Conversation 880-009

TapeTape 880StartThursday, March 15, 1973 at 12:35 PMEndThursday, March 15, 1973 at 1:02 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Bull, Stephen B.;  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On March 15, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:35 pm to 1:02 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 880-009 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 880-9 (cont’d)

                                                             Conversation No. 880-9

Date: March 15, 1973
Time: 12:35 pm-1:02 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Stephen B. Bull.

       President’s schedule
             -Donald E. Young
                   -Telephone call
                   -Alaska
                   -Meeting with President
                          -Max M. Fisher
             -President's meeting with Lucy M. Ferguson
                   -Arrangements

       Alexander P. Butterfield
            -Confirmation
                  -Federal Aviation Administration [FAA]
            -Photograph with President
            -Swearing-in

       President's schedule
             -Meeting with Arlene Dahl
                    -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
                    -Actress
                    -Photograph session
             -Meeting with Theodore H. (‘Teddy”) White
                    -Book
                    -Ronald L. Ziegler, Haldeman
                    -Length
             -Herman Kahn
             -Visit to dentist
             -Ambassador William Warnock of Ireland
                    -Meeting
                          -Shamrock presentation
                    -Length
             -Visit to dentist
                    -Openings
                          -Shamrock presentation
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            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
                           (rev. June-10)
                                          Conversation No. 880-9 (cont’d)

     -Next week
           -Openings
     -Meeting with White
     -Labor Management Advisory Committee
           -Cost of Living Council
           -George P. Shultz
           -Herbert G. Stein and John T. Dunlop
           -Shultz's presence
                 -Postponement
                 -John D. Ehrlichman's opinion
     -Organization of American States [OAS] reception
           -President's presence
           -White House reception
           -Latin America
           -Ambassadors
     -William P. Rogers's dinner
           -Date
           -State Department
           -Ambassadors
     -OAS reception
           -President's speech
                 -Preparation
     -Photograph sessions with President
           -Oliver F. (“Ollie”) Atkins
           -Nixon Library, National Archives
                 -Thomas hart
           -President at work
     -Cabinet meeting
     -Congressional leaders meeting
     -Labor Management Advisory Committee
           -Shultz's attendance
     -Congressional leaders meeting
     -Cabinet meeting
     -Shultz

Walter H. Annenberg
     -Gift in the Executive Office Building [EOB] office
            -Replica

President's schedule
      -Haldeman
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                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
                                   (rev. June-10)
                                                  Conversation No. 880-9 (cont’d)

             -Congressional leaders meeting
                   -Shultz
                   -Size of meeting
             -President's trip to California
             -Cabinet meeting
             -Congressional leaders meeting
             -Maurice H. Stans
                   -Fisher
             -Daily meetings
                   -Ehrlichman
                   -Photograph sessions
                   -Congress
             -Congressional leaders meeting
             -Cabinet meeting
             -Rest of month
                   -Open days

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 12:51 pm.

Bull left at 12:52 pm.

       Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR]
            -Annual report
            -Meeting

       People's Republic of China [PRC]
            -Ambassador to France
                  -Seniority
                  -Diplomatic service
                  -Central committee
                  -Intelligence
                  -Visit to US

       Washington press corps
           -Questions on US-PRC relations
                 -Lack of interest
           -US-PRC relations
                 -Dr. David K. E. Bruce
                 -Historical significance

       US-PRC relations
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              NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
                             (rev. June-10)
                                            Conversation No. 880-9 (cont’d)

     -President’s trip to PRC
           -Importance
     -Bruce
           -Alfred L. Jenkins
           -John H. Holdridge
           -Ambassador to France [Huang Zhen]
           -Chief of Protocol Department
                 -Rank
                 -English language
           -Announcement of appointment
                 -Ronald L. Ziegler
     -News stories
           -Kissinger’s trip to PRC
           -Handling by press corps

Press corps
      -Bias
          -Executive privilege
                 -Questions
                 -Staff testimony to Congress
                        -Walter W. Rostow
                        -Ehrlichman
    -PRC story
          -Historical significance
          -Patriotism
          -Bruce
          -Watergate
US-PRC relations
    -Importance
    -President's letter to Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-lai
          -Composition
                 -Treaty
    -Common dangers
    -Transcript

