Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Operation Linebacker II

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You know, there's always a question of each individual and the sensitivities involved.

But I do feel that some of the problems have been substantially reduced as a result of the changes that you've made.

I mean, you know, the fact that the extra wheels are left, the departments and so forth and so on.

Some of them, at least.

Well, there's no question, if you cut it down, it works.

We're moving down at a...

Right.

As far as the force of invasion is concerned, I don't know what that means.

I don't know what that means.

Oh, yeah.

I'm just waiting to have a start.

I'm trying to develop the underlying idea now that Ron's making this point as we make these announcements, that these are people who are losing and aren't being replaced.

These are rejections.

Right.

Not changes, not correct bodies, or not musical chairs, but departures.

Right.

Everyone's going bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, right now.

You know, every day.

Oh, good.

Well, by the time you let it go, Kate had joined the club.

Matt, please cut down.

You got kicked in the teeth.

Kept waiting for five hours.

Have you seen him in that time?

So I got a letter to you.

Turning it all down.

Demands the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces totally.

Now reluctantly he accepts the National Council.

He'll no longer call it a coalition government in disguise.

All he wants is total withdrawal of Nopunyan, Crosby, and his closest, and two other insane conditions.

And, uh, he has to be insane.

Well, what does that mean?

That means, as I said, we go ball-tired on January 3rd for a separate deal.

Under these conditions, Mr. President, it's the only two choices we now have.

Actually, I think the North Vietnamese are in a curious doubt that they came to the technical meeting today.

They didn't?

They didn't come to it.

They condemned us for 20 minutes about the bombing and refused to talk about anything else.

But then they proposed another technical meeting for Saturday.

Now, that's not a sign of enormous liquor.

When we lost three B-52s this morning, and we hit a Russian ship, I don't know, three more B-52s.

That's six to get all again.

Yesterday we didn't lose any.

What?

Yesterday we didn't lose any.

Oh, that's rough.

But we're scaling now.

But tomorrow, if we had any event planned to go

These SA-2s were designed to be SP-52s, Mr. President.

How much was last night redeveloped out of those SP-52s?

Hmm?

There's something Kennedy made a speech last night.

What'd he say?

That Congress has, if you fail, and I fail, you took me on too.

That it's got to be taken out of our hands.

And Congress has to let the boys out of the war.

Of course, what that son of a bitch, Hugh, has done to us is criminal.

We could have ended the war.

It's an American initiative.

How does Moore feel about the three that you're going to choose?

Is he expressing concern?

Or Laird, who you talked to?

Well, I talked to Laird, but, you know, they say they expect a three for every hundred.

That's true.

For every strike?

For every hundred.

Every hundred that you move in?

Yeah.

You expect to lose three?

Well, that's what we've been losing.

the trouble is our airport, to give you an example, every day they have flown these missions in exactly the same hours.

Then I told this to them yesterday.

They said, well, we've got so much other stuff coming in.

But these North Vietnamese aren't stupid.

They know at 7, 10, the goddamn B-52s are coming.

That's what I think happened.

That these guys...

Well, let's come back to the losses again.

If they expect three for every answer, that's where it is.

You didn't lose that many, though.

You didn't lose any of the second conclusion.

No.

Well, he wants to knock it off.

Absolutely not.

Laird does not suggest to knock it off.

Well, he wouldn't resist such an order, but I think now that we've talked, it will become, Mr. President,

The only thing that we can do is total brutality.

But we now have a strategic choice.

I think there's a better than 50-50 chance that the North Vietnamese will want to go ahead with the agreement.

Because I don't see any sense in their continuing the technical talk if they didn't want to settle.

It is now also clear to me, almost clear,

There's almost no way we can get Pew to go along without doing a DX on him.

No, I know, but I'm just saying, what has happened is we have to throttle his economic aid, we have to throttle his military aid, and we can do it, then he gets overthrown, and...

So, what I think we have to do, the only question in my mind now is whether we should get to the...

He'll be in Key Biscayne either tomorrow night or Thursday Friday night.

That's nothing to talk about.

He's now in Bangkok and he's going to Seoul.

And he'll be in Key Biscayne no later than 8 o'clock Friday morning.

And the only... Because Q kept him waiting for six hours, his schedule is screwed up.

That's another outrageous behavior of few.

No, he kept me waiting once for 15 hours.

But that's a different problem.

We have two choices now.

