Nixon, Goodpaster & Kissinger on NATO and European Security

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Hello, how are you?

Oh, just fine.

Thank you.

We've got a lot of sun.

Yes, sir.

How is it, Harry?

We've got a lot of sun.

Harry's always working.

Always working.

When he's sun, he gets it.

He's gross, apparently.

Oh, God, yes.

Thank you, sir.

Thank you.

Yes, you have the extracurricular opportunity of dealing with late in tow.

Other people.

Yes, and other people.

Well, Mr. President, it seems to me that by and large things have gone along well.

Do you have a place?

Do you mind?

We're coming close to a time when there could be substantial changes.

And there may be substantial changes.

And as I told Henry, I'd like to look ahead six months, nine months, something like that, to see the direction in which things ought to evolve.

I have an excellent opportunity to observe there and to talk to a lot of people, stay in close touch, and to some extent to influence, at least to give, to suggest attitudes or ways of looking at things and so on.

We have the general elections, French elections.

We have the entrance into the EEC of Britain and so on.

As I was saying, I think that the economic relationship between the United States and the EEC has not yet resolved and has not reached a stable condition.

And the economic thing, of course, itself has a lot of dynamic as it comes to a problem that's arrived.

The state's going to throw up the problem.

So I wanted to see how the thing looked on down the road, having in mind that I could then line up my own activity and advice and counsel to take full advantage of that.

One of the interesting things, although there's a lot of them within Europe, the nations and the higher authorities of NATO hold to themselves a lot of the decision-making, the fact is that their underlying attitude of confidence and

a sense of cooperation with the United States, I can influence that to a very large degree.

And that confidence, of course, is basic.

And the sense of identification, of interest, of cooperation with the United States remains very, very basic to them.

and our main, what I carry is my head parade of main issues in my pocket, the American force trains and related to that under your formula of comparable effort by the Europeans, European force trains and the MPFR fits into that and tied, related to that or paralleling it is this security conference which

is, I'm sure, a matter of some considerable concern.

The relations with France, which I think are being put now, they're working to a much better status

I put a lot of work into improving the tone of that relationship and working out areas of cooperation just as fast as the French will allow the pace to go.

But the initiative being on their side, for example, contingency planning for their forces that are still in Germany.

We still do that, but we conduct common exercises with them.

We exchange information.

They're tied into our air defense.

That, for example, areas specific to the country, areas of that kind.

We continue to do that.

I met with Debray about a year and a half ago.

We're going on two years.

And with Moran, the new chief of the MSF.

And I think that the abrasiveness that had existed there has been pretty well taken care of.

We're not going to go beyond the limits of individual decisions, at least not the greatest goalkeeper.

That's the term that I use for it.

But I think that we can have a decent relationship and a mutually beneficial one.

And I think that is working.

Third area of continuing, that takes continuing attention.

Because of its, it's got a lot of emotion in it.

And that's the tactical nuclear area.

Here, I think that there's been an evolution of thinking on the U.S. side.

As you know, when you came into office, the U.S. had then been secured, not only without a policy, but with a split.

Several facets split within the government that had not been resolved.

I think we must maintain and develop our capabilities and those must be visible to the Russians that we have those capabilities that could be employed against them.

capabilities that carry with them uncertainty as to escalation.

They do not necessarily escalate.

And there are certain ways of using it which would have a good probability of not escalating.

But no one can be sure.

So I think this exercises a very strong element of the deterrent on the Russians in terms of any threat to Western Europe.

Now here in the United States, very good work has gone on in defense.

Jack Morse, who I've served with in times past, retired, maybe captain, he retired 10 years more ago than served in the ABCs over in OSD and ISA.

He's doing very good work there and has improved the thinking about this.

It's not a bastion, but it's very much an essential element, I think, in our...

I haven't seen their study.

Have you seen this?

Yes, and they've done some good work on this.

It's now getting down to...

They were supposed to brief me on it today, and they said they're not completely ready.

Well, I think you'll find that there's been a lot of development of the thinking to give these options of gold, which are restrained but still significant, and...

I think that the burden of uncertainty in this falls over on the Russians so that it acts as a deterrent, a very essential element of the deterrent, in fact.

As I say, this is an emotional area.

I try to work this problem with great care.

The option approach capabilities, not trying to pre-judge, not trying to pin ourselves down, not trying to make commitments as to the exact way in which we're going to do it.

I think this is the right course to follow.

modernization of the stockpile on a progressive basis is needed.

