Conversation 799-023

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Turn to the right of us.

Now, I'll give you time.

Now, you sit here.

call that just came in that I had made to talk to Holden.

Holden's a girl, sir.

I don't know.

I stepped out.

I'll be back.

I'll be back in an hour.

We're in Manhattan, Hawkswood.

Goodbye.

I thought that in addition to the person who was willing to do a assignment, I would suggest that

uh, would be, perhaps useful to discuss the situation that you need to provide with in the event that, uh, Henry goes on there to Vietnam.

You will know probably by the end of the day tomorrow, right?

I think you'll know early, early in the afternoon tomorrow, because you'll be in session at about 7, 5 o'clock that time, and you'll know where Henry's going and where he is.

I think so, sir.

Yeah, so more insurances there or... Yeah, supervisory group.

I mean, they'll have every other place, and they'll be good.

That, that international evidence could help you to put out, you know, to put together things.

Would you, uh, if you had a chance to analyze this, you know, as to, uh, the question is, do you think you can help someone, would you?

Good conscience, that's the real one.

Oh, yes.

I don't have any trouble with my conscience.

It is the right thing to do.

I have that.

See, we've been out a long time in this war.

A lot of guys have died.

We have the POWs and all the rest, and the conscience, the...

But at this time, it's the right thing.

I mean, and besides, in terms of, as I've told Henry before, in terms of political effect, we just don't really give a damn.

Because the war could go on for a long time.

There's no problem there, as far as we're concerned.

The pressure's maybe on them, however, to do it better now than they would later.

Who knows?

Or it could be the other way around.

But just on the merits, that's really what I'm interested in.

We're all interested in it.

After all of this sacrifice and the rest of it, would you consider it something we can get?

Roughly what Henry's outlined.

Have you been on that field?

And have you watched it for so long that you feel that it's something we should do?

Because obviously,

We're in a position to put a considerable amount of, shall we say, convincing on two, but we can't do it unless we think it's in its best interest.

I mean, not only his, but the interest of what he and all of us have been fighting for out there.

No, I think that...

I think it's time to make this further step.

After all, this is...

In rough terms, it's been a long process.

In the beginning, they really didn't have any military forces.

They didn't have the tradition of it.

They didn't have the training of it.

They didn't have the government of Vietnamese leadership.

They lacked a whole lot of other things.

They really didn't have a government.

I'm not talking about one like ours, but they didn't have an effective government for their own people.

Well, time has gone on and they've developed really quite a substantial military force with a lot of substance to it.

They've got a government.

It doesn't always work in the ways that all Americans would agree with.

But it is a government, and it's done a lot for the country.

A lot of it, of course, is our health, especially money.

And so I think that this is the

This is another step in that process.

I also think that the North Head Mesa really has been my favorite for a couple of years.

But the North Head Mesa, or Hanoi's project, has suffered more than we've

ever dared to claim, because they left their political structure in the South for the whole business.

I think you have a severe manpower problem, and I think these things have been working on it.

Now, if the, if the Vietnamese had made them, not made, that's not the right word, if the Vietnamese could see this person too, this, this person, as the opportunity that, that they needed.

And, you know, it's not all bad, us leaving Vietnam.

We don't, it's like trying to mix water and oil, really.

It takes a lot of doing to, whether it trusts you or not, but you're still mixing water and oil.

You can have all the respect, I don't worry about that part, but it's just different.

They said they'd be here for an enormous amount of time.

That's right.

Probably.

And so I think, and I have to admit too, that as far as I'm personally concerned, my thought has been for three or four years

that it should never end with our military there.

Somehow we could do that, at least for some period of time in Europe, because they're not too, culturally they're not too different from us.

And there's a way to work it, the legal system.

You go to a sulfide and you've got a process.

And our lawyers can work with our lawyers and it's not too hard to work a thing out.

But out there, a long-term thing like that, I felt we always—let me tell you what my personal feeling about the thing from the start.

So, I have to tell you Mr. President, it seems to me that

uh that now is the time for the step uh i don't know i i don't have any way of evaluating the role of moscow or the chinese i'm really not ready to that so i i mean you know not any with any real appreciation for it so that's not uh what i'm talking about and uh

I really don't have any great feeling about the political situation here and so that's not what I'm talking about.

