Conversation 737-004

TapeTape 737StartFriday, June 16, 1972 at 11:22 AMEndFriday, June 16, 1972 at 12:26 PMTape start time01:35:24Tape end time02:42:07ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Alvarez, Luis Echeverria;  Mishkin, Emilio Rabasa;  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.;  Barnes, Donald F.Recording deviceOval Office

On June 16, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Luis Echeverria Alvarez, Emilio Rabasa Mishkin, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Donald F. Barnes met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:22 am to 12:26 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 737-004 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 737-4

Date: June 16, 1972
Time: 11:22 am-12:26 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Luis Echeverria Alvarez, Emilio Rabasa Mishkin, Gen. Alexander M.
Haig, Jr., and Donald F. Barnes.

     Greetings

     Introduction

     Echeverria's schedule
         -National Press Club appearance

     Agenda for meeting
         -US Latin American policies
         -Soviet Union leaders
               -The President’s observations

           US-Mexican relations
-Press statements
      -US-Latin American relationship
      -Latin America
            -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
            -Soviet Union
      -Echeverria’s comments
            -Statement by Echeverria
            -US relations with PRC and Soviet Union
            -US relations with Mexico and Latin America
                 -Echeverria’s meetings with the President
                 -New approach to Latin America
                       -Echeverria’s comments
                       -US policy
                       -Other Latin American governments
                       -The President’s meetings with Echeverria
-World attention on US and its policies
      -Peking trip
      -Moscow trip
      -Third World
            -US policies
            -Timing of Echeverria's visit
                 -Importance
                       -US-Mexican relations
            -Latin America
-US Congress
      -Address by Echeverria
-Relations between Mexico and the US
      -The President’s view
            -Differences
            -Nature
-Echeverria's schedule
      -National Press Club
      -Organization of American States [OAS]
      -Mexican-American Chamber of Commerce in New York
      -Nelson A. Rockefeller's home
      -Chicago
      -San Antonio
      -Los Angeles
      -Report of meeting with the President
            -Talks with PRC and Soviet Leaders
            -Need for substance
            -Talks with other Latin American leaders
-Diplomatic slogans
      -PRC, Soviet Union visits
      -Latin America
            -US policies
            -The President’s view
      -Echeverria's travels
            -New York, Chicago, San Antonio, Los Angeles
            -Mexico
                      -Latin America
                -Solutions to problems
           -Water salinity issue
                -Agreement on language
                -Press statements
                      -Timing
                      William J. Jorden
                      -Ronald L. Ziegler's statement
                      -References to salinity
           -The President's relations with Mexican Presidents
                -Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
           -The President's commitment on salinity
                -Settlement of issue
                      -The President’s view
                      -Timing
                           -Comparison to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
                                   -The President’s meetings with Leonid I. Brezhnev
           -The President's trip to Soviet Union
                -Arms control
                      -The President’s view
                      -Defensive weapons
                      -Offensive weapons
                      -New talks
                           -Nuclear weapons
                      -Conventional weapons
                -Agreements
                      -Trade Commission
                      -Joint cooperation in space
                      -Environment
                      -Health
                      -Philosophical differences
                           -Brezhnev, Aleksei N. Kosygin
                           -The President's political philosophy

Haig left at 11:58 am.

           -US relations with PRC
                 -Chou En-Lai, Mao Tse-Tung
                      -Political philosophy
                 -Basis for agreement
                      -Comparison with Soviet Union
           -Future foreign policy
                 -PRC and Soviet Union
                      -Foreign policies
                           -The President’s view
                 -PRC
                      -Population
                 -Soviet Union
                      -Military strength
                      -Nuclear power
                -PRC relations with US
                     -Motives
                -Soviet Union relations with US
                     -Motives
                -Communism
                     -The President’s view
                     -US role in world affairs
                     -International relations
                     -Soviet Union
                          -Brezhnev
                     -PRC
                          -Chou En-lai
                     -Middle East
                     -Latin America
                -Communism
                     -The President’s view

Haig entered at 12:05 pm.

                -Communiqués
                     -Peking, Moscow
                          -Contents
                     -Goals
                     -Value
                     -Brezhnev and Chou En-Lai
          -Soviet foreign policy
                -Western Hemisphere
                     -US response
          -Vietnam War
                -Possible questions for Echeverria
                -The President's goal
                     -Soviet Union role
                     -North Vietnam
                     -South Vietnam
                -Mexico’s policy
                     -Nonalignment
                -North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam
                     -Soviet Union role
                     -Ramifications
                     -American credibility
                     -US response
                     -Soviet response to invasion
                     -North Vietnamese motives for invasion
                     -American resistance
                          -Risks
          -Reason for the President's trips
                -PRC
                -Soviet Union
                -US objectives
                     -Korean War
                        -Vietnam War
                        -The President's initiatives with Soviet Union and PRC
                            -Soviet and Chinese responses

      Echeverria’s forthcoming appearance at the National Press Club

      Gifts
              -Emil (“Bus”) Mosbacher, Jr.

