Nixon, Helms & Scowcroft on Iran and Oil and Energy Policy

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Are you ready to come back?

Yeah.

How are you?

I think they want a picture.

Okay.

It's very good.

Whether you did it in Iran or .

So I plan, if I may take that up, to talk to the Oranians about this.

Shah is vacationing in Sanford, as you probably know, and will not return to Iran until about the 15th of March.

So I thought I'd leave here about the 10th and hope to be able to present my credentials before the Iranian of the year on the 21st, which time I believe he takes off again to go somewhere down to one of his southern resorts.

The best factor to you seems to be the bill that Joe Farland is going to stay till the 2nd of March.

It'll only be about 10 days in between the tombs, so I think that's about as tight as we can make it.

Fine, fine.

And in addition, I need that time to get myself prepped up.

Well, uh, you've, uh, you've, uh, you've always fallen through with regard to, uh,

Dr. Kahn, in addition to the rest of the people, I have already had one conversation with him and I'm expecting him to call daily to have a much longer one.

I'm going to take you to him.

Yeah, and I've taken your letter very seriously, so I've already got a first cut of the paper that you wanted me to write with.

Oh, yeah, don't you have to go?

Yeah, yeah.

There's no states, and so forth, which I'll have over together within a week's time.

All right.

I've already made some... Would you do this on that?

Talk to your British counterparts on that?

I don't think he...

Yes, Max.

One of the problems I run into on this, in our age in the Gulf, there's another type of thing.

We're running into some problems on this because after they gave up their security interests, they're terribly interested in developing their trade interests.

And those are not necessarily going along hand in hand with ours, in addition to which I discovered the American companies have a total knock on the board in Saudi Arabian oil, which is the big ones.

The French, the British, and the Dutch are not playing our game in that area at all, because they'd like to unlock our lock.

So we'll block each other.

I think we can work together, but we can't work together totally.

In other words, I think that we can get the British to help us there with some of the security problems, and the British would be able to take care of them if they gave up.

But I don't think that we can sort of get in bed with them on the whole problem.

One problem, one thing.

You know what I mean?

What you do is just let me say that I want you to

What I want you to do is to try not to think just of your CIA background.

You know what I mean?

And actually, your CIA background would be very important in terms of the

stability of the governments of the world in the area, but I'd like you to apply yourself as you go over there to the energy problem, the oil problem in general.

And this gets to the question of whether the United States can continue.

to protect its interests adequately, without having a big government-to-government relationship with these countries, and for that matter, in dealing with what we call the Soviet Union.

We simply put a thin drain, and we can't let that big pipeline thing out there be in charge of the Soviet Union.

We have two or three American colonizers.

I want you to think about it.

In other words, what I interested in is for you to think about it.

You'll be at the heart of oil there in Iran, of course.

Talk to the other people.

Talk to the foreign companies, the British and so forth.

Talk to the American companies.

Spend a lot of time on it.

Merge yourself in the oil problem.

And then, so that you can contribute to what is probably the more common basis.

Now, let's cover the Mexican thing.

Let me start by saying that it seems to me that, of course, he was a particularly gracious person to hear.

and that they never miss an opportunity to kill the United States.

The real question is, what does he do?

What is he trying to do?

Is he just trying to take a huge shot that all violence seemed to be taking one time or another?

Or is it a question of deep beliefs?

It's going to be the latter, but we've

He's probably going to say some things that you wouldn't like regular drug users to hear, but this is for domestic political reasons in Mexico.

He has nothing to do with this feeling of war.

He says, I've got to do these things.

And I hope the President will understand this.

And I realize that it's difficult for him when I do this and that and the other thing.

But I want to assure you that we will maintain our ties to the United States as we have in the past.

And I haven't seen any of these fellows, any solvency and things of concern.

leftism or any of those things.

I'm trying to get this, Mr. President.

These are his closest confidants.

I mean, the ones who really are the early moons.

And we have some American business people who are very concerned about him.

I would like to know how that conflict is raised.

It's a great question.

I just understand.

We all know that

the tendency of these foreigners, the foreign governments, to take a shot at the U.S. and say, we didn't really need anything to do with our domestic consumption.

This meeting that he wants you to attend for a day on Yucatan and so forth, he presented it quite rightly as a good platform for the United States, a good chance to get a point of view across, and we have to have another thing to see those Latin American leaders.