We can either scrap the peace plan altogether and go immediately to the bilateral.

And we, that, the North Vietnamese may force on us if they turn it down too.

Or,

We can conclude it with the North Weasley Mates if they come along.

And then, if you despise, go bilateral.

That son of a bitch.

You know, if we had known that no matter what we did, he wouldn't go along,

We could have settled the week of November 20th.

I wouldn't have presented all of this on the empty mat.

We could have gotten eight or ten chances.

No, what we would have had to do then is use the fact of a settlement.

I think, commencically, we'll be all right if we get a settlement with no noise and few rejects.

and then go bilateral, and then go bilateral.

What's killing us now is that we have neither a settlement with Hanoi nor a settlement with the Jews.

And if that bastard hadn't strung us along, if you had instructions to me, that's not your instruction, but I mean if you, because we had both decided this, my conception was, which I had recommended to you, to do as much as we can in presenting Jews' position

so that then, get the maximum from the other side, we can take it back to Saigon.

If we had known that no matter what we did, it wouldn't make any difference, that he was going to demand unconditional surrender, we could have had some sort of an agreement on November 21st or 2nd.

Because you and I recognize that most of these changes are posted.

There are slight improvements, but what makes this agreement go is what you just took.

Coming back to the B-52 thing, we cannot back all of this up.

If it's free, if they expect free of everyone, that's about what you have to be prepared for.

But I wouldn't think that they would run into that every time.

Well, there are many other targets in the North of the United States.

Of course, if these sons of bitches had airplanes that could fly... Well, they don't have, so we've got to... No, but if they could put a lot of pack air up with the B-52s, it would confuse the sands.

We've lost two.

Why can't you move right now?

Yes, sir.

Well, because now we...

They owe us an answer.

That's right.

And I think it's a sign of weakness to send them a note before we've got an answer.

That note we sent them makes it very easy for them to send.

You say they did agree to the technical talk, and since they got to know it.

They continued the technical talk that was scheduled for today.

They came in and just read a statement in arts departments, that's alright.

But then at the end of that statement they proposed another meeting for Saturday.

So far the Chinese reaction has been very mild.

Soviet reaction has been very mild.

We may get an agreement out of this.

We may win the Hanoi game.

What is that?

I completely misjudged you.

I thought at the end of October, we all thought at the end of October, the reason we held out was because we were all convinced that as soon as your election was over and he realized it wasn't just an election ploy, he'd come along.

And when we said, hey, God, the day after your election, we thought then that this would do it.

He in effect has said that.

Well, he's ignored your letter as his usual tactic and stated his demands again.

He's made another concession.

He says he will now accept that National Council.

It's a great concession of theirs.

If we get the North Vietnamese troops out, if we get a commitment from the North, if we don't recognize, if the DRG isn't mentioned anywhere in the document, including the preamble,

And one other condition, which is... Well, in effect, what he has said, and we must play this very, very close to the rest, is that he wants us to go alone.

But for now, we've got to figure it out.

We've got to figure it out in the coolest possible terms.

We've got to figure out how we can go it alone with an army.

without sending South Vietnam back to Vietnam.

The question is, will the Congress provide aid to South Vietnam in the event they don't go along with the settlement?

Also, the question is, will the United States buy back?

Well, how can they?

Without the condition that we shall pay to South Vietnam.

I know the argument.

Yes, we'll cut aid down.

Except the other side doesn't support us on that.

Put yourself in their position.

You're there sitting under a fridge and they know you won't go along.

They know we can't give up political settlement.

What the hell?

Well, what they get... What is the senator they got?

Well, they get the bombing stuff.

That's why you have to keep bombing.

That's the major reason now why you have to keep up the bombing.

It gets the bombing stuff, it gets the mining stuff, it gets us out of bed.

They don't have to worry about the DMZ.

They don't have to worry about a lot of other restrictions.

And they can gamble that Congress will cut off the aid.

I mean, it's unlikely that we're going to be able to get $800 million of aid a year for South Vietnam.

You also realize your aid promise to North Vietnam is in jeopardy, too.

I can't see the Congress aiding the North, not aiding the South.

Well, we can't get the medicine to those conditions.

Wouldn't that be better incentive for those going aiding the South?

Well, they won't.

We can't give them aid while they're fighting in the South.

I think that's the problem.

Never.

Not as long as it's a war.

There's no ceasefire.

No, no ceasefire.

But we can make the argument that the North-South region is concerned on their own behalf.

