On January 3, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:19 pm and 5:05 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 832-010 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Last person on the phone again.
Weeping.
This time we have a good case.
This Pentagon was asked yesterday whether our pilots who hit the hospital and the airfield were going to be punished.
Jesus Christ.
And they said no because we don't know it was done by American planes.
Well, that's stupid of two girls.
One, it clearly was done by American planes.
Second, it admits it might be punishing.
The meeting today was very businesslike, and they discussed, they went through it act by act, and they used, yeah, they used differences.
But this time they're in substance.
They agreed to drop all political points.
And there are just huge differences on what the International Commission should do.
But this time at least it wasn't frivolous like last time.
What are they trying to do?
They're trying to resolve some of this.
They have agreed that until I get there, they're going to discuss only the international commission and the full power commission.
The full power commission is not relevant because that exists for only 60 days.
And that's going to be solved easily.
And in other words, they've agreed to set aside some of their most controversial provocateurs.
You know, the question in regard to
That's a bad reason.
Right.
Of course they're not going to be punished.
No, they didn't do it for them.
What the hell did I say?
Why don't they ask her whether the S-man bombed on one of the people who rocketed the Nang and hit the network?
Are they going to be punished?
Has anybody raised a question about that?
That's disgusting.
I'm sure everybody can go.
That's a great answer.
Well, he said to the whole thing very much that it would come, that it would get settled this month.
President wants to come over.
They raised again the issue of the nuclear treaty.
We will have to make a decision on that during the course of February.
I don't know whether he'll come or not.
And we'll really have to look at it whether we want to do that.
On Vietnam, he didn't have a great deal to say.
He said it was rough going because
To do that while there were 50 Communist Party chiefs in Moscow was very tough, but the president was really committed.
He wanted to know how Tricia was being treated there.
I don't know whether they had had any reports, because he said they were going all out.
So Vietnam, he didn't have much news
I think that's the most effective threat we've got.
Mad seal has come out today for a cutoff of funds.
They have to do these things.
Because basically that's what they believed all the time.
And I hear it quite this morning.
They're petrified of the possibility that this might work.
Good for them.
although he's made again the two conditions we are willing to propose ourselves.
You mean option two?
Yes.
But it was a very warm meeting with the Freeman and his... One thing he told me was Gromyko and I had made an agreement here
on how to handle a minor period murder.
And I wanted to handle that debate.
I said, handle it with Stalin.
And I assigned it to Hillenbrand.
And he said, Hillenbrand, he doesn't want to complain, was totally disloyal, didn't carry out the instructions.
And so finally, the Russians had to yield.
He was promised to me for this length of time, and that is how we got away with it.
I think he's never been a good lawyer.
My chance for us to find that.
It ought to be a businessman.
It ought to be somebody who is loyal.
A businessman lawyer like Russ would really be that kind of a man.
Who's loyal and smart.
there is no, oh no, you can't appoint a man out of the question.
And particularly von Maria, these delicate affairs.
I was going to, but I can't do it.
We've got to be just among these others.
I just wonder if you're going to pass me on Saturday morning.
I don't know whether I should under these conditions.
A lot of people are pressuring me to see Albert and the leadership.
And then my yard wants to see me.
The ranking house member.
Or it's a pretty big house.
And then two or three others.
But I think it's a mistake.
You either see a number of them or not.
I think you should just say no until pending this negotiation.
You cannot talk.
You can't talk to them.
Not all those walls are weak.
that the president feels it's too delicate at this time to run any risks.
But we just can't, there's nothing we can do.
He might tell you, but he knows what the situation is.
All right, we're gonna, I'll get pressure on Friday to talk about it.
I'm just gonna tell him, I'm just gonna say, I knew your obligation to this.
I'm just gonna say we're sitting, you know, that's all, in honor of these,
discussion could be harmful.
Could be.
They don't want, actually, you know, these guys are asking to see, they really are asking to see, they want to contribute.
They're asking to see and admire because they... For publicity.
For publicity, sure.
And also they want to know.
They want to be told, Scott, what are you going to talk about?
And then they'll put it in their daily newsletters.
I don't know these people.
I understand.
It's just insensitive.
I couldn't agree more.
But they are.
But no, I think once a man feels up to it, he is free.
He does not leave.
Man feels up to it.
Neither of them have, but both of them are leaders.
Both of them are.
The board doesn't, not the board, but he doesn't, but Scott does.
Both of them have his own vote.
