Conversation 756-021

On July 28, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, George R. S. Baring, Sir Burke Trend, Henry A. Kissinger, White House photographer, Manolo Sanchez, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 2:09 pm to 2:42 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 756-021 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 756-21
Date: July 28, 1972
Time: 2:09 pm - 2:42 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with George R.S. Baring [Earl of Cromer], Sir Burke Trend, and Henry A.
Kissinger. The White House photographer was present at the beginning of the conversation.

     Greetings

     Seating arrangements

     [Photograph session]
          -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
          -Wire services
          -Instructions

     Ronald W. Reagan
         -Conversation with the President about European trip
               -Talks with Edward R.G. Heath or Sir Alexander F. (“Alec”) Douglas-Home
                    -Reagan’s briefing by Kissinger
               -European Security Conference
                    -British position
                         -Bilateral deal

     European Security Conference
         -Propaganda line
         -Danger
         -Soviet Union

     Reagan
         -Conversation with the President
              -British views about nuclear weapons
                    -US cooperation with France and West Germany

     Ireland
           -1972 campaign
                -George S. McGovern’s possible statements
                -The President’s policy
                     -Instructions for bureaucracy
                -Edward M. Kennedy
                -The President’s policy
                     -Heath, John M. (“Jack”) Lynch
                -1972 campaign

                                      (rev. Mar-02)

                     -McGovern’s possible statement
                        -The President’s response

     European Security Conference
         -Propaganda line
               -France, West Germany
         -US-Soviet meeting
               -Possible effect
                    -[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] [NATO]
                         -Newsweek article
                                -Statement of principles

     The President’s schedule
          -Douglas-Home
               -Dinner

     Reagan
         -Conversation with the President
              -Possible misunderstanding
                   -Europeans’ views on nuclear weapons
                        -Britain
                               -West Germany, France
                                     -Participation
                        -Planning
                        -Memorandum

*****************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-035. Segment declassified on 05/29/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[756-021-w001]
[Duration: 1m 22s]

     Ronald Reagan
         -Conversation with the President
               -Nuclear weapons
                   -France

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 2:09 P.M.

     Refreshments

                                      (rev. Mar-02)

Manolo Sanchez left at an unknown time before 2:42 P.M.

     Nuclear weapons
         -Michel Debre’s exchange with unknown ministers
         -France
         -West Germany
         -Planning
         -West Germany
         -France

*****************************************************************

     The President’s schedule
          -Michel Debre
               -California
               -Meeting with Melvin R. Laird

     France
          -Elections

     European Security Conference

     Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR]

     Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT]
          -Phase II
                -Forward bases
                -Nuclear planning
                -France

     European Security Conference
         -Story by Flora Lewis
                -NATO
                     -Statement of principles
                          -Compared to those signed by France, West Germany
         -Planning
                -Kissinger’s forthcoming conversations with Trend
         -[James] Harold Wilson
         -Michael Stewart
         -Italy
         -Possible effects
                -Détente
                -NATO

                                   (rev. Mar-02)

          -Europe
               -Finlandization
     -Measuring progress

MBFR
   -US policy
        -NATO
              -Security approach
                  -Compared to diplomatic approach
        -National Security Council [NSC] meeting

European Security Conference
    -Preparatory discussions
          -British concerns
          -Nations involved
                -Number
          -British cabinet system
                -Compared to US cabinet
          -US-British consultations
                -Private channel
                     -[State Department] and British Foreign Ministry
                     -William P. Rogers
                     -Douglas-Home
                     -West Germany, France, Italy

International monetary situation
     -1972 election
     -George P. Shultz’s role
     -Arthur F. Burns
     -Shultz
           -Expertise
                -Compared to John B. Connally
                -Laissez-faire
                -University of Chicago
                     -Milton Friedman
                -Compared to Burns
                     -Convertability
     -US responsibility
     -Shultz
           -Cromer’s view
                -Jakarta
           -Convertability
     -Smithsonian Agreement
     -1972 election

                                        (rev. Mar-02)

          -United Nations [UN] Security Council
          -French views
                 -Gold
                 -Effect on Britain
                 -NATO
          -Politics
                 -Kissinger
          -France
                 -Kissinger’s relationship with Georges J.R. Pompidou

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 2:09 pm.

     The President’s schedule
          -Car

Bull left at an unknown time before 2:42 pm.

