Conversation 793-010

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Well, how are you?

Good to see you again.

Very kind of you to give me some of your precious time.

Well, every time I come to Thailand, you give me some of your precious time.

I always remember when I was in the office, the conversations we had.

You're fine.

Here's the matter.

You're building up to be in the government someday.

It's true.

You had the same job you had.

It's 52 to 57.

That's right.

52 to 57.

That's a long time ago.

Yeah, and it's funny.

20 years ago, you came here, so that's a long time ago.

That's right.

Well, I must say, a lot of, a lot of things have happened since then.

I heard the first little lie.

He visits Thailand as vice president.

He was there first in the 60s, and I came there quite often, and then finally 69 again.

And I hope someday to go again.

You will always be welcome.

I will.

to demonstrate the strength of this alliance and so forth.

But it's not the other side here.

It's making statements for the effect, you know, about the force in Thailand and so forth for the purpose of only getting the prisoners back.

I think your government said exactly the right thing at the moment.

They will all be invited to leave.

The purpose of our presence in Thailand is related, certainly, to Vietnam.

But it's there primarily, and it can only be justified by the people of Thailand and Thailand as part of our defense commitment under a treaty.

That's the way I see it.

And no self-directed people could possibly look at it any other way.

And that's why I want to reinforce my commitment to our alliance, recognizing the problems we have in the rest of the country.

And we believe we will have the support of the Congress after we get past the election and all of Hollywood's women in the election.

I've been under the gun down there for many years with the Citigroup.

And now you have increased the importance of being on the war lines down here.

The future of being, of actually approaching the companies and with the insurance that we, and on our part, can keep up with this.

Thank you very much.

We have also considered that we have this tree obligation.

That's why we have no hesitation in having your make of our .

to be able to taste the contribution of the war and also give you the facilities that you needed.

And of course, the conclusion of the war on a proper basis is very much in your interest as well as ours.

I mean, to get them out of the way there, provided that we can also take some of the pressure off of the office in Cambodia.

Yes, but these are the things, Mr President, that I have watched for a long time.

We discussed these things and he told me that if there's a possibility of a meeting, he realized we're very busy, many kids are.

I should see that we would like to know the progress of his negotiations.

And the other thing is that

The security of Laos and Cambodia must necessarily be given to the situation.

And if it involves us in any way or concerns us, we would like to be consulted a bit.

If it concerns us, we have some concerns about that.

and how to settle it and so forth.

Yeah.

Well, let me say this.

Let me just give you an overview of where the negotiations stand.

There's been a lot of talk.

The parties, as you might imagine, are still far apart.

The difference now from what it was, for your private information, and I can pass it on to the Prime Minister, the difference is that for the first time since these talks began in 1968, for the first time, the North Vietnamese seem to have an incentive or something.

The point is that they have not yet indicated that that incentive is strong enough for them to make the kind of offer that we could possibly agree to, and the kind of an offer that the South Vietnamese could possibly accept, because we realize that that is the wrong tune.

Now, in our overall discussions, we always try in Southeast Asia

We do not see, you could start a conservative group and say, well, all that America cares about is our, they're all of our own forces and our POWs and no one will cease fire and so forth and so on.

We do not look at it that way.

We look at it in terms of the ability of the South Vietnamese to survive independently and the abolition of communist government by force.

And also we realize that they cannot do that unless Cambodia and Laos have some better opportunity to survive without these invading forces from North Vietnam present in their country and constantly harassing them.

So that's why we talk about, as the military side of it, we always try, North Vietnamese, South Vietnam,

South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, that these are called.

Now, insofar as you would have a vital interest in anything that was worked out here, I can tell you that there is nothing, in my view, that first, that there's nothing been even discussed, if you can't say anything, on our side, that you would not totally approve of.

When we get down, and if we do, and we hope sometimes to do it, my own candid opinion, frankly, is not before the election.

They ought to.

They only have two brains.

The judges need to realize that their bargaining position after this election, which Vietnam is going to be an issue, is going to be a lot weaker than it is now.

Because Vietnam is an issue as it will be and has been in business, especially with the election.

Right?

But any that, we don't have .

The other part that I think is that they do not see it this way.

I do not anticipate that they will see the wisdom of making the settlement now, which they really ought to do.

