Conversation 892-011

TapeTape 892StartTuesday, April 10, 1973 at 12:19 PMEndTuesday, April 10, 1973 at 12:44 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Bull, Stephen B.;  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On April 10, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:19 pm and 12:44 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 892-011 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 892-11 (cont’d)

                                                                    Conversation No. 892-11

Date: April 10, 1973
Time: Unknown between 12:19 pm and 12:44 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Stephen B. Bull.

       President’s schedule
              -Henry A. Kissinger
              -Meeting with Carl B. Albert
              -Remarks for possible visit
                      -National Conference for Building and Construction Trades Department
                      -Camp David
              -Barry M. Goldwater
                      -Trip to California
                      -Paris air show
              -Alcoholics Anonymous publication
                      -One millionth copy
                      -Caspar W. (“Cap”) Weinberger
              -Roy D. Hickman
                      -Rotary International president
                      -Support for President
              -Kiwanis International
                      -William G. Bray

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 12:24 pm.

       President’s schedule
              -Lt. Col. John A. Dramesi
                      -Prisoner of War [POW]
                      -Flag presentation
                             -Political advantage
              -Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon’s schedule
                      -1973 Teacher of the Year
                             -John A. Ensworth
                             -Ladies Home Journal
                                           -33-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                   (rev. September-2012)

                                                           Conversation No. 892-11 (cont’d)

               -Miltary bases
                      -Kissinger

Bull left at 12:26 pm.

       Lee Kuan Yew
             -Previous meeting with President
                    -Leadership assessed
                            -Ethnicity
             -Previous meeting with Henry A. Kissinger
                    -1976 election
                    -Historical perspective
                    -Comparison with U.S. Leaders

       President’s policies
              -Judgement of history
              -Abraham Lincoln’s administration
              -Vietnam
                      -Administration staff
                      -Supporters
                             -Hardhats
                             -US House Of Representatives
                             -Goldwater
              -Cabinet
              -Spiro T. Agnew
                      -Meeting with Nguyen Van Thieu
                             -Cabinet
                             -Compared to Leonid I. Brezhnev
                             -Peter J. Brennan
                             -Congressional leaders
                                     -Goldwater
                                     -Strom Thurmond
                             -Military personnel
                             -First Daughters
                             -Pham Van Dong
                             -Le Duc Tho
                             -Patriotism
                                     -34-

           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                             (rev. September-2012)

                                                      Conversation No. 892-11 (cont’d)

Kissinger’s meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
       -Proposed Treaty on the Prevention of Nuclear War
              -Soviet Union expectations
              -Reaction
                      -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
                      -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
              -Justification
                      -Nuclear weapons
                      -Use of force
              -Soviet interests
              -Justification
                      -Europe
                              -Reassurances
                      -PRC
                              -Attacks by foreign nations
                      -Great Britain
                              -Role in NATO
                              Entry in common market
                                     -US role
                      -Gen. Charles A. J. M. de Gaulle
       -Jewish emigration issue
              -Leonid I. Brezhnev’s exchange with President
                      -Congressional leaders
                      -Jewish community
                              -President’s address
                      -Yitzak Rabin
                      -Bipartisan Congressional leadership
                      -Agnew
                      -Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson, Abraham A. Ribicoff, Jacob K.
                       Javits
                      -Jewish leaders
                      -William E. Timmons
                              -Wilbur D. Mills, Herman T. Schneebeli, Russell B. Long,
                               Wallace F. Bennett
                                     -Ways and Means Committee, Finance Committee
              -President’s previous meeting with leaders
                                      -35-

           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                             (rev. September-2012)

                                                       Conversation No. 892-11 (cont’d)

                     -Public relations
                             -US negotiations with Soviet Union
              -Kissinger’s forthcoming meeting with Robert C. Hill
                     -Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
                      [ISA]
                             -Elliot L. Richardson
                     -Dealings with White House staff
                             -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
                                     -Access in White House

