Conversation 864-007

TapeTape 864StartTuesday, February 27, 1973 at 4:37 PMEndTuesday, February 27, 1973 at 5:19 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Helms, Richard M.;  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On February 27, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Richard M. Helms, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 4:37 pm to 5:19 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 864-007 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 864-7

Date: February 27, 1973
Time: 4:37 pm-5:19 pm
Location: Oval Office
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                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                     (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                            Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

The President met with Richard M. Helms.

      Departure for Iran

      Rose Mary Woods

      Paper on Israel
             -Helms’s view
             -US position
             -Leverage

      Israel’s weapon requests
              -Planes
                      -Golda Meir
              -Necessity
              -Air power capacities
                      -Compared to 1967 war

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[Duration 19s]
WEAPONS

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      Golda Meir

      Prime Minister of Iran [Premier] Amir Abbas Hoveida
            -News summary
            -Jack Anderson story
                    -Helms

      Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
             -Helm’s appointment as Ambassador to Iran
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                NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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                                                       Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

                      -Reaction

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[National security]
[Duration: 12s]

US-IRAN RELATIONS

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      Shah of Iran
             -Helms
                    -Complimentary appointment
            -Visit to US
                    -Scheduling
                            -December
                            -May, June
                    -Empress Farah Diba
                            -Public relations [PR]
                            -Camp David
                            -Demonstrations
                    -Scheduling
            -Oil
            -Meeting with Helms
            -Relationship with US
                    -Specialness
            -Relationship with Helms
            -Visit to US
                    -Diba
                    -Dinner in San Clemente
                    -Camp David
                    -State dinner
                    -Camp David
                            -Facilities
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                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                          Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

              -Visit to New York
              -Oil talks [?]
                      -Progress

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 4:45 pm.

       John B. Connally
              -Visit to Iran
              -Talk with Helms
                      -President’s request

       Shah of Iran
              -Visit to US
                      -Scheduling
                            -Africans
                                   -Kissinger

       Sese Seko Mobutu
              -Patrol boats
                      -Congo region
                      -Communists
                      -Trade for fire boats

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[Duration: 20s]

CONTACTS

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       Aden, Yemen
             -Cubans
                   -Pilots, technicians
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              NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                 (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                       Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

Pakistan
       -Role of Iran
       -US aid
              -Iran
                      -Spare parts
                      -Morale
       -Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
       -Mrs. Bhutto
              -Hong Kong newspaper
                      -Cable
              -Beauty

Gulf states

Iran
       -Diplomatic post
              -Excitement
                     -Compared with Europe
                           -Berlin, Bonn
                           -East Europe

Middle East
      -Persian Gulf
      -Kissinger’s talk with Hussein ibn Talal [Hussein, King of Jordan]
      -Oman
             -Difficulties
             -Helms’s viewpoint
                     -State Department telegrams
                     -Use of back channels

Oman
       -Army
               -Dhofar region
       -Iran’s role
               -Sale of helicopters
       -Saudi Arabia’s role
               -Sale of helicopters
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            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                 (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                        Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

               -Financing
       -State Department
               -Foreign Military Sales Act compared with grant aid
               -Congress

Iraq
       -Relations with French and Dutch
       -Impact on Iran and Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia
       -Ambassador
               -Nicholas G. Thacher
                      -Career service
       -Oil reserves
               -Compared with Iran
       -American consortium
               -Share of market
                      -Compared with Iran
       -Importance to US
               -Competition with Britain, France, and Japan
                      -Solution
                              -Ambassador

Prisoners of war [POWs]
       -North Vietnamese Statements
               -Compliance with cease-fire agreement
               -Messages
                     -Cease-fire violations
                            -South Vietnam

Cease-fire violations
       -Nguyen van Thieu
       -North Vietnam
               -Infiltrations
               -US reactions

Oil problem
       -Need to have oil advisor in White House
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                  NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                      (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                               Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

                     -Helm’s recommendation

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[Duration: 3s]

OIL

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      Oil problem
             -Oil advisor
                    -Thomas C. Barger
                            -Arabian-American Oil Company [ARAMCO]
                            -Recommendations
                                    -Otto Miller
                                           -Caltex
                                    -John A. McCone
                            -Qualifications
                            -Retired to South Carolina; La Jolla, California
                            -Experience
             -Alternative energy sources
                    -Oil sheiks
                    -Edward Teller
                            -Advice
                            -Ideas
                                    -Nuclear, shale
                    -Charles J. DiBona
                            -Teller
                            -Problems

      Iran
             -State visit
             -Helms
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                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                         (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                                Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

                         -Return to US
                         -Report
                         -John A.Volpe [?]

