Conversation 816-003

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Before we get into this, there was one thing I wanted to mention to you, Mr. President, which is that interview by that Italian bitch Bellacci.

I don't know whether you ever saw it.

That woman, I saw her because the Italian ambassador told me she was going to do an article which was a hatchet job on you, and that I, as one of your close collaborators, could straighten it out that she was influential in Italy.

She came in with a thesis.

that, you know, the liberals, and so on and so forth.

And I told her what I had said to a thousand other people, that you worked alone, the tremendous courage it took on your part to make these decisions alone without asking a lot of people, that, uh, that, uh,

almost all of the decisions had been taken by you alone.

I just stated one example of your courage was that you appointed me even though I had not supported you in the primary campaigns and that all you had asked about is what was best for the country.

And the whole purpose of my interview was to build you up.

So that pitch twisted it all around to make it sound as if I was saying

that every time that I said something about you, you twisted it into a framework to make it sound as if I had been building myself up.

I had absolutely no incentive.

For example, that cowboy quote, I've never been on a horse in my life.

I said to the president, can I have a big success?

She said, how is it possible that the president, who's not a figure like Kennedy, can have

That's a success.

I said, you have to remember, Americans like many types.

They like movie stars, and they like the cowboy who rides alone into town, like Gary Cooper at high noon, and against everybody, does what is right.

I was talking about you.

I've never been on a horse in my life, so that's it.

I think my job is to counsel the whole thing, please.

You just can't talk.

No, I will, but I, I have always felt, I don't, did not accept the public abuse that it is going to produce, and has already produced.

There isn't a businessman in town who has ever really said anything.

Let me ask you one thing about the personality of this guy.

I'm not sure why you would have said that.

I'm not going to get into depth on it.

But let me say, once each, to be quite exact, Henry, when you say to be sure that you don't break the spirit of the rest, I'm not so goddamn sure.

I just think that the message has got to get back to you and all these letters and everything else.

And, uh, frankly, it's no good to come face to face.

That's what you've got to do.

Done, done, done, done.

That's what you've got to do.

What is the timetable?

That's just so I can mention it to him.

See, I've given you the timetable that we want to develop.

In other words, I'm going to say one verse.

There's going to be one more meeting.

It's going to be wrapped up this week.

Right.

Fine.

Second.

But then I say, second, that I'm giving the details of the timetable, but we are not going to have the signing.

Around December 22nd.

It's not yet been given to the North.

You're pushing it to the 22nd, are you?

Well, the announcement on the 22nd.

All right, fine.

That's the deadline.

We can't go beyond that.

Okay, I got it.

I just wanted a date in my mind.

Yeah, but they can't track it out until the 22nd.

They've got to give us an answer this weekend.

Oh, the 22nd.

The 22nd.

And that means... Oh, I know.

I know.

The negotiations will be completed by the 7th.

Okay.

All right, all right, all right.

The negotiation will be completed by the end of next week.

We'll have that final television vote to read on.

Well, we don't think we've done it yet, but frankly, if we don't make it next week, Mr. President, it's going to get undone, too.

Sure.

No, I would be brutal.

I would just start out saying, I've been threatened with yours.

I want to maintain your independence.

And if we get this agreement, you can count on my preserving unit then.

But, and then I let him act as the D.D.O.

What does the country think?

It's a bit of a split between you and me.

It should also be pushed by the state of the country.

And, and, it has a practical disadvantage because it is a state of the country.

Yes.

Mr. President, I don't know whether you're aware of this, but in order to prosecute the board, I've talked to Ted Wagner, who you had to ask for a $4.1

Supplemental for the defense budget.

You'll never get that.

If you go on and continue the work, if you continue the work, it is pleasant, pleasant, right?

You have to ask for a 4.1 to 4.5 thousand supplemental.

Now let me ask you this.

What they want written into the agreement is an agreement to withdraw his allergies or they want all troops withdrawn before any agreement is signed.

But they want the agreement to withdraw all troops.

It's an agreement to withdraw.

Yes, impossible.

I just want to know whether they want to, whether they are saying they will agree, they want an agreement to withdraw.

That makes my little picture look better.

On the political side, it's crap, isn't it?

Crap.

Because basically, it has to do with the, well, there's one point I think you will think you have a chance of getting about the DNC.

Maybe you've got to go ahead and get out of that.

Why don't you have this letter then?

Yes, I have this letter that we have here.

But you can't go to the other places.

No, I know, but I was asking you if you wanted to see this letter.

Oh, because they wanted a provision of the DMZ, not only that they will serve the DMZ, but that they won't violate their territory in other places in order to prevent them from coming to Cambodia.

But we take care of Cambodian laws by prohibiting entry into Cambodian law.

I'm not going to let you draw me into this kind of stuff.

You agree to it?

Absolutely.

Not guilty, but it wasn't happening.

He is the next great engineer.

He's a tech.

He's not a very good engineer.

Yes, sir.

The mission of the New York president was to get you to this position.

I'm with you.

Yeah, good.

I had loads to settle in.

I had lunch with...

The North has got problems, too, now.

They've never got somewhere else.

I wouldn't give them, incidentally, that $4.5 billion figure because...

I just didn't know.

If they beat it up.

Oh, I meant that movie.

No, I just want to say that I'm going to throw up all the work that we've done.

I had lunch with Bill Farley.

And, of course, you can have a count on him, but he claims that he's going to write some articles

I'm telling you, you should head in.

This is the best we can get out of it.

Over the agreement that the defense of the movement and redistribution was going on for the 80th, that's the point.

It's just because we can get it.

An agreement doesn't make any difference.

What do they prefer?

Do they want a piece of paper, a better piece of paper, or do they want a better guarantee of U.S. support?

That is the trade relation.

That is the, uh, I've said that before.

I think we should, and then put on a four-hour meeting, and I'm fully in.

We want to knock out this idea of the South Bay of the Peaks that you and I are in.

You know, it's too bad they had to bomb some business again.

That shows you what the war is going to be.

No, no, it's going to be bad.

That is bad.

Well, at least we're hitting something these days, aren't we?

Are they doing any good?

Oh, no, we are going to .

That's what's gotten us to this point.

UMA decision got us here.

Why are the ?

Because they want us to .

I think so.

Okay.

So I think we might be going to back that up off of October 8th.

You see, I will settle on October 8th.

Right.

And then you go ahead and .

Yeah, we should have that on October 8th.

But we can't yield on that one.

Well, that's my point then.

I will settle on October 8th.

Now, we had already got a fellow changing because I better have an idea on the political person to get them to all change up.

I'll get pressers.

Oh, please, I have.

The president was in last night.

We're talking the political presser thing.

If you get that, we get a deal.

He thinks the presser ought to save the embassy, but they do everything else for that.

All right.

Good.

And he's going to invite, if you agree, the presser to us and...

to have lunch with him first.

That would be the first one against the president.

Right.

That's excellent.

Apparently, you know, the North Vietnamese complained to Moscow about their methods of use that are excellent because it said that we'd march just before the time.

Do you remember?

They're bringing the thing.

And all of a sudden, he's got the trust in Armageddon.

Armageddon said, look, this is Armageddon for them to know.

But they've got to get with the political prisoners.

Yes, Your Honor.

They'll all work out there.

And get this son of a bitch thing over with.

They've got to get him over with.

Now, they're dying to get the summit prepared.

And, you know, they want to make that a victory.

The Russians.

He's agreed to come at the end of May.

Don't you think we should announce it after the inauguration?

It's up to you.

Oh, hell yes.

Hell yeah.

Can't wait.

We'll need some good announcements.

What I mean is, everybody knows we're going to have a meeting just hitting the date.

Hello Al, how are you doing?

How are you doing?

Good.

Okay, ready to leave here and go to the Army?

I hate to leave.

How long will you let him go?

I'll just let him stay here with the company.

You know, we're here, we'll set ourselves down where we feel comfortable.

You sit here, and uh...

If you'll sit there.

Two of us.

We don't need a translator, which is good.

Just for us.

We're going to have a picture first, so we will not talk on this.

I spend a lot of time with the guys every evening.

Okay.

Thank you.

Okay.

Thank you.

I'm going to drink this and whether or not I get a cup of tea or a cup of coffee or an iced tea, iced coffee.

I could go on.

I can't .

Well, we want to welcome you and talk about where we stand because .

We think now we've reached a critical point in this.

I'm with allies and friends and we go forward together that way.

That's our goal.

As I'm sure you know, for four years I have sat in this office with hundreds of thousands of demonstrators outside on many occasions.

opposition from Congress.

And we have continued to fight not only politically, but to advise them of our ability to fight militarily.

The goal is for the right of the people of the South, the people of the G.N., of Vietnam, I should say,

So now we come to the point where

and allies all this time.

Where do you go?

What's the next chapter?

I can take that very huge and I can express.

I'm going to do that again Saturday in Florida.

I'm going to come to Florida tomorrow and write all the instructions.

And I'm going to get your opinions before I write them out.

Because this is Saturday.

I don't know the names.

I mean, with the piece on the wing side, I'm sure we know where he's coming from.

I know that there is abuse we have.

The only other location by our .

And in this country, very hard to understand.

difference of opinion, which the left wing is seizing upon.

Where out of Saigon comes expressions that the U.S. government is letting them down.

We're betraying.

We're exceeding that because we've seen this.

The instructions of the Paris Disorder.

That's got to stop.

If it doesn't stop, it will destroy everything you fought for.

There are too many dead.

We lost a lot.