I understand.

It's not a very good way to... Well, it's probably...

I think now, Mr. President,

if you were not a chief self-serving son of a bitch.

Because that's really what's involved.

That bastard can't figure out how he's going to stay in office in a pre-political context.

If he hadn't created the agreements in light of COVID, stood next to you somewhere, it wouldn't be easy to make it work and proclaim it a victory.

But now he's made such an issue of it that I don't see, we may wind up getting an agreement.

The guy collapses on us six months later.

And I don't know why we wouldn't be here.

Not because of the agreement, but because of what he's made out of the agreement.

Now, I still have to conclude that the previous son of a bitch, that if we did get an agreement,

that maybe, that you could argue that he's making this all regular so that he can say he was raped by us vis-a-vis his domestic constituency.

And then he'll cave at the very last second, reluctantly screaming, bitching, uh, fuck.

And we don't want that.

But I, that's, that's the question we have to ask ourselves.

Supposing you make an agreement with your ally, say, it's imposed, then the son of a bitch collapses and you're done.

I'm not sure about the Colson argument.

Why do you worry too much about it?

You may not recall what it was.

His fight was a bilateral agreement, the weakness in it being on what the hell it was.

That's just exactly what McGovern offered him.

It's not B, it's in a totally different period of time and after a totally different set of circumstances.

It's not what McGovern offered him, it's a unilateral withdrawal with a total cut-off of military and economic aid.

Then he'll get out Christmas.

No, he didn't.

No, no, he would say after we get out, he was sure they would release our prisoners.

It wasn't in his deal.

But it wasn't not in his deal.

The point is, I entered a different way, and might be the main one.

Now, the best way we can, as honorable as we can, we have made this last plot that we had to do.

And we've got to keep it up, or we'll never get the prisoners.

Oh, I understand that.

I mean, you've got to keep that promise of an arm every interview with the prisoners.

Without that, we'll never get the prisoners.

It's only one thing that's fascinating to me from my television performance.

On Saturday, I had yet to receive one negative letter.

I must have 200 letters by now.

For television, it's all the same.

We are proud of what you're doing.

Don't let the communists push you around.

Oh, you see, now, of course, we've militated against a separate deal, too.

We've got no place to go with a negotiated deal.

That's the tragedy.

I'm just telling you that the point is that there's no negotiation.

If you went along, Mr. President,

By last night I had come to the view that on the assumption that they could get, she was agreeing that you'd be better off sticking with this agreement and not go into bilateral rules.

But I don't see how we can go the negotiated route and then wind up with, unless we just brazenly through, get it, and then let you turn it down.

That's another answer.

We could just stick with the agreement.

After the retreat is out of them until we get the agreement.

And then let you turn it down.

And then go bilateral.

Oh, yeah.

You know, you have to do it yourself.

But if you turn it down, then my nightmare is that you will then accept it, saying, I had to accept it because the Americans betrayed us.

I think that basically we should say, and I think it's better not to try to get the negotiation to agree.

It's better, at this point, simply to make a separate deal.

And with an RSA, it's obvious that they won't go along with this sort of thing.

We can't deal with a little drop in the bombing, a little drop in the mining, a little withdrawal of our forces for the preservation of war.

And you decide the situation, and some will continue, and some will not.

Now, doesn't anything allow us, doesn't anything, we can't always talk about medicine?

Well, we can help them bi-naturally.

What Pugh has done to his structure some of these days, the one thing in which Harriman was right, unfortunately, is that Pugh is an unmitigated, selfish, psychopathic, self-proclaimed,

And here he's got a deal which we wouldn't have dared to propose in August, lest McCubbin turn it against us.

What was Kennedy's serve on the occasion of his attack?

The manager of each of the managers, sir.

Oh, Christ.

It wasn't an all-out attack.

It was a fairly moderate one.

A dole has been pumping off a son this morning on television.

Again?

Really?

Huh?

What did he say today?

He said it is not yet time to take it out of the President's hands, but if this continues, it may have to be considered.

Meaning for the sort of a half-assed support of you.

That's probably what he thinks he's doing, to support you.

No.

It didn't come across that way, like you heard it, but... No, he shouldn't have taken any doubt at all at that point.

He did, I mean, side by side with Kennedy.

They first had Kennedy, and then they said even Republican senators were beginning to talk that way.

And then Ken, the half-ass, stole the Senate.

