Conversation 838-011

TapeTape 838StartThursday, January 11, 1973 at 9:04 AMEndThursday, January 11, 1973 at 9:42 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kennedy, Richard T. (Col.);  Brennan, Peter J.Recording deviceOval Office

On January 11, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Col. Richard T. Kennedy, and Peter J. Brennan met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:04 am to 9:42 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 838-011 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 838-11

Date: January 11, 1973
Time: Between 9:04 am - 9:42 am
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                  NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. Feb.-09)

Location: Oval Office

The President met with Col. Richard T. Kennedy at 9:04 am.

       Vietnam negotiations
             -Henry A. Kissinger
                    -Protocols
                    -William H. Sullivan
                    -Le Duc Tho
             -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                    -Nguyen Van Thieu
                    -Agreement with Hanoi
                            -Thieu

The President talked with Peter JOHN Brennan between 9:08 and 9:09 am.

[See Conversation No. 35-128]

       Vietnam negotiations
             -Presidential announcement schedule
             -Haig
             -Thieu
             -Haig's role
                     -President's inauguration
                     -Thieu
                     -Kissinger
                     -Thieu
             -Timing-North Vietnamese position
             -Briefings
                     -Spiro T. Agnew call to H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
             -Haig
                     -Kissinger's cable
                     -President's instructions
                     -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                     -Secretary of Defense
                     -Security Concerns
                             -Haig
                             -Abrams
             -Details of agreement
                     -Haig
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        -Kissinger
        -Melvin R. Laird
        -Abrams
        -Haig
        -William P. Rogers
        -Sullivan
        -Shanghai Communique
        -Moscow Summit
-Rogers's call
        -Kissinger
        -Content
-Agnew
        -Possible purpose of visit
-Haldeman
-Security concerns
-Rogers's staff
-Laird
-Rogers
-Response of Col. Kennedy to inquiries
-Rogers's position
-Kissinger
-Press reaction
        -Washington Star
        -Murrey Marder
-Haig
        -Trip to Saigon
-Bombing
        -Lyndon B. Johnson
        -Alternatives
        -Public relations problem
-Bombing halt
        -"Protective reaction"
                -Laird
        -Haig's arrival in Saigon
                -Thieu
-Bui Diem
        -Tran Van Do
-Rogers
-Thieu
-Kissinger
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    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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        -Signing of agreement
        -Schedule
-Financial assistance to North Vietnam
-Legislative leaders
        -Calls to inform of developments
        -Kissinger
        -Haig to Saigon to inform Thieu
        -Bombing in North Vietnam
        -Wording
        -US goals
                -Cease-fire
                -Prisoners of War [POWs]
                -South Vietnamese self-determination
-Kissinger
        -Congressional pressure for consultation
        -Calls to leaders
                -Read statements
        -Schedule
-Timing of announcement about bombing halt
        -Kissinger phone calls
                -Timing
-Ronald L. Ziegler announcement
        -Content
        -Calls to Congressional leaders
        -Schedule
-Kissinger
        -Amount of information
-List of foreign heads of state
        -Pierre E. Trudeau
        -Kakuei Tanaka
        -Alaf Palme
        -Edward R. G. Heath
        -Georges J. R. Pompidou
        -Maurice Schumann
        -State Department
                -Trudeau
        -Foreign ambassadors
        -Kissinger
-Marc Cadieux
        -U. Alexis Johnson
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                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. Feb.-09)

                      -Rogers
              -Australian ambassador
              -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
              -President's visit to Canada
                      -Trudeau
              -Giulio Andreotti
              -Heath
              -Mitchell Sharpe
              -Tanaka
              -Marshall Green
              -Lyndon B. Johnson
              -Heath
                      -Courage
              -Golda Meir
                      -Relationship with US
                      -Aid from US
                      -Golan Heights
              -Austrians
              -South Vietnamese
              -Historical view of US Vietnam policy
              -Peter J. Brennan
              -Kissinger
              -North Vietnamese
                      -Thieu

The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 9:09 and 9:42
am.