You lost a lot more.

I know.

I see.

We didn't break that.

But if we continue to have this kind of criticism from an ally, it will destroy it completely.

any public support for the government of Vietnam in this country.

And it has been very seriously weakened by that kind of stuff.

I don't understand it.

But the reason I say that, here in Rome we should talk frankly, but to have Radio Saigon and other people

and government sources to attack us.

That's a very detrimental thing.

This is just not understood.

We are not ranked between each other.

It comes from the government.

It's very rough here.

Because you see, the whole point is that I stood firmly in behalf of the government.

I want to see you in second power.

And this entire press program you saw in here is against you.

They would like to see the government of Vietnam go down.

But it's true, because of their last name.

And so you see, every time that kind of thing comes up,

We understand that sometimes you can't control these things.

Now is the time to have the talk.

We've got to keep everything between ourselves, the differences we have, and move forward.

So I'd like to hear your views.

Mr.

Ambassador, and then Alex Westline, and then Claire Wheaton.

Be sure that when I write out those injunctions that aren't here this year, that we know where we're going, and what we can expect from you, and give you a question about what we can expect from us.

Well, Mr. President, may I just invite you to talk a few things?

Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

which I had so much fun with.

It's not like that today.

It's much stronger, much easier to get in the lane than it was before.

This year, when this came, with the urgency launched by the company, I think with the search we had, we had the chance.

Now, we have a very crucial stage to what the settlement is all about.

You may find it difficult to understand, but we have to go back to the 17th century.

because I had a lot of questions that I didn't think I was going to be able to answer.

And I didn't see how it was going to happen.

But I had all these people standing in front of me to make myself available to do what I had to do.

This gave rise to my thoughts on the position of the government regarding this problem, not because it failed, but because Kissinger, as the second President of the United States, has eventually followed around his instructions.

He is more of a companion of his.

May I also say that when I heard about the first attacks of the D.C.

Guards, I myself was very shocked, very disturbed.

We had discussed very, very, very difficult and very stunning, and I didn't like this.

I thought it was very stunning.

I watched the army.

I was sent about it.

I took it.

It probably takes a little bit of time.

And, uh, now I'm doing the best I can.

I'm doing the best I can.

But, uh, uh, what I did, uh, the command was made sure that I, uh,

which I have been told have not been made in the initiative of the government.

Occasionally, when it is mentioned, it was the program, the first review, which the commentator mentioned the GSP.

This was not presented here.

You know what I mean?

Let me just interrupt you so you want to take a little bit of your time.

You know how unfriendly the American press is and the situation in Vietnam.

It's terrible.

Shocking.

You've got to realize that the White House press is also terrible.

Shocking.

Well, there are a few exceptions.

There are a few.

Now, that is why we have to be extra careful.

Don't give them ammunition.

That's all.

We already go into that.

I mean, that's water and a bridge, but that's .

I don't know how these things happen.

People talk when they shouldn't talk.

You must remember that when you've got an unfriendly press corps, people who have predicted for years to sell Vietnam would never make it and want you to fail.

And some are on the left.

And while North Vietnam has succeeded, there are even some here.

When you've got that, then you must be doubly careful.

We all must not forget them in the end, and that's really what I'm talking about.

And so you should convey that to your government.

In fact, I am rather disappointed that President Pugh has not said, expressed really, as I have always confidence in him, said, well, I have total confidence in President Nixon.

provide his best friend.

I think he has to.

I know that he has to play.

You see, what we need in this country, we must not give the enemy.

I don't mean just North Vietnam, but I mean those who in this country do not want these negotiations to succeed.

Who want South Vietnam to be on the two.

We must not give them.

But the great...

and every time that they point out that President Chu and President Nixon are disagreeing, even though they say it's President Chu and Dr. Kissinger, or President Chu and General Haig, or President Chu and somebody else, it doesn't make any sense.

Because in this country, they interpret it as a U.S. ally having a difference with its ally in Finland.

We should have our differences with our enemies.

That's the norm.

And not with each other.

Privately, we can have our differences.

That's my confession.

But that's the right thing to do.

Just leave that behind.

Because I know we've got the substance now as to where we go from here. .

So the October 8th agreement.

That's right.

Right.

It became a very difficult moment to keep complete silence because it's a deal and it's not going to probably be in some way to raise issues to the people and to DPR.

Okay.

That's right.

Yeah, I think it's completely...

I think that President Chu and his government has done

done exactly the right thing in preparing the people for the ceasefire, because it's going to come.

And so you must prepare for it, because, Mr.

Ambassador, there's one thing that is very important.

It's psychological.

And when this comes, when an arrangement is made, rather than let North Vietnam say, well, they won't.

They're not.

They're going to lose.

You win.

I mean, because the future of South Vietnam

We all have to talk optimistically, positively about it, because if we, in advance, if we create the impression that North Vietnam saw money and the North Vietnamese negotiators have won at the conference table,

then it will look as if everybody is far from it.

And that poses some problems.

But anyway, I know you're aware of it.

One of the things that's always impressed me about President Chile is a very good sense of public relations.

But when the time comes, if we could particularly convey this to him, that when the time comes, we finally, as we will, we must,

to get this settlement, we must not be defensive about it.

We must not be negative about it.

Because the problem that I have with the new Congress is we need to go to that Congress and ask for several billion dollars in economic and military aid for Salvia now.

And I want to get it.

But if we find a situation where Salvia and the Bay is indicated that they don't like the settlement, you know, it's hard.

That's our problem.

In this field, I also work with others.

For example, I can have a seat and say, well, that's my quality.

We rest in the heart of Vietnam.

We know of and make comments on very general issues, but not under the contempt of the people.

While such things are not in the

uh... uh...

I'm actually very happy that you guys presented to me here today because I was feeling that you are not fully acquainted with our position after, for example, getting into the pact, the pact that I mentioned earlier, getting here to present to you fully.

I have here Nick, he is the president, and that's how he presents himself.

Mr. President, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.

I don't have to smoke, but all my friends do.

He doesn't even drink.

Thank you.

Well, I think that sets forth the, uh, sets forth the position, I don't know if you can see, my school library, I don't know if you can see these are the positions that I can discuss with, uh, your talks with, uh, you know, parents and doctors.

May I say first that I, uh, there are some things we totally agree with.

There's no one in the world who's more suspicious of the communists than I am.

I get that.

I tell you what, I think my way of approaching it is perhaps more to the interest of South Vietnam than to the interest of Jews.

Because he's closer to it than I am.

convey this to him so that he realizes why I am going to proceed in the way that I am.

And that decision has been made.

The second point is that I know the suffering of the people of South Vietnam.

There's been terrible civilian casualties as well as military casualties.

I know the horror that is imposed upon the people of North Vietnam when they accomplish

I didn't write any attempts when I was there in 1956.

I saw them.

I mean, who saw them?

Did you see them?

People.

All the traffic, as I say, is one way.

It's all the same.

The communists, they could get rid of us all.

And I don't know how they could get rid of us all.

not to have that kind of liberation.

I know that.

I hope, too, that the communists are very tough on their negotiating forces, that they have been intransigent on the way of withdrawing North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam.

They also have been very difficult on another subject.

That is, you know, they insist on the release of .

On that, we've been intransigent, of course.

We've said, no, you can't turn loose.

After a ceasefire, you can't .

And you're .

I would respectfully suggest that you should never say publicly that reconciliation

was in disguise in a position of the coalition of the government.

The reason I would not say that is that he is the very astute man.

And he knows when there's the principle of unanimity.

And that means that any one individual can be told.

And I would imagine the other point that I would make in that story is that this is a critical thing that we have insisted upon.

between Diamond Harbor and the Harbor here.

As you know, Mr.

Ambassador, we've been here in North Vietnam for many years.

That's where President Xi was built.

The government of Vietnam must be drawn on it.

We have never agreed to that.

So that the blinders look away from the meaning of the commission, council, or whatever word you want to use, reconciliation.

It has no effect on the government of Vietnam.

And the government of Vietnam, first President Chu stays in.

That's when I just, I didn't know we had offered, after our January 25th, we remembered President Hsu reached the presiding line for the deduction.

I said, let's leave all that out.

Let's just leave it as is.

And they paid on that.

That's good, because he, in my opinion, was the strongest in the country at the time.

And his leadership was needed.

The second point is that

As far as this condition of reconciliation is concerned, it can have no effect, whatever, unless there is agreement on all sides concerned.

And the words,

phrases that are used about that, well, I know that they can have perhaps a considerable psychological effect in Vietnam.

And as far as, in a practical sense, affecting the existence of the government of Vietnam, the president of the Jews' government, it's standing in power.

We can have none.

And we have no sorry for it.

We can have any.

And you would expect that.

all the aid we are providing, military aid, economic assistance, and perhaps as important as that, the firm alliance that the United States has not only by a piece of paper, but more importantly, the personal alliance that I have as a New Zealand elected president, a huge majority of the president's team.

that he's going to stay in, and the government of Vietnam will stay in.

That is the great question.

Now, let me just cover briefly three or four points that I think is very important.

Of course, I realize that when General Hague came on the sideline, of course, in these talks that Dr. Kissinger has had, naturally there are those who would say, and I don't know if I hear you or not, but naturally there are those who would say, well, do these men speak for the president or are they operating on their own?

Let me tell you that every word they speak, I approve.

I write out all these instructions.

I take care of them.

When General Dr. Fischinger goes back to Paris, he will have specific instructions.

I will work every option that will be presented.

