Conversation 803-009

TapeTape 803StartWednesday, October 18, 1972 at 11:45 AMEndWednesday, October 18, 1972 at 11:59 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.;  Sanchez, ManoloRecording deviceOval Office

On October 18, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:45 am and 11:59 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 803-009 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 803-9

Date: October 18, 1972
Time: 11:45 am - 11:59 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

        Vietnam negotiations
            -Haig's meeting
                -William P. Rogers, U. Alexis Johnson

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 11:45 am.

        Refreshments

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 11:59 am.

        Vietnam negotiations
            -Haig’s meeting with Rogers
            -The President's October 18, 1972 meeting with Masayoshi Ohira
            -Military situation
                     -Melvin R. Laird
                     -Call from [Adm. Thomas H. Moorer] to Haig
                          -Frederick C. Weyand
                     -Bombing targeting problem
                          -Population centers
            -North Vietnamese statements

                              (rev. Nov-03)

        -Cambodia, Laos
             -Henry A. Kissinger
    -Articles Seven and Eight
    -Article Seven
        -Military reinforcements and resupply
             -North Vietnamese prisoners of war [POWs] in South Vietnam
                 -Nguyen Van Thieu
    -Thieu’s position
        -Kissinger
             -Possible meeting with Le Duc Tho
                 -Paris or Vientianne
                 -Thieu support
    -North Vietnam
        -Release of information
             -Canada, Japan
             -Tactics
        -Delay
             -Military forces in the South
             -Thieu
                 -Offensive
    -Cease-fire
        -Washington Star story by Henry S. Bradsher
        -South Vietnam
             -People
             -Thieu's position
    -Thieu’s position
        -Kissinger
        -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
    -Haig’s conversation with Ronald L. Ziegler
    -Rogers

The President's schedule
    -Forthcoming meeting with Nikolai S. Patolichev and Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
        -Rogers
             -Instruction for Haig
                  -Peter G. Peterson
                  -Veto messages
                       -John D. Ehrlichman
                  -Briefing statement
                       -Wheat deal, trade agreement
                           -Peterson
        -US-Soviet Union trade agreement

                              (rev. Nov-03)

            -Poll result
            -Lend-lease agreement settlement
                -The President's conversation with John B. Connally
                -Negotiations
                     -Dobrynin
                          -Haig's role
                -Announcement
            -Rogers
                -Briefing statement
                     -Bilateral relations
                          -Peterson
            -The signing of the agreement
                -State Department
            -The President’s role
            -Rogers’s briefing
            -Previous signings
                -Treaty Rooms
                -Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT]
                     -Moscow
            -Johnson

Vietnam negotiations
    -Rogers, Johnson
        -Politics
    -Haig’s concern
        -Timing, security issues
    -Security issues
    -Thieu
    -North Vietnam
        -Thieu
        -The President's stance
             -Bombing and mining
        -Mining
             -Deactivation
    -Immediate prospects
        -Haig’s view
        -Cease-fire
        -Announcement
             -Tone
    -Timing
        -Type of settlement
             -1972 election

                                        (rev. Nov-03)

             -Immediate prospects
                 -Intelligence
             -Kissinger's schedule
                 -Thieu
                 -Ellsworth F. Bunker, Abrams
             -William H. Sullivan
                 -News report
                      -W[illiam] Averell Harriman
                           -Geneva
             -The President’s May 8, 1972 decision, Laos
             -Timing
                 -1972 election
                      -Thieu
             -Abrams's possible conversation with Thieu
                 -Haig's conversation with Abrams

