Conversation 831-003

TapeTape 831StartWednesday, January 3, 1973 at 9:49 AMEndWednesday, January 3, 1973 at 10:50 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Ziegler, Ronald L.;  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

President Nixon met with Ronald Ziegler and Henry Kissinger to coordinate the administration's public and congressional messaging regarding ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations and recent military actions. They discussed refuting media narratives of presidential indecisiveness by emphasizing the consistency of the "May 8th policy" and the necessity of pressure tactics to achieve a "peace with honor." Nixon also expressed his deep resentment toward critical members of the press, academia, and Congress, instructing staff to exclude hostile media outlets from White House social functions while preparing to consolidate negotiating authority ahead of further Paris talks.

Vietnam WarParis Peace AccordsCongressional relationsWhite House press relationsMilitary policyPeace with honor

On January 3, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:49 am to 10:50 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 831-003 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 831-3

Date: January 3, 1973
Time: 9:49 am - 10:50 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Ronald L. Ziegler.

       Weather in Florida
            -Palm Springs, Florida

       Press conference
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      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                          (rev. Oct.-08)

                                            Conversation No. 831-3 (cont’d)

-Democratic Caucus
      -Vietnam negotiations
      -Congressional lines of attack
             -Administration response
      -Past votes on resolution
-The President’s policy
      -Henry A. Kissinger
      -Bombing
      -May 8, 1972 decision
      -Three conditions
             -Prisoners of War [POWs]
             -Cease-fire
             -Free elections
      -Peace with honor
      -Moscow Summit
      -1972 campaign
             -George S. McGovern’s policy
-Vietnam War
      -Progress
      -Ground combat
      -Draftees
      -Serious negotiations
             -Paris
      -Settlement
             -“Peace with honor”
      -May 8, 1972 decision
             -Questions
                    -Nuclear weapons
                    -Bombing
                    -No comment
-Ziegler’s conversation with Kissinger
      -US response
      -Press perception of US policy
      -May 8, 1972 decision
-October negotiations
      -North Vietnamese tactics
             -US response
                    -Settlement
-Bombing
      -Purpose
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                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. Oct.-08)

                                                               Conversation No. 831-3 (cont’d)

             -May 8, 1972 decision
                  -Limitation of force
                  -Serious negotiations
                  -POWs
                  -Cease-fire
             -Negotiations
                  -Delaying tactics
                  -Congressional relations
                        -Interference
                        -Sensitive period
                        -Responsibility

Kissinger entered at 9:57 am.

             -POWs
                   -Delicacy of issue
                   -Nguyen Van Thieu
                   -Exchange
                   -Release of political prisoners
                   -May 8, 1972 decision
             -Congressional relations
                   -Democrats
                         -Number opposing resolution
                   -Consultations
             -Vietnam negotiations
                   -Possibility of breakdown
                         -Public statements
                   -Role of Congress
                   -The President’s consultations with Congressional leaders
                         -Michael J. Mike Mansfield
                         -Carl B. Albert
                   -Speculation
                   -Congressional relations
                         -Charles W. Colson
                         -Kissinger’s telephone calls
                         -J. William Fulbright
                         -F. Edward Hebert
                         -John C. Stennis
                         -Gerald R. Ford
             -Bombing
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           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                (rev. Oct.-08)

                                                     Conversation No. 831-3 (cont’d)

           -Handling of North Vietnam
           -Intent of press
                 -Administration’s indecisiveness
           -Purpose
           -Intent of the press
                 -The President as erratic
           -Result
     -Carl B. Albert
           -Support for the President on bombing
           -Bombing cities
           -Nuclear weapons
     -Vietnam negotiations
           -Results of bombings
                 -Col. Richard T. Kennedy
                 -Amount of destruction
     -May 1972 decision
           -B-52s
                 -Haiphong
           -Military actions
                 -No comment
           -Intensity of bombing
     -Opposition to the President
           -Washington, DC
           -Cambridge, Massachusetts
           -Attitudes
                 -James B. (“Scotty”) Reston
           -Letters to Kissinger
                 -Hatred
                 -McGovern
           -Congress
           -White House social events
           -Cambodia

Reception for new Congress members
     -Exclusions
           -Washington Post, Washington Star
     -Journalists from states with new Congress members
           -Dewey F. Bartlett
                  -Oklahoma
           -Atlanta Constitution
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            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                 (rev. Oct.-08)

                                                        Conversation No. 831-3 (cont’d)