Now, if

And on our part, I also want to assure you, as I said in the press conference yesterday, under no circumstances is this a scenario that I anticipate.

Under no circumstances is there going to be an agreement for that.

So what we come down to is that there could come a time, there could come a time, particularly because they are suffering from a terror event.

The Mayan bombing has been adversely affected.

The South Vietnamese have fought well.

They have demonstrated on the ground they can hold their own while we give them some air power assistance.

So they've got their problems.

The Soviet Union and the Chinese are not giving them the encouragement they used to give them.

The Soviet Union and the Chinese, each for different reasons, despite the public statements they make, really would like to get this over with because they realize it irritates them and their continued relationships with us.

While we each have a lose for each other, they, for various reasons, have to play games with us and others in the area.

So all these factors would argue for

And at some time, shall we say in the near future, how they're a future, God only knows, maybe three months, I would say not before the election at this point, I'm very careful.

If they see clearly that their bargaining position is going to be worse after the election, they ought to settle down.

But they don't.

three months, four months, five months, six months.

Because the game will be different then.

If they don't settle now, after the election, we will not feel the restraints that we feel now.

And when that comes, I want you to know that we are very aware of the fact that the interests of Thailand, being neighbors that you are to several countries and areas,

Your interests will not only have in mind, but you will also consult me upon settlement.

When we get to that point, you should leave.

Because you're going to want to know how the thing is going to come out.

And we have that very much in mind.

But it has not yet reached the point where we agree on anything that we can lay on the table and say, look, we're going to present this.

Except that I can't tell you that.

Every offer we have made to date on the military side, we have tied.

We have tied withdrawal from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam together.

A ceasefire, and all three have been tied together.

That's been our proposition.

We have not acquired from them.

This is the thing which we are very much concerned with.

I remember 1954, they had a meeting in Geneva, and when France was pressed to come to some agreement within a certain date, which he admitted himself, they had to turn the clock back until midnight, and allow certain communists to stay in Laos, to put themselves in the two provinces next to communist China and Vietnam.

That is proof of quite...

We had a meeting with the Asian foreign ministers, which I can't remember.

Singapore, Malaysia, and ourselves.

of Indonesia told me that privately that maybe a slip of the tongue, you know, through the North Vietnamese, who are represented in Jakarta, told me that we are suffering a bit.

We are suffering a great deal.

We must do something to help the settlement.

That's what he said.

So we may propose something.

a four points which we thought was equitable.

We had to withdraw the prisoner of war and also the truce between the two countries.

The prisoner would go to the third country, and the political settlement would be settled, and all the forces should be returned to their respective countries.

That was the first vows in Cambodia.

But they haven't come to a favorable reaction to it.

This is our first contact with them.

Very, very thoughtful.

Very, very sophisticated.

They invited our attendance team to China to spend a hundred bucks.

And I said, he was an economist, an economist, together with the team.

And they made fun to see George Lai.

They invited the team to spend another seven days as guests with the Chinese government.

And then at the reception, at dinner, George Lai attended.

It seems to me they have gone out of their way to be nice to the side.

We haven't yet evaluated what is behind their minds.

But yesterday, in our conversation, it seemed to be against the Russians.

They didn't mention the United States forces in Taiwan.

They didn't say much about

In our country, they said that they probably mentioned Cambodia.

No, they didn't mention it.

They're very .

That's all the other areas.

They never, we talked to them.

They didn't say anything about Thailand to us.

They had no harsh words at all.

We talked to them.

Yes.

They also say that your new forces in our country was for the purpose of Vietnam War.

And after that, there will be no need to be there.

It's not, I said, well, that's between the United States and Thailand.

I think it's very likely that, I mean,

Yes, but that is our problem.

Your problem, I mean, is to the extent, it's up to you, but to the extent that you think that some sort of presence is there, we would have to see.

We would have to see how an excitation of hostilities can happen.

But I hope that we will have to look that up.

That's right, absolutely, absolutely.

It's something that's, we don't want anybody in the forces present where people don't want them to happen.

But we also are going to be driven out by silly ideas.

I think one of the reasons we stay here, and we try to analyze the rest of the process, I think the presence of a big number, a large number of Chinese in our country,

And we have treated them very, very, uh, very, uh, very friendly.