[Conversation No. 838-11]

       Vietnam negotiations
             -Thieu
                    -Cease-fire
                    -Political implications
             -US Senate resolution
             -Ellsworth F. Bunker
                    -Thieu

Kennedy left at 9:42 am.
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                                        (rev. Feb.-09)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

very short reply
I think what's happened, though, in reading, they've moved the protocols along until there are now a few fundamental issues remaining, which have been set aside for consideration by Kissinger and so on.
Things are all in shape except for the one that I was watching.
Waiter S6.
As you know, we have no intention, whatever.
I don't know what he was talking about.
The only thing we try to get across is what the hell you fell down.
Absolutely, we're just going to tell you to go to hell.
I'm telling you to go out there and say, this is it.
This is the best we can get.
We're going to go forward.
Now, what do you want to do?
That's the way it's going to be done.
Oh, I don't think there's any question.
We said...
Here's the point.
This was the option in which he might be advantaged.
I can just say I totally agree that we need to go forward with the agreement with Hanoi, regardless of whether it goes along.
However, if we cannot deliver to
working something up.
We have a problem of analog reaction.
I just want to wish you luck and tell you that you might probably handle it yourself.
Are you enjoying it?
Yeah.
Well, aren't your friends that they're all identified?
Well, you know, this is a time to find out if your friends are having a lot of fun.
Why don't you enjoy it?
It'll all come out all right.
Sure.
The, in any event, in that event, no presidential announcement would be made on the 18th.
It would be, we would have paid, what it is, returns.
And then immediately after the train, we would make an announcement.
I would make an announcement and call on two foot here to us.
I have already told David.
See, it's a good idea.
I don't want to go on the 18th, two days before the inauguration, and say, we have a great one now, but you won't take it.
And then have a hell of a blast just before the inauguration.
either, you know, mosey around her over there and talk to the ties, and, you know, he can turn the wheel.
Right.
Henry was going to turn, anyway, see, right, take two or three days, and then he said, you'll come back, CQ, around the 19th or 20th, and tell him, listen, don't say anything right now, I'll report to the President.
Then he gets back, I'll get the inaugural over there on the 22nd, Monday, get the Congress in and say, listen, this son of a bitch doesn't go along, here's the deal, I ask for your support, and go
This is the way it was laid out.
I think he may have possibly gotten confused a little when we said it.
This option would also give us the flexibility to hold for time if it appears that Chu is really going to come along but needs a few more days or even a week or so to do so.
We just visualized the possibility that Chu...
I think he's going to have to tell them.
I can see the point.
I think Henry's probably going to want to give them a time table and say, well, the 22nd will initially come hell or high water.
I don't think at this point that totally for a week or two is going to make one bad bit of difference.
We've held for two months with him.
He's on either side or else.
Except, sir, that he just may be unable to do it, even if he intends to.
This was our concern.
He may have to consult a little bit with some of his leaders to bring them along and say, now, look, this is the way it's going to have to be.
I thought about this.
I understand the problem.
But here's the way we're going to have to do this.
Now, let's get ourselves postured.
Well, we can always handle that at the right time.
Right.
And just say, we've got it all laid on.
And we'd like to slip the date to the 22nd or the 26th or something like that.
Right.
But hey, that's the...
I can't imagine that the North Vietnamese, if... Well, we had delivered shoes.
Exactly.
If we tell them we have this thing set now, we'd like them to lay it for three days.
Incidentally, I had you called home last night when we were talking, sir, before the fall scenario.
Have you been briefing him?
No, sir, I have not.
Oh, that's good.
Sure.
For our discussion, sir, I've spoken to no one.
Right.
I thought you were...
I said, no.
I'm speaking to you in another capacity.
And you can tell me.
If he were asked by his commander, by his superior officer, either General Abrams or the Secretary of Defense, he was denied the union.
