Conversation 857-005

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Hi, how are you?

Andy, how are you?

Oh, it couldn't be better, sir.

And I want to thank the man that did it, sir.

I just want to say to the O.W.s that everybody's doing a job marvelous.

And they have really been marvelous.

They have been superb.

Superb.

But, sir, nothing is going to take away from what you did.

You couldn't do it yourself.

Fair enough.

That's what's history.

As you know, General, do you think that it would be out of line for them to hear that you were the one that mentioned today?

I don't think it would be.

I thought you were discussing NATO and the rest of it.

I don't think it would be.

Would you get Secretary Richardson, if he's not available, to add a little more?

Is he going to mention NATO in this conversation?

Well, here we go.

Have you ever had an out-of-bail mistake?

A lot of people.

I don't think so, no.

It's been about 40 years since I've played.

I think it was, I think it was, I think it was, I think it was, I think it was, I think it was, I think it was,

But, uh, here are a few times.

Very important.

Both of these are not a good thing.

Also, in terms of the national security context, because of the lack of NBFR, future violence force reductions, will be something that will be on our agenda this year.

Not only on our agenda, first with our university, but also with the sorority community.

And what I was saying, the European Security Conference.

This does not present, in such a case as the military matters, but which would attend on a general security level, is also a lot of, this panel's a couple of guys here.

The thing that I wanted to say is that we...

on the return of our bureau against the withdrawal program, and how the ceasefire has been made.

But also in the case of the general Apache threats, the whole problem of our relations with Europe, including

the level of American forces in the line.

I have nothing substantive to say at this time, but I think that these matters are going to be, and I'm speaking now in the AFR, the European Security Conference, we'll be having a very intense discussion with the administration and also between this government and the governments of our European allies in the major subject of the discussion.

Mr. Keith, and with all the attention that's actually being given to economic considerations, the problem of trade, which can be very interesting and sometimes difficult.

What are your views on this?

We must not overlook the fact that the entirety of all this are the security arrangements that we have with Europe.

And I would simply move to understand the United States at the present time in the matter of going through Vietnam.

We'll hear voices raised, very sincere voices that

Well, after Vietnam threw up her hands and turned into withdrawal, our obligations were, uh, one of the reasons which I consider quite important for Vietnam to be ended.

And what I think was the right way of peace and honor was that it was essential to demonstrate both to our allies

ties, et cetera, and to protect the federal service, that the United States is a dependable ally.

Because all power in the world lodged in the United States means nothing unless those who depend upon U.S. power to protect them from it.

aggression from other powers which they themselves would not be able to do.

All the power of the world here means nothing unless there is some assurance or some trust that the United States will be credible, will be dependable.

expressed by many of our good friends and allies in the world.

That we understand it, too.

Not only with regard to our involvement in Vietnam, but the decisions we have to make to achieve the peace with honor, to accomplish our goals, the goals I set forth in my main speech.

I would only suggest that

It was our conviction, my conviction, very strongly, that in the respective history, that many of our allies, particularly in the United States, were looking back and realizing that had we taken what we had done years ago, certainly when I came to office in 1969, our leaders were there.

would be willing to possibly destroy their commons.

And of course, it would enormously encourage those who might have aggressive intentions toward them.

So again, I'll leave the other thing to add to that.

As an American, I would just say that

confidence in Europe, and from the outset of the NATO undertaking, that confidence has been the foundation of the great success that has been achieved.

There has not been an erosion of confidence.

Instead, I think there's been a strengthening of confidence, particularly when

this action has been coupled with the strong support that you have voiced for the full nato enterprise and the continued commitment of american strength to nato basically as we go into this

period of constructive negotiations.

I think there is a feeling that difficult and taxing as those negotiations will be, we enter from a foundation of mutual confidence and a sense of stability and strength.

Thank you.

Sir, I think that my being here and the statement that you've just made is going to have a very helpful influence in Europe.

As you know, this is a new experience for them to be negotiating in this way with the Soviets.

The Soviets will look for everything they can find to divide us and so on.

And the sense of your commitment, your interest in Europe,

They put a lot of faith in the figure of SACEUR.

It doesn't matter who the individual is, except that it mattered critically when that individual was General Eisenhower.