       Iran
              -Visit by President
              -Embassy
                      -Accommodations
                              -Compared with US embassy in Japan
                      -Visit by President when out of office in 1967
              -Women

Helms left at 4:59 pm.

       Vietnam settlement
             -Cease-fire agreement

       Press conference
              -President’s attendance
                     -Kissinger’s advice
                     -Rhetoric
                     -Cessation of bombing

       North Vietnamese complaints
              -Validity
              -Cease-fire violations
                      -Government of Vietnam [GVN] [South Vietnam]
              -Joint Military Commission
                      -Kissinger’s telegram to Thieu
                      -Dissolution
                      -Accommodations
              -Ellsworth F. Bunker
              -Message to North Vietnam
                      -Talks with South Vietnam
                      -Bunker
              -US response
                      -Mining
                      -POWs
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           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                               (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                       Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

                     -Public relations
                     -Resolution of problem

Press conference
       -President’s appearance
              -President’s view
       -Questions
              -Aid to Vietnam
              -Thieu

North Vietnam’s statements
       -POWs
             -Delay of release
       -Economic Commission
             -US delay
             -Reply to Kissinger’s message on mining
                     -Toughness
                     -Economic Commission
             -Kissinger’s reply
                     -Economic Commission
                     -Two-track method
                     -South Vietnam

Vietnam settlement
      -Kissinger’s view
              -POWs
                      -Movement
      -Kissinger’s talk with William H. Sullivan
              -William P. Rogers
                      -Conference
      -Kissinger’s talk with George R. S. Baring [Earl of Cromer]
              -House of Commons
              -Sir Alexander F. (“Alec”) Douglas-Home
                      -Attendance at international conference on Vietnam
      -Rogers
              -Public relations
              -International conference on Vietnam
                      -Credit
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           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                               (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                  Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

                     -Douglas-Home, Nguyen Duy Trinh
              -People's Republic of China [PRC]
                     -Message
              -POWs
                     -US response
                             -Reaction to delays
                     -Aid to Vietnam
                     -Stories
                             -Effect
              -Public statements
                     -Kissinger’s message
                     -December 1972 bombing
                             -Effect
                     -Compared with private talks
                             -Ultimatum

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
       -Summit
              -Handling
                     -State Department
                     -Rogers
                     -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

International conference on Vietnam
        -President’s public pronouncements
        -List of POWs
                -Scheduled release dates

Vietnam settlement
      -Cease-fire violations
              -Thieu
              -Laos
                     -Infiltration
              -North and South Vietnam
              -Thieu’s actions
                     -POWs
                     -US aid to South Vietnam
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                 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                         Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

      The Earl of Cromer
            -Story about Vietnam
            -Departure from post
            -Lady Cromer
            -Common market post

      Vietnam settlement
            -Length
            -US goal
                    -Stability
                            -Timing

      Vietnam
            -Public awareness
                   -Waning interest
            -POWs
            -Troops

      South Vietnam
             -Number of US advisors
                    -Civilian, economic, military
             -Survival
             -Settlement agreement
             -Number of US advisors
                    -Reduction
                    -News summary

     Helms
             -Job as ambassador

     Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
            -James R. Schlesinger
                     -Shake up

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                     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                                Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

[Duration: 1m 22s]

CIA

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 5
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       CIA
              -Office of Strategic Services [OSS]
                     -Age

       International conference on Vietnam
               -USSR, PRC reactions
               -France
                      -Georges J. R. Pompidou
               -North Vietnam
               -Canada
                      -Pierre E. Trudeau
                              -Relations with US
               -North Vietnam
                      -National recognition
                              -Peace settlement
               -Kissinger’s message
                      -Joint Economic Commission
                              -Thieu
                      -Paris
                      -Delivery
                              -Timing
                      -Tone
               -POWs
                      -Return
               -North Vietnam’s response
                      -Contents
                      -Col. Bui Tin’s statement
                              -Four-power military commission
                              -Unofficial
                      -Testing US
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                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                             Conversation No. 864-7 (cont’d)

                      -Military operations
                              -Laos
                      -Response to Saigon’s initiatives
                              -Civilian prisoners