     1972 election
         -Effect on NATO
         -[McGovern]
                -W[illiam] Averell Harriman’s views
                -Greece
         -National defense
                -Unilateral troop cutbacks in Europe
                -Budget cuts
                -US public opinion
         -Press report from Tokyo
                -Vietnam
                     -H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
                     -Possible effect of McGovern’s statements
         -Effect
                -North Vietnam
                     -Prisoners of war [POW]
                -The President’s policy
                     -National defense, European policy, isolationism
                     -Press relations

     US-Soviet military balance
         -End of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration
               -Missiles, throw weight
               -Compared to 1972
                     -NATO
         -Vietnam
         -Europe

                                        (rev. Mar-02)

                -Effect of US withdrawal
                      -Soviet incursion
           -1972 election campaign

     The President’s schedule
          -Heath
          -Lord Chief Justice
                -Warren E. Burger
                -Schedule
                     -California
                     -Burger
                     -Wife

     [General conversation]

     International diplomatic relations
          -Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China [PRC], SALT
          -International monetary situation

Cromer, Trend, and Kissinger left at 2:42 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Thank you very much.
Well, let's see here.
Why don't we put you sit here?
Well, I guess we'll put you here.
You sit there.
All right.
Thank you.
There you go.
With regard to Henry's discussion,
When Reagan came back, based on his conversation with, I guess, the prime minister around here, he expressed great concern for Kurt Reagan.
He's not the most experienced man in this field, but he had been treated by him, right?
So that made him very, very comfortable.
And he expressed concern about...
So...
We told him that with regard to the security conference and so forth, that we might go off on a five-hour all-day one, and that it was very important for us to develop a common line.
And I said, I want to say on that score, not only should we develop a common line, we should also develop a common propaganda line, very important.
I said, here would be a security conference.
I didn't say this in a Russian-style way, but
I see it as a gimmick that can be extremely dangerous and can create all kinds of problems on our side.
And I do not agree, but it might.
I mean, of course, there is the argument that it also creates problems on their side, but their side is much easier to control than our side.
And we don't have Russian, we don't have British and American troops stomping around through Europe.
And they've got to fall through our side, and they've got to forget it.
The second point is,
that the concern is expressed that this one, I didn't quite know what he got exactly, that the British, he said, expressed a desire for us to cooperate with the French and the Germans on the nuclear question.
Now, what exactly you have in mind, I don't know, but that's that.
And the other, I'll mention another point, and these are the only things that I have,
The only difficult problem that I see coming up before our election is the Irish problem.
We're under terrible pressure here.
I don't know what the other fall is going to say on this.
My guess is that he will probably be pressured into saying something stupid because, you know, he'll say, well, we have to intervene in Northern Ireland and everything else.
I will not.
I mean, as Henry can tell you, I am.
I am.
I have to put it down.
I have to step on the bureaucracy and everybody else can just stay out of it.
Obviously, Teddy Kennedy is pushing around the rest.
My standard line is this.
You've got two decent men, he and Litch.
working on this territory with no problem.
We weren't going to get handed the egg and get ironed by a meaningful situation.
To our heart, we were obviously interested, and many people in this country are interested.
But only, for example, both sides thought that we could be able to just leave it.
I didn't say that.
I didn't want to indicate that, because naturally, there's much more we can play.
But I do think you should know that because of the lush
You're likely to hear, my guess is, I don't know what Andrew's judgment is, but this other fellow doesn't have my responsibility on that.
They just might pop off one day.
And our reaction, my reaction will be restrained.
I think you should know that.
Right?
And everything happens sometimes.
So if you just keep us posted on that...
We know you're the best you can.
You're dealing with a bunch of maniacs.
That's what I think.
Because apparently the good folks are going to count it as well as Protestantism.
I don't like this, but it's just great.
So there's where we are.
Now, coming back to the first verse, it's terribly important.
And I think, Henry, here we've got to start with the British.
And if we, the two of us, can get a line, and we can work on some of the French and Germans, and the French and especially the Germans, and the Germans likely are a spot.
But if we can get a line, and we want to have an European-Soviet conference, and the rest of it, we should develop it and go over to Canada and be prepared to do that.
The last thing we want to do is to have this Soviet-American meeting during the week of the alliance.