      Press
           -Photographs
                -South lawn

The President, et al. left at 12:26 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yeah, hello, how are you?
Well, I hope you had a good night.
Not very long.
Well, we all have.
get started on our meeting.
What you have just pressed us on today, I mean, you know, the people are going to say it's all deceit.
It's not mine.
Deacon is the busiest man in Washington.
We're not going to move on to Washington.
It's not my business.
Let me tell you.
No, it's not your business.
I just finished the cast.
And, uh, we, uh, uh, I think perhaps, uh, whatever subject the President would like to bring up, and then I'd like to get some more of his
and his views on our policies toward the hemisphere.
And then perhaps before we conclude, I think he might be interested to hear some of my brief views with regard to the Soviet leaders and their attitudes.
Well, Mr. President, at your disposal, any topic that you wish to address, I would like to ask you that after this topic, I would like to hear your additional opinions on the North American politics with respect to the hemispheric.
I would also like to ask you, a few moments before ending the meeting, I would like to give the impression of the Soviet leaders that you know.
Tell me, Mr. President Nixon, to what extent
Thanks to my words in Congress, and thanks to what he so sincerely said last night, we could speak in this press conference, in what I call the press club today, that a new stage has been initiated,
in diplomatic relations between the United States and Latin America that we are in the initiation of a true renewal of a style
Further, I wonder to what degree, as a result of my visit here, of my address to the Congress yesterday, and to your very kind words spoken at the dinner tonight, to what degree do you think that we could say in our joint press statement and in my own statement to the National Press Club in a few minutes, in the sense that we have begun a new era, that a new era has begun, the diplomatic relations between the United States and Latin America, that we are beginning a true renewal and a new start in our relationship?
I mean, not only with China, not only with the U.S., why not say it now?
We are starting a stage.
We are talking with a renewed frankness of these assumptions that everyone is aware of.
It would not be useful, I was thinking this morning,
Not only are you having, of course, a new relationship with China and with the Soviet Union, but why not say that we are entering into a new era also with us, that we are speaking with renewed frankness on all these matters that affect us?
I was thinking this morning that perhaps this might be useful.
Well, I think that what the President might say first was that
He should say very frankly to the national press club that he believes that at a time that the United States is developing a new approach in its relationships with the PRC, the Soviet Union, and other nations in other areas of the world, that it is important that he believes and that he told
President Nixon is very important to the United States to develop a new approach to the problems here with our closest friends and our closest neighbors in the American hemisphere.
Then he could all go on to say that what was my reaction
that they'll ask, or he may want to volunteer it.
And he can say that I was very impressed by the president's analysis, by the analysis of the problems of Latin America.
I was very impressed by the sense of urgency he expressed, and by the recommendations that he made
that I consider very valuable and important for me to see the problems of Latin America through the eyes
of President Echeverria, a man who understands the United States to the north, but who also is very familiar with and shows great perception of the problems of Latin America.
And that I think he could say that the president and I, President Shafiri and I, agree that we need a new approach to the problems of Latin America.
I would say, incidentally, I think it would be helpful if he would say that however the new approach is not limited
to what the United States will do as a government and as a private enterprise.
But it's also a full approach, a partnership on both sides, what other governments in the hemisphere will do.
That there is a need for that, and that he, President Xi, is confident
as a result of the talks that he and I have had, that there will be developed new approaches and a new era of his, without overpromising a second, a new era in relations between the American states, all of the Americans.
It's both needed and will be coming.
Do you think that's a scary answer?
And it's that way.
I would, if you could put the words to that.
Captain, you can say it in the press club.
If you're going to communicate, it's perfectly all right.
I'm not going to.
Well, Mr. President, I think you could well say, when you go to the press conference, that you are going to frankly speak to the journalists who believe that the time has come for the United States to develop a new approach, not only in its relations with the People's Republic of China and the Bursa and other nations of the world, but that you also believe, and you expressed it to President Nixon, that by accompanying his relations with other nations,
that it is very important that the United States develop a new approach to the problems that affect our closest friends and neighbors in the Western world.
I think you would ask, then, what was the reaction of President Nixon, and if you don't ask, in any case, perhaps you would like to report it, that President Nixon caused a profound impression in the analysis done by you on the Latin American problems,
also caused a great pressure in the sense of urgency with which you presented these issues and also caused a great pressure on the recommendations formulated by you in these meetings.
and that he believes that it is extremely important that President Nixon has seen Latin American problems through the eyes of President Echeverría, a man who not only understands the United States, but who is also very familiar and has great insight into Latin American problems.
