Conversation 789-004

TapeTape 789StartSaturday, September 30, 1972 at 10:17 AMEndSaturday, September 30, 1972 at 10:34 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Jackson, Henry M. ("Scoop");  [Unknown person(s)]Recording deviceOval Office

On September 30, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Henry M. ("Scoop") Jackson, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:17 am and 10:34 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 789-004 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 789-4

Date: September 30, 1972
Time: Unknown between 10:17 am and 10:34 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger and Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson. This recording
began while the meeting was in progress.

            National Defense policy
                -The President’s meeting with Sir Alexander F. (“Alec”) Douglas-Home
                -Nuclear weapons
                     -Bilateral reduction
                          -Soviet Union
                     -Multilateral reduction
                          -Europe
                              -Netherlands
                              -Belgium
                              -Denmark
                -Conventional forces
                -The President's San Francisco speech, September 27, 1972
                     -Massive retaliation
                          -Naval, air forces, army
                          -Small nations


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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National security]
[Duration: 3s ]

                     -MIDDLE EAST

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

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                                         7
                  NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                 Tape Subject Log
                                   (rev. Nov-03)


                      -Jordan crisis
                          -Mobilization
                               -Sixth Fleet
                               -Airplanes
                                     -West Germany
                          -Soviets
                               -Syria
                          -Soviet Union
                               -Israel
                          -Credibility
                               -Europe

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[National Security]
[Duration: 14 s]

                          -NATIONAL DEFENSE

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

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                               -Israel
                           -Europe
              -Soviet Naval Buildup
              -Forward Bases
              -Conventional forces
                  -US public opinion
                  -Soviet buildup
                       -Pace
                           -Navy, air power
                       -Yugoslavia
          -Troops cuts
              -Defense appropriations subcommittee
                  -Europe
              -Forthcoming talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR]
                  -Congressional awareness
              -Defense supporters
                  -John L. McClellan
                                              8
                     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                       (rev. Nov-03)

                     -European responsibility
                     -Previous resolution for pullback, 1967

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 10:17 am.

            Refreshments

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 10:34 am.

            National Defense
                -Resolution for force pullback 1967
                     -Michael J. Mansfield
                -Consequences of vote
                -Strategic Arms limitation Treaty [SALT] debate
                     -Nuclear warheads
                         -Number
                              -Equality, deliverability
                     -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
                     -William Proxmire
                         -Tactical nuclear weapons compared to strategic nuclear weapons
                     -Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] involvement
                         -J. William Fulbright
                         -Gerard L. Smith
                         -Jackson Amendment
                         -Hugh Scott
                         -Plans
                              -Appropriations
                              -Transfers
                         -Soviet Union
                     -Raymond L. Garthoff
                         -Helsinki cable
                              -Soviets
                                   -Arms control jargon
                                   -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                                        -Conversation with Kissinger
                         -Position
                              -Foreign Service
                                   -Uganda
                         -Possible firing
                              -Timing
                                   -1972 election
                                        -Leaks
                             9
    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                    Tape Subject Log
                      (rev. Nov-03)

         -John Finney
              -New York Times
         -Discussions with Soviets
              -Garthoff’s background
                   -Russian language skills
                   -Wife
              -US fallback position
         -Smith
-Secor D. Browne
    -Possible involvement in administration
    -Civil Aeronautical Board [CAB] chairman
    -Previous position at Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT]
         -Aeronautical engineering
    -Soviet negotiations
         -Russian language skills
    -Weapons system expert
    -ACDA
    -State Department
    -Soviet negotiations
    -Consultant to industry
    -Commercial aviation expertise
    -Conventional weapons knowledge
    -MBFR
-ACDA
    -Negotiations
         -Role of administrator
              -MBFR
              -SALT II
                   -Unilateral Disarmament
                         -Mutual disarmament
-SALT
    -Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]
         -Knowledge
              -Jackson’s questioning
              -Air Force Chief of Staff
                   -Gen. John D. Ryan
    -Antiballistic missiles [ABM]
         -Capitals defense plan
         -State Department
         -ACDA
         -JCS
              -Interests
                                10
        NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                        Tape Subject Log
                          (rev. Nov-03)

                     -Weapons system

Personnel management
    -Lt. Gen. Edward Rowny
         -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
         -Background
             -Army
                  -Supreme Headquarters, Allied Power Europe [SHAPE]
                       -Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster
             -Replacement [for Ryan]
             -Promotion
             -Johns Hopkins University
             -US Military Academy at West Point
             -Development of air mobile concept
             -Yale University
                  -Engineering
                  -Political science
             -Doctorate [Ph.D.]
             -Haig
             -Scholar
             -Corps commander
    -JCS
         -Views
             -Compared to the President’s
    -State Department
    -ACDA
    -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
    -JCS
         -ABM
             -Capitals defense plan
                  -The President’s view
    -Rowny
         -Haig
    -ACDA
         -Garthoff
         -Plans
         -Loyalty
             -Ideology