What brought this home to me was an article in the Newsweek, which I marked up there, indicating that many European leaders were terribly concerned that the U.S. would have to undercut the program.
So we had to sign a statement against those who were not consulting with us over the time.
And all of this, so I just thought that you should know, we didn't intend to, I mean, this is all just modeling.
The other thing is, and you should know this, when Alex Hume comes over, I want to give a small dinner for him.
I'm going to have a chat with him before.
I was going to make a little problem to find 120 other foreign ministers.
He's an old friend, and I want a friend.
So we'll set that on the schedule.
And at that time, we can chat further with each other.
That's all I have to say.
Can you tell us what he, one thing I don't know, what, what did Reagan misunderstand what you were telling us about the Germans and the French?
What did Reagan say?
He said that the British said that the Germans and the French were, wanted to have greater participation
and on nuclear matters.
I understand what the French have to understand.
Well, sure.
I don't know what it is.
Is it nuclear planning or what?
Did you see that memorandum?
Did you figure it out?
No.
I didn't understand.
I don't know.
I bet you did.
I haven't.
We haven't really talked about European matters yet.
Oh, I see.
Well, I'll talk about them some time.
They tend to, they're itching back, you know, itching back.
But on the business of the
on the business of cooperation, Henry, it would seem to me that if we could be in the closest touch in this period, on this European Security Council, needless to say, on the EMR, that's a hell of a lot more important.
And it goes so fast, too, a little bit.
It goes so fast, too, you know, just because that's likely to get hit on an important basis.
What do you, what do you see on this scenario now?
The, the, for example, when they take the European security office and they talk about the
Well, they sit there and we were trying to make that statement as reasonable as possible.
But actually, Mr. President, there was this story about Flora Lewis.
But you know Flora Lewis.
I've never known her to be right yet.
And this was from Brussels, and she probably was talking to some sales level.
NATO officials are actually stating the principles that we signed with the Soviets.
It's infinitely less strong than the one the French signed, or the German signed.
And I'm glad I'm totally in the States now.
I've heard no complaints from any European countries now.
But we have already infected the British side.
I know, certainly.
But I didn't have any great unease with them.
Now, what she has totally confused for us is that the NATO Council has been working
or the Negron, I think, were given the common sense of the principle that Christian Jesus would be used to usher in the European security contract, which we could discuss there.
Now that's something entirely different for a totally different purpose.
And she's in no way competitive with it, so she, she got, it's really very, very, we're talking about, she's totally screwed up.
Uh, in, in, uh, in a story now about Atlantic European security, uh, I will, of course, under the structure of President Walker's book, and there are all these great things about it, but I will also be glad to follow up with, uh, part, part of our approach, in which we believe, and I think we're going to need a lot of bridge services,
And you don't get to the way it got to be lost in both of these countries.
They won't get there.
You remember when Wilson saw it?
Yeah, Wilson was pushing it all the way.
Well, Michael Stewart and most of you were there.
You know, you know.
I can tell you, when I was dragging, you remember?
And the Italians, of course, pushing it crazy.
But we see it.
that we have to avoid that this conference be used to create an illusory impression of detente, which then will weaken all defense efforts, raise questions about the continued need of NATO, and lead to the possibility that Europe will feel so limited and so divided.
that this term, flint and decession, may apply.
The only way we can avoid it is to be very concrete and to have a precise program of what it is we want to negotiate there so that we do not have, and this is going to be our pressure, we want some criteria, as you've mentioned, on MBFR, and I'll go over this with you in absolute detail.
The President has been making us come up with a series of concrete options.
We have done.
Well, we're... Not that we lie.
No.
That's why I'm a rat.
I'm lying.
I know you are.
We know.
We know.
We know all those that are bad and those that are less bad.
You don't have to cry.
I was going to end with something you were saying that came here from us would be intellectually much more difficult.
It is.
It's extremely difficult and we have found no option that improves the situation.
We have a mark you that don't make it significantly worse.
You said 10 seconds.
Yeah, but, uh, 10...
Anything less than 10% don't tell you why it won't be anything more than 10% dangerous.
Because it's increasing the damage.
And this is still the case, but we've come up now with a variant, which I want to discuss with you this afternoon.
Uh, but again, we are not in a good position here.
What we do need there, again, is some support when we take these things to the neighbor council.
in the direction of the security rather than of a diplomatic approach.
Of course, the temptation is to fix on some percentage and then just cut it arbitrarily, because that sounds easy.