Haig left at 11:59 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yes, sir.
Yes, I told him there were still two major differences.
But he said, my God, if we get this, we've got total surrender.
And that's Alex Johnson's YouTube.
A little bit, but he started to, and I looked at her every day, and he sort of backed off, and he said, well, if we can get together, if we can't, we can't.
So that's the best man he knows.
What is your, uh, about the Japanese we did?
It all came back to somebody.
Yeah, it was a good meeting.
I liked it.
Right.
We told him about it.
Told him about the president.
He said it happens.
He's failing.
So he's been told.
Exactly right.
Now he does that when he feels he's also being told.
Great.
You know, I, uh, of course you're not...
It's an evaluation of the state of play.
I think we're in pretty good shape, sir.
I think as I— First, on the military side, I guess just to be sure, Laird needs no call from me.
No, I call him again this morning after I talk to you.
I was going to ask— And the chairman called back to reassure me that Wyant has—he can't use all he has right now.
They do have a problem with this area in that they're in close to these populated centers, and they have to have a target, or we've got problems.
The way this thing, I think, is going to come out, sir, there are unilateral statements on Cambodia and Laos.
They watered down.
And Henry said they're unacceptable.
So he's put them on notice to that effect.
Then there are Article 7 and 8.
Article 7 dealing with their reinforcements in the South and are resupplying.
He said he has the language that he wants.
from them, but they won't give it to them if they're satisfied with the POW issue in the cap.
So, in effect, all we're really hoping on now is to get Chu to accept some kind of a forthcoming position on this political prisoner.
Then, in effect, as far as the North is concerned, I think we've broken the deadlock.
And that could probably be done very quickly.
So it all goes back to nothing but the Chew problem.
I think if Chew comes through and recognizes what he has and is willing to take it on, that this would mean adding three to four more days, and that Henry will then have to take Chew's comments.
So when he buys, meet one more time with late October.
Now, whether that meeting takes place in Paris or Vientiane, I don't think makes any difference if we have two on board.
If he goes to Vientiane without you on board, in Paris,
Nobody, everybody at Neal's Parish is going to fail.
Yes, sir.
The ante-antelope is just too close to the sea to cause it.
Well, there are things happening.
I don't mind.
There are things happening.
Norway is leaking out.
I hear you.
They leaked out this morning.
There's something down there.
No, well, yeah, yesterday they did that somehow.
Today they put out the word that Friday the 20th is a decisive time.
They gave us the Canadians and the Japanese.
And that they're either going to go for a permanent real ceasefire and peace or a continuation of the current situation.
So they're trying to build an arm line at crisis point.
And I think this three or four day delay or five day delay is ideal because it's slowing their forces in the south off pace and they're having a hell of a time managing it.
Why is it doing it so slow?
These guys only have so much staying power.
They can go about a week, is what I call it.
Oh, actually, just a little bit.
They'll shot their wad.
They'll be starting to fold up.
And two will be on the strong side of that.
There's two of them.
That's right.
Boy, if I were two, I'd be put on the gun.
I don't know if I ever could right now.
They are having a big success in that one area.
Well, in the start of the night, Bradshaw from Saigon says it's just total, everyone's pointing towards a ceasefire.
And we've got a great psychology at work.
He's a bad man from Saigon.
Oh, he is bad.
But they know.
You know, this is kind of the thing where everybody has sensed it, wanted, and it's the same thing.
Well, the people know.
People really are sick of killing them.
God damn it, Hugh can't keep it from them.
No, he himself is going to have problems if this thing goes on too much longer.
They killed 300 of them a week, even right now.
I'll tell you that.
Yes, sir.
God, it's got to stop.
I mean, I know softly, but there comes a point when there isn't any more reason to do it.
I mean, another thing, of course, Hugh's on the spot.
storage supplies that Henry's doing there to work on Pugh.
Pugh cannot appear to be the father of the block this morning.
I think there's a lot of pressure.
But all we have to do is just, I think, just, and I told Ron this morning, just lay it down, keep our cool, and let this thing work itself out.
We're in the driver's seat.
I wondered if you could call Bill Rogers and tell him I don't want to do this in front of Peterson.
But I would appreciate a briefing on that.
First you tell him that I can find something.
I'm working on these video messages.
And I am.
I've been at her for many years.
But I want him to know that when I leave this afternoon, I'm taking it off.
I just don't know what he's going to have to do.
But I would like for him, in the briefing, to prepare a good, strong, positive statement about how good the wheat deal has been and the trade deal, not only economically, which Peter's talked about, but in terms of creating a better climate for peace and progress in other areas.