           -South
           -Women
           -Wire services
           -Columbus Dispatch
                 -George Embry
           -Jerald F. (“Jerry”) terHorst

North Vietnamese statement
     -Tone
     -Le Duc Tho
     -Paris negotiations
           -Length of meetings
     -Kissinger’s schedule
           -Acrobats

Press conference
      -Congressional relations
            -Consultation with leaders
                 -1972 State of the Union speech
                 -Cooperation
                 -Ford, Hugh Scott
                 -Bipartisan meetings
                 -Issues
                 -Mansfield
                 -Albert
                 -Telephone calls
      -Truman memorial service
            -Reasons
                 -Funeral in Independence, Missouri
                        -The President's attendance
                        -Lyndon B. Johnson
                        -Wishes of family
                        -Private service
                 -Public service
            -The President’s meetings with heads of state
      -[Thomas] Hale Boggs's memorial service

Johnson
     -Health
     -Criticism of the President
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                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                         (rev. Oct.-08)

                                                            Conversation No. 831-3 (cont’d)

             -Reasons for leaving office
                  -Behavior

       White House staff
            -Worries about criticism
            -Confidence in policy

       Congressional critics
            -Confusion
                  -Fulbright
            -Response to October agreement

       Press conference
             -The President's schedule
                   -Meeting with Kissinger
                         -Camp David
                         -Timing
                   -Meeting with William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird, Adm. Thomas H.
                   Moorer, Richard M. Helms
                   -Congress
             -Responses to bombing
                   -1972 election victory
                   -Public opinion
                         -California
                         -Washington Post
                         -Albert
                         -McGovern
             -Congressional relations
             -The President's meeting with Kissinger

Ronald L. Ziegler left at 10:28 am.

       Kissinger's world report
             -Vietnam
             -Regular correspondence with foreign leaders
                   -Australia
                   -Mobutu Sese Seko
                   -Emperor of Ethiopia [Haile Selassie]
                   -Shah of Iran [Mohammed Reza Pahlavi]
             -Edward R.G. Heath
                                     -8-

           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                               (rev. Oct.-08)

                                                   Conversation No. 831-3 (cont’d)

     -Georges J.R. Pompidou
     -Willy Brandt
     -Shah of Iran
     -Eisaku Sato
     -Kakeui Tanaka
     -Pierre E. Trudeau
     -Emilio Garrastazu Medici
     -Reasons for correspondence
     -Pope Paul VI [Giovanni Battista Motini]
           -Irresponsible statements
           -Poland
           -Vietnam
                 -Catholics
                       -Killings
     -Notes

The President’s schedule
     -[Names unintelligible]
     -Meeting with Kissinger
           -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Vietnam negotiations
     -The President’s meeting with Dobrynin
           -Soviet Union’s interests in success
     -Congressional relations
           -Hubert H. Humphrey
     -South Vietnamese Congress members
           -Cable to Ellsworth F. Bunker
                 -Thieu
                 -Backfire
                 -Aid cut off
     -Kissinger’s meeting with South Vietnamese Ambassador
     -Economic measures for South Vietnam
           -Thieu’s thinking
           -Aid cut off
                 -Congressional vote
                        -Mansfield
     -South Vietnamese lobbying
           -Congressional resentment
           -William F. Buckley, Jr.
                                     -9-

           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                (rev. Oct.-08)

                                                      Conversation No. 831-3 (cont’d)

           -Thieu’s thinking
     -Paris conference
           -The President’s domination
     -Accomplishments
           -North Vietnam
                 -Capacity to wage aggressive war
                       -Reduction
           -Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                 -Fear and respect
           -The President’s enemies
                 -Exposure
                       -Press, intellectuals, Congress
                 -1972 election results
                 -Access to White House
                 -1960 election
                       -John F. Kennedy
                             -Results
                             -The President’s exclusion from White House
                                    -Bay of Pigs
                                    -Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
                 -John W. Gardner
                 -Dean Francis B. Sayre
                 -Nastiness of attacks
                       -Lack of patriotism
                       -Hatred

Vietnam negotiations
     -The President’s October 1972 letter to Kissinger
           -The President’s political interests
     -The President’s meeting with Kissinger
           -Preparations
           -Dobrynin
           -Options
     -Kissinger’s trip to Paris
           -Preparations
     -Consultations between Kissinger and the President
     -Negotiator compared to lawyer
     -Final meetings
     -Goals
     -Demilitarized zone [DMZ]
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                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. Oct.-08)