And I will have decided that any question arises,

Before he can act, before he can read a thing, one thing of substance, except word changes that don't matter, you know, cosmetics, he has to cable me, and I have to reply.

We do all that in secret channel, too, so there's no problem with anything.

I think it's very important for all of us to understand, first, that everything that has been done today

It's not been their fault, it's mine.

And I take the responsibility.

If it's a mistake, it's mine, not theirs.

Even more important, in the critical discussions next week, which are the last that are going to be held with the North Vietnamese, the last negotiations, Dr. Pishnir

He directed first to bargain hard on the points that are rigged.

And he does bargain hard.

He will, I'm sure.

I don't bargain hard to rig.

He's already got a dozen changes that the President, he doesn't think they're important, but I think they're important.

I think they're important in a sense, for a reason I'll mention in a moment.

I don't think any of these changes are very much.

But in any event, you want to get the best deal that you can.

He will attempt to get people to take the positions that you have set forth here.

And I will write out the instructions personally and send them to Dr. Isherwood for you.

And he will then take, I will discuss it with him.

I'm meeting all day with him Saturday on the floor so that I can have a chance before he goes to Paris.

So he totally knows what he's going to ask me.

All the questions I've had, every question.

That's why this meeting is so important for him to come in.

So we know exactly how you feel.

I'm so glad President Chumak should come in so we can talk face-to-face.

We don't want to leave him out of unity.

We want him here, close here, not just a piece of paper.

But when he goes to Paris,

He will have not only complete directions as to why to negotiate and how, but he will have complete authority to complete the negotiation.

Now, during the period that he is there, he will also be directed to have discussions on our undertaking, which he will do every day with the ambassador.

And we will look into that.

And we will do our very best to make all the progress we possibly can.

It is our goal to make the very best possible deal that we can.

When I say deal, I mean that we can.

which will achieve the goal that we have fought for and which you and your people have suffered more for because it's your country and you're there.

And that is Vietnam, the people of South Vietnam, determining their own future without having

a Communist government opposed upon against their will.

Now, having said that, we now come to some critical points.

President Chu mentioned in his letter the fact that we had great success in the immunization campaign.

He mentioned in his letter the fact that the South Vietnamese forces, with American air support and mining and so forth, stopped the enemy.

And they did.

And he believes that we can just continue fighting for a period of time, in terms of the bombing and the mining and so forth and so on.

And you, of course, will continue fighting.

But eventually, the North Vietnamese will capitulate or withdraw.

You may be right.

I have to be quite honest with you, though, that if I were to order that, and I have no intention of doing that, but if I were to order it, it would be an idle gesture.

I've had this the past couple of days with the top leaders in the Senate and the House.

Not the dead of the Hawks, the top leaders.

When I say I met with them, not all personally, but by phone, through contact, and the rest.

These were people that, almost, you read about those close votes in the Senate, where we win by one vote, or lose by one vote, and so forth.

And the last vote in the House was 12.

It's been a bloody battle.

Their new Congress will be coming in.

It's out of session now.

It'll come to January the 30th.

Here's what we will be facing.

If there is not a settlement made, and the idea of getting people to live before Christians, that's your own idea.

A settlement made on terms that we consider to be

Accomplishing our, the objectives that I set forth in my speech you made, when I ordered the bombing of the mining dam on January 25th, within, and this is currently going to the president, I don't want it to go to the enemy, within 10 days, the Congress will cut off all the economic military.

There's no question of that.

The reason they will do that is not because they are for the communists.

The reason they will do that is because when I set forth the proposals on May, when I took this very, at some point, hesitant step, the election coming up, the summit coming up, the Russians,

I laid out three today.

I said there must be ceasefire.

There must be the return of the POWs.

And Vietnam must have the opportunity to determine their own future without having the Communist government imposed upon them against their will.

If you did write the agreement, which is

meet those goals as these leaders that I met with, to a man who had us feed, that the, what they read it on, we haven't shown, of course, the total agreement, that the agreement that we had on October the 8th met those goals.

But if the agreement as improved meets those goals, then, and then,

The United States says we cannot and will not sign them because the government of Vietnam will not go along.

It will not be a matter of choice.

You know, in our system, you know this country well.

our political system.

Unfortunately, presidents have great power, but the Congress has got the purse strings.

And it's done.

Now, this is something that would be the last thing that I want to have happen.

I've been to South Vietnam seven times.

I didn't mark Vietnam, I was there in 1953, before I went to Hanoi.

It's a beautiful city.

I feel sorry for the people there, living under that damn old government.

But my point is that I do not want to give, I don't want the Congress to do that.

But it will.

It will not be because the Congress and the American people are tired of war, but because the Congress and the American people believe very deeply that if those three goals are achieved, the ceasefire, the retaliation, and the kind of a political settlement which guarantees

which provides for President Xi's stay in power for Vietnam.

Despite this gobbledygook, and that's what I call it publicly, this gobbledygook about this commission and that commission and reconciliation and all the rest, he has the power and sovereignty in Vietnam.

If those goals were achieved,

the Congress will believe that that is what we have fought for and that is what they need to do.

Now there is no way, there is no way, I would not want President Pugh to make a decision based on the assumption that I, even after winning the Republican victory, could go on the television as I often have in this room.

to mobilize the American people to continue bombing, to continue mining, and to continue the war until all the North Vietnamese leave South Vietnam.

That's the end of it.

I got it?

Let's go to the other side of the coin.

So you've got the Green.

You mentioned the 34 Accords.

They were worth a day.

.

Right.

They're going to hear everything.

You know that.

I know.

Now, here, what I said about the political, we want to get the best degree, but we can't.

I'm all for getting the best degree, but we can't.

I speak now as a lawyer, and one of the things we're supposed to do that.

The best degree, but we can't do that to the best degree possible.

And we'll try to get through all the political sections.

We will try to do our best to accomplish the other goals that we're speaking about.

But I can assure you that if we were together in agreement,

which the Army and the mission agreed to withdraw all their forces from the South.

It was supposed to be done that way.

An agreement where they changed the commission for national election so that they could call it the way that President Chu did not feel that it cast any reflections or raised any questions from the coalition government.

If we got that, that agreement would not be the worth of paper that it's written on if the man sitting in this office

did not have the power and the Congress, the public, to back, and not only the power, but the will, to result by, to maintain the credibility there, to maintain the advantage in the Congress book, because even if they're back across the border, they can still come back, and they've done that so often.

What we're really saying is this.

The question is,

question is, in what do we put the greater value?

A piece of paper, an agreement, improve some, improve substantially, or do we put the greater value in a commitment that I have made in writing that I give to you now so that you can hear directly along these lines?

I then can go to the Congress, as I will have to very early in the session, and ask for the funds that are necessary to economic assistance, military assistance.

You know, we court an awful lot of military assistance in the past few weeks.

We've gotten quite deliberate because we know that that replacement, if you want to be sure that you're going to appeal,

But I've exceeded the budget.

That's very great.

I have to go to the banner.

I have to go to the Congress.

I can go to them.

And the Congress, realizing that we have a ceasefire, realizing that we have to do that, realizing that the airport is on whatever, even though they don't think it's perfect, they realize it's not going to get perfect.

They realize it's not going to reach all the goals here.

Then the Congress will say, we will support the President of the United States in his efforts

save Vietnam by providing adequate military and economic assistance.

And so I can give you my commitment, one, to provide military and economic assistance so that you can help yourselves.

More importantly, I can give you a commitment, two, which is that I will maintain the assets in Thailand and in the fleet.

So that the enemy, if they reopen this, if they choose this, well, if they've got this here, they'll start fighting again.

If they reopen it, I will resume the bomb.

And I will do it.

Because why do I have an election coming up?

If I have a resolution, when I did have an election, you could be very sure, and this is the only reason that we'll have to talk now, that I have a resolution, but I don't have it.

So that will be a suggestion.

A third point that you can make is that

stand firmly with President Chu, which I have always done in the past and want to do in the future, to say that we are going to stand firmly for the integrity, if not against any foreign aggressors.

And that means not only from the north, but from the east, might be important.

This is not important for President Chu with his great sophistication, so on this flight,

I will use my influence at the very highest level to see that those who support the norm, Russians and Chinese, know what the game is.

I will also use my influence to put them in power.

So, in my view, in my view, I've studied it through, in my view,

with that kind of power on your side, the military and economic assistance of the United States, which I have to get from the Congress.

Second, with the threat, which is not an idle threat, and Mark will know it, but I will resume military activities in the event they break the agreement.

If they have horses around, they break the agreement.

And there will be no, not a moment's hesitation.

And they are going to be told that.

That's one of the other side of the crime.

And we've got some new instructions that are going to be told without any questions.

And I think they believe it now.

They haven't believed me before.

And after all, I was the one who took the risk and can't vote.

I was the one who took the risk.

I did.

And I will take this risk too.

When you combine that with the influence which we think we can have on the other parties involved, I think, and also, above everything else, a mutual trust, a mutual alliance, at least for four years, because I'm here for four years, between myself and President Q, we can say this would be enough.

We can do it.

I will do that.

On the other hand, you see what the position puts us in, puts me in.

I understand how he feels.

He thinks he should get out.

Of course he should get out.

He feels that political provision should have no reference at all, and it ought to be any way interpreted as giving any role, even in the supervisory body for elections.

even though he doesn't need to, and he doesn't want to have anything that gives any connotation of the entity participating.

I understand that.

He'd like to have his piece of paper improved.

I understand that.

