Nixon, Kissinger & Hogness on People's Republic of China and Medical exchange

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Mr. President, Dr. Pognes and Dr. Wu, Dr. Pognes, excuse me, Dr. Wu, and then you get over this area here so the press can take the photographs.

How many are there? 13.

given the .

When they finish, we can have our little talk.

Unless you want to go up there?

No, I have so many meetings, Mr. President, today.

I have to go.

You see, I'll be at Camp David through tomorrow night, and you have to leave when the .

So we better leave today.

I'll be at Camp David.

This is Dr. .

Oh, yes.

That's right.

That was great.

Very friendly.

Oh, yes.

Thank you.

Is that wide enough for you?

We feel very safe with all the doctors.

Hey, don't be too close.

Hold it.

He's the operator of Congress.

Very successful.

Oh, well.

Her birthday was yesterday, 13th.

Thank you.

We are very happy to welcome all of you in this delegation on your visit to the United States.

exchanges of scientific and medical personnel from the People's Republic of China and the United States of America.

As we found in our discussions when I was in Beijing, this was an area in which we had total agreement that we could work together

to find the causes and the cures for the diseases which afflict all mankind, wherever they live, whatever the government may be.

We feel that our doctors can learn from you, and we hope that we have some information

I know that on one occasion, I discussed with one of the distinguished leaders of your country the problem of cancer, where we have a program just begun last year of massive research.

With this disease, as with many others, there is perhaps not one but several answers.

But the main point is that we must see that the best brains of the world are got to bear finding the answer.

And so whatever it is, whether it's in the treatment of disease or the development of proper health facilities, we believe this historic meeting between the top medical personnel of your great country and ours can only benefit all men.

And I can only say that I hope that during my period in this office I shall never have to call on you.

I still have my appendix though.

We are very glad to have the chance to visit the United States.

We are very thankful for your receiving us this morning.

The medical colleagues of the United States have made a very good arrangement for our visit.

So this is just the beginning of the visit, but we have already seen a lot of useful things.

We consider all this will be very helpful to our future work.

How many, could I ask one question, how many women doctors do you have compared to men?

Are women going into medicine?

Great deal.

I want to ask you about your medical experience and your medical experience.

I can't tell you the exact number, but we have a lot of doctors in Hong Kong.

Mr. President, I cannot give you the exaggeration of the population of the women doctors among the doctors.

But anyway, women doctors are quite common.

You consider them as good as the men doctors?

They are better than the men doctors.

That's right.

They run for office.

have a little, a small memento.

The seal of the president is here.

And then, and here is a pin.

This is related.

Now, the seal is also in the flag.

Thank you very much.

I'm sure I will convey the regard to .

This tree.

30 years old.

Very young.

Mr. President, I will tell you, just a few days before our departure in Peking, our Premier Zhou Denlan wants us to convey his regards for Mr. President.

We hope you take good care of him and Chairman Mao.

Keep them all in good health.

Thank you for your concern.

Oh, you're right.

Yes, I can .

And basically, you know, the Chinese are the ones that are bringing this war to a close in a debilitous way.

Can I ask you a question?

Because I think we had problems on it, and it hasn't been worked out.

Yeah, it's being signed today.

It's signed this morning.

Well, but at the time, the thing was all screwed up, and they were wrong.

Who did it, sir?

Who do you think?

Well, I have to say, Mr. President, I'm getting a little bit entranced with Steven.

I had everything worked out, and he's turning it into such a, you know, he's creating more

He's getting us a half a dollar more here and there.

But who basically screwed it up was the Russians.

They suddenly started jacking up.

They got so impatient that they started filling up the price of shipping.

Everybody said... Oh, yes.

Oh, no.

Well, that's what I told Peterson.

He got 50 cents more per tonne.

pissed him off, and I had to settle it on Thursday night when I came back.

When I came home, I had to go and see the president to quiet him down, and then we finally got it settled yesterday because he doesn't help them up for another 50 cents.

My point was that when I make an agreement on your behalf with Bredner, for Christ's sake, I want Bredner to be told that.

Now, on Lent, please, he's got another one of his hot little deals cooking.

But that will be signed on Lent, Mr. President.

Well, that was my worry.

But it's all taken care of.

It's all taken care of.

He's doing a good job, and he's so familiar with the country that he doesn't get to pick pictures.

Well, that's incredible.

He does work hard, and he is smart.

He's very smart, and he did a good job with it.

It's a good agreement, and you'll have the commercial deal on Wednesday.

I don't know when.

Wednesday.

I think we shouldn't hold it, because the following week is going to be a little later on.

So let's go.

Uh, well, coming to the point here, I see.

Uh, you're going to leave Monday morning.

Yes, by 10.30.

By 10?

10.30.

Right, right.

Well, we may have a chance to do that.

Suppose we meet for a picture.

Of course, no one knows I'm going.

Okay, I forgot.

Then it doesn't make any difference.

The main point is, if there's anything to talk about, we can talk in the middle of the morning.

But I couldn't agree more.

I forgot.