                                                         Conversation No. 831-3 (cont’d)

             -International voting commission
             -Civilians in South Vietnam
             -Depiction of the President’s role
             -Thieu
             -1972 election
             -Announcement
                   -Purpose
                          -Relations with ally
                          -Bombing halt
             -The President’s support
             -Kissinger’s support for negotiations
                   -The President’s decision to bomb
             -Breakdown
                   -Le Duc Tho
             -October 1972 agreement
                   -Press relations

       The President’s schedule
            -Meeting with Kissinger
                  -Timing
                  -Trip to New York

       Instructions to make calls
             -Rogers
             -Laird
             -Meeting with the President
                   -Photographs
                   -Location

Kissinger left at 10:50 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

One.
Right.
All right.
I think the main thing today is what posture you take on the whole congressional agenda.
movement and negotiations, but also where the U.S. presence stands in Vietnam.
But it seems to me, in reading the materials last night and following the news apart from being here, that there are two lines of attack that have come today from the press corps and from the Congress.
And that is, well, what is the policy?
No matter how often you've stated it, well, what is the policy?
Why was it only started?
Why was it started?
The other will be, what is the reaction and response to the congressional action that appears with the building and all of this type of stuff, which you've lived with before.
Now, it seems to me, and the other thing.
Did anybody ever get you the figures I asked them to get to you about, you know, the vote last night?
They got 38 on our side, this time they have 75.
Right, and the vote last night was 135.
Four, but yeah.
for $75,000 this time, $58,000 if anybody can get a figure.
No, I don't.
Kevin's supposed to have it.
Oh, but I go around about the vote, though.
It's not fair.
This is a Democratic caucus.
I would simply say, well, sure enough, that is what it is.
he's aware of his position and uh period that's all i don't think you can say any more about it i think several points can be made first of
Will we begin bombing again if it doesn't work?
What is our position?
Well, now, on that, I'm going to comment.
Go ahead.
Our policy, we've clearly stated, is the May 8th policy.
You outlined that very clearly at that time.
I think that should be said again.
Yeah, May 8th.
You're not saying May 8th.
Let me repeat that.
May 8th, we said that we were going to bomb.
We were going to use that.
We were going to take action.
Ryan Peebles.
or at least those who...
negotiations underway in Paris at the present time, with other schedules on hand.
We shall continue to seek a negotiated settlement, a peace of mind.
But those are the minimum conditions for those for that peace of mind.
Now, what will you do if he doesn't go?
Is he going to use nuclear weapons?
Is he going to bomb again?
Are we going to take it out?
I'm not going to have any comment on that.
Have we stated our policy on Maine?
That's still the policy of this government.
I don't want to have anything threatened to come out of your reading.
When Henry and I were going through this, we formulated the line, which is basically what you said.
We'll decide that in light of conditions that exist at that time.
We're not going to prejudge or predict what a circumstance might be, but we will decide that in light of conditions at that time.
See, what they're trying to do, they're trying to say, well, the policy is all confused, when it really is.
May 8th, the policy was stated.
In October, limitations
placed on the use of force because of a serious negotiation.
That's when the negotiations, when an in-festival, when an in-festival, and when the negotiations became non-serious, when it became clear that they, they, they, you know, the North Vietnamese were using dilatory tactics, uh, that, uh, we resumed the policy of mayhem.
We resumed the policy of mayhem.
Whenever serious negotiations are underway, we prefer a negotiated
But on the other hand, the policy made is that we must have a settlement.
We must get back our prisoners of war.
We want to end the war.
We want a ceasefire.
We want a real one.
In other words, you're driving them away from the point that, well, you're trying to bomb them.
I know.
Negotiation.
The made policy.
Don't let them.
Of course, that's what happens.
You hit them on the back.
That was the purpose.
I don't want you to say that, but on the other hand, that's what's effective.
What they ask you to do is go on and say whatever you want.
Just going over it is free.
Well, I think that formula is made in the limitation, and that's where we are today.
And we're operating that.
It's limited the use of force above the 20th.
On the assumption that the North Vietnamese are prepared to enter a serious negotiation.
Then hit the point.
We want our prisoners of war home.
There are many policies based upon that to ceasefire the South Vietnamese, to determine their future.
Then to make another point that I think should be made, and that is that peace can come quickly if the North Vietnamese want it.
And I can use this line in response to almost anything.
But it must come through serious negotiations, not profit