Ambassadors
     -William R. Kinter
            -Support for President
            -Possible ambassadorship
                   -Pakistan
                   -Cambodia
                           -Confirmation process
     -Leonard Unger, Thailand
            -Henry A. Byroade
            -William P. Rogers

Soviet summit
       -Dobrynin
       -Leadership
              -Brezhnev
       -US negotiating stance on Vietnam
              -Treaty
                      -Middle East
                              -Negotiations
       -Kissinger’s assessment of President’s character
       -Trade Bill
       -Vietnam
              -Domestic issues
                      -Political shift
                      -Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]
       -Brezhnev
              -Health
                                      -36-

            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                             (rev. September-2012)

                                                          Conversation No. 892-11 (cont’d)

       -Treaty
              -Soviet Union concerns
              -Timing of announcement
              -Most favored nation [MFN] status
              -Forthcoming CSCE conference
       -Future visit by President
              -Possible trip to PRC
                       -Peking

Kintner
       -Ambassadorship
       -Relationship to President

Gen. Richard G. Stilwell
       -Ambassadorship
       -Pakistan
              -Retirement from military
       -Cambodia
              -Perception of Kintner’s military service
-Army rank

Soviet Union
       -Treaty
       -Kissinger’s conversation with Dobrynin on April 10, 1973
               -Jewish emigration
               -Treaty
               -Vietnam
                       -Provisional Revolutionary Government [PRG]
                       -Saigon

Vietnam
      -North Vietnam interests
             -Dobrynin’s analysis
             -Cambodia
             -Violence
                    -Limited conflicts
             -Economic aid
                                                 -37-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                         (rev. September-2012)

                                                                 Conversation No. 892-11 (cont’d)

                               -Treaty
                                         -Removal of troops from Cambodia and Laos

       Kissinger’s schedule
              -Farewell lunch
                      -Lakshmi Kant Jha

