Nixon, Kissinger & Sanchez on Vietnam War and US-Soviet Relations

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You know, Mr. President, I thought last night when we, not when we, but when you write the history of your presidency, no one knows how it's up.

Most of these things were done, for example, last night.

We settled, there's a, I didn't bother you with it, there's a full power declaration on Berlin about the admission.

It wasn't freezing.

It was totally, absolutely, completely screwed up

We worked it out.

We worked out the theory to go with it.

That is, we have an agreed text now.

State is going to present one version.

The Russians present another version.

And we will present the... State of love.

The agreed... Oh, he is doing it.

He called again.

He's sending you cases of what kind.

He's sending you to us and why.

And I ask you to be sure, though, don't...

If you take that, get it to me.

Right.

It's not a secret service.

It's a choice.

It's not going to be a big deal, but we have that settled.

Then we have the European Security Conference and the Force Reduction Conference essentially settled.

They're going to give us their agenda for the meeting to work it out ahead of time.

So...

Let me ask you this.

Were you able to get across the... Well, I spent about an hour with him on the train.

And I was sitting about 11.

You know, they're terribly time-consuming on business.

They're not much for a local life.

I'm glad they are.

I'm so delighted.

And Gromyko, really, you know, he's a great bro.

Well, the thing is, you notice how when he's ever saving, he picks up every nuance and repeats the phrases.

He's as precise as he can possibly be.

Very careful, as you say, when he's out of a program.

No, if you had a secretary like him, you know, who doesn't, who's selfish, like in basic, doesn't push himself.

Maybe he just doesn't have a job.

On Vietnam, we were able to get across the fact that we were able to leave.

I just don't want them to leave.

I just feel it's very important that we ourselves not think defensively or negatively or anything.

Maybe there's a weekend problem.

They know more.

I said to him, when I was there in April, the president gave me, basically, my job was to convey to the secretary-general

seriousness in which we viewed it.

Or maybe I didn't do it as well as I should have.

The Jewish director said again, there could be no doubt.

He said, oh no, we got this one.

I said, no, I'm having you again.

The president just called me.

This is not only our last offer.

After that, we have no other route to go except a military outcome.

We don't want it, but we will do it.

He said, they tell us they're going to get

I said, Mr. Foreign Minister, can you imagine an army that wins without capturing a single city?

And then I went through some of the details of the negotiations just to show them how un-businesslike their approach is.

I said, look, when you and we negotiate, we have a text from which we operate.

And you put in a sentence, we put in a sentence, we then agree.

These fellows give us a new text.

every other week so that we'd never have a basis for a settlement.

Well, he agreed with that.

Then I told him, I said, I have come to this view after thinking it over.

What they're asking of us is that we'll pull out our forces in, say, two months.

That we agree to change the Constitution.

That we have these committees or whatever it is all over the country.

and on top of it, to get rid of the president.

Now that's a hell of a thing.

I don't think there's something non-communist can stand.

There's some introduction of communists into every town, plus having the backbone that our soldiers, that our advisors provide me, plus having our air force pulled up, plus having the Constitution changed.

So I frankly think we need you to manage this for us.

And if they're not willing to...

If he wants to resign after six months, that's a different...

But I think, Mr. President, for your position, if you end this war by dropping him down the chute, it will be just too hard for us.

For you, us.

But Kumiko really...

He went into great detail this morning to bring it, sending a message today, telling them under all circumstances not to turn it down immediately.

But that helps us too.

If we can keep these talks going through the election, what the hell is McGovern going to say?

In fact, the idiot is making another mistake.

For him to make his speech now, in the middle of our negotiations, is a disaster for him.

Because we have a guy who's making a major speech on Vietnam that way.

We cannot use him or that would screw it all up at first.

have seen him.

They're putting on this pious cloak of morality.

But I didn't notice from the press that they aren't there, that they should be pointing out.

They pick on the largest.

He came up to me at the Israeli concert and he said, after the election, you and I will restore normal relations.

I said, we have no relations to restore.

Oh, he's been vicious to me, but I've always been disgraceful to the country and outrageous to you.

I mean, after all, to put it mildly, there is a chance that you'll be president for four more years.

That's putting it mildly.

It's a near certainty.

And for him to attack you in this way is the most difficult thing.

Agnew had to say this, the whole press.

I believe they are vicious.

It's a bastard.

No one has been more generous than his opponents.

Not after this election.

No, but before.

If you've shown one weakness, it's that you've been too gentle.

It's certainly not that you've been too divisive.

We shall see now.

can't do it, I have determined that this, as far as media are concerned, our funds, Congress are concerned, that being generous and fair is contributed by them to science.

Because they are not generous and fair.

They're only a little sick.

And to do it is to cut the goddamn show.

Take it to Adel, sir.

Now, you had him on the plan.

But I didn't agree.

I was damn busy.

I didn't want to go either.

That's right.

I took up this case with the Russians on Tokyo to see whether they had any remedy.

So what does he do?

He has two articles on the water game now.

This week he has an article on me.

Well, me and Rajas, but it's got a big crappy thing in it.

Me and Rajas, me and Carly, me and Richard.

Why didn't you ask?

Oh, because basically...

I heard you're kidding around.

pandering to his friends.

He knows better.

His friends.

Joe doesn't do this.

Joe called me yesterday.