And he said, well, in other words, I ordered him to say that he knows something.
So we got him sealed.
But it's important that he know that, because otherwise, what's hate?
In an impossible position with the superior officer, Abrams just won't even know how long he lies.
But if he lies,
Having been directed, he can say later, the president just said, I didn't tell anybody, that's why I didn't.
I thought, as I mentioned the other day, there are a lot of things that I obviously wouldn't want to bother you with.
A lot of the details of the language that's being worked out.
We're getting all of that.
And at some point, it would be helpful to Al if he could sit down and read through that before Henry gets back, you see.
All right.
But I didn't want to do it, obviously, until you said so.
You can go ahead and do that now.
But what you do, you tell Al what's under the ground.
Yes.
The president laid down in the conversation that he's denies anything.
He had no problem there, too.
But you have another problem, too, if you get it around the Hague.
Rowdies now see this language.
Do I understand that Sullivan is not passing this back to Zerling,
If he is, it's absolutely unknown to us, and I believe he is not.
I'm confident he is not.
You see, if we ever get it in that channel, it isn't that they're disloyal to me, but they'll start messing the goddamn thing up like they did in Shanghai, and you remember Moscow, what the hell we went through.
That's what I can't have.
Right.
I'm sure that they do not.
Secretary Rogers called yesterday afternoon.
What did he tell you?
He said, you heard everything from Henry, and I said, well, just very little.
Just tough going.
They're hacking away at the issues.
But it's still serious.
Oh, yeah, it's still serious.
They're meeting.
The lines I would take with everybody.
and what we ought to do with it.
Now, I'll let you know later.
I'll talk to Hallman.
Maybe I can just have Hallman clear.
I want you to know that there's just not any way of reporting these negotiations.
It's very serious negotiations, and we're hoping for the best, but there's nothing reported.
The both sides agree to say nothing at this point.
See, he should know.
He will not have the sophistication of who the hell he should talk to and not to.
Yes.
Don't you agree?
Yes, I agree.
Because I don't think anybody would know him.
Well, his staff would undoubtedly know them.
I just, as I say, I talk to no one.
And each day I have postured, say in defense to Mr. Laird and Mr. Rogers' office, simply
Yes, they met again today.
We just don't have anything.
It's nothing conclusive.
They're still working on it.
That's the word, nothing conclusive.
But very serious negotiations are underway here.
And the president is directing this bill to stay in.
That's exactly the way that it's going.
Good.
And Secretary Rogers is perfectly here.
Well, Mr. Mulvaney, he's all right.
If others don't know, that's the problem.
Of course.
But if you tell others.
And he understands that in a negotiation, you can't tell a whole bad world.
First, Henry's totally correct.
In fact, all that happened in Marlowe, they're not going to Marlowe.
Sir, the way it's going up to this point, I think we're back to the October sort of framework.
They want to clean this up.
They want to settle.
Even a little further.
Yes.
It is improved.
Yes, we have.
I meant in the way they're approaching them.
Yeah, in other words, they want to settle.
They want to settle.
They didn't want to settle at all.
In other words, this is not a goal.
You know, it's amusing.
God, we really have to press completely.
It was a close start last night.
Progress nil in Paris.
I saw Mary Margaret yesterday morning.
The atmosphere was icy because of the bombing that occurred.
See, that's very good to leave him right out there, because you can't tell him anything about the atmosphere.
At least when the atmosphere is warm, it's not spicy, it's not spoiled.
But just want to leave him right there.
Don't try to leave him.
Don't give him any indication that something is happening.
But I would say that we do get some trouble for it.
Oh, I was thinking about this in terms of trying to keep the temperature down.
I don't think there's any way.
There's no way.
I'm a little worried about the bombing stuff.
I wonder if that doesn't smack Johnson in 68.
I think we have to do it with sort of a price.
I think there's no alternative.
Well, it bothers me.
It bothers me only in the sense at this point that it is going to cause this massive public relations problem.
You know, there's no question of that.
Do you want to repeat this?
No.
