Conversation 752-006

TapeTape 752StartTuesday, July 25, 1972 at 9:55 AMEndTuesday, July 25, 1972 at 10:35 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Bull, Stephen B.Recording deviceOval Office

On July 25, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:55 am to 10:35 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 752-006 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 752-6

Date: July 25, 1972
Time: 9:55 am - 10:35 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Vietnam
          -South Vietnamese military operations
                -Quang Tri
                -Television coverage
                     -News summary
                     -World War II
                          -Casualties
                          -Germans
                     -Artillery fire
                          -Effect
                -Prospects for success
                     -Frederick C. Weyand
                     -Control of territory
                 -Airborne division
                     -Western orientation
                          -Quang Tri
                 -Delta
                 -Messages from US
          -Forthcoming vote in Senate
                -Kissinger's conversations with Charles H. Percy and Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
                     -Georgetown

     The President's opponents
          -White House response
               -1972 election
          -Domestic issues
               -Welfare, revenue sharing, tax program

                                  (rev. Feb-24)

     -George S. McGovern's statements about prisoners of war [POWs]
          -Bombing
          -Thailand
                -US forces
          -France

1972 campaign
    -McGovern's statements
         -Possible response from the Administration
              -Kissinger's forthcoming conversation with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
              -The President
              -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
              -Melvin R. Laird, William P. Rogers
    -Thomas F. Eagleton's statements about Vietnam
         -Prolonging war
              -People's Republic of China [PRC], Soviet Union
              -Insinuation
              -Possible response from the Administration
                   -Haldeman
    -McGovern
         -Rowland Evans's conversation with Kissinger
              -Chou En-Lai's comments
                   -Kissinger’s view
         -Views about aid to Greece
         -Thailand
         -Eagleton’s comments
         -Forthcoming briefing by Kissinger
              -Comments
              -Timing
              -Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Richard M. Helms
              -Kissinger's possible comments to press

Vietnam
     -End the war resolution
           -Effect on foreign aid
                -Continuing resolution
     -The President's forthcoming press conference
           -Negotiations
           -Location
                -Oval Office
           -Negotiations
                -Government of National Concord

                                       (rev. Feb-24)

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[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 11/07/2022.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[752-006-w005]
[Duration: 2m 8s]

     1972 campaign
         -The President's schedule
              -Republican National Convention
         -George S. McGovern
              -Henry A. Kissinger’s advice
                    -Popular opinion
              -Democratic Party coalescing around nominee
         -The President’s goal
              -Final three weeks of campaign
                    -Ten point spread
              -Possible outcome
                    -Lyndon B. Johnson against Barry M. Goldwater
                         -Media

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     Post-election plans
          -President's opponents
                 -White House response
                      -Bureaucracy
                      -Congress
                      -Establishment
                          -Intellectuals, business community
                      -Bureaucracy
                          -The President’s efforts
                                  -Kissinger’s view
                          -Successors to the President
                          -State Department
                          -Department of Defense
                                  -Military

     Vietnam
          -End the war resolution
                -Foreign aid bill
                -North Vietnamese reaction

                                        (rev. Feb-24)

          -North Vietnamese military capability
               -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] analysis
                     -Guerilla war in 1973

     Middle East
         -Anwar el-Sadat
               -Stability
               -Policy toward Soviet Union
                    -Expulsion and retention of advisers
                          -Long-range offensive weapons and supplies
         -US negotiations with Soviet Union
               -The President's conversation with Andrei A. Gromyko
               -Sadat’s speech of July 24, 1972
         -Sadat
               -Policy toward US
                    -Howard K. Smith
                          -Interview with the President in Los Angeles, July 1, 1970
                                  -Soviet Union
                                  -Israel
               -Expulsion of Soviet advisers
                    -Possible motivation
                          -Israel
                                  -Soviet Union
         -Israel
               -Possible action
         -Sadat
               -Policy
                    -Offensive weapons
                    -Negotiations
                          -Contact with Helms
                    -Surface to air missiles [SAMs]
                          -Israeli planes
                    -Kissinger’s talk with Helms
         -Kissinger's forthcoming conversation with Yitzhak Rabin
               -1972 campaign