And we feel we need something more complex, which, however, we believe will really at least not worsen the security situation.
This is, I'm sorry, folks, this is our approach, Mr. President.
We have a meeting on it in our government in the next two weeks, and we will take it to the Europeans.
I think the only fear that I have expressed to me is that the discussion about the modalities of all this, it could merge into such a direct negotiation.
And before you know where you are, you're not talking about how a security conference would be run.
You're actually in the conference system.
And if you'll find yourself in that position, without having first decided where you want to get in and how you're going to get out, you're caught.
You're committed to this commendable thing called security, which everyone approves.
And then you have to go back.
I want to make one suggestion.
Do you care how many decisions are made by how many people are there?
15 nations can't make a decision.
What has to happen here is that we have to sit down with the British and then you bring in, of course,
do for the others matter.
But get a line and then sell it to the others.
Because if you sit down with 50, it'll be one darn awful mess.
I mean, I have a, I have a, well, I know you have a cabin that's a student consultant.
We have a cabin.
We don't use it in the cabin until it's time to do it.
But that's a different matter.
If I can get back to London and say that you would agree that we and you can get together privately to consider how a security conflict should be run.
It must not be done between the four of us.
There's a problem there because ours will leak.
It will not be cracked.
You may be able to keep it in your four homes, but we can't keep it in our four homes.
Now, I understand that doesn't mean that I might not talk about it, but it means you might not talk about it, of course, if you want to.
That's the idea.
That's the point.
It's got to be kept in a pure private channel, at least sometimes, that the Germans and the French can talk about it.
It is a big deal.
So do you understand that?
Is that all right?
That'll work.
Mr. President, I think that this is another topic which, over the miles ahead, might seem to have been used, you know, but on a similar basis, that's an opportunity.
I just don't know.
On that,
Let me suggest that the man too disgusted with the show.
But I must say, I mean, to be quite candid with you, Mr. Whitehouse, he's very powerful and he's a very, very, very close friend of mine.
I was counseled on that one man for a while.
Schultz, as compared to Connolly, is an expert in this field.
I mean, he knows that Connolly is the first thing.
Well, he didn't.
He had to rely on others.
But on this one, Mr. Schultz, he will have a great deal of, and he will also have a lot of purposes behind it.
He's not the kind of a guy that just takes it and runs with it.
But he will take a lot of it.
But as far as I'm concerned, Schultz will be able to talk to him quite candidly.
He knows that even though he, and you must understand, he is one who is perhaps
far more of a laissez-faire man than perhaps anybody in this field.
The other hand, he's a very open-minded man, and a very fair man, and will never do anything to embarrass anybody.
I think he's very well-versed with all of us, with the pitfalls of doing this.
He's been very friendly to me.
The thing is, as I say, if you would, I would suggest this.
We're talking just to the family here.
Schultz is, you know, he comes from the University of Chicago group.
And, you know, William Friedman in that group.
And basically, Schultz is the whole thing.
I think you should be in here.
Let everything flow.
Now, look, if we were starting with creation, that's what we should do.
On the other end of the spectrum, you've got our immigrants who want to go back to the old convertible.
And I'm talking to them.
We can't.
We're not serving them.
On the other hand, what we have to do here is to face the realities.
The reality is that the United States has some responsibility in this field.
I mean, we're just too big to just say, you know, go to hell.
And Henry, incidentally, will keep on this, too, because we actually did the positive thing ourselves.
But I think she'll also be reasonable.
What do you think, Anthony?
Well, George is a very good friend.
We both agreed when he was appointed that he was the person to defend.
Halfway to Chicago, we weren't quite sure exactly where, but the same area.
There is absolutely no problem at all, but I think some of these things may get...
but the other thing that the other thing i would like to do now and starting with the proposition however starting at that proposition i am convinced that there needs to be a
a better long-term arrangement than throughout the Smithsonian.
That is a step.
Now we have to build something more.
And I would welcome the best contribution you have to make, and everybody else has to make this thing, because, and after we get the election over with, then we can get at some of those things.
That's my feeling toward it.
As you know, the
This is a terribly competitive university matters, but we're not going to be unreasonable on this.
We're not going to be unreasonable.
I think what we're supposed to talk about is we've got to have a group of 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10,
I wish I knew what the French really wanted.
The French?
No.
That's about all I ever hear them say.
Well, I mean, they want gold, right?
Well, I don't know why they want it.
But I think that a French, I think, wants the gold.