I also think that maybe you could tell the press that you and President Nixon are in agreement in the sense that it is necessary a new focus on the problems of Latin America and that I think it would also be useful to add, if I may,
This new approach would not be limited to what the government or private company could do in the United States, but also that it is an association, the concept is that it is an association of both parties, and it should also include what the governments of the various countries of the hemisphere should do.
and I think he could express his confidence in the fact that the results of the conversations will lead to the development of a new approach that is necessary in a new era in relations between all the states of the American continent, that this new era is necessary and that this new era will come.
And I was saying then to the Attorney General and to the Secretary-General that perhaps one of these concepts could be incorporated into the Transparency Statement.
It is a very good summary, Mr. President.
That's an excellent summary, Mr. President, and I would suggest perhaps that we make a very good preamble to the joint press statement.
I think that other than that, if we can get time, I don't know when we can do this, but another thing that could be said which expresses my view
is this, that the eyes of the world obviously are riveted on a journey to be king and a journey to Moscow.
And I consider that the president's visit here is very important in directing the attention of the world
and of the President of the United States, of our Congress, of the American people, to the equally important and vital problems of what is called the Third World.
I don't like to divide the world that way, but that's the way people speak of it.
I think the President's visit to Washington, you know, I think the President's visit comes at a very good time in that it reminds the American people and the American Congress and the rest that as important, and everybody realizes the importance, as the journeys to Moscow and Peking were,
building a structure of world peace and security that is equally important and of the same priority are new approaches to the problems
Yes, I think that if we find time, it would also be useful to add from my point of view, for example, that the eyes of the whole world are focused on these trips to Beijing and Moscow, and that President Nixon considers that his visit here is also equally important to attract the attention of the world, to attract the attention of President Nixon, of the US Congress, of the North American Forum, to issues of equal importance
extremely vital issues, which are the ones that affect what people call, although they don't like the name of the world, but people call it the Third World.
and that it could be said that your visit here has arrived at a good time because it reminds the North American people that as important as these recent trips, whose importance everyone recognizes, to Moscow and to Beijing, which were trips to the center of world peace in the future, but equally important and with equal priority is this opportunity to develop new approaches to Latin American problems that affect the rest of the world.
Tell him that a friend of mine asked me yesterday if it had not been inconvenient that, in what I said in the congress, I mentioned that there are unsolved problems, instead of referring to the unsolved ones.
That if it is not inconvenient, in this period, before the elections,
A friend asked me yesterday, wouldn't it have been better in your speech to the Congress that instead of mentioning the problems that are still to be resolved, if you had actually referred to those that we've already taken care of, and especially in this pre-election period in this country, wouldn't it have been a lot better to use the use of elegant literary phrases in your speech?
That is a new stage that we are opening.
It is an opening with that tone of frankness that can be a norm for relations between the United States and our countries, that will be very healthy.
An opening with frankness that the president does not have.
And I reply on the contrary, because we are really opening a new era, and I think that we can speak with a frankness that will become a standard for the relations between the United States and our country, and this will be a very healthy thing indeed.
that we can't speak with Frank Nyssa because we are friends and that I'm sure that President Dixon is not afraid of what Frank talks about in matters like this.
And I believe that when you use French here as a pointer to your party, you should speak frankly on all of these problems.
Díganme que hoy hablo por el Club Nacional de Prensa, luego en la OEA, mañana por la Cámara de Congreso de New York, luego con un grupo de intelectuales,
at home at night, I mean with industrialists, and in the talks that you have in Chicago, in San Antonio, full of blood, that if it is not useful for us to protest, gentlemen, I feel that a new stage has been opened, in which we are speaking with a lot of frankness, as if we were good friends.
If President Nixon has consolidated the state, we are consolidating it.
I will be talking, Mr. President, a little later in the day to the National Press Club and then addressing the Organization of American States, or I'll talk to the Mexican-American Chamber of Commerce in New York, subsequently to a group of intellectuals, and then at Governor Rockefeller's home with a group of leading industrialists.
And also later on I will be talking to people in Chicago and San Antonio and in Los Angeles.
And I really do believe it would be useful if we could say that we feel that we're entering into a new era in which we can speak on the basis of our friendship with kindness and that President Nixon has consolidated this friendship and we are also contributing to this consolidation and we don't want to hide anything behind a variety of words.
I think you might say too that our talks with the Chinese leaders
and the Soviet leaders were extremely frank.
And we all know less, and certainly even more, to have frank talks with our friends.
And it serves no purpose to cover up paper over problems by so-called literary elegance.
As a matter of fact, there has perhaps been too much in the relations in the American community for us to put too much emphasis on fine words and slogans rather than on programs and deeds.