and not frivolous delaying tactics which we were faced with before.
And then, in response to the congressional question, Congress has to ask itself whether it wants to assume the responsibility of creating doubt in the enemy's mind about the U.S. position, or if Congress wants to raise out what they will do and the effect that that will have
those in the Congress who at this sensitive time would take a position that might be interpreted by the enemy as being a weaker position on these creative issues.
It's a bad issue because the record is very complex and it's going to backfire on Pew and it's going to make his agreement even worse because they are linking into the political prisoners after having once conceded that we have the next set of prisoners.
It's an exchange of prisoners of war.
Of course, we're referring to prisoners, not in relation to prisoners.
I'll guarantee you the answer to that is going to be exchange of prisoners.
That's basically a congressional thing, picking up the line.
I would pick them more with disdain.
who, frankly, it is not a new policy, and this is not a new attitude on the part of the Congress, on the part of the Democrats in the Congress.
It is significant to note that the number of Democrats who supported, who oppose this position is larger than on the last vote.
I point that out.
It's 75 out of the 50.
That's not a bad point.
We have taken note of that.
And the president, we can tell you the president is going to continue to do what he's right.
Then they'll ask, you know, what about the consultants in the Congress?
You can say, President, we time demand that this is the main policy and we follow it through.
At this time, President, we are responding to individual leaders and consultations being in place.
and the negotiating track, and we're not going to do that.
What if the negotiations break now?
Gentlemen, I'm not going to speculate about that.
I'm not going to – I'm not – are you optimistic or pessimistic?
I'm not going to say.
We're going to negotiate seriously.
Will the President report back on the negotiations?
The answer is yes.
You've got to say yes.
One line we talked about on the whole congressional part is that the North Vietnamese may attempt to play the Congress against the administration and then move into the point that Congress has to ask itself whether or not to take responsibility for delay.
I think we had a little problem with that.
No, I'm in favor of attacking Congress for delaying the negotiations.
I think if you say they're trying to play the Congress against the administration,
I wouldn't get too rough on the Congress.
I have to say that we understand.
The President totally understands.
He's talked to Senator Mansfield.
He's talked to other members of the Congress.
And he's talked to Speaker Albert this morning.
They reflected the views of the Congress.
The President, of course, is concerned.
He is concerned, and he respects the views of the Congress.
But the President must continue to do what he's right.
He represents, and he's seeking to negotiate
Is there anything you'd say about what should be later strengthened?
You don't want me to use the line beside the line of conditions that exist then?
In other words, I wouldn't speculate on it.
I don't think you ought to speculate on what you will do if things fail or succeed.
Just say one of these negotiations, we of course will report to, as appropriate, to leaders of the Congress, as appropriate to leaders of the Congress.
That's what I would say.
So that we don't get tied in.
That'll be, that'll be better.
I just won't suspect anything on the developments.
Depending upon the developments, of course the Congress will be informed.
Then I would also point out that the Congress has been informed.
We've been informed all along here.
They've been making telephone calls and all that sort of thing.
You've met with the, the President, of course, has been.
The only other thing I would mute a little bit in order not to get the noise back up too much is I like the line that it's the main policy which we temporarily eased when negotiations were fruitful.
When negotiations were serious.
But I'm not absolutely sure.
It's very hard to say.
We must have it on the
The reason I raised that this morning, we're dealing this morning with the press who are on a hot story, and I'm concerned about the lead, and looking at the papers of the last five days that they will draw out of the briefing.
One thing they're trying to create here is indecision, lack of course, and everything else, when our course is clear.
Well, we've got to tilt it the other way, Henry.
You can't worry about the NRP and the visa on this point.
I don't think it's going to make that much difference.
But I understand your point.
We've been doing the best we can to be sure we don't irritate the North Vietnamese and the rest.
And I think that's all we've got to progress as we do that.
We do have a strong response.
We're out in the towns.
I'm watching this.
We've got to be sure that we don't let the hell go to them.
Just keep it as real as you can, but there's no question about the policy.
What do you mean?
They said it's very indecisive.
I think this is where they're trying to zero in on why we bomb and why we stop.
They're all going to ask, why did you bomb, why did you report?
That is always asked, always, always, by everything that we do.
The answer is we do consult, and the answer is...
The reason the bomb was to break a deadlock, but you cannot say that.
You understand?
