Conversation 808-013

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I've talked to Ray, he's extensive.

I've talked to Connolly, he's delighted.

Ray just couldn't say enough.

He says he remembers when you sent me out in Malibu, and it worked just as you had always said it would work.

And of course he realizes that it's not a coalition government, a complete back down at the other side.

Well, we're just going to hang on with our left.

And, you know, let me say, I've been thinking, too, that the other side doesn't agree to negotiate before you much.

In a way, it seems better.

Right.

But in the meantime, they are going to have to negotiate in the end, aren't they?

I know, but they're already getting off.

They made a statement today saying they'd be glad to meet me on

And it's then, on November 1st, I want to talk about other things, how to implement these things.

They'd be happy to see me.

It's not they're going to drop that tomorrow.

They have to.

And I'm telling all the newsmen, not next week, but next week after we have another.

Well, Paul, let me see this.

How long do you want to spend on him?

Half an hour.

We've got to sell him tonight.

I told him I'd be great.

Well, I couldn't say to him or Rogers.

Rogers is on Salvo, all right?

Oh, it's on Salvo.

Good.

If you could say Ruth Sullivan, how much do you appreciate?

Oh, they don't appreciate it.

I just want to say, too, that we've got a long, long battle here.

I mean, the government is definitely being interested in all this.

Harris, his energy was full.

He only caught a half a day.

He pulled for two days and four days.

So this isn't a good thing.

His bulge was a 28-point spread in 16.32.

It may not go any higher.

He thinks what has happened to him.

Well, how are you?

I'm fine.

What's up?

Always glad to help you.

Good to see you.

Good to see you as well.

How are you doing?

Good to see you.

Hi, how are you doing?

Good to see you.

Well, we're starting to keep you waiting.

I had a group of people from out of the state.

You will sit here in your usual chair.

Frank has to chair.

He needs to go see me.

All right.

Bill, help me pass through here.

Mr. Sullivan.

Bill Sullivan.

Thank you.

There we go.

I think they need a picture of this here.

Well, if you look closer, you'll see.

Thank you.

Mr. President, first of all, allow me to express my thanks to you for receiving me today, in spite of your busy schedule and of the eve of the elections.

I'm very happy to be here at this crucial juncture in the Notre Dame's matters.

All the efforts devoted to this search for peace

that your government has been engaging in will soon be successful.

You have had a chance to be briefed by Ambassador Sullivan.

What is your evaluation of the tentative agreement as it affects first Laos and second as it affects Vietnam?

You have been informed by Ambassador Sullivan, what is your appreciation of this agreement project in regard to the agreement between the United States and Vietnam?

I find that it is an excellent thing.

But as I said yesterday at the beginning of this war and this morning, Mr. William Rogers, we are happy

that the state of ceasefire, or the penalty of having a war, is not too far away from the war.

Because we believe that the other side takes advantage of this time that separates the states of ceasefire, takes advantage of this advantage to reinforce

I feel that it is an excellent thing that I was telling Dr. Kissinger last night and Secretary Rogers this morning.

We would be very happy if the dates of the ceasefire in Vietnam and in Laos could be closer together.

Because our fear is that the other side will try to take advantage of the lag in order to, in the dates of the ceasefire, in order to bolster the position of the Palais de Laos and increase the military pressure upon us.

It is possible that the war has already started.

Certainly in the beginning.

And this offensive has already begun, obviously with the intent of exerting pressure upon the U.S. troops.

The Palais de l'Or command, which means the North Vietnamese command, has given orders to attack on all fronts.

Ah, yes.

I'm not sure.

The first week of October.

So, we have given instructions to our troops to attack, but it was too hard to start on our side.

Sir, we also gave instructions to our troops to attack in the offensive between about 15 o'clock.

I saw earlier that the Minister of National Defense had exposed our material needs.

I just thought we'll let the Secretary rush and I explain to him our requirements, our needs and defense equipment.

We will need armed soldiers.

We will need to be able to go to the airport.

And we will also need

of scouts, that is to say, armed advocates, and also some anti-Aryan artillery because of the action of the government.