And I think this new era to which we're referring should be one that is as pragmatic
It has high ideals, but it should be a program of action to deal with the problems of economic and others that we face in this hemisphere.
Yes, I think that it could also be said that in the conversations between the Chinese and Soviet leaders, it could not be done less and it could not be done more with our friends and neighbors.
Because I don't think it would be worth it to try to cover up these conversations.
the problems of hiding them with this literary elegance that has been used.
I think that perhaps in the past it has been a defect within this hemisphere that too many allegorical phrases and too many slogans have been used instead of acting with programs and concrete facts.
I think that in this new era, that although we are always guided by high ideals, we must have a pragmatic approach, an action program that accepts these economic problems and others of the hemisphere.
Between President Ezebeli's liberty to, of course, to, if he feels it useful to do so, to quote me directly on that, that is my belief, that that's what we need in our new approach to the problems of this hemisphere, and that that's the reason I welcome the recommendations of the President and other leaders
the American hemisphere, whom he suggests we ought to be talking to, too.
But their recommendations, so that this will be not a case of the United States trying to determine the future of this hemisphere, but in which we, together, share our best thinking.
and thereby come up with a true partnership program.
Well, naturally, Mr. President, you have complete freedom, if you think it would be useful to cite directly my words, that this is my belief, that we need a new focus on the problems of the Hemisphere, and that, therefore, I have received with benefit your recommendations, as well as I would receive the words of any other leader of the American Hemisphere, because he has that right, and the convenience of the colleagues as well, and that it should not be the case that we are in a stratum of determining the order of the Hemisphere,
but that together we will share our best thoughts to be able to elaborate a program of association among all.
Yes, tell him that I use the word slogans.
I'm going to say, I'm sorry, but we're getting away from diplomatic slogans.
The President said it, he said it in China, he said it in Russia, but we are doing it in the relations between the United States and Latin America.
It is a neo-realism.
You used the word slogans, Mr. President.
I think we can feel that we are leaving behind these diplomatic slogans.
I think this was done in the PRC visit and the visit to the Soviet Union, and I think that this also applies to American relations with Latin America, that there is a neo-realism in this relationship, and this can be based only on friendship, and how this will come our way.
It's very good.
I agree.
I think the President will say it much better than I can say it.
I think it will be good for him to carry this message to New York, to Chicago, to San Antonio, to Los Angeles, and of course back to his own country and to the extent that it's covered to the rest of Latin America.
I think it's only fair to say that we have not found any instant solutions for problems that are already nagging and have been with us for
for generations.
But on the other hand, we have put out on the table what the problems really are.
And now we, our approach is to, in a very pragmatic, realistic way, grapple with those problems and do something about them, rather than just talk about them with fine words.
Yes, I think it is fair to say that we have not found instant solutions to problems that have been harming us for generations, some of them, but at least we have placed them on the table and we have a pragmatic and realistic approach to deal with these problems.
We do not limit ourselves to using elegant words, but we are trying to find solutions.
Very good, very precise.
We have, we have, I wondered if we, if our colleagues here worked out any word language on salinity.
Have we got that?
Yes, sir. .
The first part, regarding the problem of the Sanidad del Río Colorado, which the President has always referred to as the Sanidad del Río Colorado, which has always referred to as the Sanidad del Río Colorado, which has always referred to as the Sanidad del Río Colorado, which has always referred to as the Sanidad del Río Colorado,
To this, Mr. President, I would like to say that this complex problem would require a detailed examination in all respects.
Impressed by your presentation, I would like to thank you and I sincerely hope to find an effective, creative and fair solution to this problem in the future.
for the importance of the same to the nations.
As a demonstration of this attempt of good disposition of the United States in relation to this matter, it is willing to, first, carry out certain actions immediately to encourage
or improve the quality of the waters that go to Mexico.
B, designate a special representative to convince the water immediately to find an effective and fair solution to this problem.
C, instruct the instructions to that special representative so that he can produce a report to the Indian government or to the Indian government.
of the report, once it has been approved by the government, President Nixon, will you present it for your consideration and approval?
President, you said that you recognized that in Mexico, Uruguay, there are two destinations.
Well, of course, that is a very valuable news, because there are two destinations here, the Uruguayan, and the Mexican.
goodwill, finance.
Sure.
Sure, that's fine.
Sure.
But it sort of translates to the
the position of President Nixon to find a solution to this problem as soon as possible.
He added that, based on the two recent trips that he made to Mexicali, while he was reserving his rights, or reserving his rights, his judicial positions, he decided to stop the use of the 4-1-1 laws,
in anticipation of the proposal made by the United States for a definitive resolution.
Both presidents agreed to instruct their commissioners and initiators to prepare and sign an act containing the previous program and the agreements made at the first meeting.