The reason they came back is because we bombed, but you can't say that.
You understand?
All right.
The point that you have to say is that we
They're trying to portray you as a radical, but they do that all the time.
Anytime you take a strong action, they say it's because you are a movement.
Radical is a much better word than a decision.
I agree.
The time you're going to suddenly, out of the blue, take something to be decided to show that you are that way.
I agree.
But that's the thing that we do have a consistent policy on here.
Now, for example, we're saying this morning,
And he's standing with us in his rather halting way, but it gets a lot of guts.
They were trying to short him out as a leader because he had to sit up.
But he was saying, you know, honestly, here's the reading.
The question is, I agree with you.
Some of the reasons you may say it.
I'm going to keep one thing in mind.
level of city or is it something that we might go in and use nuclear bombs?
I said, no, Carl, you're being quite serious.
I mean, I've always said we have no intention of doing anything around that.
If we want to level the city, we've done it long ago.
We've been meticulously careful.
We've done our very best to limit this to military targets.
I said, in this case, in a curious way, even though they don't intend it, the doves probably hope us.
And I suggested we might do things of that sort.
So we'll just have to take the heat to that.
But you should not indicate anything of that sort.
Except on the...
I don't just simply...
I brush across all...
As a result of negotiations, I'm speculating questions.
We'll wait to see what happens.
I mean, actually, the military damage is horrendous.
I've seen something.
They've sent me over a lot of pictures.
The only regret I have is that we used to be 52 from the beginning.
I mean, compared to what these landings do, it is unbelievable.
I'll show you some.
I mean, some of these storage here, there is literally not one building standing.
Because they don't show me the pictures where they've missed, but they, when they hit something, it is unbelievable what they've done.
This is what shook them.
Is there anything else you want to get across?
The idea of saying there's nothing to look at.
I don't care about the screaming.
It's mainly Washington and our own people who come around and around, stopping each other instead of sitting around.
That's reflective of only one place.
You know what that is?
Cambridge.
You don't have that.
some of these bleeding articles in here and show them the viciousness.
I mean, you have no idea of what these bastards are.
One full professor writes, I'm filled with hatred for you, President, and I've tried to accept you, and now I'm filled with hatred for you too, a professor.
And these are the people who say that you should
show acts of tenacity and conciliation and heal the wounds.
And Scotty Redson has another tweet in our editorial.
Today, you're opening up old swords.
How?
Well, that's what I want to show you.
When this is over, I'm going to send him this package of...
When we open up old swords, we're going to put the light on.
Let's see what you said there.
Yeah, let's have it there for a minute.
in Congress and by attacking the Washington Post, by not letting them come to social events.
There'll never be another social movement in the White House, never.
I just can't.
But these pastors, and I think what they did to us here in Cambodia, is murder this brutality of these liberals.
Well, while we're in here, I wanted to get a few to word out that, as you know, I'm having this reception on Friday for the members of Congress.
And under our new rule, I want either the Washington Post or the Washington Star, their investigation, after all, they're an old congressman from Washington, D.C. And I would pick up, for example, people from, like, somebody from Oklahoma, a new department, and get somebody.
or the rest, but either the stars are the posts you represent.
The White House events are national events.
They're not social interests.
Is that clear, Mr. Chairman?
And that way, you've got a good source of mail.
Mr. Chairman, we have the members who come in from that.
It'll give a chance.
If George, like Henry, comes to dispatch here, he's a pretty good fellow, too.
And Terry, of course, might be a good man to have now.
In other words, some of those guys would like to come.
The North Vietnamese put out a very conciliatory statement and they were relieved until then.
I understand that.
I know it's very hard.
Very conciliatory.
He doesn't know what's going on.
What has happened to the parish today?
You've got to report to me.
I'm going to report to you for this one.
Oh, really?
They decided at the time... Oh, I thought you...
I thought they started... 11 of the occupants...
which is 5 in the morning here.
But they're going to work until 7.
That is time.
So we won't be finished until 1.
We won't get a question.
I'm having some trouble getting an appointment because they are hosting the acrobatic group.
And I'm going to make some effort to get to them.
That's the only thing.
I'm sorting every show that's private, right?
The only other question.
I'll probably be asking, what is the attitude going to be of the administration toward Congress now that's starting at the beginning today?
together where there are not matters of divisive or partisan alliance, and Congress should
as far as the president feel that you can handle the Congress that way, and that there'll be some issues where, which will be determined, which will divide the party line.