I just think that this is the logical step and I think that

The way this seems to be working, where we'll be able to continue to provide replacement equipment and with DOL.

See, over a year ago when we had to look at the possibility of, you know, in realistic sense of a more difficult solution, that was pretty hard to see.

How was the EOL going to be solved?

And how was ammunition going to be solved?

Even if you went to the desperate circumstances, they could just keep fixing their equipment there as best they could.

How would you solve those other things?

So I think they're going to have to do a lot.

Whereas the Jew is going to have to create himself his leadership and never do it unless he's forced to do it.

Well, it makes sense.

Yeah, but most people don't do things unless they face it.

Well, I think it will help.

I think it will help.

That's right.

But in saying that, I'm not saying it is disgusting.

You know what I mean?

That's not what I'm talking about.

That's right, when they have to cut the mustard, then they have to take the steps.

So, I certainly can go there and address these problems with Ambassador Bunker.

You're going to have discussions with him first and then descend down the other wall.

The other point we have to bear in mind, of course, you know, the part in these military matters which haven't been worked out and looked at.

There is a question as to whether the North's

Our agreement on the political future is one that we can accept.

We've made some progress on that, but that's still a major thing we're going to have to hack around in tomorrow.

But it seems to me that one condition that I've laid down is that there

The one condition is that there cannot be a coalition government.

Now, with that ballpark, the South Vietnamese government can survive.

And, of course, Chief New Orleans is going to have to be a general, too.

That's the key point that I want you to see.

He has a New York term.

He's going to leave it.

He has to.

That's what I have in mind.

And if, let us suppose, we don't know that we can, suppose we can achieve that, suppose we get them to agree to let two say, let's have it up here with the government and negotiate with regard to what ends up with regard to the, if he stays in the state, what would you agree to talk about, what would you agree to talk about, I suppose, the ceasefire in place.

Yes.

And then, well, they've got to work together.

They've got to work on that right now.

Now, that's the best we can hope for.

Where we get that remains to be seen.

But it seemed to me, just thinking out loud, that if he could get that, he's clever enough that he could handle that situation, if nothing is forced from him.

And so, because at the present time, he's in command of a

of a good army, of a very substantial army.

The B.C.

are certainly in one hell of a shape.

Of course, one of the really tough problems we have is this situation regarding the 40,000 B.C.

as a prison.

He can't turn all those people loose.

That's a condition they insist on that we're attempting to.

That's one we're going to have to hack around a lot tomorrow.

But if you can't have those loose, you might have probably back to 10,000 to 15,000.

It's a cross-seat category.

Yeah, the point is whether or not the North can agree to that.

That's going to be a tough issue tomorrow.

I think that's the toughest one he's done.

And two.

Yes.

Three, two, two and a half.

Yes.

And they may kick up the traces a little bit on some of these supergrations that I was preaching about.

I'm not concerned about that.

But the superration thing, just talking candidly here, is all much crap.

And by, I mean, let's face it, neither one of them is going to do the best you can, make it sound as good as possible, you know what I mean, and that sort of thing.

But just remember, neither one is going to abide by it.

The main thing is the fact who has the power in place and achieves government, and his military establishment is sound and strong, he'll survive.

It doesn't always supervise reagents.

It's the word.

We're not going to assure it's surviving.

And over what you've written up is that I think you've got to make it a nice fight word.

Of course, it's different than a lot of fine language and all that sort of thing.

We aren't going to invite people to really die for this word or that word or whether or not this group or that group is unsupervised or this country or that country.

The main thing is that the real question here, which you addressed yourself to, is the important one, is whether this is that law or not.

We really do stop to think what we've done.

Their great offensive has been stopped.

They've taken a tremendous amount of losses out.

They've already taken a great deal of loss.

The mining is choked.

It hasn't stopped, but it's choked.

The bombing has got to have knocked out a lot of ambassadors.

Not permanently, but it gives them that.

And I think actually that's the reason they're talking.

They're hurting.

They're hurting very bad.

This is the first time I've gathered from my analysis of the situation that I've had.

I have not been optimistic about the fact that they ever talk.

I think there are three factors that are making them talk.

One, hanging over it, is the terror that our election will take place.