And actually, the way he presented it, it didn't have no fish hooks in it particularly at all.

I mean, it was not going to be any anti-U.S. thing.

He thought it was a good opportunity for you.

And this is the way he presented it.

We don't want to go overboard.

I mean, I just want to be sure.

We don't.

In this first statement, we must not go overboard in reacting publicly to these guys who dance around.

We have to keep in mind all of our members, and then we privately indicate what we've heard and this and that.

We've got to keep it down.

I've had a great few conversations with Sahar on their respects.

Sahar, of course,

very strong for us and so forth, and particularly once more military.

And of course, the mountain is total control.

It's the other way, so it's sort of raised out of the sand.

It's nice.

It's hard to lay, but...

I said, you know, we are in the middle.

I think you made a big mention about me.

You said that, so that means from now on, at the time, we'll have a meeting, and...

I must warn you that the American Congress is getting more and more turned on by leaders of governments who ask for our assistance and treat us the same as those who are getting our assistance for protection.

Now, this is a good principle of state.

I mean, we just take it privately.

We have to have in mind that when you find them down the road, it's a question of an ancient sorrow.

And so they've got a sorrow that's way worse.

And that's a question, therefore, of surviving.

The Philippines have the same thing, you know, the marker zone and other victims, including anti-camps.

We know what that is.

The way of intellectuals in the Philippines is to give the United States help, but hope they don't go away.

And get the Americans help, but hope they don't go away as well.

And this is true every place in the world.

On the other hand, there comes a point, right, Trudeau's done it, the Philippines have done it, our major analogs.

What would the Japanese be without the American?

What would Europe be without them?

We have, with the exception of the British, virtually all of them.

Some openly and some less openly.

And there will be something else in the future.

The question is not American heritage and so forth, but the real question is respect for American leaders of nations who have children at home.

They're all susceptible to flattery.

They're all susceptible to fear.

Now, we need a balance here.

I didn't plan on that, but though my concern feels very strong, and as I continue to just spend time with some of these people, at least that's what you call something that's not going on for you.

Like the ambulance has gotten turned around, if you're right.

I think everything's going to be

Well, it's a sort of a rambling discourse to come to the fundamental problem.

That's how we handle it.

Sahar was the president of Mexico.

We can't really have the problem of trying to have our own public opinion, our own congressmen and senators.

If you just battle them back, or if you say, well, we're a big power, we don't have our men back, the rise and tide of isolationism in this country could sue us all under.

That's the real problem, I agree.

And I don't know if you think about it a little, I mean, as to what we can do.

See, you've got to take on a different role now as your CIA, as a role, but I do think what our public position should be.

Sir, I'd like to make one suggestion to the president.

If we can stay out for the next period of time here, why don't you tamp it down, and I think you'll finally be responsible.

But if you don't have to handle this with diplomatic channels, this should be a kind of a guidance that the last six things, you know, we're taking pretty hard at.

Okay.

All right.

There's a study actually that should be made.

We've got to have a view that expresses probably all that we can say at some time.

The Centurion Council may not hear what the view is.

Roger should express his views.

CIA should express theirs.

Richardson should express his.

Because we sort of now do it on a sort of analog basis.

That's all right.

Every case is different.

You treat the Japanese differently from the way that you treat the Saskatchewan people, basically.

But there finally comes that question, why not?

The question is, how much can we respond to?

I just don't know.

We've got to tackle that problem because I think it's a growing disease.

I don't want him to do anything to hurt his own position.

But I just wonder if he has to go that far to preserve his position.

I mean, say...

He has become a very strong nation.

I ran into him all the time because of this.

But nevertheless, although he's a very great person, the problem you have is that

is everybody's thinking about the war will be over and things will get better and they saw these things and they won't.

I mean, it works.

Because it's the American Revolution's preference that Malik is saying, the United States shouldn't set this private.

The reason is probably, I mean, it's the money report.

But we should, oh, and the report.

Remember he said that Malik had told somebody that the United States should get the hell out of the nation.

We don't belong here.

The other thing I was going to say is that the ties, they find it, he wants to be with us, but they're worried, this virus of, well, the engine should go home.