That started it.

And from that time on, the figure of SACEUR is one in which they take great confidence.

And to see that you are discussing the matter of security in Europe with SACEUR will be a calming and a steadying and a strengthening influence

there, I believe.

One of the things, Andy, we have to realize is that, and I'm not bitching about these people, but it certainly was not, to put it in a British understatement, reassuring to us, who went staring at the December bombing, to find that except for the British, the Greeks and the Turks,

in the European community, including how much Nepal knocked the hell out of us.

The Australians did.

The New Zealanders did.

And the Japanese did, privately.

They were no help.

He stood firm.

And he looked pretty good as a result.

Yes, indeed.

The others have got, as the expression goes, they've got some egg on their face.

And Helmut Schmidt, oh yes.

And Helmut Schmidt must be looking back and wishing that he had exercised his option to keep quiet.

Because really, you people, as he is, what he said was quite an interest.

Oh, yeah.

There was, and he would end it enough so that it just looked as though he was taking the popular,

They were all pandering to their socialist constituencies after their meeting.

Exactly.

So to the left side of the thing, that's why I think this, that when you, we all turn a little bit on the other cheek, and I don't know if you should say it, but when you are talking particularly to civilians and the rest, I would say that as far as the president is concerned, that he is one of those who always looks to our interests and to theirs.

I thought it was once an alliance based on both interests and friendship.

It's now an alliance based on interests.

Put it right, and it's for them to demonstrate that they have some friendship in this thing, too.

Because basically, what the hell are we doing this for?

What are you fighting Vietnam for?

You're fighting Vietnam for that little strip of goddamn territory.

If we had bugged out of Vietnam the Thais, the Indonesians, the rest of Vietnam, to the Philippines,

And the Russians would be encouraged, the Chinese would be encouraged.

We send a calling card to those characters.

It wasn't easy.

Of course, we expect the assholes in this country to do it anyway.

to have our allies, the Canadians, among you.

Well, as associates, yes.

You know, two years ago, I took them to task on their boat on Taiwan, up in the U.N., and they, it really hit them right in the breadbasket, and I'll do it again on this.

I would say we're not, the president is not on the road, he's not a person at all.

He's not a matter of person, aren't you?

But when an ally, we understand when our enemies take us on.

We understand when the environment's taken on.

But when an ally, his sole presumptions, without checking, without understanding what it's all about, without waiting just to give us a little time to move on this, that he considers a pretty cheap shot.

And that doesn't mean we're not going to go forward.

working together because he's a very pragmatic man.

He can deal with the Russians.

We can deal with them.

Just all of it's going to be on that kind of a basis from now on.

I asked him, do you really think it was in your interest to do this as a nation?

And that stopped him on this Taiwan thing.

I don't know what it is, though.

Oh, they're going to their media and the leftist elements and those kind of kids and everything else.

that he, my God, I want you to protect him if you're talking to the British or a British officer member, because he'll get back to you.

He knows what I think.

The President spoke at the end of his speech as the major European statesman, as he does.

Because of the fact that he stood firm, it took a lot of guts, and he could have risked a lot.

And as I, the President, must not forget.

And as he looks to the here, he knows that we have some who are, frankly, allies, and others that are allies and friends.

And he's going to remember our friends.

I had an excellent luncheon with Heath about, just about a year ago now.

And I sensed then that here was a man who would stand and stand firm.

And their military people had that sensing.

And I do talk to them.

And this will very certainly get to it.

I had exactly the same, just exactly the same observation that you just voiced on their performance and behavior.

They were no help at a time when you were carrying this thing, carrying this tremendous burden to bring it through successfully.

It's got to count.

Well, go ahead.

Well, a few things.

On the NATO side, I've been thinking, how does the NATO doctrine apply to NATO?

What does it mean in NATO terms?

And there are some areas of movement here.

So there are going to be some changes in time ahead, and it's important for us to analyze those and be clear to guide them in what I think will be the mutual interest.

You recall when I was back in August, I talked about the idea of having a study prepared.

The NSC has started some work on a study.

Thus far, what I've seen is rather, it's in very early stage.

It's rather elementary and preliminary.

But I think it's...

I want that goose.

That must be goose.