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]

Nuclear treaty
     -Announcement of policy objectives
            -Agreement on principle
                 -Renouncing nuclear weapons
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            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
                           (rev. June-10)
                                          Conversation No. 880-9 (cont’d)

                  -Removing danger of nuclear war
           -Reactions from PRC and Europe
                  -Bargaining
                  -Draft treaty from USSR
      -USSR
           -US responses to attacks
                  -Hypothetical situations
                        -Allies
                        -Neutral
                        -India
                  -PRC
      -Reaction from PRC and Europe
      -Leonid I. Brezhnev

USSR
    -Emigration of Soviet Jews
          -Question from press
          -President's response
          -Need for stable US-USSR relations
          -Rate
          -Reaction
          -Public exposure of question
                -Edward M. (“Teddy”) Kennedy
                       -John T. Downey release
                             -Chou
                             -PRC
          -US-USSR relations
    -Private message
          -Republicans
          -Peace Corps

PRC
      -Message
      -Kissinger's meeting with President
            -Scheduling

US-Pakistan relations
     -Commitments
           -Arms sales
           -Lyndon B. Johnson
                                         16-
                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM
                                   (rev. June-10)
                                                  Conversation No. 880-9 (cont’d)

Kissinger left at 1:02 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yes, sir.
I'm going to sit down.
Teddy White will be concluding work on his book at the beginning of April, so he must have half an hour, which is a word that we both recommend.
Is the objective all about half an hour?
Yes, sir, probably half an hour.
Okay.
This might be something you want to schedule at the end of the day.
Well, we've got this week, we've got this week, this week, I heard we've got on Friday and Saturday, I don't know if you're going to
Well, in fact, further to that, sir, we have the ambassador coming in on Saturday, Ambassador Warren.
He's going to be at 1230.
No problem.
Let's see here.
I'd like to get it done.
I've got to get it done.
Sorry.
I've got to get it done.
Let's see here.
Why don't we try?
I would love to do it technically, but I feel like we have to do it conceptually.
I would love to do it technically, but I feel like we have to do it conceptually.
I would love to do it conceptually.
I would love to do it conceptually.
I just think it would be better if they feel well.
I think it's better at 3 o'clock.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
It's going to be a big four weeks.
No, there aren't going to be any more big four weeks.
Really, that's all of them.
I don't know what the consensus is.
I'm sure it's in the belief of pride.
We don't have to.
It's okay now.
You understand?
You want to see how long it takes you to change it?
No, there's no.
All right, so let's get it done this week.
They're sending here an ambassador to France who is their most senior ambassador, the only member of the diplomatic service with a member of the central committee.
He's very smart.
But, you know, who was it that thought of David Bruce, Mr. President?
When I left, we were thinking in terms of Jenkins and Holdren.
You escalated it to Bruce.
They're sending two men.
Their ambassador to France, who is the only political ambassador they've got, and the chief of their protocol department, who has also got the rank of ambassador, that terrific guy who took you around everywhere.
who speaks that perfect English, who has rank of ambassador, and he is going to be the social lion of this town.
I mean, they're sending us, this is the best Chinese mission anyway.
And they're asking us, I think we ought to wait 72 hours.
They let us wait two weeks before they approve Bruce.
And then let them announce it at the end of next week.
Well, we ought to.
Yeah, they're going to try to announce it.
Oh, man.
Well, they're actually going to announce it on a day that fits with our instructions and things that you might be asking.
Probably 30 minutes.
and you make a historic announcement, it depended on any sense of history, not even patriotism, is too much to ask.
You would have said they tried to get at the significance.
Why David Ruse?
Why the most senior diplomat we've got?
Instead, the next question is on the war again.
It's not on that.
He wanted to really get us off of that, because he was obsessed with what I gave him.
And also, he knew that was a working issue for
No, that is no example.
Oh, David.
I thought I was, I must say, I thought I, because you elevated this thing by making it through.
Now we're getting MOC and diplomatic.
Even Amura now knows that this liaison office is the most high-powered two diplomatic missions that anybody has.