What I mean, it's all right up to a point, but if they say it too much,

Those who really want the United States to go home and put our money into the ghettos will prevail in this damn Congress.

That's what we're doing.

I agree with you.

And take the Japanese.

There's a little jihadistic follow-up, and that's what he is.

He's a new boy in town.

Maybe he'll finally calm down.

He's so different from Sodom, as you know.

He talks too much.

A lot of people say, come with your man.

A lot of people want to say it anyway.

That's their issue.

And so hard, after all, if it hadn't been for the United States' position in Vietnam, Indonesia would have gotten communist.

Several years ago, when he came to power, it was the United States standing fast there to recover the country.

And I feel very strongly about that, the same with Thailand, Singapore, all of those

I want to talk to you a little about committees.

I don't want to get into any files here.

We have, as you know, within our own government,

We have a hell of a split on the Mideast.

Now, and have had for a long time.

Now, basically, it's a split to an extent about tactics.

No, to an extent about policy, strategy.

I want to have the State Department's position, which is labeled as pro-Arab.

Well, it isn't really pro-Arab.

The State Department just wants to have a public negotiation against them, you know, to bring these people together.

And I think we should now put the arm on Mr. Fischer, force the public to take his over.

And Rogers has taken a bad rap.

the Jews in this country and for the Israelis to do the so-called Rogers Plan, which is a very mild plan that has been attacked because he just doesn't give Israel anything he wants.

Basically, the Rogers position is not, as you know, a Gentile Israel.

It isn't really pro-Arabic.

It's just pro-Semite.

He just believes the goddamn thing ought to be settled.

And he believes the best way to go

on the other hand, being Jewish is susceptible to, of course, the enormous pressures of the American Jewish community and, of course, the Israelis, etc., and the rest.

Having said that, on the other hand,

as I've told you, always compensates, tries to compensate, because he is Jewish in the other direction, in his policy.

And yet, deep down, deep down, you will find, when you get beneath the surface, that every time we have the error is really issued up, that Henry finds a reason, and I don't think he does it consciously, but he finds a reason always to come back.

On the Israeli side, always.

For example, I talked about the fact that this is the year, not next year, which we have an election year, and not after the next year, because we've got a presidential year.

If we're going to get some sort of a sign in the meeting stream on a partial sign, you've got to start getting it now.

So, my average position now is, what is our election?

The Israelis have an election in October.

All right, we wait until after the Israeli election.

He says, everything has to be more harder for you.

Then, what the hell's going to happen?

Then you'll be a year from our luncheons, making our hard work.

It's okay.

Now we've come to the point.

Well, Henry's view, that's his tactic.

Henry believes we should not have any public meetings and so forth.

Part of this is his, I mean, as you know, the writers, their personality differences.

Part of it, however, is also his lack of confidence in the State Department, which is

which is over, it's over time.

He doesn't think they do anything right, and that's not correct, and he or we don't have to do everything all the time, or write either, neither is right or wrong, but he has the right to invite you to a certain extent on some factors, and this is what's useful to some kids, that we get the Israelis and the Arabs on this in a public forum,

that it will lead to a confrontation, that it will fail, and that the result of the failure will be an armed conflict.

In other words, he says, do it right.

And then if you do it privately, of course, he says, it's got to be done here.

Well, that, of course, drives Rogers, and so forth, right up the damn wall, right?

and I can say this, they might impact this based on my private conversation with the president and the grantee.

The Soviet, for I don't know what reasons, I mean, I have ideas, but I'm not sure.

The Soviet and then a settlement in Asia is a very, very important objective.

And they're willing to pay a considerable price.

They get it now.

It may be that they want to get bad clients off their backs.

It may be that they're concerned about being in a confrontation with the U.S., backing a loser in another war, and so forth and so on.

It may be the hell of a thing.

I don't know what it is.

But be that as it may, the Soviet, you can't say, is very, very impressive for a subject.

Now, you know what?

What are the interests of the United States?

As you know, I have never been, and despite, this is not due to the fact that I've never had much support in the Jewish community until this year, which I consider to be a long course, but I have never been in the pocket of a big Israeli lobby.

I've supported and faced and supported the Israeli talents and so forth.

There's a cold-blooded foreign policy requirement, in other words, to maintain balance.