Well, hang on, I was just going to respond.

I think we need to just, Europe's in the front burner.

We've got to get going, because I don't want to go on a deep, deep drag into this MEPR thing, the European Security Conference thing.

And if that's the way we act, we've got to have a position to lead them.

The NBFR is one of them.

I have felt for many, many years, since NORSTAD was my job, in fact, that it should be possible to negotiate a lower level of forces and to reduce the confrontation, the term that you used, and that this would serve our security purpose.

It would not diminish security, and it would add to stability.

I still believe that.

I support the NBFR schemes.

But I don't know a scheme.

And that's going to be very difficult.

And here, what I would like to suggest is one of the reasons we have to do it.

We've got to play it cold-bloodedly so that we don't lose it.

Basically, it's psychological.

The whole thing is psychological.

As you well know, the horses, of course, aren't for all the rest and all the exercise.

But Luke was up there.

or any other, that's why it might never happen, but it's been a psychopathy to this psychological, and we can work out something that all of us feel is

reasonable consideration that's it there's no problem it isn't a question being damn sure

And I think that this is a very reasonable and very valid objective to be working toward.

I would say we should not hurry ourselves with the Russians.

We shouldn't put ourselves under any self-imposed deadlines.

We should expect this will be hard negotiation.

And I feel that we should not fail to put forward proposals

to get their response just because somebody thinks that they may not agree to it.

For example, we have the so-called common ceiling proposal.

Well, this would require a much greater cut on their part than on ours.

They may not go that far, but the principle of parity is one that they themselves have talked about in other areas.

Let's get that out.

That's one exploration that we ought to make.

Another is what we call mixed packages.

What are the things that they have that are most destabilizing, that are of most concern to us?

What do we have that's of greatest concern to them?

Can we make some adjustment and leave each side less threatening to the other in the perception that the other fellow has?

These are the kinds of things that I think we should

i don't think that we should hurry the thing and i think that we must take care not to let them play one of us against another and they'll do this that you can already see that they're looking for the issues on which to do this but if we go into it that way

I think that we can have here a constructive avenue of negotiation that can go on for a long, long time.

And we may be able to achieve things in phases.

But simply, you've opened up the route of negotiations with these people.

And I think this is one of the constructives of stabilizing things in the whole world today, that this does exist.

So we support NBFR.

I might just say that my staff's

We're not inclined to support it.

But I've talked to them all.

And this is the stand of our headquarters.

And they support me in it now.

And we're for it in principle.

We're going to study all of these.

And frankly, I'm not interested in trying to analyze it down to the last tank or the last plane.

That's not the name of the game.

The name of the game is this confidence and the sense of security and stability that comes out of it.

Well, that's one.

Another development that's going on here, and I think is a healthy one that we should push, is the gradual development toward military unity in Europe, where they take on more, they rationalize their forces, they take on more of the burden in the sense of generating stronger forces of their own, more economical forces that can be employed with more flexibility, whereas we now have all these different types

and so on, they should unify themselves on the military side.

And as they do that, that will introduce a new factor.

I'm not proposing any lookout or drastic cut on the US side.

But there are these evolutionary possibilities I think we should visualize as we look down the road.

We have new technology coming in, the smart bombs.

These have really shifted the balance of forces as well demonstrated out there in Vietnam.

the new anti-tank means so that here we we hope to we hope to balance out that equation the application of the helicopter in that environment it's a tricky question but we're working in that again in that area and out of this over a period of time i think we can see some evolution and some dynamics

There are proposals, most of which are pretty superficial and don't have substance to them, for forced restructuring.

As I say, most of them are really a fig leaf for making cuts that ought not to be made.

But some of them, I think, do represent

changes that ought to be made with the modernization and the introduction of new technology.

Well, out of all this, then, I think as we look down the road, we ought not to think of being rigid on our present, trying just to hold rigidly to what we've got at the present time, but gradually to let this evolve and to guide its evolution in a way that will maintain the confidence, but will bring us to

a lower level, in your term, a lower level of confrontation.

We got stability out of that, and that's the name of the game for us.

As we do this, I think that

The meshing of how we work with NATO with how we work with the Soviet Union will be extremely important.

