Nixon, Kissinger & Pauls on US-West Germany relations

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Mr. President, Ambassador Polis.

How are you, Mr. President?

Well, we're sorry to see you leave.

Let's get your farewell picture here.

So let me say, echo everything.

You know, I actually would just love to see everything.

See everything.

And I was looking for it when you made your remarks.

And we only hope that your suggestion will be one that we can talk to in the same way.

Because in relation to the relations between the U.S. and the Federal Republic, after all, the Federal Republic is the same.

I don't know if you have a response to this, but we are going to do it.

And I just promise.

We need this closer to the kitchen.

Of course, I think it's fascinating for you to do what we did.

Yes, it's very satisfying that we can get authentic information after 40 years, one can say.

Yes, we can.

And then the other day I said to the Secretary of State, when he asked me in early January about his rumors, me going to Beijing, I said, well, I'm going to miss most of my beloved Americans.

Couldn't you do something to get them there?

Well, in the meantime, it has been achieved.

And then he is in office with him.

I want to be sure to tell whoever sent it that I want to be a very close friend of Judge Ambassador.

You know, he's going to need somebody to talk to.

British, of course.

You'll have a little room.

Yes, I will.

The German-British branch.

Yes.

Wow.

The German-British...

The French is not one of our greatest friends.

No.

We all... Not to think about the French government, but the French have done so.

Yeah.

We also never get...

The British also are... British are...

And it's good enough.

Another thing that you'll find in training, I understand, is a list of your own scenario, but I forget most of your list from your other colleagues, but I think it's, you can have a chance to, you know, put the Japanese there.

Yes, in a different way.

Looking at South Asia, the Pakistanis, they have good people there.

They have a good man there.

They have the brother of the man who helped us, who was here at the time.

Pakistanis, and there are others, but I should tell you, you'll know them all.

But we, of course, will have our modest office there, and we'll keep the closest up with you because

And I think our Chinese friends will, shall we say, receive you much more warmly than they would three or four years ago.

Oh, yes.

Thank you, Mr. President.

It would come from any better person than Washington.

It depends how good you are as a NATO person.

Right, right, right.

NATO, so would you let me say, let me say, let me say, don't worry, I assure you that NATO is no threat to the Soviets.

No, no, no, no.

This is funny, and when I come there, there will be a GDR ambassador from,

communist part of Germany for 23 years, but the relationship with the capitalistic part of Germany would be much more important.

Oh, yes.

And they attack them.

Some party countries in Berlin, they attack them.

They loathe the Germans.

I mean, the East Germans always say...

Maybe you told them about the fact that we were talking to our Chinese friends on one of your visits.

Apologizing for Laird.

They told me this was right after the ZOE's agreement and Laird had made some statements that we now had to take.

But retaliatory forces and Joe and I began to talk to me and said something about Laird.

So I thought he was going to criticize him and I said, well, you have to understand, Defense Minister's

Always emphasize their own field.

That doesn't mean necessarily that that becomes governmental policy.

He said, I'm terribly sorry to hear this.

We appreciate it.

We appreciate it very much.

No, that's okay.

Mr.

Prince, one field I'm concerned of is the U.S. relations.

Seems you're keen on that.

Oh, yes.

In the trade field and the monetary field, and I've employed myself very much in the last 20 years with the U.S., they have their own merits.

But I see the danger that beyond the trade and monetary field, there can be a danger for the cohesion of the alliance.

And this, of course, is very urgent to find solutions, to find common ground between the E.C.

and the United States.

It has to be a single standard.

It has to be made in canyons to one high street.

As you know, I have always stood for the unity of Europe.

On the other hand, we can have a situation where Europe, plus Britain, decides that it will go its merry way economically or monetarily, you know, deciding what is best for Europe without consulting with us.

But on military matters, for example, where...

Europe desperately needs the United States, that it's essential that we do nothing unless we can solve that.

In other words, we can talk all we want about non-linkage, but there is non-linkage.

There is non-linkage.

That being said, I understand your government's been very good about this, but sometimes there's a tendency in Europe today we haven't realized, which could be terribly dangerous for the United States.

There's a tendency in Europe first to say, well, what are the United States doing about tariffs?

Why don't we cut our rate of inflation when they're desired and ours, and so on and so on.

But beyond that, there's a tendency for the region, well, now we'll build a great economic unit, independent, et cetera, et cetera.

All this should go forward without regard to what happens to the military cooperation and so forth.

It really can't happen.

That's not the policy of no government, you know, Mr. President.

We think and we are working for as close cooperation in the economic field with you as we have got in the foreign policy and defense policy field.

This is what you needed most.

And so that we can talk...

when the Chancellor was here as Chancellor the first time in April 70, how much he stressed this point.

We have our difficulties inside of the community to get a mandate for this dialogue with the American government on a very high level.

We hope that we can achieve something more after the French elections.

So this insight is showing that this has to be done.

And secondly, Mr. President, we have a

identity of interest in the stability and the strength of the dollar.

90% of world trade is done in dollars, will be done in dollars, and we can find a reform of this international system as soon as the dollar is strong and stable.

If we can't achieve this, not, no reform of the system, no other

You can't do world trade with special oil mines.

You have one leading currency.

You have to have it.

There is no possible replacement for the dollar.

And, of course, we did what we could do in the last few weeks to help our American friends in this dollar situation.

But we knew exactly we are helping ourselves too.

There is an identity of interest rather as strong

principle of our NATO alliance, where also the identity of the interest in the freedom of Europe that NATO enabled to survive one crisis after the other.

And it has existed, it still exists, and it will exist.

And we see these two things in a very close combination.

In one view,

Yeah.

Yes.

If they do, the difficulty is that...

It will just pour gasoline on these flames that are already smoldering there.

Now, understand, by three shots I mean that only that I realize that each of the European leaders has his own domestic political situation.

I realize that each of them would probably gain domestically by being antagonistic to the U.S. because of its side, etc., etc., etc.,

I should be saying it's a very dangerous game because if the idea becomes an old planet here, the U.S. playing a role in Europe.

They'll say, thank you very much.

We want to get out.

We mustn't have this happen because we both need each other.

Certainly.

And this would be great for both of us.

So we will work on this.

I agree with you.

This year the economic military has got together.

We've got with MBFR coming up, the European Security Conference, for us to be engaged in economic confrontation at a time that we're trying to get agreement on MBFR.

And on the other hand, there's no purely economic solution unless we keep the political framework in mind.

We want to be helpful.

We want to be good partners.

We would appreciate it if you would help us sometimes.

I'm a U.S. speaking person.

So that I don't have such a terrible time with the Mansfield brothers who want us to get out of the world, let alone Europe.

Thank you very much.

I don't know knowing this country and loving this country.

What will be the situation after you?

That's why we appreciate it.

This is your election today.

Well, you're very kind.

Thank you.

Thank you very much.

Nixon, Kissinger & Pauls on US-West Germany relations

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on March 7, 1973

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