Kissinger left at 12:44 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

None of these items are of great significance
I want to have submitted to you some suggested remarks that I've proposed to drop by at the National Conference for the Building and Construction and Trades Department that I mentioned last week.
We wanted to see what ideas you have.
So I'll send them to you and you can update them tomorrow.
That's right.
We're going to agree to that often.
Just to draw it by.
All right.
Senator Goldward, having been able to accept the invitation to ride out to California in the spirit of 76, would have given us the opportunity to present Goldward with a letter designating the president's representative to the Paris Air Show.
This is one of the team's color events that we're going to be doing on ice in five minutes.
Along the lines of the courtesy call, the serviceman suggested that you received a millionth copy of the Alcoholics Anonymous publication.
All right.
I had it converted.
All right.
Again, on the courtesy call from Roy Bookman, President of Roy Bookman International Hall, he recommended this as a good source of support, particularly for our federal spending limitation efforts.
This is Congressman Bray's request, sir.
He's the one who made the small American flag in Indiana.
ceremony tonight at the, uh, at the, uh, the other weekend.
Now, although we have some reservations about having this, uh, we can't have any individuals coming in.
On the other hand, it might give us an opportunity to, uh, have them present their slides and, uh, exploit them.
I've seen the top four, and so it's not going to be everything now.
There's no more for you about this until we have an important announcement.
So, you know, you'll have other things there.
We'd love to do it, but we can't do it now.
The final item that's been called and recommended is that Mrs. Nixon win.
That's the 1973 National Teacher of the Year.
Yes.
Would you like Mrs. Nixon to receive her, or would you like to... Oh, I'm sorry, receive him before... Would you like to do it, sir?
His name is John Ensor.
He's a juror.
He's been a lot of promotion for a magazine, whatever you call it, or something, a magazine.
He's been a lot of promotion.
He's been a lot of promotion for some publication.
He's a juror.
He's a juror.
He's a juror.
There's an actual paper in the back here.
Which one?
Related to military bases.
Yeah, I know.
I've got to talk to some people about this before I want to think a little about that.
I have a distinction between people who come through the irreversible, in terms of intolerance, and second, in terms of just straight, mad character.
I think it's really refreshing to talk to this guy, and he really understands
And also, let's face it, you know, we were often asked what leaders in the world understand the damn world.
He's one of the few.
One of the few he does, he understands.
Doesn't he?
Yeah, absolutely.
He's got that good, tough, Chinese, pragmatic mind.
But wasn't that quite something when he came in about, you know,
Oh, and actually, when he talked to me, he was even more excited.
What did he say to you?
Well, he said, what your president has done is unbelievable.
No one considered it possible.
He said, we are not worried about this president.
We are worried about 1977.
He's our great hope.
And then, of course, it was these bastards in this country who won't understand.
They built a historic...
Well, no, first of all, I'm glad we had him, and I'm glad we're giving him a chance to help.
Well, if he, and what you said again, I was thinking as we were talking, who among our national leaders could speak for an hour, but speak for you and hit it exactly right, mention our difficulties, mention our determination without fracking, making it sound plausible.
That's our big national problem.
Well, that's how they're going to conduct, how to prevent either a soft head or a muddle head from carrying on these policies.
You'll do better than survive for the four years, Mr. President.
You will go down as one of the most distinguished presidents.
About that, I have no question.
It looks as if
Menafa, what did Lincoln go through?
He went through a hell of a lot, I guess, during the war.
It was horrible in a way.
We'd gone through so much due to the fact of not having a lot of enthusiasm and support within our own troops.
That's what's concerned me.
When I had to look out for the hard ends,
for support.
And the Congress, you know, I've got to look to the House members, guys that are good guys and the rest, but they're only with you when they think.
Not even they, when they, they're not, they're coming up and down.
It's awful tough.
Not very many of them.
Maybe a Bowater.
Well, you've spoiled your people by taking everything on yourself.
I mean, you don't have your cabinet to come, oh, Agnew, who was a crybaby, but still he called last week.
I didn't bother you with it when Juve was arriving, and only one cabinet member agreed to meet Juve that was Brennan.
Everyone else had some excuse for not going to the airport.
I didn't bother you with it at the time.
But then I think, God damn it, if you can stand on a platform with them, what the hell are they risking going to an arrival ceremony in which their presence, the probabilities would never have been covered.
They probably did so because they didn't think he was going to be popular.