And then we will have no restraints.

And they're absolutely right.

They will have none.

So that's why I say, on that side,

waits till after the election and we have to go another way.

And they are so bad so far.

The other thing is the Chinese and the Russians.

The Chinese and the Russians give them lip service and some help.

But the Chinese and the Russians both have other fish to fry with us.

And I think, at this point, are not encouraging them

They are, on the other hand, encouraging them to negotiate.

Right?

The third factor that is bringing them on is the fact that they have fought an awful war.

They have taken a beating, and they are beginning to hurt very, very badly as a result of what is happening.

That's the way I see it.

Now, when those things are all put together, that then adds up to a time when the forces of settlement that are running in favor of settlement are great,

If you know, of course, the study of warfare, those times come.

And sometimes it results in some, if they're missed, then it just drags on and on and on for some more.

That is why this is one of those times when, and that's the only thing the election has to do with it.

The election, to them, it's a worry.

So let it worry and get the best view of your camp now.

Recognize that afterwards, who knows what the situation will be.

It could be better.

It could be.

But at this time, I think their movement, and there has been a very significant movement in what they've been going through in the region, is due to their problem.

We don't know what's running through their minds.

My guess is that these are the factors that are affecting them.

So they go down a long road.

The road isn't very long, either.

Do you have any other views on that based on your long seances of where you and Sleeper were at that time?

Well, I guess that was Sleeper.

I do think... Well, it's been nine hours the last you've had me.

I think your wife's in trouble with you because of the psychoneuric situation, which you guys are down harder now than you can.

non-stop area under, he's going to get goosey about a cease-fire in place until that situation gets a little better.

I just have a feeling that Dan, whatever, had a political thing, a political thing he wants to have, and he can clearly see that his future is preserved and in control of his government and his army.

And if he can feel it, if he can present it in a way that doesn't look like he's a U.S. student on the side,

just as his discussions with me with Adam about never being betrayed as a tool or something that we have decided here in Washington.

We wouldn't be there if we hadn't spoken to him about it about four years.

These are real psychological considerations that he's got to wrestle with, and I think he's going to need a little bit of time, maybe a little more than we would like to have.

But that's a whole different going out to see it.

It's going to be real fuzzy for a while.

Well, as far as time is concerned, it's very likely not to make up for the time that we could have.

It could grow very big.

But on the other hand, he's got to look down the road, too, doesn't he?

Well, he's got to recognize that the cameras weren't very large.

We can continue and win his war for him, but we can't win our own.

Because after all, our efforts and his not.

They go in different directions.

You take the POWs.

Kelly didn't give a damn about them.

I'm sure he cares, but we do.

And at the present time, so we can continue the war, and grind it down some more, and try to make the borrowers deal with money.

And perhaps after the election, we can do it for six months or more or so.

But then they come to their end.

We just can't continue indefinitely.

The problem is he takes a lot of time to explain it.

His leadership is concerned it will weaken his position within his own country.

If he takes time, he could make this into a plus for it.

Hell of a blessing.

He ought to take it as his own.

He said, I waited and I finally got the kind of deal that we can all live with.

And he stepped up to us.

That's what we don't get the wisdom to say.

That's what he said.

And that's why he's given every chance with regard to ours, standing with him.

And the people who are listening here, maybe you understand my personal sense.

Well, it's probably a good job to bring him around to think that way, because right now, he is a little paranoid.

He goes to the 68 syndrome, and before, back to the 53 syndrome, and he told me that Jim Fallon was murdered, not just because the United States colluded with what was done, but more importantly, because his generals thought he was determined to soft on communism, and that he was negotiating it.

And that's the way he views it.

So I think it's about an off-the-top doing here, and together, immediately.

And there's a point we still have to go to.

If he steps past, for example, the election, and everybody may win, that's the problem.

That's the problem.

It's known that every service is true.

He was bad.

He was a problem.

Problems in our field, of course, if they come through wrong.

Anywhere near what we have now laid down as our final conditions.

And then he says, hell no.

And then they put that out.

We have a hell of a... No go.

No go.

Because though the American people are going to fight and die for two, they will.