Our reformers consist of helicopter gunships, T-28 bombers, and the Sputniky helicopters, the Nakuta, will throw fire, run its fire machine guns, and also some anti-aircraft guns.

The reason why we are not doing anything is only to protect the antennas of the bombers.

They are more fresh.

So if there is an offensive, as you can see,

If, as we foresee, there is an attack against them, can they be able to protect that city from attacks from the air?

It's just a precautionary move and so much the better if there is no air attack.

If the DCP's fire were to take effect soon, we would not need all this, but we have to be prepared.

How is it going to work out with regard to this?

What's the future of Laos?

You still have this division.

How do you see the future of Laos?

We want to avoid this.

We want to arrive at an implementation of the arrangements that we signed among ourselves.

We have been trained by the government for the current coalitions.

We have maintained the strength of the parties.

We reached agreements in 1961 and in 1962 among ourselves.

Following this, we were able to sever the present coalition government, which has always maintained in this form a tripartite government.

But it's our question.

And it will be here.

But it's our problem.

But it's our choice to don down these agreements.

Oh.

saying that we have to take into account the realities present to solve this problem.

That is to say, that we have to take into account the existence in them of a neutralist force, which would take the place of a neutralist force.

So, I ask you, I beg you,

It assures that the present reality will be taken into account.

In their life, this is acknowledging the presence of a neutralist force on their side, which will take the place of the neutralist element on which I am the leader.

And in fact, everything can be repaired.

For this not to happen, they will maintain the position of opposition.

That is to say that we have left the positions of the ministers of the vacations and we will ask them to give us the place to, together,

So we will do all we can so that this does not happen, and we will maintain our position, which is that the Palais de Laos seats have been left vacant, and we are asking them to resume their seats in the present format of government so that together we can settle the problems as agreed in 61-62.

If they don't respect the General Agreement of 1972-2010, how can they respect the agreements of Zurich and La Peneda?

Because these are the basic agreements of the General Agreement of 1972-2010.

If, as they claim, they respect the 1962 Geneva Accords, then they must abide by the during and the plan of Gérard's agreement, because these agreements were the basis for the 1962 Accords on us.

I think that you can do a lot, Mr. President, in this case, by asking

I believe there is much that you can do, Mr. President, in asking Moscow taking to exert pressure upon the family of Laos so that they will respect these agreements of concern between Laos.

Because we have already seen the solution of the problem of arms on all sides in the Syracuse agreement.

And it is already there.

Because we had thought that we had your only little problem in the Turing agreement and it was back to us at least.

Yes.

Our final solution is to arrive at the general elections after the integration of the officials on the other side in the national administration and the integration of armed forces on the other side in the national army in a proportion that we have achieved

Because then this leads to the final solution, which is general elections, following the integration of their cadres into the national administration cadres, and the integration of their armed forces into the national army, according to proportions which we jointly agreed upon.

So, after a bit of hesitation, from the outside,

on a parallel law for the implementation of the vision of the state.

That's why they proposed this government, not proposing a new one.

There is no such thing as a new one.

Whereas for us, this government already exists and we can't take it.

And at present it seems that the Palais de l'Or wants to follow a course closely paralleling that of the Vietnam talks, as witnesses their recent proposal for a three-component government, which they made a few days ago, whereas from our standpoint such a government is already in being.

But it may be one cycle behind the Vietnam Declaration.

That's my impression.

Who has the most influence on the Chinese and the Russians?

I cannot say there are two camps.

It's just that there are in Andorra the pro-Soviet camps and the pro-Chinese.

It's very difficult to say which faction has the ascendant, has the upper hand.

What I'm trying to get at is this, the settlement of Vietnam, of course, does relate also to

Do you consider it to be your benefit, or do you think that...

The problem in Vietnam is different from the problem in Laos.

The problem in Laos, there has already been an agreement

between the various political parties in 1961-62.

The internal problem was resolved by the agreement between the three parties, the right, the center and the left.