But as the leader of his country, his security is really what we can do from here.

and I will fall out all the way.

I cannot go all the way in the event that he decides that more important than having the total support of the President of the United States, the economic assistance, and the military aid which we would need to provide, if he decides that more important than that is to insist on

on changes during this next critical week or just the last week for negotiations.

If he isn't that more important than that and he's got to get these changes, then it isn't a question of my threatening him or anything like that.

It's a question of the state of the fact that if there's anything I can do, I can make a big speech saying we ought to continue to support him on all of the decadence.

I can go to the Congress in a joint session on January the 4th.

I could.

I won't.

In case this happens this way.

Because I won't do it because of the P&I, which has to do with the hawks, not the doves, you know, the bull rights, the Mansfields, and the rest of them.

I mean, they have a place, those people.

But I'm referring to, I'm referring to the Spencers, the Goldwaters, you know.

They're your real friends.

I'm referring to the Fords, the Howells, and so on and so forth.

These people are friends.

They wanted to see, but they know just about what the traffic will be.

And they say that at this point, I must tell you what they say.

I don't agree with this.

Myself, I wouldn't go this far.

But as far as the Congress is concerned,

Congressman Ford told me yesterday, he said, and he would have known this far, but he's a patriot, like you are, and I will buy it, and seize the bigger picture.

As far as Congress is concerned, if a simple resolution comes in, POWs, for withdrawal, and withdrawal of aid, is there Congress would pass it by true or not?

It's a terrible thing to do.

You can't fight a war for your field dunks.

You can't make an agreement simply for your field dunks.

That's why we've never done it.

But that shows you what the timber is.

Now, what I'm really trying to get across here is that it is not, however, that I'm rather surprised that President Chu is concerned.

I know I'm not surprised.

He's there in the battle and he sees the suffering of the rest.

What I'm trying to say, and I want to get across very clearly, is this, that we are dealing here with a reality that cannot be changed.

There is no way that the president of the United States, even with 61% of the American people voting for him in the election, can go before the Democratic Congress in January and get further aid from Vietnam in the event we don't get a salary on the basis of the present time, too.

I understand you may say, well, we'll go ahead and go it alone, but you can't.

I don't want you to do that.

When I said it, when I raised the point that, well, we'll have to go it alone and settle it all, we don't want to do that.

We don't want to do that because I want you to survive.

I mean, I don't want this war to be fought for nothing.

I don't want to have all your people to have died, 55,000 Americans who have died for nothing.

But on the other hand, I'm simply saying that if the Congress cuts off the purse insurance, become those persons that at least get our business back.

And that would be a transcending to what is otherwise been rolling to death by your people and by ours.

So you see, President Hsu's got to see it our way, too.

I'm trying to understand his way, and I do.

Because I love it.

I feel for your people.

I feel for the man and I. I feel for your children.

I feel for a little child I recall in a hospital, the face of a Madonna in 1960.

Her arm was literally blown off by a damned communist strapped on it.

She had lost it and they were going to remove the other one like that the next day.

And I talked to her, Senator Dahl from the hospital, I remember faces like that.

And to me, this is a very personal thing.

I am a strong believer that survival will be a non-part of the interests of the United States, but it's the fact that we're a policy press, as you welcome my hand, because it's the right thing to do.

But on the other hand, I do know what we face.

And what we face is that if, if, if, if, if we take a transitive attitude in these negotiations and we don't settle this next week,

And then reach that timetable of concluding it by the 22nd of December.

If we don't do that, then come January 3rd, the resolution will be introduced, and it will be passed.

And it will be passed in one week.

And there is nothing I can do to stop it, because, see, the veto doesn't come there.

This is a positive action.

I must get the money.

So, uh, if I can close the deal, I'll be showing the, uh, see, that's what the writer, there should be no money provided for Vietnam, and, you know, that's when we get a preload on this part, and that's when it'll be...

I've already seen the language of what the bill is going to put up.

And the hawks cannot beat it.

No.

But this is mine, dealing with this reality.

I will simply say that I know that President Chu is in a discussion possibly meeting with me in some court.

I don't see how that could serve a purpose.

I've been delighted to meet him many times.

I didn't tie him in the key.

It's for him and me to meet.

on a basis where we stand together and say, now we have made peace.

It may not be the best kind of agreement we want, but if we make peace, then the United States and the GDN are going to stand together

uh, over this period of time to see the disagreement as it happened.

I can say publicly at that time, but I have told you privately, uh, that, uh, in the event that it is broken, uh, that whoever breaks it will take risks that will be unacceptable.

And I may tell you that those risks will be unacceptable because what we've done up to this point, we typically say that if they break this over again, that they're going to deal with, uh,

something more than money.

And that you would let Americans approve it.

Well, that's the point.

You see, this is just American support.

It's true.

I mean, you quote Turkey about it.

We all talk about American public opinion and opinion polls and all that.

They polled the American people the other day, and somebody, Gallup or somebody, they said about a few of them were in for all this.

Sixty percent said yes.

But not me.

No, I'm insisting.

I'm insisting on part of that.

I'm insisting.

We just don't want to end the war for us.

We want to end it for others.

We want to cease fire.

We want a kind of a political settlement that will keep President Putin in power.

And with the kind of, as I call it, dolly lube up here, which will not impose on him a coalition government.

I've always opposed a coalition government.

Even the northern senators have a coalition government.

Of course, you can't believe them.

They lie.

But my point is, if I'm sure that if they really thought it was, they'd be bragging about it.

But the point is that it isn't just what Dr. Kissinger refers to as American public support.

cold-blooded, cold-turkey way, which you understand.

It's the Congress out there.

They've got the money.

I've got the money.

And this is not inexpensive.

Now, it's worth it.

I can get it.

If we get the agreement, I can assure you, you will buy this kind of agreement.

And, as I say, Dr. Kissinger will have the strictest directives to go to get everything he can

work, or to discuss it every day, the best thing we can.

But my point is, if we can get an agreement with the president, too, then say, well, there are parts of this, or whatever he wants to say, and parts of this that I would prefer changed, and so forth and so on.

But I have some confidence in President Nixon.

Something he hasn't said yet.

After all I've done, he's never said that.

That confidence in President Nixon

Then believe me, I can go to the Congress and I can get overwhelming support for economic aid, for military aid, and in the event the enemy breaks the deal, for the Congress then to go and give me the funds that I need to resolve the bomb.

And it doesn't cost a lot, too.

It isn't just the fact that I won the election.

I'll do it if I only have 5% of the Gallup vote.

I did that money for the economy.

So there's where we stand.

I talked to you, frankly, about our political situation.

I've never said these things publicly.

And I'll tell you why I don't.

I don't want to get in the way of anything that we don't have some cards to play.

We're not saying this public.

And Dr. Gipsy's not saying this.

We're not letting it get down to the idea.

But that's where it stands.

But you have to know.

You have to know.

And it's only fair that President Pugh knows.

that the situation with Congress is difficult.

Well, it's impossible.

It will be impossible if we don't make the deal.

Now, probably what you got there, it isn't a question, too, that we set a timetable that's too fast.

Let's say that we only, you know, we have a chair in this country, which we know from your education, is keeping one job ahead of the other.

And that's what we've been doing.

The Congress has been ready to vote us out of the war over and over again.

So we go to China, and we go to Moscow, and then we do this or that or the other thing, and then we have to make a peace thing here.

The doctor gives us trips to Paris.

I've helped an armistice, and I've inspected everybody.

Those are reasons that hold to themselves.

And I go to the Congress, and I meet with the Doves, Mansfield, and Goldbright, and these other clowns, and I said, I said, well, you're not going to undercut us, and we've got a chance for peace.

But now, we've come all this way.

And at this point, we have an opportunity to make these on a basis which, frankly, is not as satisfactory as I would like, but which combined with what I am prepared to do, and which I can get through.

In my view, I have to get my two of you out here.

And my view will save the GDN.

Then, you see, I have that course of action.

That's the course of action I have to follow.

And so that's where, that's my conviction at this moment.

The letters are hard to express again.

We want to see that the communists do not win.

The communists had no respect for a piece of paper.

They had a hell of a lot of respect for bombs, for mines, and for what the President of the United States was doing with war.

And they had a lot of respect for the economic and military assistance that you can have.

And that's what this game is about.

And that was on the line.

And so I feel strongly on this for that reason.

It's a question, really, I use the term often, of hardware and software.

What's the hardware?

Well, the hardware of the North is going to be a possibility that we might resume the bombing.

And I know that it isn't just having it, but having the will to do it.

You know, President Johnson and I have great affection for and respect for football.

I was stumped.

It's a great state in the bombing, Boston, I think.

I don't wish to stick with it.

I think you do, too.

And I thought, I didn't say it in 68 because I had the right, but I thought, I think if we had continued the bond in 68, we'd be different.

But now it's past that point.

We've been four years more.

We have gone out of Cambodia.

We have supported your operation in Laos.

We have bombed the line to the north.

And now we've come to the point, after all of this, we've come to the point where, as far as the American people are concerned, they see an agreement.

which may not be totally satisfying, but which on the other hand, I think they would say, as I have said today, that if the government of the United States, particularly the President of the United States, who is known as a hardliner, puts itself squirming behind it, that guarantees the future of Vietnam.

Let me put it another way.

North Korea.

Sure.

There are no North Koreans in South Korea at the moment.

What you would like is to have them go back to South Korea.

But why does South Korea survive?

It survives not because of the presence of a few Americans there.

They're down to 30,000.