Well, do you think there should be a... some hard people should begin to speak up to support it, huh?

Yeah.

That's the point Bob had raised earlier.

You don't think so?

I don't know.

Depends on what you're getting.

What kind of play did Kennedy get?

Nothing in the papers, he said.

How did you get it?

I saw it on the Today Show.

There were many CBS News women there.

Oh, hey, close this cable.

He said, I'm proud of you, Joey King.

The club now.

There's nobody else.

It's a good thing we didn't sign, isn't it?

What value did we all have there?

What we would have had to go by that trip.

You see, what Carver thinks, the CIA expert Carver thinks, that what you expected me to do in October was to go on with Hanoi and sign the goddamn thing.

That what he's been waiting for is for us to sign it, scream bloody murder and then go along.

he doesn't want to pay us and you think maybe that you think maybe we should you really think that maybe we should consider the option of signing an agreement having to turn it down well it could be one where we got an agreement and jew said i won't go until they're all out we see bob in the position that puts us in a little bit that he he then has a great faith in this country that we're signing an agreement that allows comics to stay in the country

Yeah, but you're signing an agreement that's better than any agreement you've hoped to get.

That's not different.

That's what we've always proposed.

That's what our objective is.

And that's the last line that we've got to go along.

And we say, well, I'll tell you if you could do it in an alternative way.

What I mean is I don't want to go down the road to try to get a political agreement and then you see your agreement would have been made with North Vietnam and all the rest of them are supposed to turn this down.

That's what you do.

Then you have to go back.

Then go back.

Then you'd have to say to Hanoi to implement those provisions that we can.

Because we may have no choice, Mr. President.

That forces him to take the damaging action rather than if you go by line or you're taking it, you're running out of time.

I must tell you, I have known on November 20th what we know now.

I could have emerged out of the November 20th session with an agreement.

Why not?

Oh, yeah.

You know, since you won't accept it anyway, I could evade something.

A few changes, come out, get it signed quickly.

That son of a bitch has really inhabited our whole domestic structure.

Well, isn't that... our old infrastructure survived better than the worst in this.

I know, but he's doing it for...

I mean, all I'm saying is you've got... you've shown us all your days.

I mean, when I say you, I mean the administration.

Because I'm in total agreement with what you... what we've decided yet.

Like I recommended most of it.

All of it.

I said it's only because the goddamn president's trying to play a split between us.

I can't figure those 3.52s.

I talked to you yesterday.

You didn't have this report.

How could that have happened?

No, no, that's this morning's light.

That's at 7.30 Milgram.

That's the third one, buddy.

I heard we haven't even gotten results for the whole day then.

I know.

They lost three in one run.

Mr. President, these North Vietnamese are not idiots, but you come in exactly the same hour every day.

They say, sure, it's a lot of activity, but they can tell the difference between a B-52 and this criminal.

Well...

Is there anything I should do?

Should we get more air control?

Well, I think we've just rattled it.

This is the last day of these extensive raids in the Hanoi area.

We will, at any event, after today, going to shift to other targets.

Because we've used up the targets in the Hanoi area.

They'd be raised with it.

More or less changing times.

That's why I'm going to call Mike.

Yes, I raised it with them yesterday.

They say, well, they have so many other planes in the area that they won't be able to know.

That's a total nonsense.

They can tell the people if they do from another plane.

Too late today to change this.

They are out.

Well, we'll do the best.

They won't lose more today.

Maybe they will.

But if they do, they do.

This is war, and I think we can do it.

It's a brutal business.

But we have to realize that Jews now constantly realize that if we had been knowing these things, we should have made a deal.

It's the best that we couldn't know these things.

It's for the United States to screw in our lives.

It's not an easy matter.

It was the right decision.

If we had been totally selfish, we would have just after November 7th said, don't come home on November 24th without a deal under whatever circumstances.

I didn't recommend it.

We couldn't do it.

We wanted to see Duke.

In fact, that's why I came back.

We thought we could get two clubs out of these sons of bitches.

And you spent three and a half hours with the damage area.

Hang out there three times.

I've been out five.

He won't see Munker.

Well, he'll see Munker, but Munker is lost and defected.

Not his fault?

No.

This guy's a maniac.

There's one basic reality, Mr. President, there's only one protection for these guys, and that's the confidence of the United States and the pride the American people have in the settlement.

