Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 820-016
Date: Tuesday, December 12, 1972 at 1:30 PM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Butterfield, Alexander P.; White House operator; Bull, Stephen B.; Haig, Alexander M., Jr.
Recording device: Oval Office
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/820-016

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[0:22] I don't know
[0:54] You have a reception tomorrow, you know, 6.30 at the games.
[0:56] Do you want to sit out around before that?
[1:06] Speaker Albert, please.
[1:07] Speaker Albert.
[1:12] Thank you.
[2:01] Well, he can't.
[2:02] See, the reason he can't extend that is because he's got a lot of others he's got to extend to, too, I guess.
[2:10] Oh, yeah, we had a different one.
[2:12] Yeah, I understand.
[2:13] I went over that list with him.
[2:16] Who the hell was he having?
[2:17] I mean, he shouldn't have any sisters, either.
[2:18] He insists on having none, so.
[2:20] Well, I don't think he would have any of them.
[2:22] That's best.
[2:23] No, but if he had, if he had four, couldn't his aunt be suspicious of him?
[2:29] So you don't have one?
[2:30] I said if you have four, which you have now, Timon's absence is conspicuous, so... What is the injustice of the president?
[2:36] Timon's justice.
[2:38] He's... Who are we having?
[2:40] Which four are we having?
[2:42] Flannigan, Timmons, Baldwin, Irwin, and Chester.
[2:47] Those are... Oh, wait.
[2:47] Have you invited them yet?
[2:48] No, they haven't invited them.
[2:50] Nobody's been invited.
[2:54] The cabinet member is finding a way to keep him off.
[2:59] Three.
[3:00] If you do that, come on.
[3:03] I think you can have the floor.
[3:09] I can fight with the planning.
[3:12] We've got the problem.
[3:16] It's either got to be three or I'm afraid he's got to add .
[3:29] 10 minutes to the damn thing.
[3:31] And I don't know what the hell he does with his arm.
[3:34] Right?
[3:35] That's the problem, David.
[3:36] Jacob's really in another category.
[3:39] That's right.
[3:41] I'll take it.
[3:42] But you see what I mean?
[3:43] I frankly think he should have the three.
[3:45] I don't think he should have planning.
[3:47] I just think he's got to be right about it.
[3:49] Because if you get planning, then I think you're down to the 10 minutes problem.
[3:53] You can do that each of you.
[3:55] I'll take it.
[3:57] But I don't see if he's invited and then let me know, huh?
[4:00] Yes, I will.
[4:03] Okay.
[4:05] Well, that's interesting.
[4:06] He's got a lot of money.
[4:09] Yeah, that's a good selling.
[4:12] That's a good group, yes.
[4:20] oh, I don't know what's happening in Vietnam.
[4:24] You know, you tell them the truth and they don't believe it.
[4:27] No, I had told them almost precisely what you told them.
[4:31] They asked me that in the cabinet room.
[4:35] So Breeden called and stated that he had had a report from Hanoi.
[4:42] Hanoi claims that it's Kissinger who has been trained.
[4:47] And that there were many issues unresolved.
[4:51] And Schissinger had told them that there was so much to be done that it may run until the end of December if we don't get moving.
[5:02] This seemed to bother the hell out of them.
[5:05] Out of whom?
[5:06] Out of the North Vietnamese, because the Bremen made a special point of it.
[5:12] He said, of course, I'm going to take them out of context.
[5:14] He said, I don't know how that could be.
[5:17] Well, it bothered them.
[5:18] that Henry gave them the impression that we didn't give a damn whether it took between now and the end of December or what to get this thing finished.
[5:27] So I got the impression that they feel a time constraint.
[5:34] We're not going to wait until the end of Christmas.
[5:39] No, well, no, we can't do that.
[5:43] And if the talks break off or recess, I think...
[5:48] We've got to pick it up.
[5:49] We've got to really put the heat on them.
[5:53] He also said that they not only disagreed on the DMZ, they disagreed on the political prisoners that Henry had given them an assurance, which he was now not giving them.
[6:05] That's pure baloney.
[6:06] That's not true.
[6:07] No, it's not true.
[6:08] And I went through this with the brain.
[6:10] I said, look, very frankly, because I sat in there, I know what their tactics have been.
[6:16] They no sooner get a concession from us on an old issue like HC or our civilians, they pocket our concession and then reopen the issue again to get another one.
[6:27] I said, on Saturday, we were on the verge of settlement with only the issue that I told you, and that was reiterated categorically by Legatco.