It survives because, as far as Korea is concerned, we provide military aid.

We provide humanitarian aid.

And the North Koreans know that

the least concerned.

They started infiltrating the camp, getting those that remained in the south, and maybe we can accomplish something, and perhaps through understandings to get them moving and something else to do, which the guys that are here should be working on, getting them moving out.

But they started to attack the camp.

They are at a moral risk, because this time,

We can't go wrong.

So that's, this is my .

I said we have no .

These are the points that we have been trying to convey to you as we are engaging in the conversation of these broad principles.

First of all, for this agreement to be a success in some way or another, it is important for me to show it to be a success or a victory for our side to give to others.

But for us to be able to do so, it is important for us to pretend that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain to the people that we are moving in such a way that we can explain

The question of the NDA in Saudi Arabia and then the political solution in Saudi Arabia.

On the question of the nominee's family in Saudi Arabia, do you feel that it is very important, you know, the most important nation for the United Nations?

First, or does it matter briefly

In the future,

There's nothing to listen to.

People cannot get that.

Why do we follow them?

I don't know.

Well, you never know.

Max, this time, we're going to get you all over.

I'll tell you.

I'm not going to do it again.

I'm going to do it again.

on the outside of the human body, but any appropriate coordination of the skin cannot be allowed.

In such case, this, we fear, will have very damaging effects on the body of the fetus.

And to maintain the body is very important in the context which follows the treatment.

The second point is about the question of FBSR.

It was misplaced after the sign of agreement.

There has been a political conflict.

And I said it to you when I texted you.

It is that, uh, we feel that when the president of the NCA decided to use his government substantially, and which made him feel that he could get there in the future, it is difficult for people to say that they want to live that short.

I mean, let me say that it's interrupted for one thing.

The timing on that is pretty much under its control, I don't think.

That's our justice side.

And the political decision, right?

That's right.

When the political and the elections require disapproval, the institutions for the elections require disapproval, the section, the paragraph 13 that deals with demobilization is in the same section as the paragraph on the political solution.

So you can always insist that if there's no demobilization, there can be no political decision.

And let me say that we will back you in that, the veto.

So just so you know that, I just want you to know that we, I am, I have at least comments that don't adhere to the agreements.

And let me say that on this agreement, we intend to keep it if they keep it.

But if they break it and they find this a demoralization, we will not hesitate to back you.

That's just what it is.

I said to Mr. Dux, and I think that you may find it difficult to say, I said to the president who spent all of his adult life before he came into office by the conference, who for four years stood alone against the bureaucracy making the decisions in the decision on May 8th

It was one member who voted for the president.

Only one.

One of the whole National Security Council.

The plan, it seems, it is, I say this to me psychologically and conceivably, knowing the president, that during his term in office he would probably become his taking over South Vietnam.

And have thereby destroyed everything he has stood for all his life and his birth.

Let me say another thing too, and I don't want to, this is something we can't talk too much about, but I know the danger from Cambodia and Laos.

Now, you're not obviously as interested in that as you are in the south, but we have that very much in mind too.

That's another part of it.

We can't let them come around that way.

And that's one of the reasons why we have worked on that side of the tube, the component of the Oceantin Direct.

In fact, you know the Oceantin Trail, if you remember when I went driving down through Laos, that's why the Oceantin Settlement was not in the loop.

It opened the way for them to come in and evict them.

But Barton, Gregor, and I, you go ahead.

You're telling me what the Settlement is about.

Just some of the aspects you were talking about.

It is possible only to control the degree of possible future reinforcements on the ground, only if the principle is laid out that the NDA has the right to decide that.

Because in the future, if they assume the same option to decide, it would be very difficult for us to prove very honestly the future.

How can you know?

You can see the NDA in the south, you can see the return.

And what we have, the figures we have.

And I'll be down for a long search.

And I'll give you what to talk about later.

And then if you bring the movement right now, after, after the signing of the agreement, there has to be some NDA in the south, in the south.

Let's all be brave together to prove that the British are going to be the first to take any action.

I can say this on that score, Mr.

Ambassador, is that some of these things will, our shipment, whatever it is, should be extensively closed.

Be sure we're all covered on those LLs.

These are commitments for me privately.

They're very important to understand.

I'm not going to need much approval.

That's all you need to know.

I'm not going to need much.

The way I see it is, I know these people, they do like Sector 2, which is stealth and everything like that, and I know that it's very difficult to tell.

And I know what you're really making is more basic ones.

You've got to get all out of there, or otherwise you've got the cancer there, and they will continue to feed.

But as far as the idea of reinforcement, as far as either arms or infiltration is concerned,

That's something that I will insist be watched with the closest I know what you mentioned before.

I don't believe it.

I share your concern.

I just want you to know that it's something that you come together.

We will watch.

If there's any violation, they're going to get it right.

The challenge is that we have created an intelligence group to enable us to monitor this because we don't really believe that the international machine

is going to give us a great deal of information.

We are going to establish an intelligence group in Thailand.

We'll be glad to bring you with general sense about it.

Now, I think this is a good point.

Yes, I did.

I have told him that I have no confidence in the United Nations or international intelligence or international rules.

I mean, the international supervision rules

particularly if you've got a copy to sit on, right?

Now, any copy is even a good copy.

Now, the point is, though, that is why I have said, with all of our intelligence, that in Thailand, we put the best intelligence we've got, and we've got, and that, and Hayes will tell you,

But, we will identify if they have any arms.

We cannot find if they sent 5,000.

We'll probably not find.

If they sent 25,000, we'll help.

We'll find them.

Okay.

And therefore, 5,000, you can answer.

You, that's not a question.

If they move the division, what about letting up at the other point?

He's referring only to troops with arms.

Well, arms are taken by these kids of troops.

Sure.

They can't.

There's a margin.

There are some we will not be able to find, but they're smaller, fewer, and they start moving into things.

I remember when those tanks moved in on Quantree, the rest of the big Russian tanks.

Boy, I...

They moved through the Dostoyevsky.

Of course, they're supposed to dismantle the old German system, according to the secret.

But assuming they don't, if they move, if they start one of their victory supply efforts, we will know it.

Again, they might be able to smuggle 20 tanks into the South that we don't know.

They're now moving.

We know now they're moving 87 tanks.

I'm counting some.

We know that through information that will be just as good afterwards as it is now.

And therefore, there is a margin that we don't know.

Maybe 5,000 troops spread out over a period of time we don't know.

If they move them together, we will.

There's no way they can get 25,000.

We will start.

But what we will do here, Mr.

Ambassador, we'll just have a secret intelligence group, joint intelligence group.

We will still have military aides and cooks and so on.

And now, I want the best.

You know what I mean?

But go on, go on, these are the points that I need to make.

He's still at the one fundamental point.

I understand it, and he should make the point.

I would make it if I were you.

Mr. President, moving on to the point that I was making, when it becomes necessary to click, you can only click action.

Right.

You can only click action.

I suppose that it would be easier for you if you couldn't vote.

So, I think it would be good for you to do so.

I mean, from a political perspective, I remember the way that, in 1985, Ben Jonson said that he was going to sell Vietnam.

Now this is a very good point because I told Dr. Kissinger, I discussed this with him, I said we've got to have basically what I call a big leaf.

A big leaf, right?

Now, my point is that agreement, the way that the directors that I run have, it's a big tree because these people, if these people do move, I can, let me say, I, maybe we should summarize, but when it comes to

say there has been a violation and they agree that it's going to be that, I can sit behind that desk and I can be fairly effective.

I don't mean to sound silly.

There are some places I'm not very good.

But on that, I'm quite an advocate.

But there's no way they can make any progress without either violating the provision of the DNC or violating the provisions of Pantaloja and Cambodian neutrality or breaking the C-5.

It makes all kinds of sense.

And it's with the ceasefire, the Cambodian and the Laotian thing, and the violation of the DMC, and no reinforcement.

Those are the three points.

And Mr.

Ambassador, if within those four, if any one of those four would give me the public support that I would need to move.

But most of what we say this, don't overlook the fact that...

And I think we should be very candid about this.

We're going to be talking to their allies as well.

And their allies have other fish to fry.

And we're going to be talking to them.

Not the same way we talk to you.

But we're going to be talking to them.

And they have fish to fry.

Now, they want to risk everything and go back to this thing.

They have suffered a lot.

You have just beaten the hell out of them, you know, with these last two.

performance.

General Hague was a great admirer of yours.

He always said that when that was the case, he said, well, the bombing of the mighty was indispensable to the health.

But he said, you can have all the bombing of the mighty in the world if you don't have that man on the ground.

It doesn't make any difference.

You had the men on the ground.

They were great.

And that's one of the reasons why we don't want to let them down.

We are aware of the situation, but no one doesn't want to admit.

They don't want to acknowledge.

Oh, exactly.

I just declare quickly that...

because these have eyes to be anywhere, without saying that they are here.

That's why we are not really tempted to have even something which spells out too clearly, too specifically, which makes it too specifically alleviated by the thing.

So that's why we think that the best approach perhaps would be to find some voting which refers to this question without naming specifically the NDAs for example voting that has been chosen in the Chariot of the Carrier Speedway Conference with the idea to withdraw all of non-South Vietnamese platforms

In the time of American troops in South Vietnam, there were also, in that time, foreign troops.

So, not enough to be insensitive about it.

Also, in addition to that, if we use the regional wording regarding the regional principle,

but some agreements can be reinstalled if they are important.

Each state has to be responsible for its state.

What's happening with Canada?