But insofar as it is taking the line that the Israelis ran along with all of the Israeli hell with that, I frankly was very disturbed when I saw Mrs. Myers in transit just then and didn't soften it by the start of the student meeting.

to see that she said, well, she had to say this because of domestic concern, but for her to come over here and say, we have nothing to offer, well, we already offer, we're going to stay right where we are.

About them, she can't get away with it.

They're running to China.

And also, finance, we've got to work the deal out.

So, all right, what do you agree to come down to?

That means this.

You will be, on the French side, you're, you're, you'll be in one of the best listening posts ever.

But before you can take all of them,

I want you to think before you take off.

And you give all of my call, and give me a little of your feel about what the hell we ought to do about the Israelis.

I understand I'm not asking you to make a decision on it, but you've been in this for years.

And my own view is that we've got to squeeze the Israelis.

I would never say this, and I'll deny it, but I think we have to.

I think the Russians have got to squeeze in and rejections, and I know it's tough, but if we don't allow this, then I'm not going to go on.

And also, I think the long-term foreign policy interests of the United States are damaged by continuing in a situation where we are Israel's only support in the world.

We have the Arabs in varying degrees in America because of that support.

Just so that you know what the general feeling is, there are some of them that you are aware of.

As far as I'm concerned, that is certainly a bit...

I myself don't think...

I like the revolution.

I like the Arabs, you see.

I like those people.

I, frankly, I much more enjoy my visit to Egypt.

I walk to Nasser, and they're just goddamn nice people.

And the Israelis are damn difficult.

You know, some people see my assignment to Iran as being on the Iranian-Israeli circuit against the Arabs.

And this is being played up in certain papers out in that part of the world.

Actually, Mr. President, I can tell you very honestly, I've had good relations on both sides.

And I've been very spook in this assignment.

What I'm trying to put it another way, you're at least on the trading point now, and so you basically would be as far as the policy as your percent.

See, what I'm asking you about is the tactics now.

And that 9% is as high as it has to be now.

And I think we've got to push it now, in that, over, over, right over, over, looking over at all of the damn Russians.

Uh, if we're, uh, did you realize we've got this Russian summit coming up?

Uh, that'll be probably in, uh, the summer or perhaps early fall.

Uh, we sure tell, uh, probably, uh, that, that gives us a deadline to do something, even when the Israeli election.

I don't know what the election, you know, has to do.

Well, sir, I would do this, and I'll give you some short statements, but I thought about it.

That thing up on the other side.

But the paper should be, it's about a very, uh,

All right.

Which would you prefer, that A or C with the paper?

Why don't I do that, and then I can stand on a normal...

I think you should come in and change the paper when you're here.

Right.

I don't want...

I don't want all the persons to move the file, in that sense.

Okay.

I think I've got one thing with you, Mr. Chairman.

The only person I can take this out of this is not a remark to make any trouble, but I think it's something you ought to be... Is Jim Schlesinger Jewish or not?

No.

Well, we don't have any files in the agency, and there's no Schlesinger I've ever known that wasn't Jewish.

He's in the book of the Lutheran and so forth, but I don't have any idea what the investigative reports show.

And it seemed to me that if there was any possibility about this, you ought to satisfy yourself, because as a guy who's been in the intelligence business all these years, there's a slight vulnerability there.

It should turn out that he's one of these hidden fellows that goes back towards regeneration, and he's probably like everybody else since.

But, well, I guess I suppose I don't know.

I know Hebrew.

He isn't Jewish.

Oh, no, he's a Lutheran.

It's very clear.

But I thought you might want to personally, very important, you know, the anti-Jewish, the Jewish influence on their own.

I was just going to say, if anybody tries to call him more straight than Henry does, he was at one of the United States, and he is shocked by this.

Not only his liberal friends, but they've done it.

I don't want to hear the answer.

I just want to be sure that the President of the United States knows exactly what he's dealing with.

Tell her the job's done.

It's already lined up.

Yeah.

Well, if you come in before you leave, we'll just have a little chat.

Natalie went March 10th.

All right.

Well, you do check it out and drop in.

I'm going to hand out a paper.

We're going to give some thought to having in mind all these factors, the Russians.

Thank you very much.

Nixon, Helms & Scowcroft on Iran and Oil and Energy Policy

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on February 14, 1973

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