And as I say, just this little session here today will have a restorative effect, and it will be helpful in NATO in keeping up the sense of consultation, keeping up the sense of U.S. ties to NATO.

I don't care about their sensitivity, but I would care if this somehow damaged the alliance and its effectiveness.

Because I think that an effective alliance is in the common interest of all of us here.

Absolutely, absolutely.

And that's what comes first as far as I'm concerned.

That's why I say that in your conversations with these people about their bitching around about Vietnam, that as far as I'm concerned, that simply perhaps impairs the personal relationship

I don't know, but I did not base the court policy on personal relationships.

I couldn't care less for some of my Soviet and Chinese friends.

I basically, U.S. interest in U.S. interest requires a strong

The person would be broken at best.

As far as they're interested in buying, they're going to work things out.

They're not going to be any more toasts.

They're not going to be any more steaks.

They're not going to be any more assholes.

So let it just... All they do is rock and roll.

No, they tore it.

I think the Germans tore it.

And oh, they're sorry about it.

They really wish they could go back and do those days over again.

go take a heat for a few more days, you know, and they would come through really looking like something as it is.

Who in the hell is primarily German?

I mean, you're Germans.

Well, they, you know, it's the business of catering to their leftmost elements in their department.

We could have gone here.

We've got the leftmost elements.

Incidentally, the new defense minister, this minister of labor that I talked to you about last summer, the former labor leader of the transportation units,

He's turning out to be a very sturdy character.

In fact, I'll just say sturdier than Elwood Schmidt, who's been bitten by the bug, I'm afraid.

That's exactly right.

He's programming himself with the left elements of his part.

On the specifics of what we're doing over there, I think that

As you may know, we have these proposals from different countries.

Denmark wants to cut back, and I oppose that very strongly.

I've tried to do it in a way that

can't be challenged from propriety, but I've made the opposition very clear it's public, and they know that I will continue to oppose publicly any reduction on their part.

Same in Belgium.

They want to cut their term of service for their conscripts, which they should not do at the present time.

There's a proposal in Germany to restructure their forces, and the German military

They are not buying this proposal.

Be sure that you get across this one point.

Despite the last election, we're going the wrong way against nice elections.

They might not overlook the fact that the Congress, and particularly the Senate,

will react with open arms to any suggestion that the United States go home to us.

And if the Europeans say they don't want us, everybody say, thank you very much.

You take care of your own, and we'll put the money to the generals.

Now, that's the American opinion at the moment, because you've got the isolations on the right and the isolations on the left.

And that's our majority of the country.

I'm only held together by having the confidence of the right.

But if the Europeans and the Japanese and the others say, we don't want this American presence in the Pacific, we don't want Americans in Europe, or Americans who go home, and that's all the time.

Ladies, you tell them, don't give any invitation, because Ohio will not take it.

The Congress will snap up.

say, even a little country like Denmark, if they cut back, it's an open invitation for the United States to cut back.

That's all.

The second area that I've been working on, which is a very difficult area, I talked to Elliot Richardson

So that way, I think you've got a very able and fine man there.

There's a fine head on him, but it's really going to be a source of strength.

is our whole tactical nuclear area.

This is an area which for 10 years now has not really been talked through.

I think that we are about to the point where it ought to be possible to reach a consensus on what is the relevance of these weapons?

What is their role as a deterrent, as a possible defense?

What are the limitations?

There are very many.

escalatory factors vis-a-vis the soviet union and so on this all through the 60s was unresolved and we still do not have a full resolution of it but we've done a lot of preparatory work a lot of it has sobered down it's much more

carefully developed than in the past.

And I think, and I told Elliot this morning, that I think we're up to the point where it may be possible to think our way through this and take a position on these weapons.

There are new technological possibilities.

There are requirements for modernization and so on.

And all of this, I think, can be a major effort extending over the next year, year and a half,

But it's got to be thought through before we start rushing out and doing various things.

We've had too many people doing too many different things, I think, in the past.

With the French, that's the third major area that I give my attention to.

I continue to work with them to improve the relationship within the decisions of de Gaulle to extend the areas of cooperation on the military side.

right up as far as Debray will allow that to happen.

He's the goalkeeper in the term that I use.

But the main thrust of this, interestingly, comes from the French military.