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-035. Segment declassified on 05/29/2019. Archivist: MAS]
[National Security]
[752-006-w006]
[Duration: 3s]

                                     (rev. Feb-24)

    Middle East
        -Henry A. Kissinger’s forthcoming conversation with Yitzhak Rabin
              -1972 campaign
                   -Israel
                        -The President’s belief

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    Middle East
        -Possible US message to Egypt
              -1972 election
              -US policy
                   -Jewish community
                   -Soviet Union
        -Negotiations
              -Possible proposal to Egypt
                   -Camp David
        -Kissinger's conversation with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
              -US assurance regarding unilateral action
        -Letter from Leonid I. Brezhnev
              -Possible response
                   -Tone

    Vietnam
         -Negotiations
              -Possible US actions
                    -Timing
                        -September 1972
                               -1972 election
              -North Vietnamese proposal
                    -Government change
                        -Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
                               Vietnam [PRG]
                               -The President's January 25, 1972 proposal
                                     -Elections
                    -Timing
              -Possible US proposal
                    -Nguyen Van Thieu
                    -South Vietnamese constitution
                        -Change
                               -Thieu

                                  (rev. Feb-24)

                           -Statement of principles
                                 -Ceasefie
                                 -Electoral commission
                                 -Elections
                                      -Timing
                                      -Thieu
                    -New government
                           -PRG
                           -Veto power
                    -US imposition
                           -1967
     -Henry Brandon's conversation with Kissinger
          -McGovern
     -Negotiations
          -Thieu
                -1972 election
          -Possible US proposal
                -New York Times
     -Morale in North Vietnam
          -Quakers' view
          -Effect of mining
          -North Vietnamese statements
     -Negotiations
          -Treatment of Joseph C. Kraft

Kurt Waldheim
     -Rogers
           -State Department
     -Unknown Argentinian
     -George H.W Bush's statement
     -Kissinger's forthcoming call to Nelson A. Rockefeller
     -Possible conversation with Nelson Rockefeller

United Nations [UN]
     -Appropriations
          -Paul G. Hoffman
          -Rudolph A. Peterson
          -US funding
                -Possible cutoff
                    -Timing
                           -1972 election
                -Otto E. Passman
     -Waldheim's statements about Vietnam
          -US bombing

                                       (rev. Feb-24)

                     -Dikes
               -North Vietnamese offensive
                     -Refugees
                     -Civilian casualties
               -Rogers's statements
               -Bush
          -The President's schedule
               -Waldheim
               -Possible reception
               -Previous visits
                     -Speeches
          -US delegation
               -Bush
               -Bureaucracy
                     -Richard F. Pedersen
          -The President's schedule
               -Reception
                     -Haile Selassie
               -Significance
               -Invitations
                     -Responses
                          -Kissinger, Haig, Rogers
                          -State Department
                                 -Rogers
                          -[National Security Council [NSC]] staff

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[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 11/07/2022.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[752-006-w007]
[Duration: 4m 59s]

     1972 campaign
         -George S. McGovern staffers
         -Thomas W. Braden's column July 25, 1972
              -Henry A. Kissinger's meeting with Democrats
         -Henry A. Kissinger's schedule
              -Taft Schreiber
                    -Maurice H. Stans and Max M. Fisher
                        -The President’s opinion
              -Attacks by press

                                      (rev. Feb-24)

                    -The President’s opinion and campaign experience
         -Partisanship in foreign policy
         -Henry A. Kissinger's schedule
               -Activity on behalf of the President’s re-election
                    -Republican National Convention
                         -Miami
                    -Possible primetime television interview
                    -Timing
                         -Japan trip
                         -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] trip
                         -September 1972
         -William P. Rogers's role
         -Melvin R. Laird's role
               -Attacks on defense
         -Richard G. Kleindienst’s role
         -Clark Macgregor
               -Ability as spokesman
                    -Compared to John N. Mitchell
         -Spiro T. Agnew
               -Henry A. Kissinger’s opinion
               -Role
               -Attack on the press
                    -Previous meeting with the President and John N. Mitchell
                         -The President’s opinion
         -John B. Connally
               -Role
                    -Former Democrat
                    -The President’s opinion
                    -Henry A. Kissinger’s opinion
         -Spiro T. Agnew
               -Role
                    -Henry A. Kissinger’s opinion
                         -New York and California conservatives
                         -Confidence
                         -Compared with John B. Connally