And when they get that letter from you tomorrow and so on.
Well, the letter, the letter that was prepared was excellent, you know.
Yes.
Because the way it was, the way you had it stated in there, I, I totally support every commitment.
In other words, they have the title, the stuff that they need to hear to communicate to the people.
All I did was add a grace note.
But you, it was more, it was more than a grace note.
It was
Putting it in this subtle context, we have the same assessment of the dangers.
You see, you don't have to say any more.
The history has brought us together because of our common assessment of dangers.
And you'll notice in the transcript, he picked that out.
He said, last year your president said to me, he said that he had brought us together.
These guys know how to play a big game.
On that nuclear treaty, Mr. President, the problem is we have to navigate a line in which we don't quite say we are announcing nuclear weapons, which is too dangerous.
So I thought if we could stay the same, the two sides, the Soviet Union and the United States, announce their policy objectives of removing the danger of nuclear war
That doesn't renounce nuclear weapons.
I don't know that.
I wouldn't think that.
Or there.
Could you go so far as to say there, there, there, there, there, Raymond, on the principle that nuclear war shouldn't be used.
That goes on, that is.
No, you don't.
You agree on the principle, you can finally go over the goddamn line.
Yeah, but I'm worried about this.
I asked the Russians about three hypothetical situations, an attack on our allies, an attack on a neutral country, and an attack on a country like Israel.
That's good.
I read the Chinese, the old text of that.
And said we'd never accept that.
No service.
Let me bring in to you how I am thinking of getting that same phrase.
But you will take some flag from the Europeans and Chinese anyway.
On the other hand, it's meaningless.
It's the cheapest better in the back that we can pay.
You know, I'm awfully sorry that you didn't get the question on the nuclear, I mean, on the Soviet nuclear.
I was going to say, let me address that question.
You said, to attack such a rocket would be detrimental to the interests of, our interests in having better elections and
Now, coming up, I say, for example, in the world, that having a better relationship between the two superpowers is indispensable.
We have moved in that direction.
We're not making other moves now.
This would torpedo those chances of destruction.
Or it would severely impair them.
Second, as far as...
as far as Soviet Jewry is concerned, rather than helping them, we have to recognize the fact that 40,000 of our experts last year have met the situations today, and the situation we did not look at, because that wouldn't be the reaction of Soviet Union.
And I'd say, finally, there's another subtle way that you might use, very subtle, I would say, look, the president, and this is true, this asshole Kennedy,
We wanted publicly, for us publicly, to raise the question of downing.
And with Joe and I, we did not do so.
Now, for others really to condition our China policy on getting downing, we did not do so.
Now, what do we do?
Rather than condition it on downing,
We proceeded to receive better relations with the Chinese than our enemies out there.
Now, what is better for the United States to have?
How can we better help Soviet Europe with good relations with the Soviets or no relations?
That's the key point.
Thank you.
I have, uh...
What I was referring to was not a commitment to sell so many things.
I would say we were simply both.
Thank you.
And you want to see how long it takes you to change.
Have full leadership, and we'll see a connection.
No, there's no.
I want any leadership meeting the following week, because I'm going to tell them what I'm going to do right now to prepare some things.
All right, so let's get it done this week.
Okay.
Take it about an hour each.
They're sending here an ambassador to France who is their most senior ambassador, the only member of the diplomatic service with a member of the central committee.
He's very smart.
Out of the center.
By far their best.
They're sending two men.
Their ambassador to France, who is the only political ambassador they've got, and the chief of their protocol department, who has also got the rank of ambassador, that terrific guy who took you around everywhere, who speaks that perfect English, who has rank of ambassador, and he is going to be the social lion of this town.
I mean, they are sending us.
This is the best Chinese mission anywhere.
And they are asking us.
I think we ought to wait 72 hours.
They let us wait two weeks before they approve Bruce.
And then let them announce the end of next week.
We are happy.
in Iceland, probably 30 minutes, or around exactly where we are.
And now we're in this only issue.
We aren't being more forthcoming than anybody.
Of course.
Did you ever hear of Rostov talking to members of the whole foreign relations committee?
Who ever talked to the whole Senate or to the whole House?