      Civilian prisoners
              -Number released
              -Convicts
                      -Amnesty
              -Cadres
                      -Number released
              -Disappearances
                      -Numbers
              -Thieu
                      -Responsibility
              -Effects on US
              -Nguyen Thi Binh
                      -Foreign Minister of Provisional Revolutionary Government of South
Vietnam
                      -Capital
                      -GVN
                      -Territory
                      -Civilian prisoners
                      -Hanoi’s embarrassment

Kissinger left at 5:19 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Well, we've all got you off.
Pretty much.
Let me give you another chance.
Yeah, we should let that slide.
I know, but we don't see those.
Yeah, I knew she would, but there's a liberty of going through her.
Yeah.
Well, let's sit down.
but in there is a paper on the israelis you asked for whether you like the paper or not something i want to say to you for a long time about that particular situation i just don't see any given their position i don't find i don't see where flavor out of leverage is what bothers me
They can take on any combination of our forces today and be just as fast as they did in 1967.
Well, does your paper indicate what I should say to the old lady?
No, it doesn't indicate that at all.
I don't know what you should say.
Before we get to the sign, did you see that beautiful little story on you?
I saw it on the news this morning.
The Prime Minister.
Oh, it is?
That's the funniest thing ever.
It's all over.
Taylor, I'll be a badger.
He said,
number one spot in this adventure.
You're no higher than number 10.
I love the place down in Niagara.
It's great.
You did make a real mark.
It should.
Well, tell me, what is the reaction of the Shah, etc.?
Are they pleased?
They're not a big concern, are they?
I didn't see this raised here.
I mean, a few jackasses, but did you raise it?
But did you feel, doesn't he really realize it?
He got the signal.
There wasn't any question he got out of it.
It didn't happen until a day after the U.S. and the agri-economy.
Now, that doesn't mean there aren't going to be problems in connection with it and so forth.
But I think that he got the signal that you intended him to get, which was just a compliment to him.
One of the things that's definitely, I guess, I don't know whether we get there, if he hasn't already got it, I think that he ought to come, that he would like something.
I gather you approve of that for early December, which is what I was told at that time.
But if he feels or would prefer to grow it, I mean, we can shove it in and say, in May, you know, we're awfully full there.
Why don't I write it down next time?
Tell him.
Tell him.
Yeah, the December is open.
Well, early December is open, but tell him that if he would...
I put it so that he feels it, which is true, that we want him to come at a time that he and McQueen would enjoy coming.
All right?
Or the Empress, like she said.
Now, his Empress did not come.
He came before he did.
And she's very sensitive about being moved and all the rest.
Now, the point is that you can tell him, too, that I would like, to the extent they would, that they want them to have a special third date with me.
I was sorry she didn't come before.
I think she made a great hit in the United States.
Sure, there'll be some of these jackass students there, you know, they're the ones that she's worried about.
But that I'll, we can, I thought that I think we can handle the demonstration very well.
But that I think that this country would like to see, and I would say,
from the first of May on.
In other words, if he prefer May, June, July.
July's bad.
May and June are both quite full.
But there's a problem.
If he'd like to come earlier, it might be better.
So you might find that.
If we think that this is the time, maybe we ought to have a talk fairly soon to get this damn oil thing going.
And so don't.
But December, you see, what I want you to do, Dick, is to talk to him in a way that he realizes that
That I, and it's quite true, that I consider we have a very special relationship with him.
And that we want to work it out.
We'll work it out.
All right.
And this is obviously helpful.
Well, it'll help in this latitude.
Well, it'll help.
It'll also help with your first relationship with him.
No question about it.
Because we are, you can say that we're bloated down.
Take this and say it.
Well, don't make it that much of a burden.
Say that we have some things, but we would, that I would like to see him at any time.
And then, you see, that's what, the way this, uh, I mean, they like, you know, people make arrangements for what they want to do.
California bed, you know, Camp David.
Camp David, of course, is open.
I mean, they, I don't know whether he, you know, he used to see a bunch of elephants and other people like that, but most of them do like to go there, to Camp David.
We want to present to each other a state mall, a state dinner.
And it's rather, it's picked up rather nicely now.
We've got some two or three new facilities out there, you know.
