Now, there was things said in the record, for example, in the record where we were discussing submarines.
We have said things that indicated what I have now said on the record previously already,
that we may not convert it, but I thought it was better to get it out.
No one can save a life if it ever does get out.
I don't think you ever heard of it.
And no one knows how we did it anyway.
Well, we're not going to build it anyway.
Nobody wants to build it.
Well, not until we get the arm.
Well, that's what I mean.
In the next five years, that's all the letter says.
It doesn't cover after that, does it?
Not just since we are going to build three more.
Oh, I think we really covered about everything.
We covered it.
We covered the...
The defense program.
contention of McGovern would have a hell of a problem with that.
Because you could really make the case that unilaterally cutting back on defense now, or failing to go forward with an adequate program that was credible, would torpedo the chances for a permanent offensive limitation.
Yeah, that's what I told them this morning, brother.
That's not a good strategy.
And that's good.
That's good.
You arrived in Hawaii about midnight, right?
Well, it'll be six in the morning, now that I'm here.
But it's still late.
But it's midnight, so I'll go to sleep again.
Take a pill.
And then where will you... Then I'll spend two days in Hawaii.
I'll be easily able to book a telephone.
Where are you going to stay?
I think I'll go to Hilton.
That's a nice place.
And you'll spend all day tomorrow there?
all day the next day.
And Sunday morning you will fly all the way to Hong Kong?
To Shanghai.
Shanghai, I mean.
And on at the peak?
Yep.
You have to take one stop.
I stop at Guam very newly, and then I go from Guam to Shanghai.
I think you were right not to go to Guam.
It's such a desolate damn place.
And actually, your inward clock takes only four hours.
And then there's another two to make up on the way to Shanghai.
I'd rather do it for four hours.
It isn't much easier, too.
If you go to Guam, you arrive in Shanghai in the morning.
And then you have an extra two hours that day.
This way I arrive at night in Peking and can go right to bed.
I'll arrive in Peking, 9 o'clock Peking time.
And you go to bed?
And I go straight to bed.
You'll be all right.
You're dead this night.
Chinese, you know.
They got a terrific publicity shot again.
Yeah.
What is, did you, one last thing, any further thoughts on Lavelle?
Or shall I talk to Hank about it?
Hank is putting the facts together, but I think you ought to stay out of it.
Well, I mean, I should, but I don't want to be persecuted.
I mean, I have a feeling that Andrew, you and I know that we ordered, I ordered to be very broad, liberal, and interpreting protective reaction, right?
Yeah, but he obviously considered cutting the orders.
He had cut them from there.
Well, he did.
He did.
I'm pretty sure.
But that's kind of a guideline.
Basically.
He's a hawk.
Well, all he does is listen from the command, is that right?
Oh, yes, they taught him from the service.
Was he asked to return?
I think so.
And he reached that age, or just... Well, they put a stop to it.
You know, I feel a personal personal life is not...
No, I'd certainly lay it.
He runs a department like a rootless shot.
And I'm not sure that the better solution would be to do well in his job.
And the rest of the man would be something who would cover it up, change his orders.
You're the proper man, if that's enough.
Say it was a misunderstanding.
No, it looks to me like Laird was trying to, it's the same old thing, trying to pander to the critics.
The critics jumped on, so Laird's not real punishing.
It's like, it's like, my lady business.
Well, and this was also the piece, like, months, this was the month, month after Deakin, Laird was sure that we hadn't given him the authority to bomb in the North.
Oh, I see.
Although, you know, this has become a myth now.
The only authority he asked for was to attack Mittleside.
I remember you, I went into that and you said, because I said, was our restraint responsible for this invasion?
You pointed out they never asked for it.
All they asked to hit was Mittleside.
I felt for us to pay the political price to hit Mittleside was wrong.
We should hit when...
If they had come in and said, look, we see how it's going to look across the DMC.
We want to have massive strikes on that in order to protect our forces.
We expect an offensive.
We might have made a different decision.
But they never said that.
They never said that, because they didn't expect an offensive across the DMC.
Wow.
One.
Extraneous matter, you know, I had to, I had to go rehab.
He's a great guy.
I mean, like all of them, they come in here and they like you to help them get American business.
And I heard him talking about business and government.
I got to recognize that they've got to invest money in Latin America.
They're already talking about the revolution in Kansas and so forth and so on.
I constantly come back to the point, I said, well, it's the two kids, which comes first, the chicken and the egg.
I said, there's plenty of investment that could go there, but it's being brightened away because of the prospect of revolutionary change.
I said, for example, I don't know a lot about you, and I don't pretend to judge you, but I said, capital is fleeting, and none of it's coming in anymore because of what he's doing now.
What you, what really has gotten me across, what you've gotten me across, and of course I play a lot of it, is that if other countries in Latin America could have the good sense of Mexico to have stability of government and some guarantee of survival, right, right, right, you'd get it.
But you see the Latins never look at it that way, do they?
They've always lectured you about this and that and the other thing,
Well, they're so goddamn time-consuming, too.
I mean, that bloody Mexican foreign minister takes more of my time, almost, than Duprino.
Duprino takes it for good reasons.
Duprino takes it for good reasons.
After all, salinity is a big issue for them.
Well, I got rid of it by simply saying it.
You and the Board of Ministers, you and the Board of Ministers.
I had the effect of taking that out of having State work it out.
I know, but State couldn't solve it, but I've now gotten State's approval to that formula that I've worked out.
But this guy, when he read the part of it to me today, it was not on all fours of that, because he still talked about it.
copper or water.
Yeah, but that's his position.
I told him we wouldn't agree to that.
I told him we wouldn't.
But we can't not agree with it.
We trust him.
We trust him.
What we give him now is an improvement, which is a 25% improvement.
We'll promise him further improvement.
I hope that you have a solution.
I said, we've had this hitting around for 25 years.
I said, it's now time to solve it.
And I said, we've got it at the technical and state department.
I thought, well, I'm raising it to the presidential level, and I promise you that we'll work it out.
And that's why I got that semester done.
And it makes me feel happy as a contestant.
I'm going to feel excited, too.
Yeah, can you stop it, too?
The other thing is we've got to worry about the stability of Colorado.
but on the other hand, this follows a hell of a trend in the United States, is that what I want you to do, Henry, is to really plan how to go to this hell of a nice place.
And I go there.
We don't have to do a Russian trip.
I just go down, take four or five days off, spend another four or five days, and go on to the Sub-Saharan.
It serves a lot of purpose.
Did you enjoy it?
I loved it.
I really loved it.
I may do it for three or four days.
I knew September, but I'll have to see how the campaign is going.
I mean, we can't let McGovern win.
I mean, I'm almost psychopathic on that issue.
I'm glad you got that question.
I wasn't able to answer the question.
But the president, do you mean, do you think they seriously think we didn't do anything?
Well... Did they say much about it?
No, but...
He said, it was a sort of a nasty question.
It might have been stupidity.
And I think he gave me a chance to hit it out of the ballpark.
You said they were the insurers.
You had to break in a curse.
We prepared the old man then.
Yeah.
You didn't hear any of the ballpark stuff Captain Knight had done, right?
No.
No.
I will send you reports from there.
I'll be interested.
Yeah, right.
I won't come in with this story.
No, I won't.