But nevertheless, it poses a difficult position to see and ask you about it.
Steph, I see it.
But we take care of it.
Don't you go down to the Republicans and I won't talk to you tonight.
Grab all the leadership.
to do is prepare for me a one-page, two-minute talking point for what you want me to say to the leadership.
You know what I mean?
Or I say nothing.
When are you meeting them?
All right, here's the solution.
Stay with me.
Stay with me.
All right.
I need something.
I need something right now.
You'll have it tomorrow.
But I guess, just give a little thought before I leave.
I've got to give it some thought.
I want to be sure.
I'm sure you'll get what I want to be.
We're on the right track.
It was my idea of something to say about it.
I know if you're really interested in this part of the service, it will be better to just say, we want to bring the war and we want to honor the beasts as we can get.
It's inspiring to turn around our prisoners.
So we will, uh, we're, uh, meetings are scheduled, sir, you know.
could jeopardize the possibility of progress in such talks.
Therefore, I must respectfully decline the initiative.
I will continue.
As I had always occurred,
I mean, that's development of the curve, which gives it a looter of a kind of progress to the development of the curve.
The development of the curve can be improved.
I'm not going to say whether this is true or not.
I'm going to say yes, and so forth, except that we are going to make a negotiated series, and the other side has indicated that it has to negotiate.
You see, you get into the business and say, well, now, if you've got any questions, if this doesn't work, what are you going to do?
Like Albert was saying, if this doesn't work, you're going to be able to take out a little hand, all right?
I don't know if you know right now.
But the point is, I don't want to say anything like that.
I'm not going to say what we're not going to do.
Great to see you.
It would be great if we could connect.
And it may be, as always, that they are just behind events.
Now, Laird would like to put out a list of all the targets we hit.
I don't see anything.
Absolutely not.
He says it would take away the argument that we had on the civilian targets.
I don't know.
But what it appears is that we're over the civilian target thing.
Well, that's a good thing to discuss tomorrow.
I don't think that much.
Why don't you let Laird get the five-minute report on the bomb?
Come on.
Laird and Moore, did you, by any chance, get a report from Moore about those Air Force models?
I've asked.
The difficulty of option two, which I'm sorry about, just a very difficult option one, is... You can't agree whether it'll work.
However, it is based on the assumption we will go back to
fine.
Continue.
I knew that.
Extended over that period of time.
Would raise even for that cause.
law in it.
Could we do it?
Can we get away with it?
Can we have the support of the Congress and so forth?
And in the end, it's not possible that you may have a Congress reigned in.
It would be the greatest hell on this person, actually.
apart from getting to our further down the road area now.
Coming back to option two, option two also, of course, from the standpoint of everything that we have said we have been for over these four years, is to be treated to a position
There's hardly any way we can get out of it.
There's not any other way to do it.
We have, up to this time, rejected members who fight the war for our reserves.
Always say Vietnamization is worse than us.
We can't get ourselves out of it, but that's where we get out of it.
We find a way to get out of it, but we can't.
And practice Jewel with reverse.
We know that.
That's not a good reason to do it.
The other part is that...
Looking at option one, and I'm certainly looking at option one, even with all of its flaws,
So if you turn back, so maybe it's hard to .
But on the other hand, we have to look at our own situation.
On October the 8th, we negotiated for all this time.
We've been working through option one in some form or another.
It was option one.
We indicated we would end the war.
And it's option one that we have.
presumably, Vietnam, in order to get some consideration, correct?
Exemption.
Now, under those circumstances, the question arises, should I think about referring to COVID?
I realize that
You look at option one.
It may be that you could do it this way.
It may be that you get basically a return in something that you didn't just come up with.
Too much like October the 8th, we didn't make much progress or get hit in since then.
My view of this fight is the latter one is right.
Yes, yes, they'll say, well, I didn't do something then.
That can be obvious.
The main point is that if we thought that the deal on October 8th was a good one then, in my view, it is a good one now.
I don't want you to start with that position, but I feel that's what we have to come to.
Now, so that means if you accept the deal, that shows very little improvement over what we said, you know what I mean, so forth.
But there will be changes.
I mean, there will be some, I assume.
You've already got a couple, three of them.
Thank you.
Mr. President, there's no doubt in my mind that if you had proclaimed the victory at the end of October, that we could have made it work.
We now have the issue of this – we didn't meet ambassadors in this morning.
I gave them unsure detail.