[6:39] And I said, quite simply, now they have this kind of an important and indicative of
[6:47] very fundamental misstatements of how this thing is developing.
[6:54] He said, well, we are using our good office.
[6:56] He said, Mr. President, I've been very, very anxious to get this thing settled.
[7:00] And he said he was especially impressed that the President called me personally about it.
[7:06] And he does intend to follow up.
[7:09] He has already exerted pressure.
[7:12] And he would hope that we would keep him
[7:17] specifically aggressive.
[7:19] So I've sent a message to Henry telling him to keep talking, give us something finite to give the Soviets, which would look responsive to Sabrina's request, and constructive from our point of view.
[7:39] I gather these things must have unraveled in Monday's session, and Henry was so upset about it that he didn't
[7:47] He wasn't very specific about the issue, just the atmosphere and the overall attitude.
[7:55] At least they're working on it.
[8:01] They're always going to be that way.
[8:24] together in the moment.
[8:25] We've got to keep that crowd in there as long as we possibly can.
[8:28] It's our own salvation.
[8:30] Joe and I made a remarkable statement yesterday in front of a group of press people in Peking.
[8:39] He said he expects a ceasefire in two or three days.
[8:44] And then he added, he said, you know, there's so much concern about a few hundred Americans in the prisons.
[8:50] In North Vietnam, he said,
[8:53] There should be more concern about the thousands, tens of thousands of South Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam.
[9:03] But that was a fairly optimistic thing for him to say.
[9:07] I think they're playing it tough and that they're suddenly going to give.
[9:11] They don't suddenly give to the Henry Old Desert period.
[9:15] They play it tough and they suddenly give.
[9:19] Well, I think they do in the context of we know each other's traditions.
[9:24] Did they get it, for example, in Shanghai?
[9:27] Did they give it a salt?
[9:29] I guess they did.
[9:30] Oh, I think they did, yes.
[9:33] They played it right tough.
[9:34] Played it tough, and then, well, by give, I mean, I agree to collapse, and if I collapse, they'll agree to compromise, instead of being totally intransigent.
[10:09] Well, as far as I'm concerned, two of his, I don't want to cut off our face, but he has really destroyed his usefulness.
[10:19] Amen.
[10:21] Frankly, it's credibility as far as arguing on an equal basis with an ally.
[10:29] You cannot bring this idea of a thing to an ally and kick it around and push it around and knock it around.
[10:38] This way we cannot allow that the American people will let go of one thing.
[10:44] There can be no moral or
[10:48] Any other consideration with respect to this guy from now on?
[10:50] We've got to play this on pure self-interest, totally.
[10:54] Well, the whole point is that his interests are different from ours.
[10:58] That's right.
[10:58] His interests are a total, unconditional surrender to the enemy.
[11:03] Ours are an honorable withdrawal, giving them an opportunity over a period of time to win bullets.
[11:11] Well, if there's anything short of that, it's not from a handgun.
[11:15] the seeds of stability.
[11:16] It's going to have the seeds of more conflict.
[11:19] If he insists on total surrender, he's not going to get it.
[11:22] He hadn't earned it.
[11:24] He hadn't won it on the battlefield.
[11:29] Well, he could win, maybe, if we continue to bomb the shit out of them forever.
[11:33] For three, four years, you mean they would continue the way they're fighting now?
[11:36] No.
[11:37] The Russians will send in more help.
[11:39] The Chinese will.
[11:40] You don't have to.
[11:41] Russia and China cannot allow North Vietnam to lose.
[11:45] We cannot allow South Vietnam to lose.
[11:47] That's where this war is in the present time.
[11:49] Isn't that brilliant?
[11:50] That's exactly right.
[11:51] And under those circumstances, so you make peace.
[11:55] It's as cold as that.
[11:57] where you change the character of it so that we can disengage the larger power interests the way they've been for so long.
[12:07] I must say this, though, that I think we are withdrawing the idea of my meeting, my call.
[12:15] I mean, I think that's, I'm just not going to, I'm just going to delay it on the basis of, well, I can't now.
[12:23] We offered a time.
[12:24] He never responded.
[12:25] Of course, I'm sorry.
[12:27] I can't do that.
[12:28] It doesn't mean anything anyway.
[12:29] It would be a little crazy not to be midway with my arm around me in the event that he does come in for the rest of the day.
[12:37] Well, it doesn't mean anything.
[12:39] Or are you greedy?
[12:41] No, the only way I would consider it is if it was absolutely essential to bring him back to the board.
[12:50] Well, yeah.
[12:51] Only that one.