You brought them right in.

We have been able to assimilate Chinese, but, uh, through the, uh, wisdom of our, of our forefathers.

Right.

We never allowed Chinese schools.

We never had diplomatic relations with them.

We have treated them very, very, uh, ably.

That's probably why they respect you.

Sure.

They don't respect weakness.

I mean, they respect character, strength, dignity, and I think they respect you very much.

There are two other things that I should not ask you to discuss with me.

Probably it would take too long.

I want to see your position with Taiwan.

Because we are in exactly the same position.

Our position is going to remain the same.

It's a very difficult one.

We seem to be very much on a man-heavy boot.

But we feel that we will maintain it.

We have diplomatic relations.

We will maintain it.

And we're going to have to be in this tight wire of normalizing the PRC.

But not great relations with Taiwan.

I'm not going to lie.

The DRC will not be possible totally, therefore.

But this is a position at this point and for the foreseeable future.

Hoping, of course, and no one knows what can happen, that as between the forces involved in Taiwan and Maine, that some, some,

But at the present time, I must say, I have no good answer except to say that we cannot accede to the demands of some, that we should just let Taiwan go down the drain because of our interests, which we do have with the ERC.

Let me also say this.

We're here.

We're at least together.

PRC's interest in us is not about Taiwan.

We found that that was very low .

I don't know how much they did with you.

They have to.

They went through all the motions.

And on Vietnam, they said the right things.

Vietnam, Taiwan.

Taiwan's a part of China, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

They started getting our horses out and so forth and so on.

They said, well, that's a part of a matter of time, historical process, and so on.

Not that they didn't.

The principle they made clear, the timing was something else.

The PRC's interest in the United States is about a much bigger fish than South Vietnam or Taiwan.

whether they are justified in the use of the Jews or not, they do feel that way.

They see more divisions lined up against them than they see lined up against Western Europe.

And they have a very, very long memory about what happened since 1959, and they probably go over some of those things with you.

Not the Russians today, and not the Russians this year.

Their second concern, interestingly enough, is about India.

Now, they won't say much about India, because they have contempt for the Indians as a military power, and perhaps as a people.

But their concern is that India, with Russian help, practically gobbled up Pakistan, which was their friend.

And they see India, with Russian help, becoming a part of a grand encirclement of Russia.

Here's India now, quote, and India's got a 500 million people.

Maybe you would buy India longer than that, but India with Russia is quite a potential.

And I think it's still there despite the fact that they had this, the upon Japan, it's about Japan.

Both Japan and PRC, I think, made this arrangement for reasons of historical necessity.

I mean, you can't have the third most productive nation in the world, Japan,

And those five of those nations sitting there as neighbors and not having economic contact, essentially political contact, and all that sort of thing.

Oh, Japan would be at a heavy price in one respect, because Taiwan is a better customer there than Japan.

But Japan concerns them for other reasons than India does.

As distinguished from the Indians, for whom they have contempt, the Japanese they have respect.

because they know they're able people, and also they respect them because of their enormous economic potential.

And looking down the road, while Japan, we now, you and I know, has constitutional ambitions regarding developing a military force, the Chinese, remember, the Japanese have fought them on several occasions, and they know that in the modern world, an economic potential is the first necessary step before you have a military potential.

So here they sit.

China sits there, surrounded.

Russia, whom they consider now an enemy on the one side.

India on the south, also a potential enemy.

One they can handle, but it's there for Russian help.

Japan, in the future, if Japan should align with Russia, it would be quite a problem.

What is left?

Here's the United States in the middle.

And from Japan, we're down India.

So look at the United States.

We're the ones they should hate the most because of our differences in the philosophies we fought also in Korea.

But on the other hand, they realize that U.S. interests are not going to be served by any policy of attempting to encircle China.

of the great powers that surround them, with all the falsehood that the United States has, interestingly enough, they do not believe that the United States is embarking on a policy of conquest or domination in that part of the world.

And that is the reason, in my view, I'm not putting words in their mouth, and I'm going to say it one more time, they determine, for their ends,

that they should have a different relationship with the U.S. because they did not want to be surrounded by enemies or potential enemies.