I don't think any crash program, but it has been neglected now for ten years since we had this, the government fell into disagreement on this.

Yeah, we haven't done anything about it in six years.

And I think the time is now approaching to

lay off a modernization program on a steady basis to keep up this as an element of our deterrent.

Do you have any information regarding Soviet activities in this field?

Yes, we got largely through what they do with their launchers.

They have the Scud missiles and the Fraud missiles deployed with their forces.

forward forces at army level.

These are, they're capable.

They seem to, applying the technology that we know they have, they would use pretty big, pretty big weapons on their skin and frog.

They do not have the artillery that we have, which is very small weapons.

Also, we have some advantage

I think, in our tactical aircraft, the kinds of weapons, the SEAL activity that we have there.

They have a capability, though, and studying first their launcher systems, sighting their storage sites, and here, to the best of my knowledge, we still do not have effects on whether they actually deploy nuclear weapons in the satellite countries.

But they have storage sites there where they could.

And then finally, their material production.

On that, we have a pretty good hold.

So that gives us a feeling of what they have on their side.

They do have the capability.

I feel, and this is part of the feeling, a very basic element in my own view,

of the security relationship there in Europe.

And I often quote Winston Churchill in his speech out of Fulton, Missouri, where I would sign up in one part of his speech where he said that the Russians of that day were moving to every area.

where they could, but tending to shy away from confrontation with us.

He said, they seek the fruits of war without the costs of war, which I found to be

extremely revealing and I think they've done it very successfully.

I think it's our business cost to block their effort to deny them the prospect of any fruits while making it clear that there's a high probability that they would undergo very great costs.

The way that applies here is that I think

The fact that with both of us having this tactical nuclear capability, which neither one wants to exercise, they have to ask, is there anything west of the Iron Curtain that's worth enough to us to bring this into play?

First of all, it has a good prospect of defeating us in what we're trying to do there.

And second, it carries with it the risk of the war that nobody wants, which would be devastating to Russia itself.

Well, those, I would say, are the three big problem areas.

The others link up with it.

This question of keeping up the force strengths in Europe, and that means keeping up the American strength, and tied to that, the FDFR.

I would give a very close study to solve you.

I would get into discussions with them and test them out on this by putting to them some

Very concrete things.

This is what gives them their offensive capability.

How much is that offensive capability against Western Europe really worth to them?

Let me ask you a question right now.

I'm going to read a little of this.

Well, he said basically the Germans were very disturbed.

We were not cooperating with them as much.

We know that it isn't, and here we are when they're talking about probably his concentration regarding his weapons and so forth.

Spend a minute on that if you've gone into that with me.

No, we can talk about that.

Let's see what the chairman's problem is.

I don't want to sign that letter.

I don't think he's unhappy with you.

Right, right.

You know, I, frankly, I think it was a wrap when we went on that news week and the rest of our relations with these niggers gone to hell.

They're all afraid that we're going to make a deal with the Russians, or maybe they are, but they're the ones that pressed for the European Security Council.

It's not us, you know.

Let's face it, we weren't, we weren't hot for the damn thing.

It was the Italians, and then Wilson was at the European Council.

But I, I think that a lot of these newsmen, I, I've talked to Andy about this, and I think it's difficult.

Uh, we haven't signed anything that isn't milder than comparable documents that they have signed.

Sure.

But we haven't had any complaints from the Europeans.

I saw the Flora Lewis piece that NATO is unhappy with us.

Is that true?

No.

I, they are, this is an area of great anxiety on their part.

Uh, but it's just, it's just, uh, kind of a nightmare that they have.

It's, it's anxiety with...

And they will be very, very sensitive, but there is no real basis.

They have to be.

They have to, of course, be as exciting as they read about this, and it does.

I mean, it does, and particularly the Inspector of America, and that sort of thing.

They will finish.

But they all know that.

But they ought to, the point that ought to be made when you're talking to your European friends, they ought to say that bluntly, rather than basically talking to Flora Lewis and all the other nuts that, oh, they're worried about what the next administration's going to do for crisis.

Who's fighting those?

Who's locking these senators?

We've got to have your support on all the foreign policy.

We can't let a 10-week notice.

having spent half his time lobbying these goddamn doves, including the Republicans.

So I just, what is, what is irritating to me is to read that the Europeans, you know, sitting there with a lot of guitarists after having heard the European Security Conference saying, we welcome the United States and Russia to great dangers, and if only we could get together and reduce the danger, it would be great for them, and we see them taking this on.