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    National economy
         -John B. Connally
         -As issue
               -Compared to foreign policy
         -Connally

                                       (rev. Feb-24)

               -Leadership
                     -August 15, 1971 statement
          -George P. Shultz, Herbert Stein, Arthur F. Burns

     Vietnam
          -As issue
                -POWs, amnesty
          -McGovern’s policy
          -Press reports
          -Volunteers
          -Casualties
                -Press reports

     1972 campaign
         -The President's forthcoming acceptance speech
              -Miami
              -Vietnam
                    -Draft
                    -Opponents’ policy
                         -Enemy terms
                                -Imposition of Communist government in South Vietnam

     Vietnam
          -Negotiations
               -Record
                     -Possible publicity
               -Prospects
               -McGovern
                     -Standing in polls
                         -September 1972

*****************************************************************

[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 11/07/2022.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[752-006-w009]
[Duration: 2m 29s]

     1972 campaign
         -The President’s goal
              -Margin of victory
         -Henry W. Maier

                                          (rev. Feb-24)

                 -Previous conversation with the President July 25, 1972
                       -Mary Ann Maier
                 -Speech at Democratic National Convention
            -George S. McGovern
                 -Henry A. Kissinger’s opinion
                       -Divided Democrats
                       -Katharine L. Graham's views
                       -Finances
                           -Joseph W. Alsop's conversation with Henry A. Kissinger
                                  -Investments

*****************************************************************

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 9:55 am.

      The President's schedule
           -Forthcoming meeting
                 -Report presentation
                 -Photograph session
                 -Map
                 -Press

