Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 871-007
Date: Wednesday, March 7, 1973 at 11:52 AM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Pauls, Rolf
Recording device: Oval Office
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/871-007

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[0:00] Mr. President, Ambassador Polis.
[0:02] How are you, Mr. President?
[0:06] Well, we're sorry to see you leave.
[0:09] Let's get your farewell picture here.
[0:11] So let me say, echo everything.
[0:19] You know, I actually would just love to see everything.
[0:26] See everything.
[1:08] And I was looking for it when you made your remarks.
[1:12] And we only hope that your suggestion will be one that we can talk to in the same way.
[1:17] Because in relation to the relations between the U.S. and the Federal Republic, after all, the Federal Republic is the same.
[1:25] I don't know if you have a response to this, but we are going to do it.
[1:31] And I just promise.
[1:32] We need this closer to the kitchen.
[1:35] Of course, I think it's fascinating for you to do what we did.
[1:38] Yes, it's very satisfying that we can get authentic information after 40 years, one can say.
[2:02] Yes, we can.
[2:03] Yes, we can.
[2:08] And then the other day I said to the Secretary of State, when he asked me in early January about his rumors, me going to Beijing, I said, well, I'm going to miss most of my beloved Americans.
[2:18] Couldn't you do something to get them there?
[2:20] Well, in the meantime, it has been achieved.
[2:23] And then he is in office with him.
[2:24] I want to be sure to tell whoever sent it that I want to be a very close friend of Judge Ambassador.
[2:32] You know, he's going to need somebody to talk to.
[2:38] British, of course.
[2:39] You'll have a little room.
[2:40] Yes, I will.
[2:41] The German-British branch.
[2:43] Yes.
[2:43] Wow.
[2:44] The German-British...
[2:46] The French is not one of our greatest friends.
[2:48] No.
[2:49] No.
[2:49] We all... Not to think about the French government, but the French have done so.
[2:54] Yeah.
[2:55] We also never get...
[3:05] The British also are... British are...
[3:08] And it's good enough.
[3:10] Another thing that you'll find in training, I understand, is a list of your own scenario, but I forget most of your list from your other colleagues, but I think it's, you can have a chance to, you know, put the Japanese there.
[3:22] Yes, in a different way.
[3:29] Looking at South Asia, the Pakistanis, they have good people there.
[3:33] They have a good man there.
[3:35] They have the brother of the man who helped us, who was here at the time.
[3:40] Pakistanis, and there are others, but I should tell you, you'll know them all.
[3:49] But we, of course, will have our modest office there, and we'll keep the closest up with you because
[4:03] And I think our Chinese friends will, shall we say, receive you much more warmly than they would three or four years ago.
[4:22] Oh, yes.
[4:22] Thank you, Mr. President.
[4:26] It would come from any better person than Washington.
[4:28] It depends how good you are as a NATO person.
[4:32] Right, right, right.
[4:33] NATO, so would you let me say, let me say, let me say, don't worry, I assure you that NATO is no threat to the Soviets.
[4:46] No, no, no, no.
[4:48] This is funny, and when I come there, there will be a GDR ambassador from,
[4:53] communist part of Germany for 23 years, but the relationship with the capitalistic part of Germany would be much more important.
[5:03] Oh, yes.
[5:04] And they attack them.
[5:06] Some party countries in Berlin, they attack them.
[5:11] They loathe the Germans.
[5:12] I mean, the East Germans always say...
[5:19] Maybe you told them about the fact that we were talking to our Chinese friends on one of your visits.
[5:26] Apologizing for Laird.
[5:27] They told me this was right after the ZOE's agreement and Laird had made some statements that we now had to take.
[5:35] But retaliatory forces and Joe and I began to talk to me and said something about Laird.
[5:42] So I thought he was going to criticize him and I said, well, you have to understand, Defense Minister's
[5:47] Always emphasize their own field.
[5:48] That doesn't mean necessarily that that becomes governmental policy.
[5:52] He said, I'm terribly sorry to hear this.
[5:54] We appreciate it.
[5:55] We appreciate it very much.
[6:03] No, that's okay.
[6:04] Mr.
[6:04] Prince, one field I'm concerned of is the U.S. relations.
[6:11] Seems you're keen on that.
[6:12] Oh, yes.
[6:13] In the trade field and the monetary field, and I've employed myself very much in the last 20 years with the U.S., they have their own merits.
[6:22] But I see the danger that beyond the trade and monetary field, there can be a danger for the cohesion of the alliance.
[6:31] And this, of course, is very urgent to find solutions, to find common ground between the E.C.
