Nixon, Haig & Butterfield on Vietnam War and Peace negotiations

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I don't know

You have a reception tomorrow, you know, 6.30 at the games.

Do you want to sit out around before that?

Speaker Albert, please.

Speaker Albert.

Thank you.

Well, he can't.

See, the reason he can't extend that is because he's got a lot of others he's got to extend to, too, I guess.

Oh, yeah, we had a different one.

Yeah, I understand.

I went over that list with him.

Who the hell was he having?

I mean, he shouldn't have any sisters, either.

He insists on having none, so.

Well, I don't think he would have any of them.

That's best.

No, but if he had, if he had four, couldn't his aunt be suspicious of him?

So you don't have one?

I said if you have four, which you have now, Timon's absence is conspicuous, so... What is the injustice of the president?

Timon's justice.

He's... Who are we having?

Which four are we having?

Flannigan, Timmons, Baldwin, Irwin, and Chester.

Those are... Oh, wait.

Have you invited them yet?

No, they haven't invited them.

Nobody's been invited.

The cabinet member is finding a way to keep him off.

Three.

If you do that, come on.

I think you can have the floor.

I can fight with the planning.

We've got the problem.

It's either got to be three or I'm afraid he's got to add .

10 minutes to the damn thing.

And I don't know what the hell he does with his arm.

Right?

That's the problem, David.

Jacob's really in another category.

That's right.

I'll take it.

But you see what I mean?

I frankly think he should have the three.

I don't think he should have planning.

I just think he's got to be right about it.

Because if you get planning, then I think you're down to the 10 minutes problem.

You can do that each of you.

I'll take it.

But I don't see if he's invited and then let me know, huh?

Yes, I will.

Okay.

Well, that's interesting.

He's got a lot of money.

Yeah, that's a good selling.

That's a good group, yes.

oh, I don't know what's happening in Vietnam.

You know, you tell them the truth and they don't believe it.

No, I had told them almost precisely what you told them.

They asked me that in the cabinet room.

So Breeden called and stated that he had had a report from Hanoi.

Hanoi claims that it's Kissinger who has been trained.

And that there were many issues unresolved.

And Schissinger had told them that there was so much to be done that it may run until the end of December if we don't get moving.

This seemed to bother the hell out of them.

Out of whom?

Out of the North Vietnamese, because the Bremen made a special point of it.

He said, of course, I'm going to take them out of context.

He said, I don't know how that could be.

Well, it bothered them.

that Henry gave them the impression that we didn't give a damn whether it took between now and the end of December or what to get this thing finished.

So I got the impression that they feel a time constraint.

We're not going to wait until the end of Christmas.

No, well, no, we can't do that.

And if the talks break off or recess, I think...

We've got to pick it up.

We've got to really put the heat on them.

He also said that they not only disagreed on the DMZ, they disagreed on the political prisoners that Henry had given them an assurance, which he was now not giving them.

That's pure baloney.

That's not true.

No, it's not true.

And I went through this with the brain.

I said, look, very frankly, because I sat in there, I know what their tactics have been.

They no sooner get a concession from us on an old issue like HC or our civilians, they pocket our concession and then reopen the issue again to get another one.

I said, on Saturday, we were on the verge of settlement with only the issue that I told you, and that was reiterated categorically by Legatco.

And I said, quite simply, now they have this kind of an important and indicative of

very fundamental misstatements of how this thing is developing.

He said, well, we are using our good office.

He said, Mr. President, I've been very, very anxious to get this thing settled.

And he said he was especially impressed that the President called me personally about it.

And he does intend to follow up.

He has already exerted pressure.

And he would hope that we would keep him

specifically aggressive.

So I've sent a message to Henry telling him to keep talking, give us something finite to give the Soviets, which would look responsive to Sabrina's request, and constructive from our point of view.

I gather these things must have unraveled in Monday's session, and Henry was so upset about it that he didn't

He wasn't very specific about the issue, just the atmosphere and the overall attitude.

At least they're working on it.

They're always going to be that way.

together in the moment.

We've got to keep that crowd in there as long as we possibly can.

It's our own salvation.

Joe and I made a remarkable statement yesterday in front of a group of press people in Peking.

He said he expects a ceasefire in two or three days.

And then he added, he said, you know, there's so much concern about a few hundred Americans in the prisons.

In North Vietnam, he said,

There should be more concern about the thousands, tens of thousands of South Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam.

But that was a fairly optimistic thing for him to say.

I think they're playing it tough and that they're suddenly going to give.

They don't suddenly give to the Henry Old Desert period.