What I meant is, we have pulled the trade agreement out.
The country is not for it in a positive way.
They're not against it very much.
It ain't much of a winner.
You know, trading with the communists still ain't much of a winner.
Now, you know, I mean, is it $700 billion that ceasefire?
Will that be announced?
Yes, I think $720 million.
I told Cobb that's terrific.
We went down to Iraq.
I had to step into it last night with the brain and it broke.
I forced it.
Why?
It's over $700 million.
It's $720 million.
Will that be announced?
It will be announced.
It's a policy thing.
But, and Rodgers, the more positive things he can say, tell him that the trade agreement, I think he should put it in terms of better relations between the countries, and it also means a great deal to him.
So I'd like for him to get Peterson to talk very, very positively about, you see what I mean?
This is a tremendous step forward in relations between our two countries.
Not only can we trade, but it tears away the progress of our countries.
You're just going to have a meeting here in the office.
The way we're going to do it is he's going to sign for the American State Department.
And they're going to come directly here.
Right.
And I will sit with them.
And the main purpose is to impress them.
Impress them.
And I'll sit and thank them.
And then Roger, the other afterwards, will go out and bring the press.
Excellent.
That gets me in the picture.
But I didn't want to go over, I didn't want to go through that.
You see, I don't want to appear to be exploiting agreements.
We did have a signing after all, and then we had one, and then the other, and so forth, and so I didn't want to cry.
I didn't want to sign and salter him.
This is what we've done.
I signed it.
Now, they have a picture.
I just didn't want to, for me to be, I don't want to burn out some long-winded brain that this is.
Primal, we'll get that all shaped up and get him postured.
So Roger realized that this is really a hell of a deal on the political side.
He left, he left as happy as any.
And Alex Johnson, considering the speculation, do you...
Politically, absolutely.
Totally.
My only concerns are timing and the security system.
But on the other hand... You can still take a risk.
Those people are going to fight as long as they live.
That's right.
Well, we either get two on board or we'll do it right afterwards.
We've got it.
I think we've got it.
And I don't think Hanoi's going to fall off because it's compensation for them and the fact that we split from two if that has to go that way.
Well, compensation for them, too, by getting us out there and we're stopping them off in the mining.
That's a couple of things.
The other one is basically re-electing the president.
demonstrated that he'll bomb the hell out of people in that area.
That's right.
And we will bomb the game to come.
They've had enough.
You wait.
And they're going to those mines, you know.
There's 30 days before anybody can touch them.
That's well into December.
And that's going to be a long, tedious job with our Navy having to do it for them.
That keeps them on their good behavior.
We're just, what we're going to have is a couple of weeks of hell with a lot of killing going on.
And I just want to... We've got to prepare the way for that.
If I say that, if I predict it, it's going to be... You're going to have to be strong in your statement when you announce it.
You're going to see the disease, of course.
In other words, it's somewhat threatening to Hanoi.
And if they don't play the game, we're right back at them.
We will have to take appropriate action.
So that we don't have the millennium yet.
I agree with you that if we did get that, that would go small in four or five days.
So that when the hell starts, you don't have about a two-week or three-week period or two-week period where people say, well, peace my ass, you're killing people every day.
What kind of a deal did we buy here?
We'll bring it up closer.
So that when that fighting starts, people will still be in the aura of what's been done.
And it all happens after the election.
Because there's going to be a bloodbath.
We have to see.
They both have given instructions to each other.
Get out there and clean it up.
All right, intelligence.
But even that is something that
I haven't seen him since the first day of June.
No, no, he hasn't met you yet.
It's now midnight and you'll see him in the morning.
He's met with Bunker and Abrams.
He's met with Bunker and Abrams.
It's amusing to me that some of the big networks
I don't care.
I don't care.
It's enough credit for everybody in this town.
Nobody's going to be fooled about this.
This is May 8th, and Miles and everything you've done can't come out any other way.
I think that could have an effect on, I don't know why, but I think Abrams will step up to this and say no one's here.
We are going to jeopardize the support we have for the best friend in the world.
Yes, sir.
After our session, I went over there and talked to him, and he feels this with his heart.
He gets very strongly it's time to get out.
And that's helpful.
He's not just operating from loyalty.
He believes it.
We'll be here soon.
Good luck, sir.