Isn't there a reduction of 100% here?
That's right.
We have proposed
Mr. President, Mr. Jordan
as a token of goodwill, that's the worst.
You wouldn't undertake a certain action immediately.
In the next week?
Yes.
I think it's better not to mention it next week, because it would be a good surprise for us.
Good.
Soon.
Next week.
Here's the ballot.
There I am.
It says it's me.
What do you want?
No, but please tell Mr. Jordan Foley that at least
this would be better by a hundred parts, less salinity.
My opinion, once you have known the meaning, is to put it exactly that way.
Because at least it would be a hundred percent.
A hundred parts would be a hundred percent.
The reason we don't like to do that, we don't mind breathing in that way, if this is what it would be, but it doesn't... people don't understand what that means.
Let me suggest that what we do then, that when it is breathed,
When they greet the press, we'll authorize our press spokesman to say to yours that, what do you mean by improving the quality of water?
And we'll say, at least 100 salinity.
But at the communique, it's being a little too complicated.
Consider, Mr. President, in general, that it is necessary to take into account the restrictions to immediately improve the quality of the water that goes to Mexico.
but to carry out certain actions immediately to improve the quality of work in Mexico.
They do not take action for the purpose of covering up.
I agree, I agree.
So it's always the part of improving immediately.
Yes, that's what I mean.
Today, as I say, the moment they want an explanation or a joint statement or at least a presentation,
The very important thing to is not the immediate impression, because we had a good impression after we met with and then disappointment.
I guess they've been having good impressions about for 27 ever since 1944.
The thing that I want to tell the president now
that he has my personal commitment.
We have this stated here, but I think he should, I want to say again to him, that I personally will see to it that we settle this on a just basis between the President of Korea and myself before the end of the year.
Now, we, Senator Betterman, we'll put January 1st as our goal.
This is the way, just to give him an example, that we got the soldier in my personal communication with Brezhnev, which we issued May 20th of last year, and said we would try to reach an agreement on offensive and defensive weapons before the end of the year.
Well, as a matter of fact, we didn't reach it until we went to the summit.
But the fact we made that
Set that goal meant that we did.
We're both doing it.
And I do this.
But we're doing now the same thing that the president mentioned earlier.
He has the personal opinion that we'll settle at the highest level.
Because I think we've kept it at the bureaucratic level long enough.
And now we've got to settle it once and for all.
Yes, sir, but the most important thing is not the immediate impact, because there has been a very favorable impression after the meeting with President Díaz-Sordaz and a great discussion.
I think that in this matter of stability there have been great impressions since 1944 and everything has been delayed.
The important thing is the definitive solution.
and that is why I want to reiterate my personal commitment that there will be a solution to this problem before the end of the year.
We said January 1st as the final date for this.
I want to tell you that this is how we reached the agreement on the limitation of nuclear weapons, strategic weapons, with the Brezhnev.
We set a date of May 20 and according to offensive and defensive weapons, we set it for May 20.
until the end of the month, the end of the year, on May 20, last year.
But we could not achieve that goal and we had to go to the General Assembly to do it, but the important thing was that this date was a reference for us, to accelerate our work, and I want to say, to do the same in this case, which is to say that by the end of the year we promise to solve this problem, and we will solve it at the highest level, it has been already too many years in the hands of some classes.
What are the specific points, if you could summarize for me, what were the main points that you brought to the American people when you returned from Moscow?
Well, the most important agreement we made with the Soviet leaders was one on arms control.
which is a beginning, I emphasize a beginning, a very important beginning, in which both powers agree to limit defensive weapons, nuclear weapons only, by treaty, and have an interim agreement on offensive weapons.
In October, the Soviet Union Congress approves these two agreements, which I am confident will.
We will then start a second round of talks in which we hope to develop a permanent agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union limiting offensive nuclear weapons.
I emphasize this applies only to nuclear weapons.
No limitations have yet been agreed upon.
or are expected in the field of conventional weapons.
In other words, both sides will continue to
Well, the most important point is that the agreement that we signed with the Soviet leaders refers to the limitation of weapons.
This is just a beginning and I want to emphasize it, but it is a very important beginning.
And what we signed was an agreement on the limitation of defensive nuclear weapons in the treaty and also an interim agreement on the limitation of offensive and nuclear weapons.
And in October, as soon as the Congress approves what we have signed, and I have all the rights to approve it, we will begin a second round of conversations led to the implementation of nuclear offensive weapons.
And I want to emphasize that this is limited to nuclear weapons,
because we have not reached any limitation with the Soviets, nor do we expect to reach it with conventional weapons.
In other words, more parties can continue to maintain conventional forces that they consider necessary.
And in addition to that, we have, General President, a number of agreements.
We're setting up a trade agreement, which will mean more trade.
fire help
Well, there are a series of other agreements that we signed and signed.
One in the sense of establishing a commercial commission, which would promote trade between the formations.