Jackson's forthcoming work with Kissinger

US-Soviet Union trade deal
                                             11
                      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. Nov-03)

                 -Jackson Amendment on Soviet Jewry
                     -Exit visas
                     -Amendment to bill
                           -Timing
                               -Forthcoming congressional session
                     -Co-sponsors
                     -Signal to Soviets
                 -Senate resolution
                     -Hubert H. Humphrey
                     -Jacob A. Javits
                     -George S. McGovern
                     -Opposition by Jewish community
                     -Impact on the President
                     -Compared to Jackson Amendment
                           -Timing
                     -Soviet Reaction
                           -Exit visas
                 -Kissinger’s forthcoming conversation with Hugh Scott
                 -Scott
                     -Administrative assistant, William J. Hildebrand
                 -McGovern
                 -Political implications
                     -Jackson’s conversation with Scott
                 -Compared to Jackson Amendment
                     -Voting
                     -Signal to Soviets
                     -Toughness
                     -Co-sponsors
                     -Withholding

             Kissinger's schedule

Kissinger and Jackson left at 10:34 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

And I read it and he said, tell me, are you going to, what is going to happen to your horses?
Are you going to have to reduce them and the rest?
I said, no.
I said, not mutually, you don't have to know.
And he made an interesting point when he said that if you do it, he says, you and the Russians should do it.
He said, don't have us do it, none of us.
In other words, his view is that if you do it, that's because of us.
He said it's terribly important that the Europeans maintain the voice they've got.
He said, you've got the Dutch, you've got the Belgians, you've got the Danes who are all ready to run off and hide.
Now, the other point, however, he made is with regard to conventional forces.
made the obvious point that the idea of massive retaliation, we can reduce our naval forces, we can reduce our air forces, we can reduce our army.
So it didn't make any difference whether we were second or not, due to the fact that we had this huge nuclear deterrent on the road .
But I brought it up.
That's no foreign policy.
And particularly, it's no foreign policy.
We're a smaller nation whose survival does not directly affect the security of the United States of God.
What in the name of God would we have done when we had the Jordan crisis, when we threw that fleet in there and mobilized the planes, you know, and the airfields in Germany and the rest?
What in the hell would we have done?
We would have said to the Syrians, or the Russians, look,
If you don't knock it off, we're going to start a nuclear war.
Who the hell would believe that?
Nobody says it's not credible.
They might believe it with regard to Europe.
Israel is the one where it is the most credible of the small nations.
Europe is the only place in the world that I think that a nuclear threat might have some credibility.
Now, my point, though, that he'll make is that he is concerned about the Russian naval development.
Here's a European talk, and he says that he would hope that we, as we move in this whole area, when we talk about forward bases and all that, that's the other thing he raised, that we would have the judgment
continuing strong conventional force, because as he pointed out, the Russians, at the time that they're negotiating these treaties, aren't going, and he put it in a sort of British way of asking questions, he says, why are the Russians going forward so fast on building up a navy?
Why are the Russians going forward and building up an conventional air power?
Hell, they're not building it.
You know, the fight in Yugoslavia, they're building it.
They're building it.
They're building it.
Well, with their massive strategic build-up of the old blackmail game.
Right.
The old blackmail game.
But the point that I make is this.
The conventional forces still have a role to play.
Mr. President, I just want to report one thing.
We've got a serious problem in the troop thing.
I alone stood in the defense appropriations subcommittee on Tuesday when I had the markup.
They were ready then to put in some provisions in cutting our forces.
Did you hear?
Yes, sir.
Yes.
and uh we've got a lot of educating to do they don't even know i was shocked my colleagues don't even know about the upcoming talks on the mutual pullback that's right they're absolutely ignorant on it and the ones that are good on defense issues like john mcclellan go right on down the list
They're fed up with the Europeans are not doing anything.
They think the Europeans should do more.
That's right.
You know that old game.
The point is that our getting out is not going to make the Europeans do more.
Yes, sir.
Well, what I'm worried about, Mr. President, is that on the Hill right now there's been a further deterioration.
You know, we stopped back in about 1967 in an attempt to get a resolution to pull back the forces.
Right.
Just plain black.
Right.
Yes, sir.