They play it tough and they suddenly give.

Well, I think they do in the context of we know each other's traditions.

Did they get it, for example, in Shanghai?

Did they give it a salt?

I guess they did.

Oh, I think they did, yes.

They played it right tough.

Played it tough, and then, well, by give, I mean, I agree to collapse, and if I collapse, they'll agree to compromise, instead of being totally intransigent.

Well, as far as I'm concerned, two of his, I don't want to cut off our face, but he has really destroyed his usefulness.

Amen.

Frankly, it's credibility as far as arguing on an equal basis with an ally.

You cannot bring this idea of a thing to an ally and kick it around and push it around and knock it around.

This way we cannot allow that the American people will let go of one thing.

There can be no moral or

Any other consideration with respect to this guy from now on?

We've got to play this on pure self-interest, totally.

Well, the whole point is that his interests are different from ours.

That's right.

His interests are a total, unconditional surrender to the enemy.

Ours are an honorable withdrawal, giving them an opportunity over a period of time to win bullets.

Well, if there's anything short of that, it's not from a handgun.

the seeds of stability.

It's going to have the seeds of more conflict.

If he insists on total surrender, he's not going to get it.

He hadn't earned it.

He hadn't won it on the battlefield.

Well, he could win, maybe, if we continue to bomb the shit out of them forever.

For three, four years, you mean they would continue the way they're fighting now?

No.

The Russians will send in more help.

The Chinese will.

You don't have to.

Russia and China cannot allow North Vietnam to lose.

We cannot allow South Vietnam to lose.

That's where this war is in the present time.

Isn't that brilliant?

That's exactly right.

And under those circumstances, so you make peace.

It's as cold as that.

where you change the character of it so that we can disengage the larger power interests the way they've been for so long.

I must say this, though, that I think we are withdrawing the idea of my meeting, my call.

I mean, I think that's, I'm just not going to, I'm just going to delay it on the basis of, well, I can't now.

We offered a time.

He never responded.

Of course, I'm sorry.

I can't do that.

It doesn't mean anything anyway.

It would be a little crazy not to be midway with my arm around me in the event that he does come in for the rest of the day.

Well, it doesn't mean anything.

Or are you greedy?

No, the only way I would consider it is if it was absolutely essential to bring him back to the board.

Well, yeah.

Only that one.

Yeah.

But I don't think it will be.

If he decides to come aboard, it's not going to be based on that issue.

You are now leaving, though.

We do get it, you know.

Sunday.

Yes, yes, I know.

I told you one point.

I'm not so sure that I...

I mean, I don't mean...

I don't think we can keep too much.

But I also mean that I don't think we have to insist on too much either.

Let me say, I frankly think at this point, the deal is so goddamn confused and stitched up and screwed up that however it comes out is going to make a lot of difference.

And we're worried about, well, how can you grieve that?

How can you grieve that?

Did we gain this or that in concession?

To be perfectly frank with you, they went back to October 8th.

I accepted it.

Well, I can go back to that.

No, I think Henry would do that.

You know, we discussed this rather cold-bloodedly before I left, and it was that if we can't get this last EMG thing, we're okay.

They're not even giving us that option because they keep opening up new things.

And it's just, you know, more of you have been in difficulty with

ever showing them a willingness to compromise, is a thing.

The fact is, it's immediately exploited.

And then the next thing you know, you are in an untenable position.

I know.

That's... Well, here you are in the present time, so you're probably going to break off the day and do that, and whatever.

Yeah, I think so.

I think today will probably be another frustrating session, but softer than Monday's.

And we will feel that we've gotten some progress.

We'll probably say that we've gotten some progress, but it may not be.

And that he'll want to stay on tomorrow and have another round.

And then I think there's a good chance he'll settle with tomorrow.

I'm more optimistic.

More so than I think you're going to settle.

You think so?

Let me tell you, I'm totally relaxed now that I think about the thing now.

I know it's going to be an all hell of a day.

The hopes are so high.

I do care about my wife.

My wife is here today, Renee.

Yet there's a real provocation.

We're going to bomb the hell out of them.

And that's the thing, they can't get more through his goddamn thick head.

I mean, he showed me some half-assed little things, but I really do.

There's one goddamn thing that's new.

Well, if you've got his communication sent here.

I said, but you did that before, haven't you?

He said, we took it out in 68.

Radio pilot.

What about the, that's communications.

Oh.

Sorry, communications.

I said, power.

Well, that, we took it out in 68, you know.

I said, all right, there's the power plant.

There's the radio in the shack.

And then, what else do we do?