And, uh, and we, if we would like, if we can take a flight in here, the President would expect to come to have a question or a talk some different day.
It's rather harmless if we have one to him.
And, uh, Tom also,
I don't know very clearly on how that bureau talks are going, but they're going better than I had to spend a moment.
I want you to be particularly, if you would, of course, particularly nice.
Hello, Henry Conway.
He comes there because, well, he'll be separate from the companies.
I find it related by the years, since I've seen you last, and that's the talk that you want me to have, so that's very uncommon.
I don't know.
I just told them what I wanted to do.
I didn't talk to the shot about the possibility of coming in December, but he and the shot determined earlier that it would be better that I was working in May or June.
That's damn hard, but it can be done, and I think it's very important.
So, fair enough.
But, we're gonna get through a lot of them, right now, as a matter of fact, also September, until November, because we've got that afternoon coming here some other year.
You know, maybe we should move that for the,
Henry's always pushing the attributes on them, I know, all the time.
Well, ever since you gave five... any of the troll boats to... or boot him, and he traded them...
The fireworks!
No, you gave him the troll boats to keep communists out of the country.
Yeah.
And he traded them in for two fireboats, simply, uh... Well, he doesn't think it's technically, uh...
I think there's something... David Cooper, I think he'll...
You bring her a very important service.
And I say, if you get out there and you test the crew, then you're at fault.
I don't like those things as Cuban technicians and pilots and so forth going to aid.
But be it.
There were two things, Mr. President, that I had mentioned to me.
One is to explore the use in our understanding of Pakistan.
Good.
And to recognize that.
That is, that is, that is not considered charity.
That doesn't sound like Pakistan.
Anywhere or indirectly.
Yeah, I think we've got to start setting spare parts effects in so we can get a little morale boost.
That's right.
I got that.
You told him he could appeal to us occasionally.
I can't find two notes from him.
I said, I noticed they're coming in.
It doesn't matter what happens.
He was lost.
The Hong Kong newspaper was reporting on some of his food, and I had a three page table.
He said it was the same.
He hoped I wasn't taking any questions of his food.
Well, she's very pleasant.
She was very pleasant.
Yeah, OK. Yeah.
Yeah.
All right.
She's a beautiful woman.
A beautiful woman.
Boy, oh boy.
And who was smart as hell?
But Pakistan is important, and of course, you know, the Gulf states and all the rest.
If I were going to be an ambassador, I would like Iran as well as almost any place.
Because, look, Europe is dull.
Let's face it.
There's nothing worth doing in Europe except for land there.
or any business is being done.
You can't do it in a Russian country, it's not a communist country, they don't do any goddamn thing.
Uh, Iran is doing some action.
It's an interesting place.
I really think, sir, I thought the problem through.
The second was, rather than you just mention Mr. President,
Did you keep a special eye on who you'd go?
Yeah.
I saw King of Sand this morning.
Oh yes.
That is a very tough situation in Oman right now.
That is.
And I read the telegrams from the State Department now and discover that they're feeling that this is very different than my feeling about it.
In other words, I really think maybe this takes a lot to be looked at a little bit more carefully.
That's where you've got the YouTube special channel.
fire something which may not otherwise you see that's why i'm using my tongue because if it's true that a third of people are trapped in that border then i think anything but they won't get on to do something
Well, they were always giving some helicopters, and so were the Saudis.
But we were fiddling and diddling with the Saudis, you know, who gives the helicopters, who pays for them, and so forth.
And the State Department's all wound up in these seagulls, and he's about with his foreign military sales, or grand aid.
There's iron guns throwing around.
They're trying to cut everything.
That's right.
And the pockets.
Oh, well, it didn't work out.
We've survived this far.
I just want to ask you about this one question.
It's about these relations they're trying to make with Iraq these days.
The French and the Dutch are the principal ones in this.
All the reports I get is that they're really, they've got to kind of collapse.
and agree to a deal with the Iraqis, which they do, will not only unhinge the Iranian thing, which may be in the process of working itself out, but might very well unhinge the Saudi thing.
And I wonder if we've talked to the French as sternly as we might about, you know, not really running out on us on this thing, because I get the impression that they're just hot to try.
Okay.
Let me ask you this about, what is the, what about who is our investor in Saudi Arabia?
Nick Thatcher.
I don't have a note.
Do you know him?
No.
Let's check that.
I think we better see.
He's obviously a career.