[6:38] and the United States.
[6:49] It has to be a single standard.
[6:52] It has to be made in canyons to one high street.
[6:56] As you know, I have always stood for the unity of Europe.
[7:09] On the other hand, we can have a situation where Europe, plus Britain, decides that it will go its merry way economically or monetarily, you know, deciding what is best for Europe without consulting with us.
[7:25] But on military matters, for example, where...
[7:29] Europe desperately needs the United States, that it's essential that we do nothing unless we can solve that.
[7:37] In other words, we can talk all we want about non-linkage, but there is non-linkage.
[7:40] There is non-linkage.
[7:42] That being said, I understand your government's been very good about this, but sometimes there's a tendency in Europe today we haven't realized, which could be terribly dangerous for the United States.
[7:56] There's a tendency in Europe first to say, well, what are the United States doing about tariffs?
[8:03] Why don't we cut our rate of inflation when they're desired and ours, and so on and so on.
[8:08] But beyond that, there's a tendency for the region, well, now we'll build a great economic unit, independent, et cetera, et cetera.
[8:18] All this should go forward without regard to what happens to the military cooperation and so forth.
[8:24] It really can't happen.
[8:25] That's not the policy of no government, you know, Mr. President.
[8:31] We think and we are working for as close cooperation in the economic field with you as we have got in the foreign policy and defense policy field.
[8:42] This is what you needed most.
[8:44] And so that we can talk...
[8:50] when the Chancellor was here as Chancellor the first time in April 70, how much he stressed this point.
[8:56] We have our difficulties inside of the community to get a mandate for this dialogue with the American government on a very high level.
[9:06] We hope that we can achieve something more after the French elections.
[9:12] So this insight is showing that this has to be done.
[9:15] And secondly, Mr. President, we have a
[9:19] identity of interest in the stability and the strength of the dollar.
[9:26] 90% of world trade is done in dollars, will be done in dollars, and we can find a reform of this international system as soon as the dollar is strong and stable.
[9:40] If we can't achieve this, not, no reform of the system, no other
[9:47] You can't do world trade with special oil mines.
[9:51] You have one leading currency.
[9:53] You have to have it.
[9:55] There is no possible replacement for the dollar.
[9:59] And, of course, we did what we could do in the last few weeks to help our American friends in this dollar situation.
[10:08] But we knew exactly we are helping ourselves too.
[10:12] There is an identity of interest rather as strong
[10:18] principle of our NATO alliance, where also the identity of the interest in the freedom of Europe that NATO enabled to survive one crisis after the other.
[10:30] And it has existed, it still exists, and it will exist.
[10:34] And we see these two things in a very close combination.
[10:39] In one view,
[10:51] Yeah.
[10:57] Yeah.
[11:19] Yes.
[11:19] Yes.
[11:25] Yes.
[11:42] If they do, the difficulty is that...
[12:09] It will just pour gasoline on these flames that are already smoldering there.
[12:14] Now, understand, by three shots I mean that only that I realize that each of the European leaders has his own domestic political situation.
[12:25] I realize that each of them would probably gain domestically by being antagonistic to the U.S. because of its side, etc., etc., etc.,
[12:38] I should be saying it's a very dangerous game because if the idea becomes an old planet here, the U.S. playing a role in Europe.
[12:55] They'll say, thank you very much.
[12:56] We want to get out.
[12:57] We mustn't have this happen because we both need each other.
[13:02] Certainly.
[13:04] And this would be great for both of us.
[13:07] So we will work on this.
[13:09] I agree with you.
[13:10] This year the economic military has got together.
[13:13] We've got with MBFR coming up, the European Security Conference, for us to be engaged in economic confrontation at a time that we're trying to get agreement on MBFR.
[13:25] And on the other hand, there's no purely economic solution unless we keep the political framework in mind.
[13:51] We want to be helpful.
[13:53] We want to be good partners.
[13:55] We would appreciate it if you would help us sometimes.
[13:58] I'm a U.S. speaking person.
[13:59] So that I don't have such a terrible time with the Mansfield brothers who want us to get out of the world, let alone Europe.
[14:09] Thank you very much.
[14:39] I don't know knowing this country and loving this country.
[14:48] What will be the situation after you?
[14:51] That's why we appreciate it.
[14:54] This is your election today.
[14:55] Well, you're very kind.
[14:56] Thank you.
[14:58] Thank you.
[14:59] Thank you.
[15:00] Thank you.
[15:02] Thank you.
[15:02] Thank you.
[15:02] Thank you.
[15:03] Thank you.
[15:08] Thank you very much.