Second, one that is ready for a greater cooperation, a joint cooperation on the issue of space, another on the environment, and another with the Senate.
But the point that I would particularly emphasize to the President, because he is a pragmatic man, as I am, these agreements were made
without any compromise on either side of our philosophies.
Mr. Brezhnev and Ms. Segan are very dedicated communists, and I, like the President, am a dedicated believer in the system of free government.
I want to say something, Mr. President, because you are always so pragmatic, just like me, that these agreements were reached without compromising in any way on the subject matter.
The same is true in our new relation with the People's Republic of China.
Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong and their colleagues are totally dedicated communists, and we have no illusions about that.
What brings the two countries, what brings the United States and the Republic of China together in certain areas?
And what brought about the Soviet Union and the United States reaching agreement in certain areas?
is not an exchange in philosophy, but it's really a matter of necessity and mutual self-interest.
This approach between the United States and the People's Republic of China in certain areas and these agreements signed between the Soviet Union and the United States in certain areas
I expect, for example, Mr. President, that both the Chinese and the Russians will continue their actions of subversion in support of communist causes in your country and all countries in the world.
I have no reason to think they're going to change that.
What we have to do, though, is to recognize the fact that in our national life there will be a billion Chinese, about a third of all the people in the world by the end of the century.
And the Soviet Union has an armist military nuclear power and is therefore a potential threat to its neighbors if they decide to use that power aggressively.
No, I will never say this publicly, but one of the reasons is the Chinese, certainly,
wanted to have a better understanding with us was because of their fear of the Russians.
And one of the reasons the Russians wanted to have a development of better relations with the United States, one, there were others, was because of their concern of the future possibility of China developing significant strength.
It was very pragmatic.
This is something that the public could not say, but one of the reasons why the Chinese wanted to reach a greater understanding with the United States is the fear they feel for the Russians.
And one of the reasons, among others, that the Russians wanted to develop better relations with the United States is the concern they have for the future of the possibility that China will develop an important force.
These are pragmatic approaches.
He knows my long reputation as an anti-communist.
My views on the danger of communism, on the repugnance of the system have not changed.
But the United States at the present time, by the accident of history, is the only nation with the power to restrain the Soviet Union.
at this time and in the future with the potential power to restrain the People's Republic of China in the event they decided to engage in adventuristic policies in any place in the world.
It was my belief that
exercise the restraining influence on these two great communist powers by negotiating with them, by having communication with them, even recognizing that Breshtov and I are totally different in our philosophies.
Joe and I are different in our philosophies.
By talking to them, you have a better chance to, by negotiating with them directly on a very cold basis than having
virtually no communication, and then have a confrontation develop in a place like the Mideast, or maybe another place in Latin America, which brings us together and the world becomes involved.
This was a risk I decided we had to take to talk directly with them.
Now I want to explain a little of my philosophy about this meeting, Mr. President.
I believe that you are aware of my reputation as an anti-communist.
They have not changed my point of view on the threat that communism represents and the repugnance that this system causes me.
These things have not changed.
But the United States, at the moment, has suffered a historic accident.
It is the only nation that has the power, the strength, to be able to exert a limiting influence
in the Soviet Union at the present moment and in the future we have the forces in power also to make a limiting influence for the People's Republic of China to decide any of these actions and to dedicate themselves to some adventurous policies in any part of the globe.
And my opinion is that we are in the United States in a better position to increase this limiting influence on these great communist forces
Yes, first we negotiate with them, we communicate with them, with them.
Lesney and I are totally different, I and Mike too, we are totally different, but I thought we would have a better opportunity talking with total truth, which was the way we talked with them, if we communicated with them
A very significant part of each communique, the one that came from Beijing and the one from Moscow,
was that both Peking and Moscow agreed with us that we would avoid and refrain from engaging in activities that might bring on confrontation between the two powers.
Now, this is not a treaty, but it is an understanding.
We have no illusions about the eventual goal of all communists.
They want to have communism all over the world.
But we do believe that having this kind of understanding put down on paper between the government of the United States and the PRC on the one hand and the government of the Soviet Union and the United States on the other hand is constructive because it
It could mean in the future that this will be a restraining influence on leaders of the two great communist superpowers as they move.
I think we can speak very privately and candidly to the president.
I think we can expect them to continue to move with their subversion, but insofar as overt moves,
I believe that these two journeys that we've had this week, this month, this year, probably reduces very significantly the chance for over-moves on the part of China or Russia, because it would be a violation of understandings that we reached at this time.