Dan has an important post for this moment.
Well, I did some figuring the other day.
I'll do a bag full of statistics for you on the interview which I came up with.
There are
proven reserves of 200 billion barrels of oil in Saudi Arabia.
By the Zain Compensation, there are 45 billion barrels in Iran.
That's five to one.
The American Consortium takes 100% of the oil out of Saudi Arabia and only 40% of the oil out of Iran.
So you have a factor of about 10 to 1 there in terms of the dollars and the oil and all the rest of the things between these two countries, which is the two biggest oil producers in the region.
And it's really a staggering statistic, as you go down to 1980, 1985.
And therefore, when you say Saudi Arabia is important, it's the most important thing in terms of our economic interests.
And it's the one thing the English, the French, the Japanese, and everybody would like to unhinge us from.
What do we do about it?
Well, I think we, except for what you were saying, I think you find the best man in the United States to go to Saudi Arabia if you're an ambassador.
In other words, when you're looking around at all these ambassadorial appointments, you get a hot felt.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
We haven't looked at that closely.
We haven't looked at it closely.
We won't do that.
Well, let's see, you know, you'll be leaving here.
What's the latest on our field of your problem?
Anything new?
No.
No, I think they're okay.
You hope?
I think so.
I was reading many of the things.
It appears to me that what they have said, they seem to be saying two different things, in fact.
On the one hand, they put out a statement that they are, you know, we have to do this and that.
On the other hand, they say that they are not relating on the, you know what I mean?
If we comply.
Right.
I think they're trying us out.
We haven't got any message from them yet, do we?
Well, we got a message from something else.
They're complaining particularly, they're probably, I don't know, about the ceasefire violations of the South Asian leaves.
As far as I can tell, she was paying not the slightest attention to the ceasefire.
I think now my instinct would be that 80% of the violations are on our side.
They are infiltrating like crazy.
Well, that's what I'm concerned about.
That's what I'm concerned about.
That's a hell of a violation.
It's more important than these little skirmishes they're having.
Have we said any word to them on the infiltration?
Well, we have.
Somewhat.
We want to get this one done first.
Mr. President, all the oil things are probably disappearing over the horizon.
I have two small suggestions to make in the general context of this, based on my studies and talks since 041.
that some were in the fringes of the white house i honestly believe that you need an oil man you don't need somebody that intellectually understands this you need somebody to know something about oil i have a suggestion to make
A man who used to be the president of Aramco, a man named Thomas Barker.
He was president of Aramco for 70 years and spent 30 years in Saudi Arabia for Aramco.
Otto Miller of Caltex, John McCone, anybody that knows this man, he's absolutely first class.
He's a very decent, quiet human being that's retired and just remarried, and I think he's on his way to South Carolina at the moment.
Preparatory to driving to California's home in La Jolla.
But I wish Henry would note down the name, so that when you're looking for a man that understands oil, who's not on somebody's payroll, who's a decent fella...
objective and thoroughly tutored in all the businesses of transportation, well digging, geology, how oil companies operate, how they view the world, and so forth.
It might be very useful for you to have a person like that at some point.
Well, you'd better be A-A-R-G-E-R Thomas Barker.
Yeah.
And if you need a locator, Jim Critchfield knows how to get in touch with him.
That sounds good.
The other suggestion is that the big problem you obviously got through is the question of alternatives.
And that's something where I think you're going to have to rattle the chains, because if we don't do something about the alternatives, it scares the Middle Eastern shakes just a little bit.
This is the higher seller's market and the worst sort.
The only man I have heard talk that seems to really have in his mind these various ideas
alternatives rather clearly in what conceivably can be done about it.
That would be Edward Teller.
And he's really quite articulate on this subject within the limits of what he's able to talk about.
And he's the kind of a man who has at least looked into these things enough to have some idea for the feasibility of some of these very good ideas.
His mind reaches out.
He understands everything from nuclear to shale to all this other stuff.
And that's the idea.
And now you see we've got Devon working on this.
But he's basically just a technician, a systems analysis guy.
And we want to tell her.
Tell her I understand exactly what you're telling me.
Fire people understand, you know, this is a good idea.
This is a good idea.
And you know, tell her.
You couldn't have him around anyway.
He's very emotional.