[12:53] Yeah.
[12:53] But I don't think it will be.
[12:54] If he decides to come aboard, it's not going to be based on that issue.
[12:59] You are now leaving, though.
[13:02] We do get it, you know.
[13:04] Sunday.
[13:10] Sunday.
[13:12] Yes, yes, I know.
[13:13] I told you one point.
[13:15] I'm not so sure that I...
[13:16] I mean, I don't mean...
[13:20] I don't think we can keep too much.
[13:22] But I also mean that I don't think we have to insist on too much either.
[13:26] Let me say, I frankly think at this point, the deal is so goddamn confused and stitched up and screwed up that however it comes out is going to make a lot of difference.
[13:36] And we're worried about, well, how can you grieve that?
[13:39] How can you grieve that?
[13:40] How can you grieve that?
[13:41] Did we gain this or that in concession?
[13:42] To be perfectly frank with you, they went back to October 8th.
[13:46] I accepted it.
[13:50] Well, I can go back to that.
[13:54] No, I think Henry would do that.
[13:59] You know, we discussed this rather cold-bloodedly before I left, and it was that if we can't get this last EMG thing, we're okay.
[14:13] They're not even giving us that option because they keep opening up new things.
[14:18] And it's just, you know, more of you have been in difficulty with
[14:23] ever showing them a willingness to compromise, is a thing.
[14:27] The fact is, it's immediately exploited.
[14:31] And then the next thing you know, you are in an untenable position.
[14:33] I know.
[14:36] That's... Well, here you are in the present time, so you're probably going to break off the day and do that, and whatever.
[14:43] Yeah, I think so.
[14:44] I think today will probably be another frustrating session, but softer than Monday's.
[14:51] And we will feel that we've gotten some progress.
[14:55] We'll probably say that we've gotten some progress, but it may not be.
[14:59] And that he'll want to stay on tomorrow and have another round.
[15:07] And then I think there's a good chance he'll settle with tomorrow.
[15:13] I'm more optimistic.
[15:16] More so than I think you're going to settle.
[15:19] You think so?
[15:23] Let me tell you, I'm totally relaxed now that I think about the thing now.
[15:27] I know it's going to be an all hell of a day.
[15:30] The hopes are so high.
[15:31] I do care about my wife.
[15:36] My wife is here today, Renee.
[15:41] Yet there's a real provocation.
[15:43] We're going to bomb the hell out of them.
[15:45] And that's the thing, they can't get more through his goddamn thick head.
[15:48] I mean, he showed me some half-assed little things, but I really do.
[15:51] There's one goddamn thing that's new.
[15:54] Well, if you've got his communication sent here.
[15:55] I said, but you did that before, haven't you?
[15:58] He said, we took it out in 68.
[16:03] Radio pilot.
[16:03] What about the, that's communications.
[16:06] Oh.
[16:06] Sorry, communications.
[16:07] I said, power.
[16:09] Well, that, we took it out in 68, you know.
[16:11] I said, all right, there's the power plant.
[16:14] There's the radio in the shack.
[16:16] And then, what else do we do?
[16:18] Well, the other thing we do is go back and take out the bridges so that they rebuild.
[16:23] And I said, what about the civilian airport?
[16:26] Oh, there's much trouble.
[16:27] Sorry, Mike.
[16:28] He said, well, we could hit one side of it, but they're all military.
[16:37] You know, you should be crimping him down.
[16:40] You should be having to crimp him down.
[16:42] That's not inevitable.
[16:44] But my point is, what is the, what the hell is there?
[16:47] What can we do?
[16:50] That's my point.
[16:50] What can we do in terms of stepping up bombing?
[16:54] I think the 52s in that area are a tremendous psychological blow and very, very effective.
[17:00] What in the hell are they going to do?
[17:02] Bill, I mean, just the fact that they're dropping things in the boondocks, are you going to scare people?
[17:09] No.
[17:09] They've got to take out that.
[17:10] They've got to use some smart bombs on the dock facilities and hike bombs.
[17:15] Well, if they do, do they use any smart bombs?
[17:17] No.
[17:18] That will have to be very pinpoint, careful delivery in good weather with the smart bombs.
[17:23] That will impress them.
[17:25] You've got to take out the power plant in Illinois, which we've never touched.
[17:31] I agree to never touch that.
[17:33] And the transshipment point, the base rate.
[17:35] Yeah, I think you showed me that.
[17:37] You showed me that.
[17:38] Got to take that out.
[17:39] Deliver it to the students.
[17:40] That's right.