The President, Kissinger, and Bull left at 10:35 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I was looking at the, you know, the sort of spot that was out there, how desperately the television bastards tried to, I mean, they, I mean, there was a South Vietnamese soldier on the show that maybe there was a death.
Oh, I'm saying that the guy's panicked.
What?
Yeah.
The president, you take the crack troops.
Tens of thousands.
You take the crack troops of any country.
Well, under artillery fire, you almost always get one guy panicked.
He just can't stand it.
Well, you hear this.
That's what they use to call shell shock.
That's right.
One, I mean, it's...
essentially.
Well, that's our report yesterday.
My concern has never been the battle.
My concern, Mr. President, is that I'm worried about our U.S. being oriented towards the north and then get hit from the side.
That's what this is.
Well,
Why in face is Washington?
We've got all our military.
We've told them we don't care about controlling territory.
So what did they respond?
They responded yesterday.
They have already oriented the airport division to face towards the west.
After they take the country, they'll wheel them all and get them pushing towards the west.
and that they think they can handle it.
They have a division in Myanmar to come up from the Delta that they could throw in, but that actually the regional commander doesn't want, and they think he's got enough there.
And with all of this judgment that they haven't got, two messages from us, I think the only reason at all.
I called Gertie and Messiah.
Gertie just turned me down flat.
I said, now Chuck, you're a man of great moral principles.
Will you explain to me what the best thing that can come out of this?
Just tell me what you think you can achieve.
He said, oh, I thought I'd given so many speeches for it.
And he just went back to Messiah.
If I wasn't running, that's your problem.
Why would he do it?
But if you're running, it's your problem.
No assumptions.
Thank you.
We're going to work our tails to win the election.
We should win.
If we win.
I'm going to turn to most people.
I only have one man.
They're never going to see this son of a bitch in place again.
That's all there is to it.
We should not have this anymore.
I don't care if they vote
I don't care if they were against us.
You know, rather than sharing, they could be against our tax burden at all.
But they know this is wrong.
They're pandering to the worst odds.
If we've been in the same position, that son of a bitch in the government said, he's now said he would not resume the bombing to get the prisoners.
And that the Thailand, he would keep forcing Thailand as a gesture only, in order to get other people to have to spend it.
Did the gestures get back those who were God and that French ethics?
I wouldn't even...
We've had forces in Thailand as a threat for three and a half years before you resumed the bombing.
That man, every time he opens his mouth, he becomes more revolting.
In fact, I'm beginning to think that we...
I have to talk about...
I've got to find a place where we can get him slugged quickly when he says something, if he's by somebody other than you or the Vice President.
For example, he doesn't say...
Over the weekend, Eagleton said that all of this year is a tremendous flop.
It's a revolting thing on a number of grounds.
First of all, it shows total incompetence in foreign policy.
Why would Eagleton in Moscow work with you on your re-election?
if they do, that in itself is a venture accomplishment.
So it shows that they don't understand anything about foreign policy.
But secondly, the insinuation that you would deliberately keep a war going so that you can settle it closer to the election is a verification of the most outrageous source, that if we made it, they would be accusing us, and I think we ought to hit them as being a divisive, mean, cheap,
for making such charges.
They shouldn't get away with it.
I think on things like this, as long as it's done at your level, somebody should just say, this is politics of this torturous sewer that is exploiting the anguish of Americans
We can understand honest differences of opinion, but to insinuate that the president would keep a war going one hour longer than is necessary is an outrage.
And the idea that he and Moscow would join a plot to get the president re-elected shows total incompetence.
Yeah.
Roland Evans was in this morning.
He had talked to a group of...
Somebody sent back from China who had seen Zhou Enlai and said, Zhou Enlai really lays into McGovern.
And he said, what did I think of this?
I said, look, you have to assume that I know better what Zhou Enlai thinks than anybody.
And you've never heard us say this because we don't want to use this for the message.
I think that's a correct report.
And you know it's on the pitch.
Even something like the, I think that they should never let, they should never let a veteran up on that, stopping eight degrees.
I think they should never let him up on this.
I mean, of course the pilot has to gesture.
You think these assholes pay attention to a gesture?
Eight degrees.
It's time, I think.
What Ecoson has been saying.
Then his own arrogant statement, he was asked about the briefing he was trying to get.
Oh, oh, oh.
And he says, I've been right on foreign policy for eight years, watching the boys in the White House basement.
What are they, incidentally, said on that?
They're aiming now for August 4th in his office.
Yeah.
Well, I would build a son of a bitch up on the train.