We don't want people to know about it.

I'll be around.

But I'll come in for half an hour just to clean up.

I'll die then.

Come on.

Now the thing that I...

See, that's what I...

I had a lot of thinking last night about Q. I sent him out.

At the beginning of it, I had a feeling that he ought to say something right now.

It's about time that he did it.

He has confidence in the President.

But let's wait till I get there.

We are voting him over.

I have instructed Bunker.

And the other one I had in mind is that they were going to go sooner.

I don't think so, Mr. President.

You can't control it.

He ought to go in with me, and that's the first time.

We have sent Funker in with a scary political plan, and with a detail, and with, as we told him.

Absolutely not.

That's just pure speculation.

Pure speculation.

I'll go through it day by day.

Then I want to discuss the Hanoi part of it with you because that's what puts the covering crew on it.

On the 15th, we thought that there'd be a noticeable reduction of farming starting now.

This has been accomplished.

We're cutting the sodas over the north.

Tuesday, I need to make a final pitch.

18th, which is Wednesday, I'll be...

Right.

Then I have about 40

grammatical changes.

On those five changes, I may fall off two or three of them.

There are two that are essential.

Okay.

Munker has received you every day and has kept him softened up so that you cannot say that he has had no preparation.

If you haven't had any reaction from Munker, the main thing Munker's got to go in and say, look,

You've got to press the president.

That's what this is all about, Henry.

You know, I'm a confession.

I fought with him.

But we ought to get, you know, if we are lucky, if the thing works beautifully, either leave Saigon with a smiling few and do a thing.

I mean, the difficulty with that is what I see at the end of it is that that may make whatever we say an announcement in the agreement anti-combatant.

No, because we won't say what's in the agreement.

Well, I hope.

But if they say there isn't a reason, I don't know.

You've got to be very careful about this, too.

I'm going to say it.

I agree with Sandy, by a second.

Oh, I'm going to for example, after you've been in Hanoi and Saigon, everything is settled, you know, and it will leave like crazy.

Not here, but out there.

My guess is that that would make it.

I don't want what I do to look like an election.

I don't want it to look like an election.

In other words, I leave something

Now, the only thing I will say that is not in doubt is the survival of Jews.

The reason, the thing that worries me, Mr. President, is if we leave too much uncertainty in Saigon, it doesn't do us any good.

I mean, in the public opinion, because if there's any, if there's any failure, there might be a coup or a riot.

And if you announce a settlement, one of the things I have to get done

in both Hanoi and Saigon is to get them to stand down military activities until the election, at least, so that they don't start a murderous law delay after the Indian settlement.

All right, go ahead.

Then you go to where?

You go to, assuming everything goes well on Tuesday, you then fly to Saigon.

Are you going to take this Solomon with you?

Yes.

Is he going to be with you and be with you?

Yes.

Would you want to?

I thought so.

For Christ's sake, you're going to let him in on the political side right now?

Can you trust me?

I'm going to take it.

You're going to let Solomon know that we're that far off?

Well, yeah, he's got to know because why else am I going to side him?

I'm going to keep Rajas quiet.

No, we'll tell Rajas there was enough to enable us to go to Dagda.

I won't let him have any communication.

He can't.

He has no communication.

They all go through us.

I think it's better than having these guys slice back our hair.

I agree.

Have them in on the deed.

I want to assure you, Mr. President, there'll be no implication that anything, that it's all settled when I leave.

The only implication... That's not the exception.

That's the exception for the fact that we must not make this look like a political grandstand by me.

Oh, no.

But there'll be no agreement of any kind will be announced until you go on.

The only thing we need in order to avoid a riot is a show of soft, soft, a show of consolation and solidarity.

I agree with you.

Yeah, I understand.

And let me say this.

At this point, if you're willing to vote for Hanoi, vote for Hanoi.

If Hanoi votes, and vote goes public, it will not hurt us in the election.

If he does, it could be perfect.

It won't be as good, but it could hurt very badly.

So that's the whole idea.

We'll pay any price to keep you.

We can pay.

But that's the whole point.

You see, I think if you were charged with having pushed him into a break just so that you could get a settlement before the election, you'd be in trouble.

In fact, I wanted to make the following suggestion, Mr. President.

If he turns in transit,

Before there's a break, then we have to cancel the schedule.

I have to come back from Saigon, meet again with Li Dazhou and Saris, and then we have to flush him after the election.

But we cannot.

I don't think you want a total break if he's going to be flushed.

I don't think he's not going to be done.

Whatever cost needs to be paid, we cannot have any break with you before the election.

So you will agree that if he's absolutely acquitted,

then at an enormous price in Hanoi, I don't want to mislead you, this will be a fantastic price.

I do know what it is.

If you lose the vote, then after the election we'll make it.

Right, but if you lose the vote, and also between now and the election, you could be authorized to go away off the line.

Of course, it takes too much steam out of the kettle.

It'd be a tragedy if it had to go that way.

What else can

No choice.

You've got to get a better choice.

Why?

1920 and the 21st, I was sent in.