I said, you – I said, I didn't think the president could ever dissipate the goodwill in the hands of our president.
I said, but he's – he's proving that I was wrong if he keeps it up.
I said, here, look what this president is going through, and what do we get out of Saigon?
Why is he going through it?
We could have settled.
We could have gone up to Hanoi in October.
If the president has been out for himself, he's doing this entirely for you.
There's nothing in this for us.
As you can see in the daily news.
But he says that you have to talk so darkly now that even with the two changes we are still holding out for, it makes it impossible for him to accept it.
The danger we're running now is that
Even the accrued agreement may overthrow two.
So we are not facing now a problem where we keep the government in power, but where as a result of an agreement we make, the North Vietnamese achieve the objective they saw in the end of the overthrow of the GBN.
That's the problem that we're in here.
Will you overthrow two?
to get it done there.
I agree that it's certainly a hell of a possibility.
But just like the other way, we've got to think of the overdue GDN and all that sort of thing.
We've also got to think of how much, really, we can take ourselves in this country to continue military strikes.
We've got a good test run, Henry.
We've got a good test run.
See, what happened in May, in the situations I have is so quite, it's so different now.
We don't have an invasion anymore in point two.
Sure, they're still there.
We have not like, what do we have?
We have, well, we wouldn't go through with an agreement.
And they won't return our prisoners, so we're gonna bomb them.
I'm not sure we're working on it.
That's the question.
That is the question.
That's what he says.
He can't accept anything, is that right?
No, I have no question that if we can get the agreement to a non-negotiate, that we should go to any banks that are down his throat.
But if we go back, it isn't really a probate.
I know what you're talking about in this room, except if you ever make a public statement, if you say October 8th, you're giving them more than they're asking for.
October 26th, that would surely overthrow him, that he couldn't possibly survive.
Hardly because of his own vicious encounters.
Maybe he has to come to them.
I don't...
I don't think they'll come to them.
You mean you believe we're in their option, too?
No, I think, Mr. President, if... if we get a decent agreement on international control, if they can... they have it in their power to prevent an agreement, no matter what you intend, because...
They can prevent an effective operation of the International Control Machine, in which case then you would not have achieved your major objective.
If they want to be passive, and they can, uh, have stolen all of us again.
I don't believe they've stolen all of us.
Or they can absolutely talk on those two issues now.
But the DMZ is in our power to yield.
On the signing procedure, it isn't in our power to yet.
We need their signature.
We need their signature.
We need the signature of Saigon.
I would like to stay in the agency.
Why wait till I leave?
Well.
I have never liked it.
The reason I don't like it is
My real concern is deep down what we're doing.
And what I mean is not the same money we bought long ago.
My concern is whether or not you really do take a risk.
I've never felt that way before, even with the election.
Same as the media, etc.
And it's a pretty rough deal.
It's pretty rough.
I mean, I'm speaking out on us.
But I think it's going to be rough on those handsomers in college.
And school will be back in.
The hell will break loose.
No, I agree.
They'll say bombing the prisons.
And getting more prisons.
You know, that's true.
That's true.
Oh no, I can see the jokes.
You're mentioning more Christmas so that you can buy more to get more Christmas back.
The only way we could make... And this is new, this is the floor.
The only way we could survive, option two, could do this.
It's not the floor.
on below the 20th, and keep the residual force.
We could live with that for a while.
Where we could simply offer to renew the bombing, and though I won't hear you, and do so,
I don't think so.
I think, in other words, it has to be in the case of saying, all right, here we are.
People, people, they think that's effective.
Because they're all we're saying is, look, we're not, I mean, we're bad, we're lying, basically, in the bad area.
I think everybody will flip an option, too, in their own mind, in our own minds.
That's what I agree with that.
I'm not sure that's too bad an option either.
I mean, after they take a lot, much longer time.
They have a lot longer.
I know.
It just doesn't hurt them enough.
That doesn't hurt them enough.
But on the other hand, they want to stay a lot longer.
Because we can also bomb in North Vietnam and Spain.
I don't know how that's going to happen.
I just do what we're presently doing, in other words, saying we're going to continue that.
All right, we move to the other now.
We move to the, what you're going to be talking about.
I have to say that the October 26th agreement with any improvement
I'd go 48 hours after Hay comes back so that we can go through a process of seeming consultation.
You ought to make a turn.
I was thinking, rather, you should just go to Hanoi.
I think that's a big trip.
I think...