[17:41] That one we can just cling at.
[17:43] And there'll be some slop over casualties.
[17:45] God damn it.
[17:46] So be it.
[17:47] So be it.
[17:48] That gets their attention.
[17:49] That gets their attention.
[17:52] We'll have to take out Radio Hanoi because that's a real command and control problem.
[17:57] Sure.
[18:00] We've got some other targets in the outskirts of Hanoi, rail rebuild shops, maintenance shops.
[18:08] We've just got to take them down.
[18:10] There'll be some slop over there.
[18:11] I just want to be sure that those 72s go every goddamn night.
[18:19] That's what they do.
[18:21] And they can hit the airfield.
[18:23] I think we should go in and take out every airfield.
[18:27] I'm the only M5.
[18:30] They're five and they're about three.
[18:35] Why not just take them all out?
[18:37] Like the Israelis took out the Egyptians' airfields.
[18:39] Why not?
[18:41] Are we afraid because there's some Russian?
[18:43] No, it's just not a productive target.
[18:47] How the hell is it being productive?
[18:50] Just take them out.
[18:51] We can take them out.
[18:53] As simple as their airfields are.
[18:54] I think it would be good to take their military side of that civilian field back.
[18:59] Did you take it out?
[19:00] That's right.
[19:00] And yesterday, where the hell did they go to land?
[19:05] Then we got some very good targets up in that buffer zone with China.
[19:10] And we got to cut that down.
[19:11] I cut it down to five miles.
[19:17] I can't see why you think there's any reason for outcasts.
[19:23] Well, let's start out with the basic assumption that they're hurt and that they want to settle.
[19:32] That I believe.
[19:33] Even despite the fact that we have this moment, we still have to hurry.
[19:40] The mind has got to hurt some, because...
[19:54] I believe that.
[19:57] Secondly, I believe that they do know.
[20:01] I don't think they read us the same way we read ourselves.
[20:04] We know we've got some pressures working on us.
[20:07] They can't be sure of those pressures.
[20:09] They've misjudged you every time.
[20:12] And I think you've had them on edge with respect to what you'll do.
[20:15] At the same time, I think they do feel that
[20:22] They can work time to their advantage with us, up to a point.
[20:26] They get to a point now in January where they've got to commit themselves to a strategy in the South which is conventional and much the same as it's been.
[20:37] Not break their units up the way they're doing it, getting ready for a ceasefire, where they become more vulnerable if the war continues.
[20:43] If the war continues, they have themselves all configured for a ceasefire.
[20:49] They're quite vulnerable to Jews
[20:52] counteraction, and it could have ruined that whole structure.
[20:58] The very fact that they've moved, they've instructed their canneries, they're going to a ceasefire, and the momentum is all in that direction, I think it's going to be hard for them to pull away from the South.
[21:11] I don't take any comfort from what they're telling the people, because the bastards are going to conduct a pretty tough struggle.
[21:17] What's Chu doing?
[21:19] What's he doing?
[21:21] And what's he doing about this?
[21:23] Why is he making this kind of speech?
[21:25] Because I think he's just, in his Mandarin style, is deathly afraid of entering into a political context.
[21:35] So, when we make a deal with him, I think ultimately he'll come around, but he's going to be portrayed as being forced into it.
[21:48] So that he can always
[21:51] keep the sympathy of the people, and that the tough sequence of events that follow, he can say, well, this is the best I could do.
[21:58] I mean, we've got to suffer through it together, rather than to have been accused of being naive and gone into something which I would not have heard.
[22:10] And I would say I regret the speech, because I think speeches mean more, Congress has said, much less we will mean others do.
[22:20] I think you've got to figure this speech is made for that audience.
[22:25] And he was doing it for the record.
[22:29] He was received with almost total silence in the house.
[22:33] He was.
[22:33] He got no applause.
[22:35] He got no reaction.
[22:38] All right.
[22:40] It would be well-being to hear a little comment on his hands, too.
[22:46] And there are plenty of guys standing in the wings that have already told us they'd be delighted to accept this settlement.
[22:52] Well, there's no need to take your word up, you know.
[22:57] We should have it by now.
[22:58] It should be very soon.
[23:00] There's no attendance to what?
[23:02] It's ten minutes to seven.
[23:05] What?
[23:06] Ten minutes to seven.
[23:07] Eight o'clock.
[23:09] Eight o'clock.
[23:10] The meeting's over.
[23:11] It may not be, because he would call me as soon as he got back to the embassy.
[23:16] Amen.
[23:16] Amen.