Well, the significant part of the statements that we signed or that we issued after the effects of the Moskv, is that both Beijing and Moskva agreed with us that we would avoid, that we would abstain from any activity or any action that could lead us to a confrontation between any of the two powers, us Chinese and the Russians, respectively.
These are not treaties, but agreements that we have reached.
We have no illusions in terms of the final goal that all communists pursue, which is a world totally dominated by communism.
But I think that with these agreements and agreements to which we have already reached in these two meetings, we already have them in black and white, in writing, between the government of the United States and the People's Republic of China for one part, and between us and the Soviet Union for another.
I think they are constructive.
because I think it could mean in the future some limiting influence on these leaders of these great superpowers, communists.
And I'm going to say this here, very privately and with all frankness, Mr. President, that we anticipate that they will continue their subversive efforts, but I don't think they would take any open action of any nature.
For example, no doubt is left in the minds of Soviet leaders that we would resist Soviet adventures in the Western Hemisphere.
Por ejemplo, no me queda ninguna duda en el ambiente de los dirigentes soviéticos que nosotros recibiríamos cualquiera de turismo soviético en el Ministerio Occidental.
And also, I think the President's journey of some of his people may ask about Vietnam.
I only say that we, that I can give you my assurance that we are going to
Our goal is to bring the war to an end in an honorable way, just as soon as we can.
And a way to respect the independence of both North Vietnam and South Vietnam.
And I believe that we're making some progress in that direction.
Perhaps you will ask yourself, or perhaps you will ask yourself on your trip, about what the situation is with respect to Vietnam.
And I can assure you that our objective is to put an end to this war, in a honorable way, as soon as possible, and in a way that respects the independence of both North and South Vietnam, and I think we are progressing in that direction.
I think that's what I want to learn.
I know that I don't believe, I don't ask, and it would be very wise for the President to get into that issue because of concerns, because of Mexico's traditional policy of non-alignment in some of these matters.
But I would only say that it is my view that if
If the massive invasion of South Vietnam, which started right after Easter this year, supported by a super-power, the Soviet Union and its tanks and its guns, if it succeeds, not just in conquering South Vietnam, but in inflicting a defeat, and forcing a withdrawal of the United States, then this would have
a very damaging effect on the credibility of the United States, among its other friends in Asia, in Europe, in Latin America.
But even more, and I think even more significant, if that kind of action, in other words, the support of an invasion of arms and tanks
by one of those who are communists with the party, if it succeeds in a place like Vietnam, and the United States does not react and see it through, then they will be encouraged to try it elsewhere.
And it's the rule of international relations that if aggression pays, they try it again.
If it doesn't pay, then they don't try.
So I think bringing this terribly difficult war to an end in an honorable way is in the long run in the interest of a lasting peace.
On the other hand, just chaining in to communist aggression would encourage more aggression and more war in the future.
Another thing that I would like to add is that I know that you are not going to get into this subject in your conversations due to Mexico's transnational policy of non-alignment in many of these matters.
But I think, and I want to give you my opinion on this matter, is that if this massive invasion that took place in South Vietnam by the troops of the North, shortly after the Easter parties here, supported by a super power, the Soviet Union, with its tanks and its weapons, if this massive invasion had succeeded, and not only occupied South Vietnam, but also defeated and forced the withdrawal of the troops of the United States, of the US troops,
So I think that this would have a very bad effect on the position of what people believe about what the United States is, not only among their friends from Asia, Europe and Latin America, but what is even more important is that if this invasion action is carried out by weapons, tanks and subsistence guns, a super power or communist, it has to start and if the United States does not react and hold out until the end of this
then they will be encouraged to try to manipulate this species in other parts of the world.
That is the foundation of international relations, that if an aggression succeeds, it will be followed by another aggression.
But if an aggression fails, then it will not be repeated.
So, although we want this war, so extremely difficult, to come to an end, we believe that if we follow our current policy, that this will be our greatest contribution to the peace of the world.
When we see that there is a communist aggression, then we will have to create more aggressions and more wars.
The important thing is that what did the government of the United States give after its visit to Colombia?
What is the motive that the government of the United States has given?
If I may, Mr. President, I have a question.
What does the U.S. government attribute to the fact that this aggression with support of the Soviet Union took place after your visit there?
This is something that puzzles the whole world.
Well, what they say is to confidence to the President.
The Russians said they were surprised.
that it was not their plan that it should take place.
And they tend to blame it on the Chinese.
On the other hand, the Chinese, we believe, we have reason to believe, did not encourage it.
My guess is that the North Vietnamese, after seeing that we had gone to China, one of their great allies, and we're going to Russia,