If we have an apartment which provides for a non-communist South Vietnam, it's going to be a very, very difficult operation for us to justify staying there, Senator, because he says, well... With these assistants and everything else as part of this, they're not just assistants.

They're assistants.

They're all replacements.

Economic assistants, replacements.

And that replacement's going to be very generously done.

And you're, of course, you're loading the stuff in right now, which is good.

So we're going to keep doing it on hand.

So, uh, well, the thing I think that, uh, I, uh, I would say that in this instance that, uh, your position was quite different from the time you were there.

I think that you and Bunker, knowing the man, of course, playing with subtleties and sensitivities and everything, but you've got to remember that his own interest is, if this comes up with the minimum conditions I insisted upon, it's going to be bad.

his turning that down would not be in his interest, it would be in the interest of the government of Vietnam.

Second thing is that means that you really, to the extent that you can, be effective in this respect, there have got to be strong advocates.

Advocates that now look here, this is the way it is, and it's time to do this, and so forth.

This is really not a time to be here.

Well, here the point of Malibu is very well taken, too.

We have a problem here.

The North Vietnamese for the first time are negotiating what is called good faith, to the extent that any of those countries have good faith.

But by that I mean they are trying to find a settlement.

And they have made very significant concessions now.

If that gets out, and he blocks the settlement, then he'll be through for sure.

How?

Because we would then have to flush him.

That wouldn't be good for him.

It wouldn't be good for us either.

Because there's nobody else there to run the place.

That's right.

He's the man.

And so this is our problem.

I think we're in a position, and what I agree to get down to, is I think that you and Bunker can, in very good conscience, make this over.

And if we do come to the hard place, we have to lead him, convince him, tell him everything that's necessary.

It's a lot different than when you were there.

Well, it's a matter of what is going to be presented to him.

If we get what we want, it's going to be very different.

So that's what he presented to him.

One thing was, he was out.

His sentence was, you know.

And the law of terror came to his room.

And also, the political department was one that was a lot different.

That's why I said to Henry today, I said, it must not in fact or appearance be a coalition effort.

And if we can get that now, he then will accept it.

Huh?

I think so, because if everything comes in arms, then we have a hell of a time here.

I'm sure it'll be Alaska, Tokyo, and in the cycle that's the shortest.

Well, we should know that as well.

Now, where Thieu has us in the show here, of course, is that we do not want a public blow-up with him.

We have two problems.

We don't want a public dispute.

There aren't Vietnamese going public.

That could hurt us.

We don't want a public blow-up with Thieu right now.

That could hurt us.

So it's a question, really, of laying this out.

But what I hear you say is this, and I have studied it.

I ask you for your opinion.

We made some awfully tough close calls there.

Christ of Canberra, we had hand-lobs in May 8 and all the rest.

We stood up to hundreds of thousands of demonstrators.

We fought the whole establishment here in this country.

And we defended him.

And as we run from a popularity poll in the United States today, it's about 12%.

On the other hand, if you say you want to oppose a communist government in South Vietnam, it's overwhelmingly against it.

That's what the issue has to be.

People don't want to end this war without some honor.

But the point that I make is, now that we've come this far with him, he's got to recognize that we have studied the situation and reached the conclusion that this isn't his best interest.

The best interest is South Vietnam and the rest.

And that he's got a judgment, but we've got a judgment.

And we're allies.

And we will continue to be allies.

And for him to just say, well, don't go.

This is not, this is going to be very seriously eroding whatever position he has here in his office.

I'm very serious about this.

I would fail him.

Because we would have to go on for elections.

So we just wish he were here.

That's the rule.

That's my way to go.

All right.

Let's see.

How do you like your office over there today?

You think you'll be all right?

Well, we want the Army to do better than the Army football team.

That's what I mean.

But the main point is that the Army is taking a hell of a battle and much of it won't fare.

And your job is to do everything you can to restore its morale and its pride and everything like that.

That's a good reason.

I know they're a bunch of great people.

And I'm going to let these bastards kick around the area.

It's not going to be done.

But you've got to slow down.

You've got to sit down and tell them.

that they'd be proud of, rather than the way that Americans say, now why are we bombing these civilians?

Don't you agree, Malcolm?

Well, there's no question about that.

Hey, we're lucky.

If they got to my best student, hello, and I'm going to say bye.