In Towers there already exists an agreement between the different Lao political factions going back to 6162.

The domestic problem has been settled by agreement on the three factions, the right, center and left.

I don't think that the Prime Minister understood the question.

I think what the President was asking is not whether he could follow his model of Vietnam, but whether the settlement about which Ambassador Sullivan agreed to is beneficial to Vietnam.

No, I don't think it's as difficult as Laos.

Certainly.

because it will lead to a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities.

That's what will benefit us.

But we do not want the arrangement to be applied to Laos, because as far as we are concerned, we ask for the application of the agreements that we have signed together.

Of course, if we are going to take advantage of this moment, it will benefit us, that's for sure.

What would be beneficial to Laos is that this would bring a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities.

But we cannot apply this form of settlement to Laos because, in our case, we are asking for the implementation of already, science agreements already existing.

So what will be the detection will be the factor of the settlement of the C-spire and the cessation of hostility.

...provides for putting to effect in 1962, so that's why it's not allowed... ...so that we have a combination of C5 plus the 1962-72.

Plastic remains are disposed of the Slavic order...

If they accept the agreement in 1962, it would be a good thing to respect the other agreements that were used in 1962.

If they accept to abide by the negative decision even for the mouse, it implies that they agree to abide by the prior agreement that were handed in to the Mongols.

So, if they accept to abide by the negative decision even for the mouse, it implies that they agree to abide by the prior agreement that were handed in to the Mongols.

If they accept to abide by the negative decision even for the mouse, it implies that they agree to abide by the prior agreement that were handed in to the Mongols.

But if that is ok, to talk scurrilously about the procession yet again, would not serve us any good.

I think, I talked to Amanda Sullivan about this.

We should shift the discussions that are now going on from the political solution to a ceasefire solution.

And David, in fact, what did all the Vietnamese have committed themselves to do with us?

That's why I said they're one cycle behind, and that's why we only have to see what we will do in our negotiation.

C'est unique et pareil à celle adoptée par Hanoï.

Si, évidemment, vous arrivez à arranger l'affaire avec Hanoï, et si vous arrivez à cesser le feu, le côté à cet âge, c'est ce feu.

C'est ça.

Yes, as I was saying earlier, the other side in Laos, for the cause parallel to Hanoi's cause, if you would have a ceasefire with Hanoi, then the other side in Laos would accept a ceasefire.

See, let me get to Frank's judgment at this point.

Yes.

If Hanoi at the highest level has made a decision that for the time being,

And of course, for the time being, it is for their members to have a pause in their other very adventures in South Vietnam, in Cambodia, and Laos.

That will be often because Laos will

The way I try to judge this, I leave to the experts like Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Sullivan

But in the final analysis, what really counts is what the principal party's motives are, what they consider their interests to be, if their interests, and what they consider

are to comply with an agreement, then it will mean something, either interest or not.

then it will mean something.

Whether they're interested or not, it will mean nothing.

I think that's the key question.

And I also, I feel, too, that at the moment, there is a chance.

We are not certain there is a chance.

North Vietnam may conclude that their interests are best served for a time to pay attention to their own problems.

And North Vietnam can resist in their

expansionist policies against our neighbors.

I will leave a few details to our experts, Kessinger and Amas Nelson, knowing, of course, the importance of these details, knowing you, the fact of the agreements that have not been respected, but what counts above all, as a last resort, is what are the ideas and the motives that enable the main parties in presence, as to the definition of our interests.

If it is in their interest to respect an agreement, they will respect it.

If it is not in their interest to respect this agreement, nothing will go on.

And for the moment, it seems that there is a possibility that the North of Vietnam is willing to, for a while, take more care of the internal problems that it thinks are of its own interest.

to cease to promote its expansionist policy towards its neighbors and to turn towards its internal problems.

We want to let go like that.

But as to... to... to... to... to... to... to... to... to... to...

But as far as trusting in their words, that is a very difficult thing.

Totally.

I have to say, the conviction which I have also felt, that probably holds me from this other place.

I don't have to do well.