Saigon.

I will send, if you go.

Do you know your time?

Yes.

If Saigon goes along with us, I will send Sullivan to Bangkok and Laos to quiet them down and explain to them

where they're going, because they don't, they shouldn't read in the paper that I'm in the North.

And Phnom Penh, or I may have over to Phnom Penh, depending on... You just don't have any idea about your Hanoi land, you know.

That is one thing that's got to be kept absolutely quiet until you get to Saigon.

That's right.

Okay.

I'm getting Habib down from Korea, and sent him back.

They don't have to know about the Hanoi land.

They just have to know about the ceasefire.

Then the morning of the 22nd, I go to Hanoi.

We stop the bombing north of the 20th parallel.

The morning of the 21st, we shove it all over North Vietnam.

The evening of the 21st local time, we announce the end of

We have to announce a suspension of bombing, because otherwise it will leak out anyway, after it's announced that I'm in Hanoi, that we've temporarily suspended the bombing.

It's only four days before you go on.

I don't like that.

I'd rather do it than let it leak.

I'd rather do it.

I'd just act on that.

I wouldn't announce a suspension of bombing.

I said that we wouldn't suspend the bombing.

I'd just do it and then let it catch up with this.

It's much better just to announce it and just say it's done and let our actions speak.

There'd be no bombing.

Fine.

That's entirely it.

October 22nd and 23rd.

You see the bombing things, even though smash too much, and bombing calls, and all that sort of thing.

And it's just something that we had four days of vicious reaction here until we got off.

Of course, we'd show it at the end.

But I'd rather do it and let the Navy and the Army and the Air Force let them leak out.

They're not going to do it.

They'll certainly be out by the end of the day.

Let it be out.

That's fine.

And we'll say, no, we just let it.

We'll locate it.

We're not going to make it public.

If I can do it, then let it leak out.

Confirm it.

Confirm.

I'll do it in this period.

You're there, actually.

I'm not having anything, but just bear with me.

I have no further comment.

OK.

I'll let you know.

We'll locate it.

But there can't be any stories, because we had promised them that there'd be no resumption of bombing unless the agreement failed.

I agree.

That promise is absolute.

But it doesn't have to be made public.

Then I am there on the 22nd and 23rd.

On the 24th, I come back to psychiatrist for a couple of hours, come right back here, report to you.

You're on television on the night of the 23rd.

And the ceasefire goes into effect at 26 at noon here, which is midnight there.

Let's talk about the problems here.

I understand.

Now, let me... Well, first I have a hell of a negotiation with Swan Street because there's going to be a pitch, and it may get unstrung there.

That's right.

But assuming that gets done... Let me say what the weakness in this plan is, in my judgment.

The weakness in this plan

is that the Hanoi trip is putting us in an extreme time zone.

Now, this has advantages and disadvantages.

The advantage is it puts them under absolute obligation to settle on Tuesday.

They just can't go through the weeks of nitpicking, which they do.

They won't be in Hanoi.

Second, it puts the same

in Saigon, and also in the whole context, into a dramatic, brings it to a dramatic end.

Thirdly, and this is the most important part, it gives us an opportunity to tell their tough leadership what is expected in Laos and Cambodia in a way that is tough for them to convey.

And fourthly, and even more importantly, it enables us to lay the basis for the relationship just as the trip to Peking did.

That is, if Jew takes a drawing, if Jew plays it smart, if Jew sees me off and receives me back with signs of approbation, then he, in fact, is strengthened by this.

But it requires his cooperation to a maximum.

And it puts us in the timeline, which I already mentioned.

We are pretty much committed to it, so the only way we can get off it is in one of two ways.

One is if the 17th leads to a failure.

Or if you defend, in which case, I completely agree with you, I've got to come back from Saigon, I mustn't push on to Hanoi.

Although it's our position.

Although we pay some unpredictable price for that.

because I saw from the state comments, for example, that literally the only comments I've ever had were, except for one point, which is a good one, which I've communicated to the International Commission.

It's unimportant in the total context, but it makes it look a little better.

All the rest are word changes that improve the grammar, but who the hell gives a damn?

So we've got a good agreement, and when I talk to the news,

when I hear what they expect and when I know what's going to come out.

Of course, I can't guarantee you.

In fact, I would expect Hanoi to leak out part of the political thing.

Otherwise, the shock would be too great for its population.

But we've experienced it a hundred times, Mr. President, until you speak.

It just doesn't have any standing.

But Hanoi...

How do you go to an ISR?

You take our plane?

Yes.

Have you told them that?

Yes.

I don't think so.

They don't have the power, do they?

Of course not.

That's symbolism.

All right.

Well, I can take a small plane.

Oh, right.

They haven't been able to find the power units, or maybe out of contact.

But the thing is, basically, I don't go to Hanoi unless it's done.

Tell me, what is the, getting back to the points, what are the essential elements?

You want me to get it?

I'll get it.

Nixon, Kissinger & Hogness on People's Republic of China and Medical exchange

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Also recorded on October 14, 1972

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