I, uh, if I were you, I'd need it.
I'd need it.
Do it in, you could, in three quarters of an hour.
I thought the best thing was not to take Hayden out for long, and I'm going to his office, because that way I can keep everyone else out.
I'll take them along, but
It's awfully hard for me when we are on Instagram.
And I think we should play it.
That's very cool.
If any newsman asks me, did I ask him to do anything, I say no.
We can't get some of the facts of the current situation here to draw it out.
What else do you got on this war resolution?
I think, I'm not glad they killed before anything.
I think, I essentially could have known that.
We could have known that.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
We'd have to celebrate a continuing resolution.
We don't have to have a continuing resolution.
They didn't want to know it.
And I just ignored it.
Oh, yeah.
Isn't it always true?
You know, in a sense, everybody would.
everything they know that's going on.
If you have the press conference, I would not answer any question on the negotiations.
I'm just saying, this is too sensitive.
If they say, what do you think of the government of National Concord?
I will not go into any of the subjects that are not being discussed.
always saying something about your drug support.
At the next meeting, we're going to slightly set a field.
Yeah.
Well, I don't know.
As a matter of fact... And that is kind of what it's going to be.
It's going to be another way.
It's going to be another way.
And it's that way.
I mean the bureaucracy.
That's what I mean.
And I mean, frankly...
I think that
President, first, you shouldn't do to yourself what you did last time, of having to carry the government single-handedly for four years.
I think this was a superhuman effort to begin with.
Second, you could, I'm sure you could go through it, but why should you have to make every decision alone, sit at the Kremlin alone, let the chips run out, and have
and do this at every stage.
So that you shouldn't have to do.
Secondly, I think you ought to push the bureaucracy enough so that when you leave, you will have turned them around and your successor, if he's a Republican, will have support.
If the Democrats come in, we'll have some support.
Yeah, we'll have some support.
We'll have some support.
Oh, don't worry, we've got it.
You can't, not in any personal sense, but really, a fellow that's been here for eight years, in this case it would be 12.
You should go back to teaching, or back to business, or frankly, back to private life.
Everyone has no responsibility to have somebody stay here the rest of their life.
And so their families and their kids have school, but that's life.
Absolutely.
They've had a very good position here.
They ought to be able to find a good position outside.
I think the top echelon of the state has to be cleaned out.
Some younger people are in this one.
It depends.
Yes, it's easier to do it in defense because they don't, their career service isn't so well developed.
I think the military, once Vietnam is out of the way, they have to be re-invented.
That's right.
Well, you've got it.
I think the fact that they killed a poor eight-year-old makes it a little easier for us to follow.
It's all what I should be able to envision is for the effect of an army of the eight-year-olds next time.
Absolutely.
But they've seen these things kind of go.
I think it's totally in the news.
Now they're going to wait for the effect of their offense.
But then they've thrown in the kids' thing.
Now we have the CIA analysis at last.
where even CIA says that next year they can do all they can in the world.
That's a couple of things.
What's your analysis?
I wanted to talk to you about it.
I have some concrete.
I'll give you my analysis and then I have a complete operational proposal.
First of all, I think the guy is highly unstable and you cannot
talk of a coherent long-range strategy, there could be three basic motivations.
One is, as a black male moves against the Russians, he's kicking out some of them, keeping another batch of them there in order to blackmail them into giving him a long-range offensive weapon and immediately supply them to the devil.
One of the better negotiations we've conducted is the one between this building and the Russians for the last eight months.
Maneuvering them into a restrained position on the Middle East, because that's what the bad is.
The one that started the new talk with Gromyko.
Because that's what Sadat is screaming about.
He made a speech yesterday saying the Russians were too cautious.
I saw that.
Second possibility is that he wants to make a move towards us
being dissatisfied with the Russians.
And as you remember, when we talked about it two years ago, when you went on television, I think it was our case, from Los Angeles, we were saying that if the Egyptians get dissatisfied enough with the inability of the Russians to produce something, they will be forced to move to Australia.
That is the time to brutalize the Israelis.
We've never said that publicly.
The most worrisome one is that he's getting rid of the Russians, but still counting so that he can trump the Israelis and force the Russians into supporting him.
That's the one that worries me most.
Now, I think the guys... After the Israelis probably figure we have elections, they might welcome the chance of flattering the Jesus out of the attention.
Now, operationally...
He's done all three of them, really.
He's trying to get offensive weapons.