The Mansfield resolution was up.
Right.
And I wouldn't—if we had a vote in the Senate, I'd be fearful of what the consequences would be.
And they don't understand—as you know, in the debate on salt, I went through this business about the 7,000 nuclear warheads.
you know, day after day, and, you know, you've got to have equality, and you've got to include them, even if they're not deliverable.
And they're all confused.
And I said, look, these weapons are tied to NATO commitments.
I was debating with Smiram.
He doesn't know the difference.
He said they're tactical nuclear weapons.
Then the next press, he says they're strategic.
Of course, one thing we are going to do is... Oh, we've got a hell of a problem.
We've got to do something about these ACTA guys who are running around.
ACTA?
They were cutting your throat.
They were up in Fulbright's office continuously.
And Jerry Smith calls me up and he says, I understand, you say, that our people...
I said, well, they're there right now.
They're in Fulbright's and they finally got them out.
Isn't that right?
That's right.
We sent a man up to the hill and we said...
We order you to get these guys off the hill fighting Jack the Jackson.
When he said, I haven't got any guys here.
So they said, that's very funny.
There's somebody building a new Scott's office right now.
They're bad.
The plan has got to be this.
First, we've got to get their dad to come to the appropriation in half, which I've already done.
We just transfer the assholes, get them out of there.
I don't.
You can't have that.
It isn't because of the administrative disloyalty of the country.
Well, they are actually disloyal.
There's no integrity.
You know, listen, they're always pushing us out of the game.
That's right.
Gartoff is the son of a bitch in that.
What do you mean?
Gartoff.
Gartoff.
Ray Gartoff.
Is he with the...
He is the... Ray Gartoff.
Oh, that's the following thing.
We must get around.
We got a cable from Helsinki, which said the Russians told me to follow them from Kata.
And it was a very complicated argument.
I said, this doesn't sound like the Russians to me, because they don't even argue like this, you know, with all the island control charges.
So I went to the prison.
I said, listen, I just had this message.
This doesn't sound like...
I don't understand it.
You won't find out from me.
Just what...
What you were trying to say here, he checked in Moscow, what had happened was that Ray Carter went to the Russians, gave him this whole line.
The Russians didn't say anything.
And then the son of a bitch reported it.
The Russians, the priest said the Russians didn't know what to say to it because it was so outlandish, so he said nothing.
And he reported his talk to Moscow.
So this guy... Well, he was fired right then.
The presidential appointees.
No.
He's up with John Finney in the New York Times.
He's a ruthless peacemaker.
I mean, he is.
He is really bad.
Going over and talking to the Russians while our negotiations are going on.
Of course, he speaks full Russian.
He gives the Russians back on his wife's Russian.
He gives them our fallback.
And he tells them what arguments to use against us.
Why is that?
You've got a problem there.
You know, there's one name that I would, in your administration, I haven't even mentioned this to Henry, one fellow you ought to get involved some way, I don't know where he should be, is C. Corp. Brown.
Do you know his background?
C.A.B.
C. Corp. Brown, of course, taught aeronautical engineering at MIT.
He's head of C.A.B.
He has been negotiating with and discussing things with the Russians for the last 25 years.
He speaks fluent Russian.
He's an expert on weapons systems.
And he knows about it.
What could he do after that?
I know, but I want somebody that licenses the Department of Bureaucracy, because that will screw us all.
He's a hardliner.
He's tough.
He's been dealing with the Russians, Mr. President, for 25 years.
of that disarmament has sent the talk of all.
Well, you don't need to worry.
I haven't even talked to Henry, but I wish you'd look at him.
I don't.
But on negotiations, it seems to me that with his experience with Russia, speaks it fluently, and he's dealt with them.
He has been a consultant to various industries dealing with the problems of aviation.
He's one of the world's top commercial aviation experts.
And he is extremely competent and bright now.
You ought to look at him.
He also probably understands conventional weapons and so forth, which is very important.
He's an engineer.
He's hard as nail.
Maybe he doesn't have to negotiate it.
Go ahead and take your follow-up, sir.
He sure does.
Mr. President, my idea on this is not to use the head of ACT-IS, the chief ambassador, to go sheer.
They are just—you see, I would get a— Do you agree with that?
Completely.
We were going to recommend to the President that the envy of our negotiations be set up.
But also assault.
Assault in the same way.
I don't think we ought to have the head of ACTA doing the damn thing.
I don't want ACTA knowing about it.
I don't want them knowing.
Listen, you can't have somebody who is free to honor a disarmament, negotiating a mutual disarmament.
That's the limitation of our... Mr. President, one other thing while we're on this.
It's really bad.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff didn't do their homework.
It's sad.
I grilled them up there.