That's right.
I'll be God damn.
They'll be there for Brennan.
You can bet your bottom dollar.
No, no, he won't buy it.
But so that's so symptomatic of the attitude.
Now Brennan, let's again, he is a hard hat.
He was, well then we cancelled, I can ask my opinion, I said it's better not to have any cabinet member than just have the Secretary of Labor.
That's right.
And
But no senator couldn't get the leadership to come either to the dinner or to the arrival.
They didn't come to the dinner either?
No.
Why, those bastards.
Those bastards.
Who the hell was the answer to that?
Well, we had senators.
We had Goldwater, Thurmond.
We had the troops.
I thought my kids were here during the day.
Jesus Christ, that's terrible.
That really shows, though, the lack of patriotism.
It really is lack of patriotism.
The lack of courage.
I mean, I'll bet they'd come fam-bomb-bombs here.
If Lee Duck Toe, who's been wanting to come here in July, he shows up, you'd have to beat them all.
Right.
What did he do in your breakfast with Mr. D this morning?
They are obviously sweating out that treaty, Mr. President, and
We can get them what they want, and we probably should.
It will raise hell in NATO, I must warn you.
And it will raise some cane with the Chinese.
We can keep it from making it a treaty renouncing the use of nuclear weapons.
And that we will not do, but there will be a lot of people screaming that...
I mean, what I've got to phrase that now is that the objective of their policy is to remove the danger of nuclear war.
We are not saying that they are renouncing it.
And then say that this requires that they refrain from using force or the threat of force against each other, against allies, and against third countries.
So no one really has the right to complain.
And it leaves it open-ended that if they do use force, that their nuclear weapons become possible.
But of course, we should have no illusions.
They wanted in order to be able to pretend that there's some super deal cooking up.
Isn't it worth it?
I think it's worth it.
I think it's worth it because he's did it.
Look, that's what the damn Europeans and everybody else, the Chinese, we've got a private deal with it.
Everyone can leave that deal.
And moreover, we can say...
I hope that the Europeans, God damn it, we reassure them too much anyway.
Well, and we can say we are making, we can make to the Chinese a very good case that it's obvious why I made Article 2 of this treaty, which means that they should not use force against third countries.
Right.
Then they have to make a solid treaty with the United States.
And then we have the basis for doing something.
I say that to the Chinese, but the Europeans, not them, but how do the Europeans race on them?
Well, they'll say it's just groups again, hegemonial, but they'll pitch anyway.
They pitched about the last one, and I'd try to get the British sort of calmed down on it if you could.
Well, I think we can get them calmed down, but the British are playing...
The British really haven't been all that helpful in NATO to us when all this happened.
Well, they're being European, which has been a great mistake for them.
It was a mistake for us to push them in.
You didn't do it.
I was a guest to a Senate.
Well, you had no choice, but you came.
Yeah, but by that time, it was down the drain.
By 69, it was down the drain.
All right, let's go.
Now, on the Jewish issue, he's given us really very good assurances.
Now the question is, how do we handle it?
Should I set up a meeting with congressional leaders?
They will let us use it.
They do not want you to say it from President personally.
You can say it is a direct exchange between you and the Soviet leadership.
Right.
And you can use the actual text of it.
Right.
Well, I get the leadership, but you think we ought to get the Jewish community in, too, or should I?
I think so.
Maybe I should.
Should I tell them?
Well, it's a plus with the Jewish community.
All right, let's do it.
Could we try for Friday on that?
Fine.
Friday's a good time.
And then I wonder, I was going to call in the Israeli ambassadors.
But if we call him in first, I think I'll call him in after you've done that.
No, no.
Get the leadership.
You know, this, in addition to the, I have the big four of our leadership, you know, the big four of both, of the bipartisan leadership, of the big five, so to speak, so to speak, so to speak.
We sure have got that, haven't we?
And then, there's Jackson, and then there's Ribicoff, and then there's, you know,
And then after that, we'll have the Jewish leaders.
And then I could also, you better talk to tenants about it.
It may be that you'll want to have, uh, have Mills, Mills and Schneiderle and, uh, Long and Bennett, because it's in ways and means in the finance.
And then have the Jewish leaders there.
And I told the leader, I told the leader this morning, I did, I, because it was on agenda this morning, I just laid it out.
I said, now, I said, here's the situation.
I said,
Don't make this a publication.
I said, if you make it a publication, the door will come out and won't repeat all our other initiatives.
So I've got that pretty well aligned up.
I did without telling them we had a deal.
I said, now, I can't only tell you we're working on it.
Just don't make it a publication, or you're going to be counterproductive.
Okay, I'm seeing no today.