He's romantic.
He didn't sit there.
Of course, he wanted to go bonk on her.
He used to, but maybe we can't point that out.
One of the toughest things I discovered about this whole problem is if you go to fix over here, something comes loose over here.
Unless you have people that really understand this business, we're all going to hinge the wrong thing.
Well, you will be, uh, we won't be visiting Iran.
I think they are, they're on one of the great grounds of all time.
But, uh, you'll probably be back here before too long.
I've got, we've got both the other time.
We'll be back in April.
Really?
Yes.
They, they have to get a report from John.
At least when they come to the Senate, right.
But you'll be back at, uh...
But I must say that they're wrong.
Mr. President, I'm looking forward to this.
I did, uh, you've been in before I came to the embassy.
It's very nice.
It is.
It is.
What I mean is, just the biggest advantage of the embassy, but it's set out there in the mountains.
It's a nice swimming pool.
The only reason I visited the embassy in 1967 when I was out of office, it was, you know, Stan and I asked this nice question about it.
And I'm looking forward to it.
And you'll get the best job I've got.
Good luck.
I don't think... What I want to ask you is to get your judgment on that precedent tomorrow.
I think I should not go out as long as there's a reasonable chance that we'll get something settled on this, because I think we've escalated at the right level, rhetoric-wise.
Do you feel otherwise?
I don't think you should give it another whack, because I think we may have did it too hard.
I'm a little sorry now because we have got to stop the...
Do you think so?
Because they send out a long list of charges, most of which they're right on, such as the ceasefire violence.
I read that 80% now of the fighting is CPN-initiated.
And they're 100% right about the accommodations of the military commissioners.
There's no excuse.
I've sent a scorching telegram to two
Because there is no sense this commission is going to go out of action in 30 days.
It doesn't make any difference whether they put them in barracks or into the Ritz.
I mean, we don't need them in the Ritz, but they ought to be in a, I mean, there's no Ritz over in the Cararal.
That's an incentive down, but they ought to have accommodations.
Right.
You can take newsmen.
You can, of course, indicate that to these people, too.
That's right.
Well, I want to wait until I get a reply from Buckhead.
No, no, no, no, no, no.
I meant that you can indicate to the North Vietnamese that we have taken this up with the South Vietnamese.
That's right.
Have you done that?
Yes.
Well, I did that in the note this morning, but I've now sent this note to Bunker.
Hopefully... Let me say that I wouldn't be too concerned about the stopping of the mining and so forth.
I think we have to...
I think we have to be tough.
Yeah.
If you are... You see, Henry, if you...
If they think they can fiddle us along on these POWs, that's the one thing we can't take.
We can take other things, but we cannot take them in this time.
I couldn't agree.
And so therefore, I think it was very wise not to say publicly, however.
I think that would have messed up.
But my instinct is, Mr. President, that unless the thing is resolved tomorrow, we should...
Unless the thing is resolved, you might not go out.
You might consider not going out.
Well, here is my opinion.
You might go out on the press tomorrow.
There's no need.
I mean, there's no great anchor for me to do the press.
I'm just not, because I might not have on about every three or four weeks anyway.
I think we ought to let this cook.
And if I go out, we've got to remember that three-fourths of the questions will be about this subject.
And about Asia-Vietnam, what about Cuba?
In other words, as I say, they're trying to make him the whipping boy, and he probably deserves it.
But we cannot be in the position of making him the whipping boy.
He deserves it on some things.
But my point is, what they did is they picked a few issues on which we can't give them satisfaction.
They never in the message to me said,
that they were holding up the release of prisoners.
And secondly, they also sent us a message on setting up the economic commission.
How did they send that?
How to proceed on that.
Now, they're not idiots.
They know damn well.
And we will accept that, because we are overdue on that.
Well, then, is that why you're concerned?
Because their message?
And if you're concerned about your sending out the message on the mindset for that reason, you thought that went too far?
That was a little tough, but that's all right.
It's better to be too tough than too slow.
Well, they'll just think that's me being tough.
Oh, it wasn't.
I don't care about whether they think I did it.
No, what I meant is they have this idea that I might do things.
I think on balance, we've got to use, we've got to perhaps use a little of that.
I think on balance.
All you indicated was that if they don't do this, we'll have to...
But you also said in that message that we'd go ahead with the economic commission.
No, I didn't put it in there.
Sorry.