The Congress of the President, they've blown all of this now, and they're haggling around, and all this bullshit about the North American resources in the South, that's just putting them in a condition which they know can't be met.

They won't push them out.

They won't push.

They had four divisions in military region three days, the South Vietnamese.

The North Vietnamese have 10,000 men against 120,000.

They won't push them out of military region three.

Then they have the nerve to come to us and say, you negotiate them out.

And if they had pushed them out, this issue wouldn't exist.

Now that's 30 miles from Saigon.

Nor did you make one concession different from what you have stated publicly for two years, which they never objected to.

I love the ceasefire.

On October 17th, you proposed the ceasefire in place.

On January 17th, you proposed the ceasefire in place.

On May 8th, you proposed the ceasefire in place, and that's exactly what you got.

I mean, it's no right thing that you can say you've made a concession.

We're not going to worry about it.

The right thing is for anybody else in the name to acknowledge the creed.

That's what that is.

And the goddamn Nass that sent you a letter saying he wants to price the war alone.

That not only keeps all the truth in there, it opens up the DMZ, it keeps laws in Cambodia, supply chains open.

So it isn't the truth that's out there.

When will the police get out with the Hague's and everybody?

Oh, that can't get out because only Hague and you know.

And neither have an interest in getting that word out.

Nor do we have an interest, I think, in getting the word out.

Oh, I'll say.

Because we don't have an agreement.

That's right.

They're just making art cover.

Yeah.

Well, I don't know about that.

It might make the North settle.

I think they really got us hung up there.

Well, we'll see.

We've got to continue the bombing of the NARV.

It does not have to be on the massive basis that we've had.

We've just got to continue their fracking up there so that they know we can still come back.

That's what they really need.

It's got to be massive enough so it's really good.

I meant NASA interns in the Hawaii area, which is... Oh, oh yeah, no, they are, they are interested in scaling down.

There are two of them, but basically they're not going to go there.

They're assessing losses and made us worried that that's an irregularity for political purposes.

And the military effect there is not all that great, which is well known.

They both look at the Russian and the Polish shit.

What do you want me to do?

We've had that before.

It isn't a bad protest.

Low key.

All the ships are there.

It's a battle zone.

I haven't expected it.

No, actually, I think the Hanoi part of it is working out.

That's going almost like May 8.

Because...

I don't think the American public is as opposed to what we're doing.

Yeah.

Well, I don't know what my mail is an indication of, but... You may hear more of them, but just the fact that those are not mobilized, that's what I mean.

Now, the Leibniz and Kennedy and the rest, yeah, you can mobilize some.

Right, Bob?

Yep.

and common commentators and the rest of them.

The commentators, of course, they're not squealing as much.

They're good at it.

Cambodia is squealing the most, and we can't say it anymore.

That took May 8th.

They squealed a lot.

But, you know what I mean?

They didn't stop.

The World War III thing and all that crap came along.

But this time, you see, they haven't been burned particularly on May 8th.

They're a lot more scared.

I think that's what I agree with.

Well, this is a new action.

If the North Vietnamese came back to talk to me,

I think it would go like May 8th.

It'd be a great victory.

I agree.

And then we should settle.

And then Kew refuses, and then we'll just finish it.

How do we finish?

Go by that road.

What about that?

I had given Haig all sorts of instructions on how to work out a common strategy, but the pass never got around to it.

I mean, that would permit it.

I don't mean to make it a mess, but I mean to.

Well, to taking back the letter, yeah, I mean, that's what he doesn't, as far as I'm concerned.

There's no other track.

That's why all, most of the people talking tonight must say that rather than, rather than making a deal and then having him publicly turn it down,

is to simply say, frankly, publish our letter.

And his response...

But then he's finished.

Huh?

Then he'll never get money for it.

That's right, too.

That's right.

You're right.

He can't do that.

He's worse off with that than he is turning down the peace offer, because he can make a case for turning down the... the negotiations.

He can make a solid deal with it.

Yeah, because my letter indicates that we're going along, doesn't it?

Good.

No question.

And therefore we cannot publish that?

No.

But we would have to do rather than publish it if we simply say that he prefers not to do it.

Just state it, and then go by that.

I'm not trying to think about the game of play.

My own view is, in view of his response to my letter, that publicly dragging along is not a good strategy in this sense.

Well, except Hanoi may force it on us.