He has, through his intelligence, approached the count and asked us to make a specific proposal.
Absolutely, he started harassing Israeli airplanes with damn batteries from his side.
What I would like to do, and I wanted to talk to you about that today.
In fact, I was talking to Helm this morning about these messages.
First, I'm going to call in Rabin.
Thank you.
I think we should return the following answer to the Egyptians.
We should say, look, you've had three years of proposals.
If you want to deal with the White House, we don't operate that way.
The way we'd like to operate is to have an understanding in principle first of what they're trying to accomplish, to lay out a game plan, and then we can come up with some proposals.
Therefore, if you want to talk to us, send somebody over late September, early October,
say, honestly, we can't do nothing before the election.
Because we can't, Mr. President.
If we make a big proposal on the Middle East, the Jewish community will go up in flames.
Besides, if we make a big proposal, the Russians will consider it an anti-Russian move, too.
So what I think we should do is to have the, is to propose to the Egyptians that they send my counterpart over here.
at the end of September, early October.
We then work out a game plan for September.
Maybe in Camp David or someplace.
That keeps them happy, keeps the Russians fired.
But I have just...
to bring in an assurance that we would not take advantage of the situation, that we would not move to the graduate city.
What's he saying?
Well, he has told me that we've got a sort of a stupid letter from Dreschner, in which Dreschner points out that they thought up this idea of their own withdrawal, of having confidence in you,
it's a down payment and now you owe them something.
Now that's a sort of stupid thing for them to say because it's so transparent.
But what I think we should do is to ask and then let it to press in a very warm way.
Now I have one other suggestion having to do with my talks on Vietnam next week.
I think
uh... uh...
The North Vietnamese proposal is that the government has to change and that then the changed government talks to the PRG to set up a new constitution.
We could rejigger your January 25th proposal to accept those two propositions but to make the government change result from elections and to say that then that newly elected government talks to the PRG
that has the advantage.
What they want from us now is that the government gets dismantled before negotiations start.
This way they have to accept you to work out the details of this arrangement.
It's not a sell-out.
On the other hand, it's a face-saving formula for them, and we can create the same confusion with this.
All we need is four weeks of confusion.
I'm being cynical.
As we did with our January 25th proposal, that doesn't change a hell of a lot.
Now, that one part about changing the Constitution, we have to present without dealing with you, because you've just heard all of it.
But one of two things will happen.
If they reject it, we will give it to them.
If they accept it, then we have the little problem of selling it to them.
But changing the Constitution, how will you...
But the Constitution, what would happen is, first there's a statement, we sign a statement of principle,
That will, and that will produce a ceasefire.
Then three months, there'll be three months that will be followed by three months of political negotiations to set up electoral commissions.
Six months after that, or nine months after the same in principle, or in other words, next August, there'll be elections in which you won't run.
One year after this new government is put in
to elect that new government will talk to the PRC about drafting a new constitution which means in other words that government has had two years to establish itself and it has a veto because it doesn't have to accept any constitution and it doesn't want to it's the advantage but it has the advantage of suppressing
and all the people who say why should they live with a constitution imposed by the Americans in the argument that we are fighting for Q it would be entirely on the basis that these sons of bitches want a communist government and that's what we can win it won't be easy to sell the Q Mr. President but at the other side whether we can have McGovern in the election
Henry Branson, who has been on your side up to now, this weekend, said, I'm for your Vietnam policies, but Henry, for God's sake, how can the President take a one percent chance of turning this country over to the government for the sake of Vietnam?
We cannot lose you.
We cannot.
That will lose the election also.
But I think this is not an unfair proposal.
Yes, I agree with that.
And then I will redo it so that it doesn't look like 8.0.
And I'll get it sorted.
Those are the only new provisions, but I'll get it sorted.
But it will take a few more times.
We need to figure it out.
Every time we've got something, we've screwed everybody up.
But I hope it won't be necessary.
You never know.
They may decide to...
I don't believe that.
I don't believe none of that.
I don't believe that.
I don't believe that.
I don't believe that.
I don't believe that.
I don't believe that.
warning their people against institutions to act something, why the hell would they publish those if they were in something deeply wrong?
Now, in Hanoi, giving the people out, the line I've been putting out to newsmen is, they say, well, they were very tough to show craft, and that I'm very encouraged by that.