But I'm answering that other one on the economic commission, indeed, agreeing to... That's right.
That's the way, that's what I like, is to do track progression.
Basically, yes, we're going ahead as if nothing, as if everything is on track, but at least we'll go ahead with the economic commission.
And we have, uh, we have, uh, taken this matter up with the Southern Vietnamese government.
Period.
Got it.
Got it.
Got it.
But that all is lost, to, on all sides, as far as...
They'll yield.
The prisoners will be moving this weekend, and practically soon.
Well, the main thing was...
If it was a shot across that valley, we acted violently.
It was very healthy.
Well, Charlie, wasn't that in your conversation with Sullivan, or did you talk to him, or did you just have a message from him?
He had no doubt about it.
No question.
Sullivan is 100%.
Rogers, we've been through this with Rogers.
The only thing Rogers is now worried about is his confidence.
I saw Cromwell this afternoon on something else.
I said, what's this about you?
He said, let me check.
He called me back.
He said,
Nothing to it.
There's a question and answer period in the House of Commons this afternoon.
Hume went back for that because there was no session scheduled for tomorrow.
He's going to be back for the session on Thursday.
He just took advantage of the fact that there was a recess, and there's no dissatisfaction.
But it's what Rogers has never understood is when he's tough, he gets good publicity.
You're making Rogers a hero because this goddamn thing is going to get settled tomorrow.
And you claim he did it with trim.
He did so.
Well, let me say, you know, the thing we have to remember, I often sit here and think of what the hell we've been through.
kind of waiting for the Chinese, wondering if this, you know, the time that we were, that Sunday morning when we got the message from the Chinese that they were going to go ahead and all this.
And we just are being knocked off balance at this point, at this thing, on the POWs, I must say.
That happens.
And they put a toast to me that the peace thing is going to blow.
That's why it's going to get settled.
It's going to blow because
We cannot let them fiddle us around with B.O.W.
Did you realize that all of a sudden?
Everything would be lost.
No chance of getting aid.
Everything else would go right out the window.
Mr. President, if they did less of the prisoners for any length of time, if we want to turn on them, we could put on some of the prisoners in the South, could put out some of the horror stories of their imprisonment, and we could level them, and we'd have public support.
We'd level them.
Surrender this time.
They won't take that time.
That's why I, even though you're concerned about your message, you see, my point is, I was concerned about it publicly, believe me.
And I knew that would have a reaction here.
And also, it's like, publicly, it's like going on before the December bombing, publicly.
That puts it to them too hard so that they, it doesn't let them save face.
Here, we just said that we say it privately, but then they get the word message privately.
But publicly, we say this thing has to be settled.
We didn't quite put it in an ultimatum form.
I think avoiding an ultimatum in public, an ultimatum is quite, it's almost, it's essential that you deal with these factors.
In Asia in particular, don't you agree?
Absolutely.
Remember, with the Russians, the Russians didn't want us to ask them whether the summit was going to be
That's right.
Remember he kept saying, don't ask us.
That's right.
Don't ask us.
That's right.
And they wanted to say no.
That's right.
I remember that.
And the state, all of them were saying, God, can't we ask you?
Can't we find out?
That was what Brandon said to us.
Don't ask us.
That's right.
That's sort of my way of dealing with these people.
That's why I don't think I should walk out there unless they got a damn big sign.
No.
No, I hope this.
I hope.
I hope.
I hope it's a good two-day plan.
They should, they're supposed to, tomorrow's the day that they're supposed to give the list, huh?
Yeah.
Or is today the day?
What is, let me ask you this, what is the...
It's about tomorrow, the day after today.
It isn't, it says about every 15 days.
So the 20 days that took us to this world, to this country...
You see, Governor, when you talk about Chew, let us not forget that these bastards in Laos weren't playing any damn... Oh, no, they saw this game.
Let's not forget that their infiltration isn't being done for those.
Obviously, the whole thing is, let's face it, both sides are bastards.
I have... Chew is embarrassing us because he's our ally.
True, my brother.
I think Chew should have done a goddamn thing, believe me, until...
Then I don't care what he does.
I really don't care, sir.
Only it'll cut off his aid.
You know what I mean?
What Cromer is saying is serious.
But Cromer brought me a quote from the 19th century British traveling.
Vietnam, which said that the trickiest, most miserable people he's ever met in his life.
Cromer is leaving, I understand.
I've heard rumors he's never said something.
I think at the end of the year or a little bit.
Apparently it's a three-year stand.
It seems to me he doesn't have your guy.