How many people, I don't know this, but how many since 1962, how many Laotians have been killed in the war in Laos?

Military and civilian.

We have lost essentially civilians because at one point there was a massacre of refugees.

As far as I know, the refugee is small.

Several thousand refugees were massacred.

There are 600,000 refugees out of the population, less than three million.

And most of those 600,000 have moved at least two or three times.

And the last few years, each time they've moved to the north, they've missed .

Well, I want to say to Frank this year that we have no illusions about the intentions in our communities.

We believe that this agreement is eventually formalized

something only if necessity leads the leaders of North Vietnam to turn away from their foreign adventures.

And it could be that because of the punishment they have taken, their casualties in South Vietnam, the bombing, the mining, et cetera, their casualties in Laos, you can't believe it.

That now leads to the conclusion it could be that this is a time for a pause.

Assuming that that is the correct theory, or correct conclusion, then it means that we must use this time to strengthen the

institutions, those independent countries, so that if the aggression is resumed, you will be strong enough to resist it.

And this is time that we make sure it is done well.

I dare to tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we do not make any illusions about the intentions of the Vietnamese people.

We believe that this agreement, if it ever receives its definitive, formal form, will give us something that, insofar as the necessity leads the leaders of the Vietnamese people to turn away at the moment of their venture abroad,

and perhaps the punishment they would have received, the great losses they suffered in North Vietnam, in the South of Laos and Cambodia, will lead them to the conclusion that they should have taken a pause.

If this conclusion is accurate, this means that we all, in Laos and Cambodia, must use this time to strengthen the institutions of independent countries, so that if the aggression was never done,

Letting apart in this great chess game, of course, will be the big northern neighbors, the Russians and the Chinese.

And again, spinning on a theory, it is possible that each of them, for his own reasons, the Chinese and the Russians, may feel that it's not to their interest

aggression that is emanating from North Vietnam.

What I want the Prime Minister to understand is that I

As I often said to Dr. Kissinger and also to Pastor Sullivan and Secretary Rogers, the Prime Minister is one who is very sophisticated.

He knows his neighbors and he knows his own country very well.

I want to assure him that what we want to bring

And we will make a good faith.

And we want to end this war.

We are under no illusions about the intent of the enemy.

I do not question it.

On the other hand, I do not assume

Their intent is the same as ours.

I think they're going to, if they are doing, if they do enter an agreement, they will do it because their interests will be served at this point by an agreement.

If that is the case, it will serve our interests, too, and yours.

But I mean I.

We must continue on our side, your side, our side.

We must continue to work together to strengthen the institutions and to resist communist aggression.

And we are keeping our efforts entitled to the perception of the interests of the United States.

And we are also continuing our assistance to the government blocks, which are to the extent that Mr. Sullivan can get the Congress to approve them.

What I would like to ask you is, and as I often say, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador to the United States of America, I know that you are a well-known man, you know your neighbors, you know your country.

Nous voulons un accord, certes, et nous le voulons en votre foi, et nous voulons mettre fin à la guerre, mais nous ne faisons aucune illusion quant aux intentions des loups.

Je ne les mets pas en cause, mais je ne suppose pas pour un seul instant que leurs intentions se rappellent de l'État.

If there is an agreement, it is because it will be in our interest to have this agreement and in this measure, it will be in our interest and yours too.

We will continue our task, our work all together to strengthen our institutions and continue our efforts and our assistance to the government of Laos in the measure in which the ambassador-general will get the Congress that he wants.

The Prime Minister will be, of course, talking to other world leaders because the tension is one of the most crossroads in the world where they all meet.

And he will hear that now that the United States is bringing to an end its military involvement in Vietnam, that this means that so the United States will simply

pull out of the whole area.

And this is not true.

Our interest is in preserving independent, free governments in Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

And to the extent that we can be of assistance, we will continue to be of assistance.

We are not going to be shielded from temptation, which is very great in some circles.

I would say, well, after this long and difficult war,

I know that you may be talking to other world leaders because Vietnam is a global capital and you will hear them say that now that the United States is ending its military commitment to Vietnam,

They will simply leave soon, the United States will leave.