But if they didn't be very flexible to show craft, I would have drawn the conclusion that these guys are trying to put public pressure on us.
If they want to talk seriously with us,
I'd expect him not to tell it to Chauvin, but to tell it to us.
Only one.
Why are you giving Ricky very bad advice?
I see that you're mad all the time.
He wasn't our guy.
I remember we talked about it.
He said he was no goddamn good.
He was a statesman, wasn't he?
He was a statesman.
We wanted the Argentinians.
We wanted to save the world from two rounds for us.
And that's what he did.
That's what he did.
Now, we've got to punish him.
We've done one thing already, which isn't enough, so we've sent Bush in.
And Bush hit him pretty hard, but I would like to call Nelson, because Nelson has a lot of social ethics.
And I'd like Nelson to tell him as a friend, don't screw it up as a friend.
Also, you've got to remember this.
I will screw it up.
I'm sick of the U.N. anyway.
Totally, desperately sick of it.
I don't care who's up there.
Who do we got away with?
It was Paul Hoffman, John, who we put up with that.
He just needed to cut off his money.
I mean, don't ever think for one moment I won't pass it.
I don't want you to understand how we can cut any U.N. appropriations.
I understand.
I'm not going to vote for the election.
I'm used to screwing around.
I don't have to do much.
I don't pass them.
I will be delighted to do it.
All right.
But you have to give him his opportunity.
But this son of a bitch, inserting himself into this thing, I mean, on the basis of flimsy reports about dikes.
God damn it, you know.
Why doesn't he say anything about the refugees in South Vietnam told by their offensive?
How about the indiscriminate shelling of cities?
How about 38,000 to 40,000 civilians already killed in this offensive?
Why don't you say anything about it?
I was glad to see the driver just to get him on.
That was good.
That's right.
Absolutely.
It's not nice to get him on.
But what did you do with him?
I don't know.
But anyway, let me say this.
The son of a bitch has never come in this office.
That's true.
I mean, you don't know what I mean.
He's never going to be in my office again.
He's done.
I'm never going to.
Never, never, never.
This year, Mr. President, would really be a liability for you to go there because those bastards would fix a reception for you.
And you've gone twice every time and it's not that way.
You make superb speeches.
I think we just fire them all.
We're going to do it deep down.
I'm not speaking about the Bureau.
I'm not speaking about the top.
I mean the Axles and the Bureau.
They're the ones.
They're the ones who I killed at that time.
It's a weapon.
We're going to destroy it.
You were, I mean, the disrespectful treatment of you by the other delegates.
Oh, they were stood up.
The way the Americans used you to build themselves up, they should never have had you sitting on the floor of that...
I was listening to a half-hour pilot that I did, and you go there.
I mean, you are the biggest figure at the U.N. whenever you appear.
You are never such another delegate.
It's terrible.
Terrible, terrible, terrible.
I don't know what happened again.
And into that, whatever invitation you push or address, I don't know if it ever occurred.
No, no explanation.
Don't say my schedule is full.
Just say no.
to say, no explanation.
Please, don't give them.
I do not want a courteous response.
That's the order to these people.
No courteous response.
They ask me anything about the UN.
It's just no.
And it's not at a high level.
Like, for example, have your, rather than your getting an answer from the White House, have it done by, you know, one of your assistants.
I won't do it at all.
I'll let the state answer it on your behalf.
In Rochester, I don't want that.
A very low level of
Well, that's what I would like to do.
I want to hear your thoughts.
See?
He just does it.
He says, on behalf of God, I have to respond.
And on behalf of the president, on behalf of God.
And then, it's in certain terms.
I know.
And so that was me.
I don't have to.
uh uh
I think we can make this foreign policy out.
We can make Vietnam an asset.
We can say we have got a Vietnam policy.
If Vietnam policy is to accept the enemy church, that's not a policy.
That we have made, we haven't done.
But we've done everything else that a decent person can do.
And I think we'll get a lot of the press with us.
And I don't think the American people are all that upset.
After all, we've got only volunteers over there now.
That's another one about the press.
They really are.
Viciously are.
But I think in our acceptance speech in Miami, we did our accomplishments very positively and not at all defensively.
What we've gotten out
That's right.
This is what we've done.
And I bring in again, the only thing, why not say our opponent probably needs to accept the enemy's terms that we have not done.
And that we will never do.
But we will accept.
Accept the enemy's terms of imposing the incommunistable.
That's the issue.
That is the only issue.
That's the issue.
They can sweep us around.
It really isn't that.
It is that I've got the record from the last session, which we can pull out.
I'm contacting these meetings now with a view of possibly making it public.
And we may pull it off.
I'm not at all.
I think we've got a better chance now of pulling it off than we've ever had.
Well, I mean,
He's keeping it from being pulled out as long as he's 15 points behind.
If he stays 15 points behind, it's September.
No, I don't want to step out.
It might be easier.