I think I ought to go to Seoul.
I mean, I ought to go to all our allies.
That just takes three or four days.
Go to Seoul, Bangkok, to India, and then Hong Kong, India, and to Hanoi.
Saigon and back here.
If I left on the 18th, I'd work it out.
And I think you're insane.
If by that time they would have stopped bombing, hate would have been in Saigon.
And I'd be on a trip.
And by that time, even nitwits would know that Eve is coming.
Well, maybe you're wrong.
See?
They could be wrong, but you still say they haven't.
That won't happen.
Well, I think, Mr. President, on the 25th, assuming it works this way, on the 26th, you're going to tell
division of the House and Senate and maybe even have them stand behind you when you make your speech.
I know it's on one, but you might consider it because this is a deal that could go south with the attitude that this guy has and call on you to sign it.
I think that would be one hell of a decision for him to make here.
Why don't you just announce the leadership of the House and Senate?
I mean, that's a very good decision.
Well, I've recommended to you that you have support.
And I've asked everybody in the leadership that would say that you'd announce it.
You'll either sign it or be in the morning to say it.
That's what I think you should say.
But we could not justify continuing the war over assistance.
Yeah, of course, it's a solid Vietnam.
And then he could resign, right?
He might resign.
I don't know.
I'm just trying to make it true as to what we're reading.
And I think it would probably be the green.
Okay.
But, Mr. President, his interest is to create the impression that he won't agree.
You see the other thing, Henry?
that they're probably an option too, is that we've got so many other racial problems in the world right now.
I don't like it.
I know that you both know that my hair is coming in, so we've got to start fighting basements.
We've got a hell of a lot of problems, but that's going to be what I've got to work on.
We're starting a new term.
We've got our problems with the Chinese.
We've got our problems with the Russians.
We've got a lack in America.
We've got a hell of a lot of things.
We've got to reorganize the Defense Department.
And the State Department.
And all that, sir.
And the Foreign Policy Bureau, and the Domestic Policy Bureau.
They're telling us Europe and Chelsea got a list on high for being finished.
Well, in the Foreign Policy Bureau, Mr. President, I haven't been able to pay sufficient attention to Europe.
Europe?
I've left that out.
Can't we do something about the urban names, sir?
The thing that Greenan has complained about would never have happened, Mr. Mikko.
If I could have given day-to-day attention to it, even the telegram, I would have just killed the bastard.
I mean, that's the sort of thing I do normally.
With my left hand, I'd never be here if I'd had it.
But you're not here.
But you also have to realize, too, that it...
that I have responsibilities far beyond those.
And I just can't devote all this time to them.
We cannot have Vietnam continue to blank out our vision with regard to the rest of the world.
And I admit it.
Thank God we did Russia.
Thank God we did China.
But my point is, at the present time, as far as advanced Congress is concerned, and I'm sorry, lousy media are concerned,
That's all they will talk about.
That's all they will talk about.
At this point, it's one of those things where basically, let me put it this way.
We're frankly taking an option one, which we know has potential risks, although not certain risks of
I think it's better than going on option two with all the pressure and the agony that we have to go through.
In other words, there comes a point in the war when not defeat, because I disagree with what we're talking about, unfortunately, in a sense, but where
and an end that is not too satisfactory.
In fact, it's very unsatisfactory.
It's a hell of a lot better than the two.
That's who we'll be giving that to.
Particularly with having in mind that the possibilities of option two might not be supported by the Congress after two to three months.
Now, let me copper that what I said
over 20 and with the mining and with the residual force it is possibly viable now it's inevitable you should have no discussion options with the government might be enough to do it because they would lose the war in the south certainly well it occurred to me that after the gods were thinking this last night after the end of the
That mining is still one hell of a thing by itself.
Well, that's the mining.
That's the fact that the chiefing end could start some offensive operations then.
Well, they're air powers on that station.
Isn't that right, Bert?
And we wouldn't have to say what they're going to do anyway.
We could have an occasional raid north of the 20th.
I think we have to look at exactly what we need to do.
That's why I'm giving you the option to do it.
The reason I'm painting that picture as dark as it is is that I want us to see whatever the other picture is, dark as it is, it may not be as dark as this one.
You see?
I know the darkness in the other picture.
I know what you have in mind.
I know that we ought to approve the agreement because otherwise he can't take it.
The building can collapse.