Because really, they really want to live in their old car.

The problem they've got is to be very sure that the peace section will take over in this country.

We'd be out there just like that.

I mean, how totally?

The American connection.

Incidentally, if I can be very limited and discreet, I went down and I talked with the new minister of defense to the Germans.

They heard what his name is.

He was the head of one of their big trade unions.

He was not as able, not as projective, and no dummy, no dummy.

And I was the first international visitor that he'd had since he came into his job.

We had a good tour of the whole subject area.

And I talked about the American connection with him.

And he said,

that they're very concerned about this point that you raised.

And he said that he would tell me something indiscreet, that he had spoken to George Meany.

And he suggested that the importance of NATO was such that me and Ray, we ought to take a rather balanced view as to American political affairs because they thought that the view that you have of NATO was very encouraging, very important to them.

What he was saying is that they are very worried about some of these proposals for cutting the hash.

So that's what he was really saying.

Now, on this point that was raised with Governor Reagan by Minister Karmel of Belgium, that the Germans needed to have more voice and more say, nobody has been able to find anything that that's really based on.

And this may just be part of Karmel's notion

of adjusting the balance in Europe between the French and the Germans.

He's, of course, the militants live in terror of NATO coming unstrung and they're being exposed to the Germans.

That's, they're just terrified by that.

Now, but nobody can really put much into this thing that Harnell raised.

As a matter of fact, I would not accept that as a premise.

This is not something great.

I agree with Andy.

The US will be dealing with the pandemic.

They had this when Eisenhower was president.

This is not, this is just their nightmare.

And they'd better be worried about that.

Sure.

But I don't think it's focused on anything specific that you have done.

And on the contrary, I don't know any European leader who doesn't consider you almost the only guarantee they have against this.

And what Flora Lewis was writing about, I can't even imagine.

Of course, what it could mean to is this, that we have to realize that the European youth, like the American youth, if you generalize,

has a very, very strong segment of, he said, I need Christ, and get the hell out, and better rid the dead, and so forth and so on.

And these European leaders, you know, they'll talk so strong in private, but boy, in public, they're always simmering around this.

I think that's part of this.

I don't know if this is all wrong.

I don't know if that's from his letter, Henry, which is in here.

As I said, it's a lot different.

It's public statements, and public statements aren't all that strong.

But Brown didn't go to take us on before his election.

He's trying to try to pretend as much as he can that he's outshone instruments, you know, to send us through.

And we live in this time, you see.

No, but anyway, I don't mean it.

We have a...

I'm just serious about what the problem is.

Let me give you a little contrast here between your point and what they say in private and what they say in public.

Their parties, as they form the party basis for governments when they get together in coalitions and so on, work out these programs and platforms that accommodate this position and that position.

The party leadership in many countries

particularly as you get over on the left side at all, will be looking for ways to play to the youth, to play to the attitude.

And this will be talking about how they can cut down here and so on.

Now, as we actually come close to this NBFR and to a certain degree to this security conference as well, now you find that

They want to be sure that we don't go too far.

And they want to be sure that we don't drop our guard.

And as I put it, they want to be sure that they retain the American connection.

Because that means survival to them.

And they know it.

There's no doubt about it.

Let me go back to one interesting point.

And I used to challenge them just because on this they told me about their concerns and so on.

They raised this from time to time.

Not having anything specific to base it on, but just because it would be devastating to them if it were to happen.

I go back and I say, do you remember what happened with the boat on Taiwan coming into the, on Taiwan in the UN took place last fall?

What did your ambassador tell you would be the reaction of the United States if that boat went the wrong way?

And they all say, well, he didn't say anything about it.

I said, do you know that, to my mind, that was the most dangerous moment for NATO in its whole 20 years.

If Mansfield and company had been on the other side of that issue, I would estimate that they could have destroyed NATO.

They could have ran through in the emotional surge that took place.

at the strength of feeling that was demonstrated there.

I said, you there endangered the American connection more than I should have endangered before.

I tell them, that was a stupid thing to do, and Europeans generally aren't stupid in that way.

And then they'll try to argue with me what the merits of it are.

I'm not involved in that.

But what I am involved in is to know whether you are analyzing what is needed to maintain the American connection.

And then I go right into this business of keeping up their force strengths, keeping up their military budgets, which, to my judgment, are not, across the board, are not seriously out of line.

There are weaknesses.