And I work with them very quietly and around the corner.

And they push for a good NATO tie and to enlarge the areas of cooperation.

We have improved the whole tone of that thing a great deal.

And this has been one of my major lines of error.

You've got a very capable man now down in Spain.

He's working well with the Spanish.

It's a very tender area where it's hard to make progress, but we are finding specific and concrete ways of making progress in NATO vis-a-vis Spain, which again, I think is one of the very important things we should do.

And I was interested in talking to Elliot Richardson this morning that he thinks he's strong for this.

He thinks this is an area that we ought to continue to move on.

I sit on that joint committee of

We talked through our problems and this gives us a good tie-in, a good communication with the Spanish.

I think this is an important area.

It is not too early to start thinking about the next arrangement with the Spanish because this one I think extends only for about another year or a year and a half.

I saw something the other day that suggested maybe they

their interests may be more in the political field for the next go-around rather than in aid.

They now have $5 billion in foreign exchange.

And they're conscious that, man, if we want theirs, and as Franklin goes, is to get them to hell, and they don't exactly deserve it.

They belong there.

And I think that even before that, we could do some preparatory things.

And if you want to push that as hard as you can, the Spanish knocked you down, pushed up every time you got an opportunity.

While it's on my mind, I saw Brunsel off.

I want you to have a good, solid talk with him and get him all this and that in, but particularly get him on the hard line.

in terms of the military and why you can't have a back-end in this and that, you know, given the names, numbers of the players, the kind of people who would be given the, getting this line that I had told you about, how he doesn't handle the situation with regard to those that get his tail.

Well, I did not mention that to him.

I will see him as soon as I get back and say, now, that's what we want done.

You and he must have the same license.

I don't see any new men in that sort of field, particularly even with civilians.

You say, well, don't worry about that.

We all understand.

We know why you have to do it.

Don't do that.

I don't mean, on the other hand, go out and say we're better than the rest.

You say, well, the relationship has changed, and we understand it.

Our interests haven't changed.

Therefore, we'll work with you.

But let's don't assume now that everything is hunky-dory, and the relationship is toast-toast, back-to-back, down, down, all finished.

Incidentally, when you sent Dave Kennedy over, he immediately, we got together, and he came out to see me, and he said, the last thing President Nixon said before I left was, you get close to

But we work together very, very well.

He's a bright young fellow.

I read this as you're wanting him to come over there and to develop.

First of all, here's a young fellow that you have an interest in for the future.

And the second thing is that he will build himself by this experience.

and educate him fast because he might decide to run for the Senate in a year.

I'll get together with him and push him hard.

He's great at public appearances.

Let him make public appearances.

You might tell him that.

He gets a chance to go on television.

If I've got to go on there, he can light their brains up.

And I think that will be an Elston Clinton speaker.

That looks good.

Smart.

The only other thing I wanted to mention was that I see Mimi Eisenhower from time to time.

And I'm just, we're just, we think it's wonderful the way she's, her spirit's good.

She just looks like a million.

I think she is not as strong as she was, and she must take care there.

She's always had this, she, from a, frankly, as far as her spirit is concerned,

It's a hell of a lot better than it was when she was in Hawaii.

Exactly.

She's outgoing.

She's willing to talk to people.

She wants to do things.

We stay close.

We see her from time to time.

In fact, when we're back in April, we were going to stay with her up there, but she said she'll be down at Augusta at that time, so I'll miss her then.

But she's always after us to come and stay with her up at Gettysburg, and we'll do that.

But we're just delighted at the way she's

into things, and you know, that's a face that makes Americans happy, when they see a picture of Mamie doing something, particularly when they see the juror saying that she's in things and so on.

That's one of the good things in America.

Have you read, by the way, the Hannah Cash Breed, the Salt Farrell book, 90 years?

No.

I saw a reference to it, and I'll

As a matter of fact, I want to .

It's very important, because it has to do with, as I told Reagan, I gave him, I said, don't read the accounts of the Scourges and the Kennedy others.

You know, it's got to be important to tell us a great deal about U.S. foreign policy.

The reason I'm asking for a page is I don't want to draw it.

It's very much a good question to copy that Kennedy book to prepare for it.