The thing in the way of this whole thing.
That's what I think they want.
So that's why I can always say what the French have in arms.
Because their position is so dominant and confident, they make sure it's a real sense of interest.
Let me make this point on this one.
In this view, I know nothing about the economics of the other person.
On the other hand, I'm kind of separated from what I don't mean to do this election intervention.
I don't know what that's about.
that's why i've got henry working not not taking responsibility but whenever you see things that that are not just purely economic enough you raise in this with with the history and then you'll get it
Well, Henry also can do some good work with the French because he has the best, I would say, at the moment, haven't you?
Yes.
Well, and he's very good at making himself available.
I'll be honest, because he had to put the car engine over it.
Let me say, one thing all of you have to realize is that, actually, you always watch our elections, but
This election is not going to be a good time for the alliance.
It's not going to be a good time.
It's going to be difficult for you.
It's not in a partisan sense, but unfortunately, it's not going to go away.
And even the guy in here, I heard him.
I totally disagree with most of this.
But, you know, he's already, you know, stuck in the Greeks.
We all have problems in the Greeks with him.
But you're going to hear a lot of talk about unilateral cutbacks from Europe, unilateral 30 million dollar defense cut, all the rates.
I'd like to fight the battle for all of them.
as these cuts, and we'll, from a popular standpoint, who knows what was popular among the Americans, all the cities that we've been cut by, of course, rich Europeans, people, and so forth.
But I just think that the main thing for you to bear in mind is that as they go on this, on these tips, that we will be letting, as L.A. Henry called us, Paul Armstrong began that,
something uh uh uh
uh, McGovern said, has positive elements which could lead to a speedy resolution.
So, even with McGovern, they didn't say, uh... That made the addition.
I was thinking that one of the things that you may find in the election campaign is that, in how I place it, the way they may say, whatever is elected, we will return to be whatever it is.
We don't want to get you in our campaign.
The main thing I want to assure the Prime Minister, and we'll also tell this to the Prime Minister here,
I don't give a damn if we lose the election.
We are not going to cut the defenses.
We're not going to turn back on our European policy.
We're not going to turn isolations in this country.
I, Senator, I am much more, if I may progress, I am much more, shall we say, reasonable on this than I am private, but to me,
This is a very important break point in the whole history of East and West.
We're at a time now, you, you, you, you know this most of you, we're at a very critical time.
When Eisenhower was in office in 1960, January of 61, we had, the United States had a 15 to 1 advantage over the Soviet Union, and the East and the West, and your wing, and everything else.
The day has evened.
I mean, roughly.
Now, we're in some area now and so forth, and when we get in and so forth, then maybe we get a little better.
But nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that at this particular time, if the United States turns back and turns away, if it fails in a miserable place like Vietnam,
to edit and monitor all day, or looking at the more important areas of the world, which are in Europe, starting back down.
In my view, you're just opening the floodgates for a massive Soviet imperishable war.
And that's my view.
And so this is going to become an issue in our campaign.
I'm sure it's going to be fought right out.
But assure your people that we'll do our best on it.
And don't worry too much about it.
I feel good, Mr. President, that after the election
Uh, there might be a location.
Once we get, do you get the government to organize, put a meeting with the Prime Minister again?
Well, as a matter of fact, uh, now that you mention it, I would like very much to do that.
In fact, if you tell the Prime Minister that it is convenient to consider, I would like to see it before the first of the year.
Say that in December?
Yeah.
He told me he'd do it a good time for us.
He told me he'd do it a good time for us.
He told me he'd do it a good time for us.
He told me he'd do it a good time for us.
He told me he'd do it a good time for us.
He told me he'd do it a good time for us.
He told me he'd do it a good time for us.
He told me he'd do it a good time for us.
Yes.
Is he, uh, is he, is he your associate minister?
He's coming, he's going to some conference.
He's out across the station.
By himself?
In California.
But he's staying with, with, uh, the Chief Justice.
Yes.
With, I think with his wife.
I see.
Uh, but, but, uh, the Chief Justice is, is, is his host.
Yeah.
I can't be a wife, unfortunately, sir.
Oh, I see.
Uh, but he's, he's, we can't take him.
I was thinking if he was mine, so I might be able to say, but I, uh, well, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I, I,
I wish he would.
He doesn't share anything with anybody.
He's just a pretty good guy.
Because he could handle that sort of shit.
Good time.
Thank you.
Good to see you.
And don't forget that international monetary thing.
This is the one that I can handle.
I can handle the Russians.
I can handle the Chinese.
I can handle the salt.
But they make the international monetary list.
I turned it over to Henry.
Okay.
Goodbye.