Now, of course, it's already paid some dividends to the Japanese-China detente, to a lesser area, the Korea detente, that is beginning to develop.

Oh, that's still a long way up.

Another thing is, for them, what's in it for them is that, in fact, they have this relationship with the United States.

gives them somewhat of a feeling of security against the enormous threat that they think that the Soviets will transfer.

Now, the other side of this coin, of course, is our relations with the Soviet.

We're playing it very even-handed.

We're not, and the worst thing that we can do, you know, you're a long experience and all that.

I don't know the ambassador so long.

When we talk, we talk about him.

I know he's a great economic expert now, but I know he's one of the great diplomats.

So we talk about the, what I can say is that if you look at the Soviet Union,

So we proceeded with our environment agreement, and we're going to have a trade agreement probably, and we've got a science agreement, a space agreement, and more important, an arms agreement.

Now what is all this thing?

Why?

Why is the Soviet doing it?

They have various reasons too.

I won't try to judge what their reasons are, except certainly, certainly,

The Soviet, as they looked down the road 25 years, would not like to see the world in which the United States, China, and Japan were in a frantic relationship compared to the Soviet.

Also, I think they naturally have their interests, their designs, and so forth.

Also, they have a concern that we have about the escalating arms race and what can we do about it.

So we have an issue with things that we talk about.

So we work toward reducing the burden of arms, or at least something that

We talk also about better relationships.

Naturally, in the Mideast, our interests come in conflict, and there's always a chance of that spreading into something that is near as wild.

And the same is true in Europe.

We've already worked out the Berlin Agreement.

So in my view, what is happening here in the world

It is not a case which some people will say that the United States is sitting down, the President of the United States is sitting down with Joe and I, and also Trump, and deciding whether we're going to decide what's the future of the Pacific.

Not true.

Or the President of the United States is sitting down with Russia, and deciding whether we're going to decide the future of Europe.

Not true.

Each for its own selfish interests, ours are selfish too, is attempting to build a kind of world, a balance, which will be safer,

We're going to have a lot more animals than the Soviet Union, as they make their moves on Romania, on Poland, and others that fear them more than even the Europeans do, or the Western Europeans.

We have our influence there.

And they want their part.

They get a lot of it.

Because what do they want?

They want the world's most populous nation and the world's most prosperous nation.

and, say, cooperation against them, potentially.

They can't do that.

So our policy will continue to be to play these.

Now, where do you come in?

I think the tie is better than most of the countries have.

You've got new leaders.

I mean, the South Koreans, I mean, well, it's an old country.

They haven't had much experience in self-government.

They just haven't gotten to the mission.

I must say, if you get down to Malaysia, Singapore, Liman, he was a very, very sophisticated fellow.

He understands these things very well.

But in Cambodia, the leader, Laos, Cambodians think of Cambodia as Laos, Laos, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

Your people, you, your leaders, I've always thought of them as very, because you lived in it so long.

That's how you survived.

You lived in it as a government.

policy, as well as the Soviet policy, is really hoping to use this.

If we stand in total isolation, PRC, we will have no influence on that.

Our only influence will be the threat that the event they do something, we might move.

But that threat becomes less and less credible after the United States has been through Korea and then been through Vietnam.

It becomes less credible.

They must still say, that's why I will not cut the Navy, and I will not cut the Air Force, because they've got to have these professional forces to be there just to say, now look here, you fool around, we're going to move, and we will.

But it becomes less credible than it was because they were, yeah.

But we feel that if we, with China's, China, of course, may not, let's face it, they may have the Chinese on time, and it wouldn't be surprising that certainly the balance of Southeast Asia

Absolutely.

And certainly, I would say they'd like to have more influence over Japan, Korea, and the rest.

But, above all else, they've got to make their survival.

And their survival will depend upon whether they are able to hold off somebody who holds the ring against their big brother, the Soviet.

Now, who do they have the charm to do it?

In whose interest is it?

It's us.

And in that story, we, I think, by having this new relationship with the PRC, putting that subject always foremost before them, I think we, thereby, can have an ameliorating effect on what otherwise would be a policy, inevitably, of expansion.

like a blocker that has stopped everything around it.

I know that under no illusions.