With Canada, the government has signed a plan to explain to the people how to maintain the model, to provide a very central issue

Many people started asking about it, but it didn't make any sense at that time.

Since it is important to protect the environment, we are confident and we show that we are part of it.

We need help to help.

together with us, to make such a gesture, which is very special to the difference of the form.

We do not have to mention any day by name the use of form, which could be interpreted, but it includes every day, and it does not have a right to be decided.

We have presented the two instructions.

10 times.

And a single proposal that was made silent.

We did not.

We did not vet it.

We presented 60 on high toll pipe.

We're now.

We're going to present them all.

We've only got 12.

We presented 69 changes last week.

The one in the data that Mr. Tuck mentioned about the principle that, of course, we could say that it's safer than it's safer than the actual national borders.

We must have spent three hours on this.

And, uh, their position is that in practice,

They're willing to withdraw forces, but they are not willing to admit, A, that they had forces there, which in a way is a privilege, because then they do not claim to us that we do not have a right to be anywhere in Vietnam.

What they claim to us is another lie, which is that they have no forces there.

What they claim to us is that they are only Southerners.

They are whites and sons of Southerners.

Now, in substance, that's an outrageous lie.

legally it has been managed that they are not flagging the right to be here but that later sentence which Mr. Tuck mentioned we spent all the time thirsting and and therefore we come down to the proposition I will say 98% of our time last week was spent on precisely the issue that Mr. Tuck has raised and the

Our objection is we can try a phrase accepting the principle that they should use military force against each other.

The country says it's a trap.

We have a chance with this.

But it finally comes down to the problem.

Because if we have it, it doesn't mean anything in practice.

I really wonder if I could cut through this principle.

You've got to separate the hardware from the software.

Now all this stuff that Dr. Mishkin did, you ambassadors, non-ambassadors, especially when you work on the software, when creating the contents, the contents are not those that keep the grades.

What is hardware is cold steel, bombs, etc.

And if I were to develop the applications,

I would much, much prefer to have the protection of hardware, a wall of steel, and a wall of paper.

Now, that's putting it quite bluntly, and I don't mean to indicate that paper is not important psychologically.

I know that I can see the points that you make.

But also, let's visualize it another way.

Let me put you present.

We will interpret it our own way.

And that's going to be a very historic meeting where we stand together.

We interpret it.

And that will be a message to Hanoi.

It will be a message to the Soviets and the Chinese.

Also, it will be a very encouraging message to the people of the state, the dear people.

That's what I'm told.

That's why I want to meet with him, you know, after we finish.

For President Drew and me to try to sit down and work out such things as this, this is for the end of it.

You know, he's an expert.

I think I am.

But basically, you see, if we sit down and meet and haggle around these things, it can only end in, I think, disappointment because, okay, it doesn't matter.

I, uh, once said to Doug Reed, who was a Stokely investor, you know, probably got us on a long build, and I said, hello, Mr. Investor.

Uh, I remember the spirit of the candidate, and I remember the spirit of Judy, and I remember, you know, all the spirits that we had, the spirit of Vienna that Kennedy left for the Suns, Eisenhower left for the Suns, and the Russian, John, and Glassboro, the spirit of Glassboro.

They all failed.

I said, I'll tell you why.

I said, one must never go to the summit unless he knows what's on the other side.

And when you get leaders to the summit, and it will be, where President Q and I meet, we can't go and fail because we would go there as allies and friends.

If we disagree, we would depart as friends, but we would no longer be allies.

And that cannot be.

I just assume you can't have that risk.

The alliance between our countries I feel strongly about for personal reasons I mentioned a moment ago, apart from geopolitical reasons, which also I am responsible for in this office.

And as I say, I read his letter very carefully.

I will re-read it before I write the instructions for our tradition.

But I think it is important for me to say that

Let me start with January, the Congress comes back.

The Congress, in effect, has said through the hawks that no goal, if we cannot reach a settlement, unless the communists rename what they agreed on, again, on October 8th,

Because you see, as far as our people are concerned, Mr.

Ambassador, all they know is what the October 8th thing, which of course did provide for the C Spire, and as far as our public opinion is concerned, our Congressman, or President Hughes, they are in total control over South Vietnam.

When I use South Vietnam, I mean GDN.

I'm trying to, I use it all day, not because I don't recognize it, or that you do.

But my point is, but the political process to be determined by the people of South Vietnam.

And that is, this language is no accident.

Sure, some of those phrases and words

shall we say, some mystical gene, and it will have an effect on the population.

But I, as a Quaker, am supposed to be a mystic, but I can assure you that what really counts in the crunch when you're dealing with people like the communists is that hardware.

And I tell you here today, I can connect the hardware, I can get it in that Congress,

I can get the aid.

And also, in the event that they break the agreement, and there are plenty of ways that we can determine it, we will react.

If, on the other hand, we have a situation in which this breaks down, and it breaks down because of the failure of your government and ours to agree to go to Canada, then we have to say, well, we can't get an agreement.

then we, President Pugh and I, will be responsible for, well, not only the comments to take over South Vietnam.

It doesn't occur if our leads don't.

And the North still got to take the rest of them.

And if, frankly, the Congress voted to stop the war, that's really what you came down to.

That's the thing that I think we have to understand.

But on the positive side, on the other hand, I feel so strongly that that's the reason I'm talking to you so frankly.

I don't normally talk to visitors like this so frankly, but we're friends and allies because we've bought in our men and value together.

And that creates a bond that is more important than others, more important than others.

But I can assure you that

that I am sitting here making a commitment, which I have not left, I am not clear with you on this, but I make a commitment, not only to continue economic aid, military aid, but the big commitment is that I will afford the resumption of the bombing and more in the event that they break the agreement.

Now that is the big thing.

I want the President for you to understand that

That's what he has to mean.

However, I cannot keep that connection.

The Congress says, well, you didn't get the grant.

It was a reasonable agreement.

RPO dollars are still there, et cetera.

I know President Tu mentioned in his letter, and I appreciated this, that you would release 10,000 RPO pennies

But let me say, it is just a POW issue.

That's a highly emotional issue in this country because, you know, more than we ought to be, you can't fight a war just to get your prisoners back.

We understand that.

My fight is that we now face a situation, I repeat again because I cannot emphasize this too much, I repeat again, where even if I want, even if I wanted to say to President Xi, we will continue the war for a year.

as far as we're concerned, we will continue to bomb, we'll continue to mine until the enemy gets out of the South Vietnam and agrees to our conditions, we lay them down.

Which they might, if we could continue.

If I could make that promise, I couldn't keep it.

In fact, I could keep it only to set up a specific date for the 13th of January.

That's the date.

That's when we'll be out.

It'll take them only that long, 10 days.

They'll have to hear it, vote, and there'll be a massive public reaction.

It'll be bad for me.

It's all right.

I just have to survive for four more years in office, and that's that.

Beyond that, even more important, it means that everything we fought for was done.

That doesn't need to happen.

It doesn't even matter.

Believe me, when I speak about our hawks, I'll give you the wrong impression.

They want to be with our friends, and we want them.

They have stood by, and they have made speeches for, you know, the government getting on the GDN and the ARP and all the rest, despite horrible pressure from the American press.

But having done all that, and now seeing the possibility of a settlement which they did, while not perfect,

Well, they, and frankly, he was one of these foes that Congressman Ford, you know, during the public, you know, you're always voting on the right side.

He said to me yesterday, he said, well, he said, you've got to remember, he said that it was a kind of something.

which has the combination of the ceasefire field that we have, and a political satellite which provides for the retention of President Tuesday and for control of the political process, which, for the lawyer also, I asked him to study this particular provision, and he agrees.

He can't be a monkey.

He says, look at that.

He said, if you combine that with the support of the president,

and his ability to resume the mind and so forth.

He says, this is a very good deal.

That's what he feels.

Now, if he feels that, there's nothing going to change him.

That's my problem.

That's the problem, yeah.

And you very properly are, as President Q, understandably are presenting another point of view.

If we were dealing in a vacuum, it would be different.

But we're not.

We're dealing with the horror of political reality in the United States.

And in my view, it is a situation where I think President Chu is

See, none of the policies here, he does not seem to, it means anything to have a commitment to the president.

But more importantly, he does not seem to understand that I am making this commitment.

I am putting everything on the line.

But I will then go to the Congress and ask for the money.

I will get the authority.

I will order the strikes and so forth.

And I will do this.

But I cannot do it unless I have some public support.

If I don't have some public support, the Congress isn't going to give me the money.

Frankly.

Let us suppose, let us suppose that

that we don't get a deal now, and the war drags on for a while, and we continue the bomb, and all that sort of thing.

We would have to do if it drags on.

Let us suppose that.

Well, first of all, what would happen is that they get off the bonds.

Well, we have enough in the pipeline that we could continue maybe for another three or four weeks.

And then what happens?

We could say, well,

or something like that, then you'd have a public opinion reaction in this country that would be massive, coming at a very, very difficult time as the new Congress is in, because the public opinion reaction in the demonstration march around this Capitol has not yet overturned the Congress, this time it would, because never yet has an argument piece ever agreed to any kind of a proposal that would involve our prisoners.

or a ceasefire, or anything that would allow the government of Vietnam to stay in place with a political process and an election, which, through your veto, you control.

Let's say that in the past, Mr. President, it's the unreasonableness of Trump to know Vietnamese position.

They immediately had us.

Let me tell you what I have said from this chair on 11 different occasions on national television and radio.

Do you remember, Mr. Pastor, you're probably ready to die.