Anyway, what I say is that

And also, I don't agree with his views about Cuba and a few other things.

But damn, he cuts to the jesus of Kennedy's foreign policy and finally gets Eisenhower's in some perspective.

Bill Eisenhower.

I was fascinated to watch how the opinion developed through the middle and toward the end of last year.

We could get it over there and I could see what was happening in the United States here.

feeling that people had that their business in the foreign field was being done seriously, skillfully, maturely, and so on.

You could see that rising constantly.

And this slapdash crisis appealed to the galleries and so on that we had during those years.

Throwing away any mechanism or any real organized means of dealing

And getting out of one by getting deeper into the next one, I always try to find something to do a phrase for the cue for the competition as being .

As a matter of fact, that wasn't the man.

The rest of you got about a 20 to 1 advantage over an enemy you know goddamn well that he's not going to confront you.

The second point is, having him in front of you, you dropped the ball.

What did we get out of it?

We risked everything and got everything out of it and gave that damn Castro a perfect sanctuary.

I would make a third point, and that is we should never have gotten into it.

Had there been a firm and coherent line

I don't think they're going to move those in while you're here, and they did move them in while General Eisenhower was here.

We stopped them two or three years ago, and they moved the stuff right now.

We said we won't tolerate it.

And also, frankly, they're shit.

The Bay of Pigs operation would have worked if they'd flown a couple planes over the place.

That's exactly it.

You remember, John, last hour, at the time of the Guatemala affair, when some people were engaged in that gut-cooled feat.

And he said, the time to have thought of that was before we started.

We're not going to turn it back now.

Same with regard to the East crisis.

He said, what's the second step?

I said, well, we're going to take the first step.

Suppose it doesn't turn out the way you're expecting.

We're prepared for the second step.

I said, yes.

We're going to take it.

But you've got to know what the sense of step is.

Well, you know, the thing that is really encouraging, and to a certain extent, we didn't, I didn't anticipate this, either.

I never thought you'd see the field others come back.

But in a very ironic way,

The nation now has some heroes out of this room.

They didn't, you see, we all know their heroes.

45,000 died, and I mean the congressional medals of honors and all the rest.

But they come back, and the precipice is on them, and all the rest, the immoral, and the praises of the goddamn draft doctors and deserters, and wants to give them the seat.

But these guys, they come back, and all of a sudden, they see brave men who've been captive against change for six and a half years, standing there saluting the flag, saying, God bless the command of the chief, and God bless America.

All of a sudden, they're heroes again.

You've been a nation.

You've done an enormous lift to the nation.

It was tremendous.

Tremendous.

How long have you been around?

I just came in yesterday.

Oh, just terrific.

And these fellows come down there, and they look like those are Americans now.

That's what America is.

Those are Americans, not these.

Not these.

get this snippet of brass from Canada saying, no, I don't want Amnesty.

The president and the U.S. government should ask for Amnesty to be there.

I am morally right.

And they're morally wrong.

That's the first thing we've ever had to do.

Well, the other thing was not to be that way.

The people who...

Thank you very much.

You ought to read it in the plane.

Just read the whole book.

I'll do it.

And tell the rest of us.

Because basically it's a fascinating analysis of American PR and what a president should and shouldn't do.

The one thing I was told here of what these men coming back said about the bombing,

that far from the bombing discouraging them or making them feel that it was worsening their chances, they thought this was the greatest thing.

And what an answer to all of this stuff.

As a matter of fact, maybe it were.

He told me yesterday that he brought that over.

He has a lot of here.

He read the dispatch.

This can't come out.

A lot of this, what they didn't say, can't come out to everybody.

In fact, that's what they think.

But this guy, these guys said that they felt that on December the 26th, the day after Christmas, the war was won.

And of course, I remember that was the day I had been in Florida for Christmas.

And we gave them a Christmas pause at 36 hours.

I directed them then and then.

I said, I want everything that could fly, fly to that damn place.

Of course, military targets on us.

So they put 116 B-52s on the target that day.

We lost about 15.

And they bombed my home, and they took out everything that was.

And they heard that, and they said, from that day on, they had two of their chambers turned.

They thought that that day, the war would be won.

And they speak in terms of winning.

They know, of course, North Vietnamese did gain.