I know that when you've got a Chinese, when you've got Chinese influence on the overseas communities, when you've got the ability, when you've got their history and the rest.

If I were sitting in Thailand or Indonesia, I should have mentioned Indonesia.

It's obviously important to all this.

And the rest, I'd be a little concerned, somewhat concerned about what our charges, eventual desires, and so forth.

I think that the new relationship with the U.S. has with China, I would never have done this except for this, because you know I'm connected to three nations of Asia.

That's where it lies.

I would never have done this except that I felt that over the long haul, I think the short haul, doing nothing, the PRC would have been fine.

Worked for five years, maybe, or ten.

But over the long haul, looking to the time, the PRC is going to be a significant movement of power.

Now, to make the focus of the US at a time they needed us, we moved.

And then we can influence that, perhaps, in a more turning-inward policy rather than turning-outward policy.

Now, that's basically the philosophy that I have to talk these things publicly, but I find it to be very welcome to pass it on to the University of Rhode Island.

I'm grateful to you, Mr. Benson.

It is comforting to realize that you do take interest in this whole affair, and particularly in Asia.

From the outside, they seem to think that the United States is about to pull out.

This is the thinking.

Let me say, there's one other thing that's part of this policy.

Now, that's nonsense.

I noticed he's following the government.

He said he'd padlock all the bases.

Pacific.

Well, now that's the silliest thing I've ever heard of.

What's going to happen to Japan?

If the United States gives up its treaty commitment with Japan, Japan, with its enormous industrial power, with its schizophrenic attitude toward power, with the frustration of having lost the war, is either going to make a deal with the Russians, who are the only ones powerful enough to make a deal with, or they're going to rearm, and either way it's bad.

So that would be bad.

But beyond that,

Asia has demonstrated that it can do better than the communist Asia.

I believe that the Japanese, the Koreans, the Taiwanese, the Filipinos, even with their current problems, the Indonesians, of course, even though they've had to come from pretty bad states, it's got horrible problems.

They're fighting the Chinese, the Thais, the Southeast Asians, and so forth.

And then we're all over Germany, so

But my point is that the survival of free Asia is uppermost in my mind.

Uppermost in my mind.

America, just as the survival of free Europe is uppermost in my mind.

We will do nothing with the Russians.

We will do nothing with the Chinese, which will in any way impair that survival.

Now, that is why we cannot unilaterally withdraw our forces in Europe.

I will never do that unilaterally.

You hear Hunter talk like that.

That would be something.

If we do, the whole thing will unravel.

All of that, if the Europeans and the Warsaw Pact people agree that there's some sort of reduction, we can both make it.

We will make it.

But that is yet to be seen.

I've got to see a formula that I will prove.

Now, in Asia, a continued U.S. presence in Asia, adamant to keep our commitments, is essential.

And let me say another thing.

I've talked about this Chinese game.

But you put yourself in the position of Joe and I constantly talking against the old age.

The others are wrong.

After all, they took the Long March.

After all, they are Chinese.

After all, they're very proud.

They are Chinese.

Now, they'll say we're only interested in talking about problems in turn.

We have no desire for designs and expansion and all that sort of thing.

But great peoples inevitably expand.

Inevitably.

at this stage in their development.

I mean, it's still a very young country as a government.

Now, looking at this situation, it seems to me that the only way this policy toward PRC is going to work is if the United States maintains its presence on the perimeter of the mainland of China.

If we maintain that presence, we will command their respect.

It will be worth talking to.

If we withdraw, why should they talk to us?

We're too far away.

There's another reason there that this is very important to them.

I think, again, there's a big Russian brother up there.

What do they want?

Do they want 40 or 50 Russian divisions on one thing and a few Americans at Fort McNair?

So you see, even though the Chinese will say in their public statements that consumption

The United States should get out of Asia, should get out of Japan, should break its treaty commitments, get out of Thailand, and not help Indonesia, and so forth and so on.

I don't think deep down they really want that.

And we're not going to get out.

We're going to stay.

That's why the Texas Doctrine is basically one that is not a way to get out, but a way to stay in, a way to work, to help the country so that they can help themselves.

But there has to be some American presence in position.

That's my philosophy.

We try to believe that the Chinese also wish the United States forces will remain in Europe.

That's for Russia.