No, okay.
Yes.
Even up to the 20th.
You know, remember, every time you do anything, you remember the person after the bombing call, even so-called protective reaction, you know, all that jazz, that's what that coordinate,
I said, that's fine.
I said, if they shoot at you, you don't have to shoot them.
The weather's bad.
You can go back and get them the next day.
That's exactly what he was doing.
So that will cause euphoria, there's just no doubt.
However, it may be tempered somewhat.
I would suspect that when Haig arrives in Saigon, there will be the usual state of leaked out stories that were... Saigon's driving the state.
That's right.
But if they do, is that going to really result this time in this country?
They'll drop the ship.
This PL in this country don't want to fight for cheap.
The reports of these two fellows that were in here, Wee Yam and Doe,
are going back.
What do they think?
They're very clear on this.
They've made the point.
Because everyone they've talked to has told them precisely the same thing.
Are you sure you can tell Rodgers that today?
Does he know about post-mortem?
Yes, he saw them.
He saw the two, and he made the same point to them.
When you talk to them, you've got to have something to say.
Yeah, exactly.
I'm just delighted.
I'm very pleased.
Jim's on the spot now.
He will hear it from some people.
There's no tomorrow.
There's no tomorrow.
Just tell us about the couch that lies where it is.
You see, he should not have really gotten in a position, which I've always been uncomfortable about, that he was going to go to an oil initial.
Henry had not seen, and I think he now sees, the enormous symbolic problem that causes not only in South Vietnam, but in the United States, for the representative of the president to go to the capital of our enemies.
Yes.
You know, Jesus Christ, you read the history of wars.
Yes, sir.
You see my point?
Yes.
I think, as I said to Bob yesterday when we got this, the second one's infinitely better.
Yeah.
If there's any way to work.
To go.
He doesn't know where to work.
I'm going to get the list of all the videos in which the calls will simply say that they should be done on Sunday because of the
There has been some significant progress that has been made in the Fox.
I don't want to say consult Q. I don't want to give any indication to the public to say report or report to the public.
Inform Q.
Go.
That's it.
To inform Q of this latest development.
Inform Q of this latest development.
And because of this progress, this is, I would say, Sunday.
I just tell the leaders Sunday.
in the talks goes forward.
How does that sound to you?
I think that's just exactly right.
And then, oh, and then go on to say we cannot answer the question, what is the substance?
My agreement, both sides have agreed there will be no discussion of the substance of the talks.
To discuss that might jeopardize the agreement.
Consequently, we cannot discuss the substance.
As soon as we reach, no, discuss the substance, that is not
It will finally bring us reach.
Except for, and I think you could add, except for the fact that we are, that the American position is, that we are still seeking an agreement.
Our three goals of January 25th, 1998, a ceasefire, a return of prisoners of war, and a political process in which the South
to think about, number one, so that you can indicate in this that the moment he arrives back, the pressures for consultation with the Congress will be enormous.
In order to handle these pressures, this is my view, Mr. Hollywood, he would call
the top leaders, and then I would have other calls made by other people on the staff, just reading them this, and I wouldn't be on it.
He would call the top leaders.
Don't mention the other calls out of the public interest.
As far as he, he always gets worried to figure somebody else.
Who's going to call him?
He said that he would, that he would have to make the calls from the public interest leaders to the public interest leaders, and nobody else would be informed.
But that would be done on Sunday before the Monday morning.
See, in other words, we only move up the announcement of the bombing thing one day.
We'll send the bombings to the side or...
This is going to be essential for the reason that otherwise we're going to have even Republicans coming to the table here saying, now what the hell is going on here?
Would it be possible to hold that until Monday morning, do you think?
Yes.
I'm afraid Sunday, by Monday morning, it'll probably hit the newspapers.
It'll be, well, not necessarily.
The leaders, I think, are going to be there.
It would be better, it would be better, sir, I think.