What the hell did they fight the war for?

They fought it to conquer South Vietnam.

They didn't get it.

They don't.

And they can talk about the fact that they had a victory in the rest of the world.

Oh, shit.

No matter how you slice it, that's how it came out.

That's how it's come out.

That's right.

And the South Vietnamese had given the best chance they could ask for.

And now they're going to make an announcement to them.

Very much so.

With our help.

But you know, these guys know.

They know about the bombing.

It's a curious thing how it takes only about six weeks.

You know, I remember in that period, all of our friends around, not all, I think one of our friends who were in many of the newspapers, George Green's all about it.

Why didn't we explain to them this?

You realize if I go on television to say we're going to bomb because the negotiations have broken down, we'll stop the bombing when they come back to talk.

They couldn't possibly come back.

The things couldn't.

So we just had to do it privately.

We did tell them that privately.

And by God, they came back on our terms.

Do you know, do people across the country understand that?

A lot of them do.

Better than the media?

Better than some people across the country who wrote in some copies.

But in the end?

They now see in particular how they're all sitting and they wonder what about these media people who are told that bombing has never helped, what that would have been like in World War II.

You would say bombing didn't help.

Of course, the infantry didn't.

I'm sure the infantry didn't know why they destroyed the German cities.

And they had the civilian areas delivered and they closed off for Eisenhower's landing.

About every bridge across the Seine was gone.

It was great.

But General LeMay said, you pay the price of admission.

How many times do you have to pay it?

This was done the right way.

You paid the price of admission, and it was high.

Sure.

But it was a big operation, and they told me that after about the 27th of December, the defense was gone.

And in fact, yeah, Mars said that he, he said he realized the last two and a half days he'd lose a plane.

He said, well, he'd shot all of us.

He said, we could have continued for a month.

But it turned out it wasn't necessary, but it shows you.

Well, Mr. President, this was a historic...

This place was flooded, I can assure you.

Actually, except for a couple of our men here on our boat, and then why I was continuing to come pitching to me, but they were all whining.

Well, they're basically dazed on it.

They don't know the facts and they tend to look at it the easier way.

The Congressional people were quiet and a lot of them, almost some stood for it.

But the media was impossible, unbelievable.

The churches and the rest of the people.

There's a cordon lined with coal.

And since then, except for two or three exceptions, none of the media has recognized the media work.

And they're sure keeping their head down in the weeds.

I don't mind.

I don't want them to.

That's hard for an intellectual to grow.

But at least they ought to quit nitpicking us now.

And that's what the P.O.W.s coming home did.

It stopped the Netflix for a while.

People are proud of their country.

They're proud of their flag.

You know what I did about raising the flag?

Yes, John, that was marvelous.

And we had the flag at the top.

You talked to Lady Bird.

Sure.

She agreed.

In itself.

Put it up there.

That flag will fly higher than these men bird in London are.

And people want to see that flag up there.

You know, we need some patriotism in this country.

Some love of the country.

We've got something that certainly is evoking that.

Do you realize that we had come out with a bug out in Mansfield, Montgomery, where we would have said, okay, we'll get our prisoners.

If you'll just, if you'll give us our prisoners, we'll withdraw.

Now, basically, basically, first, they would never have given us that.

They had to have a fake name for the period in which the building was set up.

And second, assuming that they had, these men would have come home, not as heroes.

They would come home and say, well, we fought a war and lost 45,000 men for our prisoners.

That's what Curtis counts as here, sir.

Well, sir, we have to get on with it.

It's a tough passage, but it's been a successful one.

Very successful.

They realize that things can happen.

It's strengthened our country.

Things go southeast Asian.

They'll say, oh, well, it's going to go any way.

Why do we do all this for the Soviets?

We've done our best.

It's theirs now, not ours.

Absolutely.

And the role of our people has been very, it's been brought up very, very graphically.

And those men getting off that plane, they could write, they could do all that they want, but you're not going to reverse that.

The young man came off, concluded in his voice, he said,

God bless America.

God bless America, Jesus.

God bless America.

And he said, God bless America.

Wham!

I mean, the whole nation was in tears.

Let's come and see my father.

Yes, sir.

OK.

Yes, sir.