Really?
Did you ever do that?
Yes.
What the hell are we talking about here?
But it's, but what's even worse is that you make a historic announcement.
It depended on any sense of history, not even patriotism is too much to ask.
You would have said they tried to get at the significance.
Why David Ruse?
Why the most senior diplomat we've got?
Instead, the next question is on the lawyer game.
It's none of that.
He wanted to really get us off of that because he was obsessed with one game.
And also, he knew that was a recognition for us.
It's just all that.
They don't know.
The bastards know exactly what they're doing.
Oh, they know.
They're a bad one.
Oh, then I thought I was, I must say, I thought I, because you elevated this thing by making it through.
Now we're getting MOC and diplomatic.
Even Amura now knows that this liaison office is the most high-powered two diplomatic missions that anybody has.
And when they get that letter from you tomorrow and so on.
Well, the letter, the letter that you prepared is actually true.
You know why?
Yes.
Because the way it's, the way you had it stated in there, I am.
Yeah, but you are.
I, I totally support every commitment.
In other words, they have the title, the stuff that they need to hear to make the changes in the treaty.
All I did was add a grace note to the endowment.
But you, it was more, it was more than a grace note.
It was
Putting it in this subtle context, we have the same assessment of the dangers.
You see, you don't have to say any more.
The history has brought us together because of our common assessment of dangers.
And you'll notice in the transcript, he picked that out.
He said, last year your president said to me, he said that he had brought us together.
These guys know how to play big games.
Now, we've got to play the essence of this.
On that nuclear treaty, Mr. President, the problem is we have to navigate a line in which we don't quite say we are announcing nuclear weapons, which is too dangerous.
So I thought if we could state it, saying the two sides, the Soviet Union and the United States, announce their policy objectives of removing the danger of nuclear war
That doesn't renounce nuclear weapons.
Well, that wouldn't make sense.
Or there.
Could you go so far as to say there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there.
Yeah, but I'm worried about this.
We'll do to the Chinese and to the Europeans.
Well, the way we can do it is to get the Chinese to work and give them the public's money.
Well, that's what they've done.
I've given them the Russian draft.
Plus every Russian explanation.
The Russians really fell into a trap.
I asked the Russians about three hypothetical situations, an attack on our allies, an attack on a neutral country, and an attack on a country like...
That's good.
I read the Chinese, the old text of that.
And said we'd never accept that.
No service.
Let me bring in to you how I am thinking of getting that same phrase.
But you will take some flag from the Europeans and Chinese anyway.
On the other hand, it's meaningless expression of the chance to say you got something.
It's the cheapest currency back that we can pay.
You know, I'm awfully sorry if you didn't get the question on the nuclear, I mean, on the Soviet nuclear.
I was going to say, let me address that question.
To attach such a record would be detrimental to the interests of
cause world peace, that would be detrimental to Soviet Europe.
Now, come here.
I say, for example, in the world, that having a better relationship between the two superpowers is indispensable for man peace.
We have moved in that direction.
We're not making other moves now.
This would torpedo those chances of destruction, or it would severely impair them.
Second, as far as the other
as far as Soviet Jewry is concerned, rather than helping, we have to recognize the fact that 40,000 got extradited last year, and that the situation is today, and the situation will be that none will get it, because that would be the reaction of the Soviet Union.
And I'd say, finally, there's another subtle way that you might use, very subtle, I would say, look, the president, and this is true, this asshole Kennedy,
wanted publicly, for us publicly, to raise the question of downing, that would kill him off.
We did not do so.
Now, for another, it was really to condition our China policy on getting downing up.
We did not do so.
Now, what do we do?
Rather than condition it on downing, we proceeded to receive better relations with the Chinese and not down the South.
Now, what is better?
For the United States to have it, how can we better help Soviet Europe?
with good relations with the Soviet, or no relations.
That's the key point.
That's exactly right.
You know, the idea of Jews.
Thank you.
Thank you.
I don't think anybody raises the question as to whether we had a commitment.
You remember, I saw it by you.
No, no, no.
What I was referring to was not a commitment to sell so many things.
I would say we were simply fulfilling a commitment.
John did commit the goddamn thing.
John, you remember.
No, but I told us that.