Oh, supposing Hanoi... Says we won't make a deal unless... No, but supposing Hanoi replies, if Hanoi turns down our detention on Monday, we are in good shape.

was that supposing Hanoi accepts it, and Zephyrus meets on January 6th, then my view would be that we should meet, because that would take the heat off, uh, settle, and then just put it with you.

That's what I would do.

What would you do?

Then, what happened?

He says, no, I won't do it.

No, you will probably say, I'm forced to write under duress and silence.

That's what you'll do.

That's what most people really think.

You can still order all these guys.

Yeah, but they've all been wrong.

I've been wrong.

Everybody has been wrong.

I have been wrong.

What?

I mean, I thought...

and told everybody who knew something about this that he would welcome the terms at the end of October, and that we'd get an agreement with his acquiescence and support.

Then when he picked us up at the end of October, we thought, well, maybe that's a recollection of 68.

And as soon as your election is in the bag, and he knows you still mean it, then he'll yield.

So we sent Hague out.

He played his usual game with Hague.

Then we thought, all right, we go through the charade of presenting his demands and getting those turned down, and he'll come along.

But he has just as... he's gotten meaner and meaner.

They know how to treat old signs.

I agree.

Old signs.

Some of my people think you should give him one more chance.

I think that's a mistake.

You've given him every chance.

Well, how would you do that?

Well, you could say, on January 5th, I'm going to make the following proposal.

But that's a sign of weakness, because if he reacts as he did, he's never replied to your proposal to meet him.

Right.

He's never replied to you before or after.

He's replied to every overture of yours by just repeating his old proposition.

And, of course, he's created an objective situation now.

They have made it a shot.

North Vietnamese can no longer settle, because they've been so weakened in the south.

The end of October, the thing was nicely balanced, in which they had enough assets left.

The CIX station chief, in fact, aren't things.

They're so weak in the south now that they couldn't survive the ceasefire.

Well... Well, it isn't your action on Monday, Mr. President, to restore the initiative to you.

We can now...

This thing is going to end.

They wouldn't have come to the technical talks if they weren't weak.

Well, they only came for the first time.

But they don't keep the technical talks.

I know they only came for the first time, making a protest.

Yeah, but they have a chance tomorrow at the public session.

This is a secret.

No one knows they made a protest.

Oh, they agreed to end the marching of the talks.

And then they proposed at the end of that meeting to meet again on Saturday.

But I suppose tomorrow they could break off the talks, right?

I doubt it.

Tomorrow there'll be two grudges.

Oh, I had already thought that if Saigon didn't queue and cave, we could have sent them a message and proposed a fixed date and say we now got Saigon's agreement.

It isn't that gloomy.

I think we're going to pull it out in January.

but uh i am uh i want to keep people on top of this uh military situation i don't want the military to do stupid things you know what i mean well the plane losses though i think are predictable you send 100 planes over there with sands down below you're going to get some planes yeah but they actually they're not 10 this morning

Huh?

They must have had only 30 planes.

We lost 10%.

What do I mean?

You've got to think all three days.

You've got one day, two days, three days.

Between two and three percent.

Now you've got to see what they use for the rest of the day.

We don't know what's happening.

I went over to the next one.

They must, but there are other targets in the north, beyond the 20th railroad.

And it's outside the sand belt.

Yeah, that's what I mean.

Railroads and so forth.

Bridges.

But it makes you wonder what these B-52s would do in Russia.

I'm not sure.

They don't look bad.

They never get to.

Because as they do, it's their oldest.

Well, the Air Force needs to know how to share.

You need to know, because that's the way you can make it.

So is the Army.

So is the Navy.

Well, that Zumbo's roughness is lack of intelligence.

His roughness is lack of character.

Well, I'll give it a little look.

Getting back to this point, Mr. Whaley, you want some people to start banking.

This is the main thing that I can...

I'm not so sure that we want to be that much...

I'm not a good judge of it.

In the newspapers it doesn't play much.

On television I only saw it this morning.

Good morning, George.

The other thing is, the more we do, we've got to do it, we've got to make a massive effort to get anything pursued.

Our mechanism is good, our results are good, as long as it's not like the airport.

Yes, Senator, we've got to drop him off a lot before we get him caught.

So, in any way, I'm just raising the question whether

Whether we can get...

There has to be a debate going before we get any potential trial for what we do.

If there is any county that the things aren't going to be there, I think it'll be the Christmas season.

Nixon, Haldeman & Kissinger on Vietnam War and Operation Linebacker II

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on December 20, 1972

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