It's been re-broadcasted on Alameda Mountain, and I have said it.

I looked right into that camera, the camera's sitting here, I'm sitting in that chair, and I said, there is one condition that the enemy insists upon that we can never reach.

They insist upon that we, the United States, participate in joining with our enemies and overthrowing our allies and imposing a common discovery on the people of South Vietnam against their will.

This you will not do.

from his letter, they said that's what we're doing in this agreement.

And I don't agree with that.

That's just...

I don't agree with that view of what we're prepared to do, not only because of the agreement.

The agreement is not the agreement's line, which is important for many reasons.

But the other thing, for the reason of the power that you're going to have and the power that backs you up, the threat that faces the North in the peace.

In the club, I feel happy and not only that there is no reference to the presence of a neutral FAA, but there are also qualifications

the NPA and the state of Vietnam after this fight.

I think the article indicated that the question of the Vietnamese armed forces inside Vietnam has to be settled by the South Vietnamese Army.

We have requested that it be changed to the South Vietnamese armed forces.

The question of the South Vietnamese armed forces inside Vietnam has to be settled by the South Vietnamese Army.

That we can try longer than we've ever tried.

We can perhaps put into words some people in these armed forces that none of us ever put up to us.

We've never proposed this.

I cannot give you a name.

No, we've never put it to them, and we did not accept your point on this, because we've always put it to other causes, that all non-South Vietnamese have to withdraw, and that they reject rights.

But since they have never admitted that their voices did,

I think this is a change we can make.

I think we can.

We'll try.

No, no, no.

This is very important.

This is more important than the Congress.

In fact, what I should do, Mr. President, if you agree, is to sit down with Mr. Duke.

I was going to sit down tomorrow morning and go over the exact time of the morning so that you've got a chance to think it over or something like that.

When do you have the time?

Well, I'm in a position because this is the most important thing for me.

Of course.

You see, I have a leader.

I'm in the middle of my cabinet.

I have to meet the young chiefs in the morning.

I've got to meet... You'll have to be here to vote for the commissioner.

That only takes an hour.

We've done it.

But I think it's important that we get, excuse me, you go ahead, you say thanks to me if you want me to hear it.

And in addition, if I emphasize again, let me say, Dr. Chester, in the past, maybe it wasn't really, let me say, through all these negotiations, in the past and in the future, when he speaks, I speak.

Because I have written it all out, and people get the impression that

He's a brilliant negotiator, and he is.

He's got great tenacity, thank God.

He has done a brilliant job with the Chinese and the Russians and all the rest.

But as Dr. Kissinger will tell you, he knows every thought that I have.

He has never received his instructions.

As a matter of fact, he has the ideas, and some of them may have been bad ideas, may have been some of them lying.

And I'm glad to mention to you that I'm going to write out these instructions to Dr. and next week, he will negotiate a hearing.

But I just wanted to know, because you should not feel that you have here, as we said, a runaway gentleman.

He's doing what he's supposed to do.

He's a friend of ours.

I have a question about that.

He's a hardliner.

We think this is what the challenge should be.

But we know that we should try to approach to have the movement in such a way that it indicates even indirectly a vital condition.

We know that in practice they will be in South Korea, at least for some time, regardless of the fact that you have some similar sex which denies you the right to be in the South.

All these psychological and political reasons which I have to submit to you, considering these political questions, I think that, as you have pointed out, this CLR, if I may say, by abbreviation,

That's what I thought about when you asked me to work on the principle of unanimity before we can be told everything is not proper.

However, it is important for us that it is, at least on the agreement, that children have a kind of functions, powers, which indicate that it is an organization which

We are present institutions.

Let me say this.

It does not have any control over foreign policy.

It does not have any control over your economic policy.

It does not have any control over your district governments and so forth.

If it does, I have this right.

That's the thing I was concerned about.

And I want the president to know that, listen, I fought for him all the way.

In fact, many of my advisors, not Dr. Mischinger, not General Davis, there are honors, but we have some that aren't.

The State Department people, frankly, they said, flush you.

I said, no.

And I said, no.

And I don't know why.

Not just for personal reasons.

There are personal reasons.

But because he's the best man.

He ought to be.

He's a strong man.

He's a strong leader.

He's very solid, very sophisticated.

He should study it.

And he shouldn't resign.

He put it in there, his proposal there.

He resigned five months before that.

The thing that I like about this agreement is that he stays in power, and they put this thing in there, but there are no functions.

He does not have a committee.

Foreign policy will be a non-disclosure of the GDN as conducted by President Chu.

The domestic policy or economic policy with President Chu is my fault.

I have told you to do it.

If the GDN conducts itself with confidence, first of all, this committee doesn't have to

You are only obliged to do your utmost to set it up in three months.

There are a lot of other things that are supposed to happen in three months that the other side is supposed to do, like demobilization.

Sure.

So if you are the next, you are the next.

Why do you have to have this happen?

Let's hear it.

Well, Mr. President, in such matters, we feel that not only this is what's happening, but also the reform of the agreement is also important.

Yes, yes.

Yes.

A structure of power.

Never.

You see what I mean?

And we'll do our part.

Let me go further.

You talk about the psychological effect, too.

So everybody's got lawyers and ambassadors and all this language.

What does it mean?

If I did a political judgment, and I perhaps would pass the one after the election, it would be very well, but the political judgment says, what is going to have the greatest impact on the world, and on North Vietnam, and on the Soviet Union, and on the Chinese, and I think on the South Vietnamese people, are the fact that President Chu and President Nixon stand together and say, we are going to see to it that we're going to stand.

and Vietnam against the aggression.

And that is the main thing I want to be sure he understands, that that's my commitment.

And as a matter of fact, I was going to say, as far as I'm concerned, I'll meet him at Christmas.

I'll do the attention for that place.

This is the only thing that I had to do before the inauguration.

I had to write my State of the Union.

I had to write the Uniter.

I had to do the budget and all the rest.

But I would go to a meeting and we worked out.

I think that is terribly important symbolism, too.

I wouldn't discount that.

Because at that time, the world was wrestling with it.

What I heard the left-wing press says to the rest, by the time we get through with them on that occasion, we'll have put out our version.

You know, what does it agree with what we say about it?

Besides, we are going to insist that the word, that the difficulty is, Mr. President, that the word administrative in English is fine.

No one will take us to that, but in Vietnamese there are two words for it.

One projects structure, power, and the other one... We have to think these both towards the structure.

And then we have to think these both...

Well, it is a government, but to me a commission is not a government.

A commission is a way to get rid of a problem.

The government of Vietnam completely shares the views of this.

You understand that, yes?

Yes, we understand.

But we have to stand to the people and convince them.

I understand that too.

We all will.

I know you're a problem.

I'm not at all worried about you.

You've been very efficient.

Let me say this.

I will... Oh, sorry.

Sorry to interrupt.

You've been very efficient.

Go ahead.

We can be in such a way that we can explain that it is a success for us and not just a way for us to miss the event.

What all of the success is, is the fact that you're going to have, I can see in this country, you can have an outpouring of, frankly, support and affection for

The people of Vietnam, if we can make this agreement, that's what I want.

But we've got to stand up and say it's good, you know what I mean?

let us do we got to work it out i think it's very important mr ambassador that the president you and i uh hold on and let me say hi at this business people are saying this and that the other thing that bothered me didn't bother him i've got i don't have people government weekend they just trust in terrible things what i have to say is that

He is a, I consider him a personal friend and an ally.

I hope he feels like that.

But my point is that we've got to trust each other.

And my point is we should both think positively about each other.

We should think positively about this agreement.

We should always remember that every, every agreement ending every war has been

not satisfactory to either side unless there was unconditional surrender.

I wish there was unconditional surrender this time, but there cannot be.

That time is probably gone.

I mean, unconditional surrender of an arm.

I wish, for example, if the forces were there, perhaps if I had been president four years before I became president,

You could be very sure we wouldn't have stopped the bombing.

You could be very sure we would have beaten this bunch out.

And while we had 500,000, we could have landed a force.

I'm talking very candidly about what I would have done in the high fog area.

And I think they were in hell.

I really do think so.

But it's too late now.

We can't do that.

So what we now have to do is just strengthen you.

I want South Vietnam.

to have the strongest army in Southeast Asia.

I want you to have a strong air force.

I want you to have a strongest economy.

And with that and the back of the United States, you are going to be the major power in the area.

That's my belief.

You work hard.

I mean, I love the Cambodians and the Laotians and all of your neighbors and the rest, but I know your people.

Say, Martin, stop your talking.

You know that they fight well.

So do your people.

It isn't a question that they fight well.

Let me tell you why the North fights well.

Not because they're communists.

Because they're Vietnamese.

Vietnamese are brave people.

They're brave people.

They fight.

But now is time

25 years, and we want to help.

We want to keep you strong economically, strong militarily, and we want to be your friend and your ally.

As I say, I will always be your friend.

But if we do not make this, if, for example,

agreement, which we are going to negotiate this next week, and the timetable which we have now to do in order to meet this Congress to the vote.

See, I don't want them to push us out.

We've got a state march all ahead of the sheriff.

This time the sheriff is the Congress.

That's not the case.

No, no, no, no, no.

It's not the Congress.

I need to worry about the Congress because they meet January the 3rd.

And we've lost two seats in the Senate, you know.

And so we've lost two, so we're a little bit weaker in the Senate.

And as you know, Mr. Gretzky, we've had votes that won on occasion.