He just got here in 1971.
Three years.
And he's been a very good, solid guy.
Why is it solid?
He's not a brilliant guy.
Why is he solid?
He sees, I think they're going to put him into the common market.
Well, we can, uh, let's start a plan on this.
They said it would go on for a while.
As you've well said, our major role here is to keep it patched together for just a couple of years.
That's our hope.
And I think we'll, we'll do it.
And if we can do that, Mr. President, we... We've done our job.
We've done our job.
Well, then 100 years will have happened.
We believe Vietnam is going to recede in Southeast Asia in the public mind goddamn fast when our prisoners are out and our priests are out.
Believe me.
Does the number of advices need to be as high as we have there, 11,000, whatever it is?
What's your reason for that?
Well, some are civilian, some are economic.
I see.
On the military side, it's only about 3,000.
Unless we think it's necessary, anything that's necessary, because the Bible tells me it's not.
And it's not prohibited, I agree with that.
But on the other hand, that's a little less than the size of the...
I don't think it is 11,000.
That's what I saw.
I know of only about 4,000.
But this may not include the civilian.
That may not include the civilian.
No, I think Holmes is going to do a very good job.
Very good.
Oh, yeah.
Oh, God, yeah.
And those who don't go back to OSS go back to the late 50s and the early 60s, which was also 14 years ago.
You know, your analysis, too, of the Congress is so decisive over there.
When you say, now, why the hell are the Russians going to walk out?
Why are the Canadians going to walk out?
I can't see why the Republicans and the Franks and the Hosts aren't going to want to have a call.
And the Northeast and these other ones.
And I can't see why the Canadians want to walk out either.
I don't think Trudeau's gone a little too far and given us.
No one is going to walk out on the conference.
It's not primarily to our benefit.
It's primarily to the North Vietnamese' benefit because they get an international recognition of the peace settlement.
Of course, it's not primarily to their benefit.
They are more interested in it by far than we are.
Then what you will do, as I understand it, is to send a message.
Go ahead with the economic commission and proceed with the, to try to keep you in line.
Is that what you're going to do?
Yep.
I think that should go.
Where do you send that?
It's going to be sent to Paris.
Yep.
That's who could say that.
That'll be delivered right there to somebody.
Okay.
That should go very soon.
Yeah, maybe I'll get it up.
If I use it immediately.
Because if we do something that's daytime out, no, it's going to be daytime.
About three hours out there.
So if we receive this message, it would be a more conciliatory one, too.
No, I just ignore any of them.
Ignore what?
I don't want to refer to the other one, I just refer to the economic one.
I was going to say, in response to this or that, we're going to do that.
That's what I meant by consultatory.
Instructing, basically.
It's a narrow back off of it.
Sure.
Just to set the field up where they're going to be returned.
The way I read that, I didn't read the full text until I was looking at the morning report, which I did not hear about the morning report.
They were quite categorical in regard to what they were going to say.
I mean, they agreed that they were just, that they seemed to be a pretty blunt dogmatic statement, did they not?
Or did you read it that way?
What they said, yes, but it was set at a level where they can move away from it.
It was said by a lieutenant colonel of the 4th Power Military Commision.
And they can always claim that he took his own, that that was his own view.
It was not an official notification to our governor.
It was said to the press.
It wasn't said officially in the note to us.
But annoying maniacs sometimes, they operate that way that people call it.
Oh, it's deliberate.
They're testing us out.
Oh, my goodness.
Well, I think they're being made very uncomfortable by these military operations.
Like Laos?
No, but Saigon.
Oh.
You think that's their real hand?
That, plus the humiliation of their prisoners.
Plus the fact that Saigon has done a damn thing about the civilian prisoners.
And that if they're lost, well...
I wouldn't bet my bottom dollar that I think they released some convicts on an amnesty and caught them 5,000.
I don't think they've released any of the dead countries yet.
Also, they made about 20,000 of them disappear in their books.
They now claim they only had 6,000 civilian prisoners in all of South Vietnam, where three months ago they had 40,000.
Well, what would you do if you were screwed?
He'd be nuts, isn't it?
That's why I was so delighted with Articlacy.
I knew that you would screw it up.
He's right, but...
He's embarrassing us.
Well, he's driving them crazy.
I mean, that shows Madame Finn got screwed, whoever else got screwed up this deal.
Here she is.
Foreign Minister of a country that dare not establish a capital.
So that is embarrassing, I don't know.
But we got it tomorrow.
Well, they'll get it.
I think they're gonna be on the road in Solution tomorrow.
Yeah.