This is not true.

We continue to be very interested in maintaining the freedom and independence of the countries of this region, of Laos, as well as of Thailand, of Vietnam, of Cambodia, of South Vietnam, of Indonesia, of Malaysia, of Singapore, of all the countries.

There will be a great temptation.

for the American people to do that, because the issue, as the Prime Minister knows, the American involvement in Vietnam has been quite a problem, in many words.

But to the extent that our leadership can be effective, we are going to try our best to retain

an interest in the area and also to continue our support of the independent governments that have a right in our independent governments.

You're right.

We want all those children to be fine.

I mean, again, to say it's enough.

But, as you know, the American commitment is very unpopular.

But as long as we can remain effective in the best possible way, we will keep an interest in these regions and support independent governments which, in our opinion, have the right to independence.

Mr. President, I am very happy

I have not heard you say that you will not abandon this part of the world.

But, what I would ask you, since the United States, in order to avoid the invasion of China, is not to focus too much on the port of North Vietnam.

In North Vietnam,

There are people in the war who are comparable to the Japanese.

There are Japanese in the war.

You can very well take back the feeling of misfortune, and by the purity of the orange,

The situation on their part, they have been forced to accept their conditions.

So their object is to think that it is possible that in 5 years, in 10 years perhaps, there will be a violent reaction on their part from all the neighbors, from the top, from the bottom, from the bottom.

to modernize a little bit the doors or the doors of the dams in the area for the construction of his country.

I don't know him, but I know very well the people in the area who have, until now, lived on the victory of Lesbeth Fou.

After Lesbeth

France has said many times that Jacques is considered the greatest general in the world and that the army in Vietnam is considered to be the first army in the world.

At such a point that the soviets, at one point, wanted to rely on Vietnam to conquer China.

This was said.

to rely on Vietnam in case of need, not to resist China.

And if they want to resist, I think that the Chinese are aware of this, because it is the construction of the border with Belarus that shows the efforts of these routes, especially to Vietnam.

Mr. President, I'm very happy to hear you say that you will not abandon that part of the world.

But I would like to ask you, since the United States will aid in the reconstruction of Indochina, do not give too much to the North Vietnamese.

The North Vietnamese are hard workers.

They are the Japanese of Indochina.

And there is no doubt that they could overcome their mishaps and moved by an idea of revenge because they have surrendered.

In fact, it is a surrender of their heart, except in your terms.

Their pride is hurt, and in five years or ten years, their mishaps visit their revenge upon their neighbors from Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam.

So temper your offer to North Vietnam.

You come to your effort to rebuild their country.

I speak helplessly, but I know, I know them.

For years they lived on the impetus of the Yankees' full defeat.

after they defeated the French General Jack, considered himself the best general in the world, and that the North Vietnamese army was the first in the world, to such an extent that the Soviets once believed that they should lean upon the North Vietnamese army to face up to the Chinese.

I was told that they should consider that the North Vietnamese would help them face up to China, and I think that the Chinese are aware of this.

which is perhaps why the road being built by the Chinese in northern Laos does not go beyond the Mekong River, but aims primarily at Novi Adnan.

It is a road that goes to the Indian Territory.

Like you said, the sage would be there.

Well, I mean, my ministry would be there.

Many distinguished foreign leaders have come to this office other than distinguished foreign leaders.

I've always found he is one of the most perceptive and one of the most skeptical leaders I've ever met.

The only one, perhaps, who is more skeptical about the intentions of the North Vietnamese is myself.

So we are together.

What we will do, I mean, of course what we must do is put faith.

That's why we're taking our time.

get the agreement bottomed down and then have and then exert our influence as effectively as we can to maintain peace in the area that we will do but we haven't but we are going to do except nothing on faith we are not going to be sentimental or soft-headed about it and we think with that kind of approach that our influence could be constructed

And for their part, they are not going to accept anything of this.

But on their side, they will not accept any trust, they will be very sceptical, and on their side, they will also do the right thing.

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