Oh, did you get this?
Well, the memorial service is being held for those who were unable to pay the respects of the private services.
Pay the respects of who?
This service is being held here in the county so that those who were unable to pay their respects in Independence
And he goes into this modern monologue.
I know the torture that must be going through with all these attacks.
So no, I'm sitting here.
In the transition period that he had me in here,
And there were those three-day television sets there and the two-hour service clicking right there.
That's right.
And he'd get up and he'd throw himself on the floor and he'd go straight off.
Go through the stuff, go through the telephone, call him.
It's incredible.
It was a real experience.
Well, four years I made a little bit of work.
I love that.
Well, don't let our very raw intentions
Softies and the White House staff worry a lot.
They all bring out some times like this.
Just stand right up there.
I think we have a very consistent policy, don't you?
We have the right to state, and I think we should state it and not be defensive.
God damn libs are terrified that this is going to work.
This is what's really driving them right up the wall.
They are.
That's what they're really hearing.
I think they are terrified.
I think that's why Fulbright's supposed to hold this hearing still after January 20th, aren't you?
They were heartbroken when the thing ceased to work at the end of October.
Then they began to build up the agreement.
Now the agreement they've built up is the greatest thing that had ever come along, and it has showed up.
Now, then they said, you can never bounce it back to the table.
Never.
It's been demonstrated.
Now they're back at the table.
They're all writing that they're coming back with a tough attitude.
I know there's such a hard time this morning.
That's another side note.
Maybe you're right.
God knows Henry and I had to hold.
Be sure to point out that Henry and I met for two hours
If you could work it out, I would like it.
I think it would be good for your team.
I'd like to get back to you after the start of the recent writing.
I think you and I should meet at Camp David on Saturday.
What is your situation on Saturday?
I can come up in the morning.
What is your environment?
You can come up in the morning.
I got this reception on Friday night.
I thought I'd go up then.
And I would, and I think if we could have a good meeting, Aunt David there, it would help to build the Aunt David with the followers, you know, that are to come up Saturday morning.
Is that a good time for you to go?
You know what?
I'm up Friday night.
I was going to go to the dinner.
No, no, no.
As you know, it's Saturday morning.
Could we say what time...
That's all we need.
The point is
Nobody's talked to Larry about it.
Well, they will, I'm sure.
Fair enough?
Yes, sir.
That gets that covered.
Friday morning, I'll have to handle it.
Anything else you need to cover, huh?
I'll let you see.
I'm begging and panting to get after you this morning.
No, not today.
I'll have to worry about it.
You'll handle it.
Glad you're back.
Didn't you notice a difference in California?
Oh, yeah.
Yeah.
Talking about
And sitting out in California and around people, you know, Christmas and this type of thing, from all over the country, really, who were in California, they were talking about Vietnam.
I mean, they were talking about the president's election victory in this kind of thing.
They called back here on the telephone and the Washington Post and these types of things were all swirling around.
It is a big deal.
It's nothing.
He's always talking about his mail.
There's a speaker in the House talking about his mail.
The mail, mail from the same people.
It's exterior.
It's basically the last gas of the livers.
That's what this is.
The McGovernites.
McGovern's knew about it.
When he asked about that, the President went out and reported it to the Senate for the session.
Just say, well, I don't know.
I just have no comment.
I just have to use a little bit of comment.
I'm just smiling at that.
I agree with him in total disdain.
Anything McGovern says is in total disdain.
On the other hand, and so did the early Congress and the work with them and all that sort of thing.
Jeff said the President will go halfway and he believes the responsible leaders of Congress will also go halfway.
Congress is not interested in making a record against the president for making a record for it.
Good luck.
Also say it.
If there are differences to say, no, that's true.
And if they get the question to raise, I think it's fine.
But then we can say we might have been one hour this morning, but last night we were two hours and a half.
We might have been this morning.
So, okay, good.
I didn't put much in about Vietnam because I'm going to cover that with him more or less.
And I've mentioned to you one plant that I think is very important.
I think there's about 24 liters of importance all over the world that I have fairly regular correspondence with.
I've mentioned this before.
But letters like that, you know, letters.
If you take the Australian, for example, you might even include some guy like a boatman, too.
or the emperor of Ethiopia, Serbian Shah.
You see my point?
Where I just rank them from time to time.
I thought you would be interested in, and we might write about a domestic policy that we have, because the correspondence that we have not used as effectively as we can.
I know we send them copies of our world report, which we should.