So, in my view,
You know I was always, I was always far from one, Mr. President, for all the reasons you gave me, for the reason that I knew domestically we'd wind up in something like this position sooner or later.
Sooner or later the doves were going to come after us, that we would have to pay ransom to the Soviet Union and to Communist China just to keep a war going in Southeast Asia which we can no longer win because of the errors of your previous efforts.
and thirdly, because option one fulfills your mayor's objective, it exceeds him, and if the guy collapses, it's his fault.
So for all these reasons, I've always thought, and the criminal thing he has done to us is, your authority, I mean, supposing we had brought this thing up at the end of October, or let's say the middle of November in order to separate it from the election, your authority of having foreseen it
you would have shoved it out that you would have made it.
And this son of a bitch had involved us in a totally needless domestic brawl in a war in which it was well designed, we achieved our objective, and suddenly he raised objections which he had never raised before.
On the other hand,
I believe you were right at the end of October.
If you had right to tell his role in the last week of the election, the same sons of bitches who are now crucifying you this way would say this cynical guy who first he calls Stu, one of the great politicians in this world, and when it serves his election purposes, he puts him down to shoot.
So we shouldn't have.
It was the morally right thing to do.
We couldn't have the guy who said that insanely answer
What a shocking and a decision would be to have Congressmen running around over here for the country.
He says he agrees with it, but he says in the palace they're living in a different world.
I don't think anyone's paying any attention to that.
All this grew up a little bit.
Why are we concerned about bringing it off?
There's no question about it.
If you bring it off and grew up, it's going to be a good thing.
You realize that?
Oh, yeah.
You realize you bring it off.
I mean, the peaches can only be as high as the valleys are deep.
For God's sakes, this is good.
That's what this is all about.
I mean, you've got people who have seen what a hell of a thing you had to do to go through, and if you bring it off, it would be spectacular.
Otherwise, they'd say, well, why didn't you do it earlier?
I know that, but let's not get our hopes up.
I'm just simply indicating my own view that I think we ought to go on option one under the worst of circumstances as compared to option two.
That's strange enough, Mr. President.
Our best bet to get option one is option two.
And one reason I'm not so bothered by these resolutions is because I think the North Vietnamese, that's the last thing they want.
It's a cut-off of military operations only.
That's all they're asking for in return for the prisoners.
Because that gives them no co-hold in the South.
Gives them no political co-hold in the South, no recognition of the BRG.
It gives two or three hands for the next year or two before they can build up again to clean out the country.
And so I'm more relaxed.
You don't really have that power thing over any time.
You never really discuss that with me, correct?
Not with the other side.
I'm part of it.
And also be consistent with your program.
way to do the damn thing.
The fact that she doesn't see us on television is irrelevant.
And it helps us with Thailand and Indonesia.
They don't see it as an American negotiated solution.
But the other one they see is a bugger.
There is a whole point.
My name is Henry.
I think we've got to look much deeper.
You know what I mean?
Just don't underestimate what these people are going to do.
Don't underestimate how much hellish problems the counties are going to have to take on the Vietnamese.
When you've got two, either one of which is signed, you're really powering it.
Then the thing to do is to take the one that most closely resembles our goal.
Now, I laid down a goal in a speech in May.
We achieved those goals.
We told the nation we achieved them.
We signed.
You see, it doesn't go along.
There is the critical point.
Then what in the hell will the North be amazed if they don't go on?
They won't turn back to prison.
We've got to deliver the GDN.
So there's the bug in that.
On the other hand, my view is we've got to take that risk.
My view is, Mr. President, if you get an agreement which you declare necessary, after all you've done, no one will think it was a soft agreement.
If then the GDN turns it down and it's an issue of you or...
But then we go to action two.
But then it won't be your face.
I mean, that would be a completely different circumstance.
And if we could plan, if we could plan on Saturday morning and come up with a plan, if you could come up and come serve, come get some rest, make a tent, we'll have another go.
I'll say that.
I'll say that to the leaders of Martians.
I'll get it out to the press.
And then you will admit it.
And you will be off to Paris the following day.
Why don't you go Saturday?
No, not that Sunday morning.
Do you feel all right with me?
No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no,
He wants the European Security Conference, and he wants the Middle East, and he wants the agreement on the nuclear.
I need you to be cold for sure.
We can work on some of these things if we get this standing out of the way.
Now, let's get going.
Let's get going.
You haven't had a date with the Chinese yet, have you?
I haven't seen them lead a decision.
I'm getting over here.