recognized that they had better move now, or that their two allies would put pressure on them to settle.
And they thought this was their last chance to knock out the South Vietnam military, particularly since I had been drawn at many of them, and there were very few Americans.
But they made me think a great mistake, because they didn't expect me to react, and risked the summit, which I did do, as strongly as I did.
And they're being handled as fatal.
That's my confidential opinion.
That's why I think that we can see in the future, I'm not saying next month, I don't know when, but we can see the end of this long war coming because they've failed militarily and now they have no choice but to negotiate.
Because neither the Russians, in my opinion, nor the Chinese, now want this war to go ahead.
I'm going to say very concretely, Mr. President, that what the Russians said to us, that they were also surprised by this invasion that was part of their plan, and they blame the Chinese.
Now the Chinese, we have the reason to believe that the Chinese did not encourage this invasion.
My point is that in the north, after having seen my visit to China, their great ally, their plans to visit the Soviet Union, they thought, we better act now, because if not, they will reach an agreement with our two allies and they will try to pressure us to put an end to this war.
And I think that this was the last opportunity to give the immortal blow to Vietnam from the point of view of the military, having I withdrawn the troops that we had there.
But it was a very serious mistake, they did not expect my reaction, they expected that I was going to hack and leave and travel to Moscow, the director of the Union, to Macumbe.
But I can say that they have failed deeply, and I think that we can see the end of this long war.
We are reaching the end of this long war.
They have failed from a military point of view, and they will be forced to negotiate.
And now I think that the Russian and Chinese will also help each other.
is this thought that we realize our policy has been subject to much criticism.
But I'm sure he understands that I would not have gone to China with all the political pressures involved here.
I would not have gone to the Soviet Union unless I had felt, and unless this nation had felt, the belief and the need to build a more peaceful world.
The United States was involved in Korea and then in Vietnam, not by its choice, but in order to try, in our awkward way, to save people from having a communist government imposed upon them against their will.
But I think our Russian and China initiative
should lay the rest of the charge that we do not seek peace in the world.
We do seek peace, but we do not seek surrender.
And I think the wrong way to peace is to be weak and to cave in to aggression in any place in the world.
The right way to peace is to be strong, fair and strong, and resist aggression when it comes.
Well, I think that a passage that I want to emphasize is very important.
I know that our policies in this regard have been criticized in many parts of the world, but I know that you will understand, Mr. President, that if I have gone to China with all the internal political risks that this represented me, if I have gone to our country, it is because I believed and the nation believed and we believe that it is necessary to make a contribution
We have participated in Korean and Vietnamese affairs, not by our own decision, but we have tried in our own way, perhaps not the best in the world, but in our own way to save these countries so that they would not be imposed against their will by a communist regime.
I think that my visits to Russia and China have already eliminated these accusations that the United States does not seek world peace.
What we do seek is peace, but not capitulation.
I believe the wrong way to peace is to be in a weak position and to give up and succumb in case of any aggression anywhere in the world.
The correct way to peace is to be strong and fair and to resist aggression.
Yes.
Tell him that, without any doubt, outside of electoral opponents or intellectuals or communist groups in the world, in the American opinion,
Outside the United States, there is objective constancy of that struggle for peace, which was a risk deficit, totally new in the diplomatic history of the world.
There is no doubt, Mr. President, if you leave aside the people who are opposing you for electoral purposes this year, if you leave aside the intellectuals and certain isolated groups of communists in the world, that both within and without the United States, in public opinion, there is a clear awareness of the fact that you are awaiting a struggle for peace, and that you have undertaken these journeys with all the risk that they involved in this new and unique diplomatic way of doing things, new in the history of the world.
And I believe that if China and Soviet Union had felt very strongly, they would not have accepted Euro-Turkey.
We must get to the numbers.
President Trump
As you know, we have this problem.
We don't want the government level problems that we have to deal with.
The best thing we have thought was to create a commission for two or three Americans, two or three Mexicans, that in six months or eight months study the problem and advise each government the way out.
I think you can work out some language.
Being very careful not to get massacred.
I feel sorry for them.
And I grew up in California, and we had lots of events.
Some of my best friends went to school in the U.S. That's right.
We have, incidentally, I have just trinkets that I want to...
For each of your daughters, if you see this, that's the seal of the cross.
And there is a little pin.
And for the men, for the boys, if you see this, that's the seal of the cross.
Uh, he'll send it over.
He'll send it over.
That's awesome.
That's awesome.
That's a little cranky.
That's a little cranky.
That's a little cranky.
That's a little cranky.
That's a little cranky.
That's a little cranky.
Oh, yeah.
After we get past the election.
I didn't want to shock you.
Uh, the, uh, the press, uh, would like us to walk along.
We'll walk out on the other end.
Get it.
Yeah.
Hold it.
Good.
He said he's all right.
We'll tell him anything.
Good.
Yes, ma'am.
We'll work with you.
Good.
I'll tell him.