I'd like to have it more on a reporting basis.
We don't have 20,
We've written a lot of Medici in Brazil.
I started skipping the polls.
He's been so irresponsible.
He's about to vanish.
It's what it is.
But it's terrible that this spiritual leader of hundreds of millions of Catholics, that you're facing communists.
They're trampled down all over the world.
Have they ever been to Poland?
Are they trampled down there?
Do you think Buddhists are going to be killed in South Vietnam?
Hell no, the Catholics, by the hundreds of thousands.
I have made some other notes, but I'd like to go over a couple of them.
Which we can talk about later this afternoon after you finish up the reading.
Because you ought to get prepared for that.
I think what we discussed last time with the President
It's after all the probable outcome.
They're afraid that we're going to pull off the steal.
And funnily enough, the pressures we're getting from Congress are pushing us in the direction of a state of right.
The same
I went to the table and used to get this on a urgent basis that sending members of the House and Senate to lobby members of our House and Senate would create a
which might result in cutting off all aid.
I'm seeing that this is my view, doing it before the inauguration.
Let's get it pushed off at least beyond the inauguration.
But it is a terrible idea from their standpoint.
He's demented.
He's really under this head.
Now, we have about four economic measures which we have worked out, which we could begin applying.
Now, we could do it now, or we could wait until we have an agreement.
They're not drastic, and they can always be reversed.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
No judge of his mind anymore.
I don't know what in Christ he does do.
He must be living in the green world.
I think we ought to do it right after we get in the green.
My feeling at the present time is going to irritate him at the moment, but I think his ambassador should know that we're interested in working with the president's family.
It does not want their aid at all, and Congress is in that kind of a mood.
Talk about this vote today.
And that man's view was that they're going to come up with the Senate's going to do the same thing every day.
And that scared the shit out of me, telling me if these people come, it will be, it is the president's view that it would be a very disastrous, have a very disastrous backlash.
Not in the Congress.
He doesn't know that this Congress deeply resents any pressures, and particularly from foreign, even domesticated, they resent.
But foreign pressures, they go right up the wall.
They call that an interference by their,
In a sense, it's the God's truth.
The Hawks would die with this.
They would go right up the wall.
Crazy God damn.
Who the hell caused this?
Buckley?
No.
Oh, Buckley's on our side.
Bill Buckley, I mean.
No, Bill Buckley's on our side.
Okay, or somebody.
No, Mr. President, this guy is nuts.
I mean, he has lost his, he's demented.
What he, the maximum he can gain does not outweigh what he's lost.
at your own pace, before Congress came back, and announced that you would be dominating this goddamn Congress now.
And as you said last night, he was...
He was on it.
He was on it, yeah.
Oh, Mr. President, didn't... Let me say it, Mr. President, in all the agony of the truth,
Several things have come out of it.
We have to look at it.
North Vietnam's capacity to wage aggressive wars has been sharply reduced.
The Russians and the Chinese have got a look upon us with certainly more faith and therefore more respect.
And finally, I think we have to bear in mind it's smoked out again.
Our enemies in the media, in the intellectual community, in the Congress,
And there they are.
And otherwise, there would have been the most sickening attempt on the part of the residents and the rest for me to start going to the 38% who voted against us rather than the 61% or 4% attempting to govern this country.
But let me say the 38% that are against us are out, period.
Never this White House again.
Never, never, never.
I couldn't agree more.
The way you run the country.
Listen, let me put it this way.
Against Kennedy, I got 49% of the vote.
He got 49% of the vote.
I lost by 112,000.
As a matter of fact, if you take Alabama's electors out, I had won by 112,000, because Alabama's electors did not vote for Kennedy or for somebody else in the 8th man.
So the country was evenly divided.
I never saw one succumb to editorial or any suggestion.
The man who had been the candidate for president had been vice president for eight years.
In eight years, I was never the vice president.
But the Bay of Pigs.
The Bay of Pigs.
Yeah, I was in town at the time.
He called in because he needed somebody to cry.
Oh, Christ, he had to die.
He was locked in that chair.
We got heated.
Kennedy said it next year that they'd be on the damn wall.
The Klan.
The Klan go home.
Kennedy couldn't get rid of us.
My point is that in eight years, I was never invited to the White House.
What I mean is a pardon.
I was never invited to a social function.
They don't do the social.
Never.
To luncheon in.
My wife or my son for eight years.
Now, let me say, there's no way we're going to do it our own way.
This idea that we invite John Gardner, Dean Sager, and all the rest just to prove we're not mad, there's no way.
Why should we?
Now, and also the lack of compassion.
After all, Mr. President, here you've been elected the 6th of December.
It must have been a painful and anguishing decision.