And also... You think that we remain in Europe?

That means the Russians have two fronts.

You've got your mind.

And also...

They don't mind keeping forces in Asia.

The only thing they would

I want these two new forces to be taken out of Taiwan.

That's the prestige of Taiwan.

That's a very important thing.

That's one that we just aren't going to do.

We just can't talk about it.

You understand that it's difficult, you know, the problems.

But we had it out there.

Our team in the K is very skillfully written.

It means one thing, but that's one thing.

But we're going to keep it.

On that one, we...

We should not jump into it.

We need to be very careful.

We could count on you.

I mean, you could count on us to provide a little bit more of that.

And I, uh, uh, need, uh, people, sir.

Yes, so that way, uh,

I'd like to say we're the ambassador

Wait, wait, before you go to the factory, we've got to press about your .

There's a no name on it, so you're not taking sides in our election.

There it is.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Thank you, Secretary.

Good luck to you.

I will, uh, I will want to send an ambassador.

I think it's time for a change.

I think the adult president falls in line, but I, what I would like to do is send an ambassador who is facing very close to me for a little bit harder confidence that he could talk to me.

Uh, I will have, probably, probably have a contact made with you.

I think we should make it.

I don't know what's going on with the

I was thinking, I'm actually thinking

What would be a good idea here?

I have found some of our best ambassadors who basically go there with their loyalty straight to the president, will do what they want, fool around with bureaucracy.

So I don't think bureaucracy is always bad, because that's the way it sometimes is.

I'm sending, for example, Admiral Rivera, the former commander of the 6th Fleet, to stay because we have some military cadets there that are very important.

Another hand that I have considered, this is the greatest of greatest economies, I don't want to underline what we've got at the present time, is the command we just left as the commander of our, and one of the most revered men in our whole country, we just left as the commander of the Brazilian fleet, McCain.

I don't know what you think of him.

He has a great feeling for Thailand.

But if you have any views about it, I haven't made a decision on it.

He doesn't even want to think about it.

But I was thinking.

that having a man who knows the area, who also has some understanding of the military situation, but of course he would be tired of me coming there as an admiral, coming there as an ambassador, if I were to select him, that that could give some additional assurance about what the ties are, about what our ties in Thailand are about.

That's right, he was good, bad, or he would be acceptable, but he wouldn't be.

If he would be acceptable, I'm talking about him, but he has such a regal, he's a tiger, you know, he doesn't have all the social niceties, but he's such a deep believer.

I mean, very close to me.

I thought, I want somebody in Thailand that is very close to me, you see.

Yes.

But he would be acceptable.

It would not concern you that he had a military background.

No, no, no.

That would be fine.

He would certainly be acceptable, I'm sure.

But I'd just talk to him, not let him know.

Right.

If you would.

And then pass that through a private channel to, if you don't send it through the president, let us know through.

I don't want your ambassador here to just talk a lot because you know.

And that's all I need to know.

Who?

Yeah, if you could get two guests here.

But I don't want your ambassador here.

I mean, just so.

Yes.

What you suggested in our private conversation would be acceptable.

That's all I need.

Send that kind of a message.

I can do that.

But don't send it through our agency.

I don't want that.

But then I don't tend to do it until after the election, actually.

But I don't want to put somebody in the straw who will tell me what the situation really is.

When you see some of the problems Jeremy's seen go there, right out there in the forces,

Well, we'll do our best.

I think we've been such good friends that I'm most grateful.

I just love to come there, my wife and I.

We've sent all our friends.

Well, my best due to all that, and also to His Majesty, and to the Queen, and to the great royal family.

In my hopes, I feel the affection that we can have.

I can say that the troops, the double troops in Thailand now, which is more than any country in Asia,

More than three of them, right?

Do they hate?

I was there before and they saw my misbehavior.

People are people.

You can't.

Nobody's perfect.

Not even senators.

Well, here we go this way.

That's the doors.

That's the way you used to go.

been made into a private office for some other reason.

I thought this room was live.

Did you have it there?

No.

Oh, it's the same size.

It's the same size.

It's been redecorated now in white.

It takes a little bit of these curtains are put in for color.

Take care of yourself.

Thank you.

You take care of yourself.

Good to see you.