I don't think it would be better to wait until there's an announcement about the bombing before then.
Goddamn, you could make college marks.
Well, that may be Sunday night.
How's that?
The call should be made Sunday night.
Then it doesn't matter, because...
These calls will be made Monday morning.
I'll buy that.
Just Sunday, we'll just... We'll see.
But he will have to take off a couple hours to make those calls.
He's got to make it.
I think that's fine.
And I'll update off of it.
Yeah, well, you know, just say that I feel that the pressures are enormous already, and that I'll be reduced to talk, but I think that if he gets back, we kind of hold without saying anything.
I think we have to say that much to the leaders, and that's exactly, of course, what
And that will also be the content of the Ziegler announcement.
Ziegler will say the same thing in his announcement.
But I want you to beat the leaders to get their calls an hour before Ziegler announces.
And the leaders think they're insolvent.
I want to call a leader Sunday night.
Well, the Sunday night is a better thing.
Sunday night, then, if there were to be any other calls, a few other selected people, they could be called on Monday morning just before zero.
Five years will keep it.
That's exactly what we said.
We've got it, but Emory's tendency to say call nothing.
That's great for him, but we can't take it here now.
I mean, we told him that during the bombing in December.
We told him that and so forth.
There comes a time.
Get me a list.
Several foreign heads of government.
Trudeau, for example, is an example.
Of course, the Swede, etc.
uh... first
We have the opportunity to do so.
We can hear from any of those people.
This is an order.
And I want you to see what the legislature calls the right.
There is to be no response given at all.
In other words, the ambassador, I mean, there is exactly no response at all, just ignoring it.
Second, there should be no communication
that any of those should be a hold on all those for a period of 60 days.
On any subject, as far as the President is concerned, any subject, that means that the President is not to be mentioned.
If they have a message to the President, it's not to be mentioned.
It will be transmitted to him.
I don't want the State Department to use the third person saying the President appreciated it, et cetera.
You've got to kind of trust two different things.
One, if they have anything, for example, let us suppose that if we get some sort of agreement, we get some sort of a note from Trudeau saying, I'm delighted to have the agreement.
The State Department people would have to say, thank you very much for your gracious note.
We say nothing.
We say absolutely nothing.
And I don't see the ambassador for bad agreement.
Also, the other thing I want to say is that all of the ambassadors
as far as the state department is concerned they can see the desk officers you know what i mean i just i don't even control state they'll see that that's i don't go that far i just don't want to know why i'm sorry i have uh you understand i yeah it isn't being a detective it's what i'm trying to do is develop a little respect for some other from future time you know you just
I already, over the weekend, well, and yesterday, had stayed not to respond to a request from KADU, the Canadian ambassador, to see Alex Johnson.
Absolutely.
And Mr. Rogers mentioned this, and said it was kind of a little difficult, and I said, yes, sir, I understood, but he said, well, I understand, so we can hold on.
This one is a particularly difficult thing.
They were really badgering me about it.
I saw Alex Johnson even at the... Alex was a little upset by this one because Cadieux was a friend of 20 years.
Sure.
And the Australian ambassador is a very friendly one.
He's a marvelous man.
But God damn, he's an ambassador from that country.
I mean, you don't have to bring anything.
after the Russians stomped on Budapest, simply because you liked the way he transponded.
That's my point, exactly.
Which is not done on the basis of France, right?
It's done on the basis of their policies.
No man can separate himself from his government.
And this has not been done to help.
We've been damned generous to these people.
Well, we want that damned trip to Canada, which is probably considered the closest to an election.
May have saved Krugel because his anti-American attitude was not helping.
But I didn't want to get into Krugel's answer to the election here.
It's a pain in the neck.
We just did it for the son of a bitch.
Don't worry.
He's going to have four years of being heard to be in this place.
It should be, it looks like.
Not because he's...