They owe it to their country, whatever they think about you, to ask about the man who did
He's a madman.
He doesn't consult anybody.
He does it because of this or that.
And the viciousness and nastiness of these attacks.
But they are not patriots.
They are not thinking of their country.
I told you they would.
It's one thing to say, remember you said that after the election, you'd have all the ball in your hand because you couldn't bear being out in line.
No, they're so vote-hating.
absolute eye-opener to me.
Because I thought after you had won, and also after all, if you hadn't wanted peace, we could have screwed this thing up in October so that no one would ever have known that there was a peace order.
You wrote me that letter saying it didn't have a chance for peace.
You said, on balance, it's actually against my political interest to do it.
And, well, anyway, let me say, you get back to your things.
I will have a, I've written down some thoughts that I'd like to discuss with you this afternoon, after I get a chance to think about it a little more.
And after you seem to bring about the option one and option two, I think the more we talk about it,
Where are we going?
Why don't we put it this way?
When you go to Paris, Monty, I want you to be in position so that you know totally
And as you do, I don't know what I think, but what direction so that you do not have to wire back and say, well, they won't take the BMC and they won't do this or that.
I think it's time that we should make a deal on one basis or another or this or that.
If you know that you can be in a position of our, all that you should use, you know, if you're going to be in a position of Paris in this negotiation,
to use me as a delay tactic to say, well, I'll have to consult with the president.
You see what I mean?
Or as a marketing bank, I do not want you to be, but I want you always to know, the negotiator should be successful like a lawyer with his client.
He's got to have complete control of the game.
Now, a good negotiator, like a good lawyer, must be successful.
No, it's totally what his client wants.
And that's what, and that's, you've always known about this point, but you have felt that you had to wire back, shall I do this or that?
Shall we break off this or that?
This time, it's all through, it's all up now.
This is it.
This is the last time.
There ain't gonna be no more.
There's no more tomorrow.
I think that's what we've got to understand.
As far as negotiations are going, you might not have another wheel or something, but this is the last negotiation.
I think it's as far as I'm concerned.
And this time, you've got to be there, calm, confident, determined, strong.
So far, making every bit of the record that we possibly can, but grinding hard for what we want to get.
And then, if we don't get it, we're going to have to go some other way.
If we do get it, we'll go hard that way.
To the point that I want us to sit down and go over this point by point.
you know and i said i don't want to see a long paper about the bnc international voting commission and civilians in the south it's all about crime they're meaning i know that doesn't mean anything you know the october agreement about any changes have been fine just fine and you know that's what we have you do it
This is all this crap in the newspapers that you pulled it back.
You didn't pull it back.
You didn't say one comma in the goddamn agreement.
You made the decision, which was 100% right, which I 100% supported, that if you fought, we would not have a blow-up with him in the week before the election.
And that was not an electoral trick.
That was for the sake of the country, so that the country didn't think that we raked in our lives before the election.
That was the basic purpose of that.
Exactly.
Particularly in view of the past history, where we raised an ally for the election of Obama.
Exactly.
That was the purpose.
And that was in the national interest.
That was the morally correct thing to do.
That was the only decision you made.
You never raised one question.
I mean, all this mythology that's now building up, that you screwed up the agreement.
There wasn't one word that you objected to in the agreement.
We discussed it.
I was over- Yeah, as a matter of fact, as a matter of fact, following your death, you, you went back to the last round of negotiations.
I, uh, that you wanted to continue to negotiate, and I broke it off and decided to bomb.
I doubt you remember, I was the one who was insisting that you stay in your retreat, that you stay a little longer, that- Nor did we, nor did we break it off.
Lee Duckworth told me he had to come back on Thursday.
It was a mutual decision.
Well, I would say to you, I would say he reached an input.
He reached the deadlock.
That's awesome.
They are in patience.
That's right.
Not ours.
Okay.
So we say about 3 o'clock for that paper.
I don't think I'll be back until about 3.30.
What's that, Joe?
Well, you don't have to because I've got a plan for Sunday.
3, 3.50.
About 4.00.
4.00.
4.00.
And I'll be in order.
And they are...
I have to check with the president.
If they could see me.
You'll be sure to get the calls to Rogers and Laird today.
That's done.
And that will be here at 10 o'clock.
I told them he'd let them know about the place.
I'll leave him here.
But I know he's all I'm thinking.
I think he said this one time.
What do you think?
I wouldn't make it so high.
Then maybe we ought to meet him.
Well, we'll decide tomorrow.
We don't have to decide tomorrow.