I told Joe yesterday that I have reluctantly concluded that I can no longer have any social contact with his brother because as long as he writes like this, I want to be able to say I never see him.

Well, he was mortified.

I

He said he's sick.

I said, well, I like him very much, but I can no longer have anything to do with him.

Oh, right.

You know, I'd call him on the phone.

Let me tell you what.

These lefties, the thing to do is, frankly, to crucify him.

The lefty steward is like Joe, but he doesn't have the strength of character.

Social, social.

I mean, the way the social life operates in this house, you know, you've got Tom Brayton, Kay Graham, and all these guys.

And all these guys.

And you'll never hear anything else.

But I think that the Russians are going to get that message to Vietnam.

But, Henry, you couldn't be more right.

I'm due tomorrow morning at 9.30.

What are your plans for the next couple of days?

I'll be here.

I'm leaving Saturday morning.

What about you?

I'm going tonight.

I'm going about 7 o'clock.

I'm meeting at 8.30.

And there will be two subjects he could have in that message.

One,

Vietnam, the other, maybe they're giving me an account of their talk with the Japanese.

They've specifically requested me.

Whatever it is, I will quote exactly what you said it to me clearly.

Never.

Never do.

Nor do I think annoying women by the moment.

I don't know.

I thought you said it is a current prospect.

So be it.

We are going

I hope you've had the other part of the decision.

I don't know what would fit into that purchase.

Taking a brutal line on Vietnam.

We've not been brutal on Vietnam.

We're going to be.

I mean brutal.

Goddamn it.

We can talk about whether Bob splashes over and hits.

We prefer not.

We've got to end this goddamn war.

The Jews are going to be huge too.

I think we should move them up a bit anyway while they're reflecting on this so that they see what's coming.

How far are they going?

Oh, no, they only go to the 18th.

We should move them up to the 19th.

But all the passes are...

I think we should hit the pass area.

All right, we should do that.

Yeah.

Let's get going.

Because I know there's ground action.

That may be the goddamn video.

I think also, Mr. President, if the war effort settled right after, I mean, really within two days, we should shake up the command out there.

The Asian air command.

We've got to do that anyway.

We've got to avoid the temporarism and inefficiency.

Temporarism.

This was 100, etc.

Inefficiency.

You've got to get something.

Everyone keeps asking me what I'm going to do.

I never take a position because I want to leave it up to you.

I don't want any comment now because you should have complete freedom of action.

But I just wanted you to know that the only reason I don't comment is to give you a chance to do what you want.

I don't know exactly what I want to do.

The best thing to do is to play a no comment.

But that's what I'm doing.

But I want you to understand.

It's not psychological warfare on my side.

I just feel it would be inappropriate.

Well, it's what they're all doing.

They're running around all the time.

Exactly.

No, I think you have heard the right to do what you want.

Well, I agree we can't go along with weakness, we can't go along with deficiency, we can't go along with this sort of weakness and deficiency.

They're all equally better.

Absolutely.

And I think if McGovern really does make Vietnam an issue, and if we don't bring it to a point, I would be, if you think it would help you, be prepared to go very quickly

go on television and do whatever is necessary.

Before the election.

We have a chance.

I do not exclude, mad as it may seem, that around the 20th you may be able to announce an agreement.

In principle, not every last detail.

But that would include prisoners, ceasefire, everything.

The details would have to be worked out.

It would go into effect.

Get those certain Jews moving on.

You've got to do something in order of magnitude.

deal with it has to be.

Now, what I'm tentatively playing with, Mr. President, I don't know how you, whether you can have any objection, but maybe I should take Hank with me on Sunday.

You seem a little reluctant simply to have an adult with me.

My staff is good at this.

The only problem I can say is if you take him, I would always be saying to him, you build up

But I'm thinking of it.

I think it's good to have a good, strong man with you.

Particularly as he's been in Saigon.

Then, if we get a big breakthrough, I'll send Hank back here.

He can brief you.

I might go on to Saigon.

And I might even go from Saigon to Hanoi, get it wrapped up and come here.

Now, I don't want to raise expectations with you.

If I go to Saigon, it will be within an eighth of being said.

I won't go otherwise.

Well, I'm afraid the days we are dealing with...

But it's a hell of a...

I told Gromitko, I said, well, maybe after I cut the next meeting, he said, it would be a very somber decision for them to take, and I don't think they'll take it.

I do determine that there will be a three-day meeting.

The way we will handle it is Sunday morning.

The secret will announce that I'm meeting with them, and that my return will be announced when it has been decided upon.

That way it's clear that it will be at least a two-day meeting.

The life of the meeting will be announced once it's decided upon.

Yes, exactly.

I'd say the life of the meeting will be decided upon.

But he could say it's probably going to be more than one day.

And then it can go one of two ways, Mr. Clifford.

It can either go that we agree enough to justify a trip to Saigon and Hanoi, or else I could come back here, work out another position with you, then go to Saigon and back to Paris that way and get it settled there.

They don't deserve to win.

They've lost, sir.

They've lost.

Okay.

But those meetings, with these guns, I go out this morning with a mask on the phone.

That's all you put on when you learn all this from me, though.

Of course, you'll have to dig ourselves out of this contest in the field.

that we are cooperating together.

Mr. Andrews.

Nixon, Kissinger & Sanchez on Vietnam War and US-Soviet Relations

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on October 3, 1972

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