I'm surprised at the Italian.
Well, I want him treated a little differently.
Let me say, he's an Androian.
Androian is this.
He's simply reflecting the left wingers there.
The Italian, I would, I would, I would, let me say, I don't want the Italian any response from me.
But don't rule out the Italian seeing the same part of the people in the rest.
The Italians, the Italians have a terrible left-wing problem.
Don't you think that's what you're talking about?
I don't think, exactly.
I don't know how much you're talking about.
Heath was having problems in the same
In fact, of course, the Charter of Canada tells us, I don't know, tells us this was exactly what their problem was.
They were afraid if they didn't say something, the government would go down.
Bullshit.
And who knows?
But it certainly is the case of the Italians.
They will go down.
Yeah.
That's why the Italians are going to be treated differently.
But let's say that they take away Tanaka.
What was Tanaka going to be without us?
No excuse for that at all.
No, there was no excuse for this.
Michael Green has given a number of ambassadors in town just really terrific dressing down.
He's really called them off.
And apparently the reporting back is pretty accurately reflecting.
What's he telling them?
Oh, he's just telling them that we cannot possibly understand how their government could put us in the same context, in the same breath.
Of course, you see, they got away with it so much during the Johnson period, if you recall.
Yes.
I mean, all the governments around the world were burning emissaries and all that crap.
And during the war, I suppose they didn't get away with it with us, you know, kicking
They know damn well it wasn't us that sang these songs.
And you refuse to talk.
Oh, it isn't that bad after we think of it.
Out of the 20 or so countries that may have done that, there were a hell of a lot of others that didn't say a word.
Isn't that true?
Exactly.
Look at him.
That took a lot of guts in his heart.
It did.
And I shall remember that.
He's going to get the carpet treatment like nobody.
We didn't hear any mentions of going to Miami.
No, not at all.
You know why?
She also wants to be able to look tough.
She's a terrorist in business, you know.
She's taken precisely this point of view.
Just be as tough as you can be, is her motto.
Well, if they go up there and bang hell into the Syrians and the Golanites, and if we're a public opinion, get operated by the hell out of them.
You don't stand well with what's happening here.
This is proactive action, not popular.
March.
The tragedy is that we're not doing it for the citizens.
We're just doing it to save these poor guys.
Some people make the people from the extermination.
But it's our way.
We'll see it through.
Years later, people will look back and be hopeful.
Realize that we're trying to do the right thing.
I totally agree with him.
He may have put it this way, but I think he may have misunderstood the message.
But I told you, I had no thought, whatever, that we were going to reach no shape.
Is that true?
Is it?
Let me say it.
if you've got an idea do you uh do you have any idea how you could deliver it uh the new secretary of commerce yeah secretary of commerce uh yeah he's a uh no no i'm sorry he's a secretary of club former under secretary of commerce new secretary of hud meet you the
We like to work as a different kind of formulation with our enemies.
If you absolutely refuse us, well, the problem is, by that time, you can't go there to cease fire.
All right.
I suspect we will be able to deliver that vote.
We won't be able to deliver it.
Maybe... You mean Chu will go to ceasefire?
He'll go to ceasefire.
I can't imagine a Chu.
I think this would be suicide politically for Chu.
Everything that we've seen up to now suggests that Chu indeed... All right.
Suppose, though, we can't deliver it at the political summit.
I agree, and all of our personnel, but we can give them that without anything.
I mean, that's the Senate resolution.
If I had a leg, and this is what I fear, they'll raise the hand and say, fine, yeah, stop all that.
I think that's a very strong possibility.
One, which I'm sure that you understand, too.
If it goes on that, the Congress should go for it.
Fast as hell.
This, of course, is a mess.
It's again too cheap.
So hopefully all these pressures will bring him around one way or another.
I think Bunker has a feeling that if there's a better than 50-50 chance, or at least at least 50-50, that he's going to do it.
50-50 is not good enough.
He's got to go.
I think this is a reflection of an excess of caution based on our earlier kind of experience.