Well, the other thing we do is go back and take out the bridges so that they rebuild.

And I said, what about the civilian airport?

Oh, there's much trouble.

Sorry, Mike.

He said, well, we could hit one side of it, but they're all military.

You know, you should be crimping him down.

You should be having to crimp him down.

That's not inevitable.

But my point is, what is the, what the hell is there?

What can we do?

That's my point.

What can we do in terms of stepping up bombing?

I think the 52s in that area are a tremendous psychological blow and very, very effective.

What in the hell are they going to do?

Bill, I mean, just the fact that they're dropping things in the boondocks, are you going to scare people?

No.

They've got to take out that.

They've got to use some smart bombs on the dock facilities and hike bombs.

Well, if they do, do they use any smart bombs?

No.

That will have to be very pinpoint, careful delivery in good weather with the smart bombs.

That will impress them.

You've got to take out the power plant in Illinois, which we've never touched.

I agree to never touch that.

And the transshipment point, the base rate.

Yeah, I think you showed me that.

You showed me that.

Got to take that out.

Deliver it to the students.

That's right.

That one we can just cling at.

And there'll be some slop over casualties.

God damn it.

So be it.

That gets their attention.

We'll have to take out Radio Hanoi because that's a real command and control problem.

Sure.

We've got some other targets in the outskirts of Hanoi, rail rebuild shops, maintenance shops.

We've just got to take them down.

There'll be some slop over there.

I just want to be sure that those 72s go every goddamn night.

That's what they do.

And they can hit the airfield.

I think we should go in and take out every airfield.

I'm the only M5.

They're five and they're about three.

Why not just take them all out?

Like the Israelis took out the Egyptians' airfields.

Why not?

Are we afraid because there's some Russian?

No, it's just not a productive target.

How the hell is it being productive?

Just take them out.

We can take them out.

As simple as their airfields are.

I think it would be good to take their military side of that civilian field back.

Did you take it out?

That's right.

And yesterday, where the hell did they go to land?

Then we got some very good targets up in that buffer zone with China.

And we got to cut that down.

I cut it down to five miles.

I can't see why you think there's any reason for outcasts.

Well, let's start out with the basic assumption that they're hurt and that they want to settle.

That I believe.

Even despite the fact that we have this moment, we still have to hurry.

The mind has got to hurt some, because...

I believe that.

Secondly, I believe that they do know.

I don't think they read us the same way we read ourselves.

We know we've got some pressures working on us.

They can't be sure of those pressures.

They've misjudged you every time.

And I think you've had them on edge with respect to what you'll do.

At the same time, I think they do feel that

They can work time to their advantage with us, up to a point.

They get to a point now in January where they've got to commit themselves to a strategy in the South which is conventional and much the same as it's been.

Not break their units up the way they're doing it, getting ready for a ceasefire, where they become more vulnerable if the war continues.

If the war continues, they have themselves all configured for a ceasefire.

They're quite vulnerable to Jews

counteraction, and it could have ruined that whole structure.

The very fact that they've moved, they've instructed their canneries, they're going to a ceasefire, and the momentum is all in that direction, I think it's going to be hard for them to pull away from the South.

I don't take any comfort from what they're telling the people, because the bastards are going to conduct a pretty tough struggle.

What's Chu doing?

What's he doing?

And what's he doing about this?

Why is he making this kind of speech?

Because I think he's just, in his Mandarin style, is deathly afraid of entering into a political context.

So, when we make a deal with him, I think ultimately he'll come around, but he's going to be portrayed as being forced into it.

So that he can always

keep the sympathy of the people, and that the tough sequence of events that follow, he can say, well, this is the best I could do.

I mean, we've got to suffer through it together, rather than to have been accused of being naive and gone into something which I would not have heard.

And I would say I regret the speech, because I think speeches mean more, Congress has said, much less we will mean others do.

I think you've got to figure this speech is made for that audience.

And he was doing it for the record.

He was received with almost total silence in the house.

He was.

He got no applause.

He got no reaction.

All right.

It would be well-being to hear a little comment on his hands, too.

And there are plenty of guys standing in the wings that have already told us they'd be delighted to accept this settlement.

Well, there's no need to take your word up, you know.

We should have it by now.

It should be very soon.

There's no attendance to what?

It's ten minutes to seven.

What?

Ten minutes to seven.

Eight o'clock.

The meeting's over.

It may not be, because he would call me as soon as he got back to the embassy.

Amen.

Nixon, Haig & Butterfield on Vietnam War and Peace negotiations

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on December 12, 1972

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