There are things that they are failing to do.

particularly as they shorten terms of service, as concessions soft to their left.

I think those steps are very bad.

We've got a very bad proposal up in Denmark now, which is in many ways the weakest of all the countries.

But I keep pounding that it is necessary to keep up their side of this.

And if they will do that, if they will hold to a steady course on what has been laid on in response to your formula two years ago, then given comparable effort, the United States will maintain and improve and will not reduce its forces except in the context of mutual reductions.

If they won't continue to do that, then I tell them I think the connection can be, can continue to be maintained.

And that, that is the heart of it.

Well, the election, Mark, the member of the Senate, said he is, you know, I just wish he had joined us.

We have to rely, we have three months for today, but the election, I think it's probably the best debate in this country about defense levels.

about a bug out from NATO and so forth and so on.

I mean, I've heard a thing on Greece, which of course, the Danes, the Norwegians, they all love that, and some of the British left.

But God didn't destroy a state like that.

That's right.

They just cut off, you cut off Turks, and you should ruin a man for anybody, apart from that.

The main thing is that we have this period when

We're going to have more, more deals with the Russians, let's face it.

It has to be done.

But, uh, there is a kind of weeping, just scrupulous, in, not only in farming and in consulting with the Russians, but in, in making no deal with the Russians at the expense of NATO.

Because that helps us make the deal with the Russians.

And they, uh, they're quite aware of that.

Now, the rate of the, of the worst thing that the NATO people could do

is to indicate lack of confidence in this administration.

They have to realize that they're going to indicate lack of confidence before our election tomorrow.

But they're going to do their, you know, they're inspired to kick the hell out of the American doves.

That's what they should do.

Yes.

Let's hear stories like that now.

They really got to do that because, of course, they have a press over there, a lot of our press that is, they already have a strong and a lot of love to the U.S.

You see, that sort of thing doesn't give me hope, because then we get it both ways.

We get it from our doves, and we get the idea that our policy also has disturbed our European friends.

Well, the best hope, in fact, the only hope for England, the only hope for Western Europe,

is for the maintenance of the kind of leadership that we're providing.

That's the only way.

That's the only way they can survive.

And it's been at great political cost with us, and it'd be much easier.

I can justify, I can justify doing things that will do toward the so-called peace line that a guy like Ron Free or any of these other people couldn't.

Like, they could never have done the China thing.

They could never have done the last of all that.

because they wouldn't be trusted on the issue.

So I can even rule in this direction.

I'm not going to, because I know what's going to happen.

I mean, the very cornerstone of our policy to deal with the Russians is strong in the Slavic community.

We all know this.

And that question, the Russians, they can talk about everything else.

They're interested in South Asia, and they're interested in the Mideast, and they're interested nationally.

In the future, certainly, China perhaps is even more important, too.

But right in the heart of this Europe,

And anything they can do, anything they can do to have the European community disintegrate and fall into a spot where we become weak so that they can rule over, militarize themselves in terms of organizing, all of that is militarized, and then check on this.

But we're with them.

You can give them every kind of assurance on that.

But in these next two or three months, it's very important for them to be able to understand what goes.

I've taken the stand that the department counts, and I think it fits right into that, that we should hold a steady course.

of the next few months, which will be turbulent.

But I think we can do that, and I think that we can continue to maintain this, keep this thing pulled together.

I think, from the Russian standpoint, is their reference to this not wanting to negotiate on a block-to-block basis.

I regard that as utter nonsense.

On their side, they have a block.

Whatever you call it, that is a block.

It shows they have the criminal rights people.

What they are really saying is that they want to see NATO disintegrate and want to break the American connection.

For people to be taken in on this block to block thing.

I do talk to the French on this because they use this term.

They have told me privately that they use it.

not because they think that there's any validity in it, but that they've regarded this as a way of blocking the MDFR, and the reason they want to block MDFR is that they do not want, the French do not want to see any reduction, whatever, in the American force.

Well, good to see you again.

All the best to you, sir.

Thank you.

I would say that immediately after the election, we'll sit down and take a look, because I think it's time to do a little something.

particularly due to what may happen next year with our Russian friends.

Right.

Before that, you've got to get our things checked.

Incidentally, on that negotiation with the Russians, I'm very well aware of the meticulous care that you've taken not to negotiate with other people's businesses.

All the best to you, sir.

Nixon, Goodpaster & Kissinger on NATO and European Security

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on August 7, 1972

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