You can read the record.
They didn't even know it was in the agreement.
And the representative of the Air Force is the joint chiefs.
Ryan couldn't answer.
Ryan is the chief of staff.
He didn't know, Henry.
I was so embarrassed that if it hadn't been in closed session, I was embarrassed to be in America.
I asked this guy, and he just fumbled around.
He didn't know anything.
You know, you were raising hell about our going to the Capitol APS.
The president was willing to stick with the two sides we had.
We were the last ones to hold on.
He saw it.
He saw it unanimously.
Well, you know what they did.
The Chiefs came in with things, and the Capitol Knights said, I want to defend Washington.
The House will get loaded at any place.
But what did we do with State?
I know.
And the Chiefs.
The Chiefs were the leaders of the Chiefs.
Yeah.
And, Mr. President, all they were doing was to try to get their own special weapons systems to do anything for that person.
I have a good man in mind, by the way, who's a friend of General Hayes, Ed Romney, who's been doing the .
No, he's Army.
This is going to be better.
Let me tell you, he's a lieutenant general.
He's now in shape, working for good pastors.
Let me tell you about it.
Here's what he ought to be, the guy to take, what's the fellow's name?
The Air Force man.
Air Force man.
He's now a lieutenant general.
I think it ought to be upgraded to a four-star spot.
Let me tell you about this fellow.
He graduated at Johns Hopkins at 19th.
graduated then from the Air Force, the West Point, Ed Rowney, R-O-W-N-Y.
He developed the Air Force.
Then he got his double master's from Yale in engineering, got a degree in engineering and in political science.
Then he got his Ph.D.
Oh, well, he is.
He's a brilliant guy, and he's a great friend of General Hayden.
You asked me about him.
I know Rowdy very well.
You know him.
He's a scholar, Mr. President, and he's been a poor commander.
He's outstanding.
He's hard-line.
Oh, he's brilliant.
You see, what we have to do is we've got to have the Chiefs be more hard-line than I am.
I'm hard-line.
It's all what you see.
I know.
The point is, I have everybody else.
Everybody else.
We've got the State Department.
We've got Acton.
We've got, frankly, the CIA, the whole band, not just offline.
And the Chiefs are supposed to be the anchor.
We sent in that damn little blinky.
I was the one who was fighting against them in Washington.
I was hammered for it.
You know, you remember.
But what the straw that broke the camel's back was when the Chiefs made this move in that direction.
Well, Mr. President, I just feel that
That part of it's got to be built up then.
And U.S. General Haig was president.
And they're great friends.
Could I ask you to do something else?
Yes, sir.
On a private basis, would you pass to Henry the names of people and actors that are bastards?
Oh, I have to... We have a visual list.
I've got it.
Okay.
I tend to go with the science of the place.
They're totally disloyal to you, Mr. President.
They wouldn't be loyal to any president.
They'd be loyal only to their ideology, you know.
Their God.
But the main thing is we want you to know we just... We have to take certain conversations.
But it doesn't hurt to think.
It helps us to have you...
I'll work with Henry if that's all right.
Just pull us over here.
And we can come back here.
Do you understand?
Right.
I'll work with Henry.
We've got another problem on, and I know with your talks going on with the Russian trade and otherwise, you don't want to get screwed up now.
Here are two options.
One is I have an amendment on Soviet Jewry.
Yes, sir.
But it's an amendment to a bill that will be taken up in the next session.
And I'm getting co-sponsors on it, which will be punished but not acted upon.
It will be a signal to the Russians what will happen if it will strengthen your hand if they don't do something about this exit problem.
Now, the other alternative is this.
Humphrey and Chavez and McGovern have got a sense of the Senate resolution, which the Jewish community is violently opposed to because it doesn't mean anything.
It won't mean anything to the Jewish community, and it will screw you up.
Because it will...
The scoops would not pass in this session.
If you had a couple of times, we wouldn't have gotten it for six months.
But here's the signal to the Russians that they know I've got one third of the money, and we're working with the Russians on this.
I know.
It's going to be helpful.
It's going to work.
If you put them on the spot, the back of the corner, they don't get the action.
Well, if we could get some signals up there without your teeth and signs.
You get involved in that.
I know.
With you and Scott.
Yeah, they were just fine.
You're the Scott one.
I know.
You got the bad guys.
What's
Yeah, he's the problem.
But the government is using this.
And I told Scott, I said, look, you're going to fall right into a political trap here.
And he's going to go to the Senate resolution.
It should be the worst of both worlds.
The advantage of groups of growth.
Don't vote on it.
Don't vote on it.
It's a signal, and it's tougher than a sentence.
It's a tough Russian vote.
They didn't say much.
They said, if I eat more, you would get a majority vote.
I tell you what, this is what's going to happen when it comes up here.
You better, why not work this out, and we will withhold it.
Okay, sir.
Thank you.