The House, as Ford told me yesterday, while Republicans came 13, there were some who ran on the basis of the fact that they thought we were going to work out a piece of some play.

The point I make is that in keeping that one jump ahead,

What we've got to do is to have all of these things out, and then as allies say, all right, this is our deal.

Let's be proud of it.

Let's meet on it.

And it's not that we need to take place in the earliest possible time, as soon as we can.

But it cannot be a meeting unless we know what was done and we understand it or not.

You can see President Pugh and I disagree.

That would be an international disaster.

It would be bad for us if it would be suicide for him.

No question about it.

Just suicide.

And so we must not let that happen.

On the other hand, the President, you and I, me, and his other hand, and this is thanks to you, I guess you've got to work out what the proper instructions of your president would be.

Then we leave with me, and we have an agreement.

We meet as friends and allies, and we stay friends and allies.

What I don't want to do is to have a situation where I will always be, as I said, a friend, but where because of the Congress, we cannot be an ally.

Now, that's really what it is.

It's just a simple fact.

I wish it were otherwise.

If it had been four years ago, or perhaps eight years ago,

in 1965, and I talked to President Johnson in this room, and he says that he feels that he is just sorry that he escalated slowly.

See, that was the difference I had with him.

I was in the country in 1965, and I saw a few Americans out there, and I said, if you start a bomb, if you ever start a bomb, don't do it in a, you know, with smaller machines.

And my group was actually killed by the mining incident, and I said, you know,

We gave them a massive stroke, and that will finish it.

But we never did that, you see.

We escalated the war slowly, which is a terrible mistake.

But that's all.

Water is the bridge.

We're now not in a position to escalate.

We're either slowly barging back.

If we were, we'd have a different situation.

Understand?

I'm telling you this in private.

That isn't what we're talking about.

We're not doing that.

We received an official protein from the Russians tomorrow and yesterday because I threatened the North Vietnamese with the President's instructions.

As I told you, I was embarrassed about resuming the bombing.

The Russian objective?

Well, we had, I had said, since the President resumed the bombing before May 8th, before this night, he might do it again.

He will do it certainly again and the Russians protested about that.

So I...

It is a tale that has stuck me to requesting views on the modality of the negotiations.

We feel that as the United States has been negotiating with the Hanoi president,

Hanoi seems to have a tendency to take advantage of the United States in pretending things to be contentious fashion.

Politically, it says that Hanoi does not form Washington, does not send troops to the United States.

Why should the United States do such a thing?

Or Vietnam, who are asking the United States to take even better obligations with them?

On the other hand, for the political solution, Hanoi portrays some of the political independence of the United States, and therefore the impression of the United States in terms of hosting political solutions.

You can contact the D.O.P.

while we are trying to get some notice from him.

This is like a cancel route.

Right.

In case the police appears that it is not possible to attend for them, we will try to attend in order to

to have the right, political and psychosocial, psychosomatic, to deal with those who are responsible for the United States, to deal mostly with the military and others who are in the business world, in the context of the United States.

And then,

Mr.

Ambassador, I noted that in his letter to the government.

If I were he, I would raise the point as he has and as you have.

At this point I would have to be very, if you want me to be frank, it is too late.

Maybe it was something, as you know, we tried and tried and tried and it did not go.

But now we are past that point.

And we're at a point where next week we are going to Paris.

And we are going to negotiate as hard as we can to get the very best possible agreement we can with these objectives that I have laid out, which I laid out on May 8th and January 10th.

I want Dr. Chester to meet you, frankly, if you or Dan has to meet.

to go over this and everything we possibly could have seen.

They apparently were very tough at last meeting.

However, we have told them the same thing we're telling them.

This is our last week.

This is it.

We're not going to wind it up.

So what I want, I think the idea of now changing the strategy, moving back to that position, separating the military from the political,

while it's a point that the president, I understand the president, you should make, you should make, I have to be frank and say that it cannot be done at this point.

But in effect, we've done it.

I mean, the other side of the political thing is really very general.

Well, in that case, what I meant is the very fact that we have not imposed a political settlement on South Vietnam.

As a matter of fact, the future of South Vietnam is going to be determined by a very astute, a very clever President Chu and his colleagues like yourself and yourself and the others.

I don't want to hear people.

with the support of the United States, you're going to determine that future.

The North's not going to determine it.

Presidents of some part of the individual groups are not going to determine it.

These psychological factors are not going to determine it.

The major psychological factor that's going to have influence on the North and on the South is going to be, in my view, the fact that, first, we're reaching agreements, and second, that we have President Hube and the President of the United States at the meeting,

and say we stand together for solidarity behind this agreement.

And the reach of it will be, of course, we will move on.

And the third point is that my vote with Congress

and getting congressional votes.

See, I have to submit it all to the Congress.

Congress, because the Congress, this requires some money, as you know, to continue to keep it obligated and obligated to provide.

And then, also, going to the country.

It would be my intention to go to the country.

Primarily, Mr. Trumbach, to lay the foundation and say, now, this is a reasonable agreement.

It's been .

It's an agreement, however, which depends upon the good of those sides.

And that will be not of you, but of the other side.

And we intend to keep it.

And we expect the high minority to keep it.

If an audience does not keep it, we should be prepared to act.

In other words, I've got to set the stage in this country so that if I have to act, I trust we will not have to.

But if we have to act, I can.

In order to do that, in order to set that stage, if I had to go before the American people and say, well, President Chu and the government of South Vietnam will not go on the agreement, well, two things are going to happen.

One, the Congress will cut it off.

And second, the American people would never support paying harder or anything.

But be that as it may, I wouldn't have to get ordered to win, because the funds that are necessary

to take military action will not be there.

The Congress can restrict the president.

We have to stay well jump ahead of him.

I don't think it can come to that.

Let me say, I want you, Dr. Kissinger, to sit down

you be as helpful as you can, or him be as helpful as he can, work over this language.

I have made a decision now as far as we're concerned.

It's a reasonable one.

I've got you from our viewpoint.

I'm very interested in all the points that President Chu has made.

I'm going to have Dr. Kissinger press all those points in his discussions.

I don't want to leave any illusions that you could, for example, get

That is probably about the total withdrawal of all of our BWKs.

That is going to happen.

We have to be very candid.

It's going to happen in the future.

But on the other hand, I'm talking about some of these other changes that we speak about.

I will tell the Institute exactly what we are talking about.

Also, what you can't get, what you can't get.

That's right.

What we discussed Monday afternoon at Cal Davis.

And in New York City.

Exactly.

And then that will prepare me, Mr.

Ambassador, for the meeting I have with Dr. Chester on Saturday.

He will come to Peterson, Florida.

And I'm going to meet with him for all morning then.

I'll go word for word with the things that you have discussed with him and all these technical details so you can talk with him.

and I will have the instructions as to what our, what I call, our better proposal is.

That's what I'm trying to do.

I would like to confirm the answer to that.

The problem for us is how to present, I think,

We have already been trying to have an agent of the people because we feel that it is indispensable for our success, for our solution.

Now in this regard, may I say, we've committed all the facts.

But in Vietnam, we have considered that since the end of World War II,

The policy of the United States, Asia, has been based on the contentment of child.

I think one in the nine has now understood that that is an evolution.

But in this context, if in this agreement, there is no religion to the point that I have submitted to you, it is very difficult for the GDPR to extend its bid and require a demand for us.

If you recall the positions that our two governments have taken, especially the government that I have taken in the past few years, and what it is now, I think you will realise that there has been a great evolution in the direction of flexibility.

both regarding military and political violence.

What it means now is just a few facts, a few small facts regarding police.

Two subjects.

In the NBA, at Manila, a police patrol, a police patrol six months after the beginning of the patrol arrived home.

Later, a silent police patrol now becomes

to the stage where there is mention of God.

We have already almost completely known what life was.

All we need now is just a simple reference, even a direct interest reference, but at some stage, somehow, the entity has to withdraw.

That is, it has to rise again.

I would not have used the time to go into the stage, but if you decide that you can work or not, that is the principle.

And then we can find a way in order to fight the wars.

But somewhere, somehow, we feel from a standpoint of the United States, that there should be a reference indicating the NDA cannot stay in South Vietnam after the ceasefire.

A second of the political issues, but the national reconciliation or anything,

can be interpreted by the people of South Vietnam as a coercive government.

Therefore, to avoid wars, a few of the sign-lines used in describing coercive government, like free companies, or even the U.S. state companies now, the governmental structure, or something like that.

And even if education or imputation of their two parallel companies in South Vietnam could be very, very damaging to us, because if

I see the points.

I think that goes to the heart of the matter.

There are difficult points and you can work on those.

I want to be equally frank and point out that we will

We're now, of course, we must move forward with the very, very best we can.

But we're going to settle.

And we're going to settle in the right way.

We want to settle in a way that we can

continue to support Vietnam, both through our economic and military assistance and through the commitment to take action in the event of the agreement.

One final word on the Chinese thing.

That mystifies me a bit, because I would suggest that we will have far greater influence

on the Chinese from within than we ever could.

And that's my view of it.

I don't know that we're good enough to contain it.

But we're doing both.

We're containing them.

The whole point of the fact of the matter is, if you read the anti-communicate, it was one in which the Chinese renounced the concept of expansion .

Well, anyway, we must get on to our other chores here.

It's good to see you again after all this time.

We've had a long evening here.

It's good to see you again.

I wish you the best.

I appreciate your hard work.

I don't think they pay investors enough.

All right?

All right.

Hey.

Hiya.