I'm slightly leaning now towards his taking ISA.
I think you were right.
Of course, now Richard won't want him anymore.
But I have...
I think he thought he could use Richard, could use Hilda and John May to hold him.
I mean, that is what... Mr. President, that is...
He doesn't know the words of the White House.
I mean, all of them know more.
Talk to him.
I have never had fear of that.
Never.
And it doesn't concern me in the slightest.
I'm just saying what his motive was.
Let me ask you this.
Why don't we send a fellow like Bill Kim to Pakistan?
He's a good friend of mine.
He's a hardliner.
He's never had anything recognized.
Excellent idea.
Oh, I like him.
Excellent man.
Outstanding.
He also could do Cambodia.
It might be even better at first in Cambodia.
And then you could send the other fellow over to the general.
So you don't want a general in Pakistan?
No, we need a tough guy.
Kitner would be a good guy for either place.
No, I think the general ought to be in Cambodia.
Let's get a military guy in there.
Well, you'll have confirmation troubles, if someone says.
Oh, you're right.
Don't do it.
Why not Kitner to Cambodia, then?
He's willing to take the rest of his team.
Oh, yeah.
You see, we'll put his name down.
The kidnappers should get one or the other.
And we've got to get that bastard Anka out of Thailand, Mr. President.
Roger is dragging his feet, but he's just got to do it.
All right, fine.
That's viral.
Viral is done.
I've done that one.
All right.
All right.
Well, what is the situation now with the Russians on the South?
Well, they have the agreement.
They're waiting a minute.
The agreement has been called home for a meeting on Sunday.
He implied very strongly that they are having a leadership problem right now.
And I can consider it possible that Dresden has... See, I think we can use this treaty.
We can tell him, cool turkey, that in this, if we don't get convincing evidence that something is being done about Vietnam, we just won't be able to sign this treaty.
Secondly, this treaty will get them off our backs
I mean, it gives us the freedom of maneuver with the Middle East, because you don't want to nail yourself into a position that you must add something into something.
If we can get something, fine.
Well, I think we've got to do this.
We've got to play the Russian game, because it's the only one in town, frankly, at the moment.
And I think it's the right thing.
Well, he thinks it's our leadership problems.
Does he think the summit thing may not come off then?
No, I don't think so.
My first message will come off.
I told them, you're getting pretty sure.
I said, this is my own opinion.
I said, look, I know the president.
Now you've seen him.
Do you think you can pressure him?
Do you think he's been waiting because of this?
No, I think they're waiting for three things.
First, the trade bill and the fear that things might blow up in Vietnam.
Plus, they might have some
Some domestic problem.
They could turn right.
You know what you mean?
They could turn hard again.
But I don't think they'll do it before the European Security Council.
Do you think Brescia will do this?
Is he well?
Yeah.
But, you know, it's 68, Mr. President.
Do you have any?
No, we have no reports.
I believe the last message we had from Russia was on Vietnam.
That was Kashi, and I'm sending it in to you.
I think we can fix this treaty to meet most of their worries and still protect ourselves.
So as far as getting any kind of a confirmation in the Sun, you probably aren't going to get it until he goes to Russia now, is that true?
We'll probably not be able to announce it for two weeks.
But I think it's... Mr. President, they need it more than we do.
They want the MFM.
We should.
We must be in a position.
They want the MFM.
They know if they screw it up, we'll screw that European Security Conference right against the wall.
And... And he mentioned again that they want you in the Soviet Union next May.
I'll go.
I think it'd be good.
I'll go there.
Bill Kendrick's name occurred to me last night.
He's a scholar, a friend of mine for years.
I haven't seen him for years.
But the old Bill is probably the right age and so forth.
He's probably a little old, but he can do this job.
He's in his middle 50s.
You put him right in there.
He's a backyard man.
Absolutely.
Totally.
Stilwell could do Pakistan, you see.
We could have Stilwell, we could get Stilwell retired from the army and send him to Pakistan.
I think to send Stilwell to Cambodia is too dangerous.
It looks like it's military, but you could sure send Kendra to Cambodia.
Kendra makes some military journalists.
Oh, but he's a former colonel.
And they would hold that against him.
He's been in that penitentiary.
Ten years.
Fifteen years.
Nobody can hold it.
That's like holding the back of a jeweler or a farmer.
Whatever it is, you put it in the arm.
If I was a farmer, they'd hand it to me.
That's right.
That's all you say, Rick.
That's right.
Now we can handle that.
Good.
I'll get on that.
All right.
I think we go on.
Good.
Well, I'll let it dangle another 48 hours until you're working very hard on that.
I don't think we should carry stuff like that.
No?
Is that what you mean to talk about this morning?
Well, we talked about the Jewish issue and the, uh, treaty in Vietnam.
What did he say about that?
Well, in Vietnam, he had sent me a document saying that they had talked to the PRG and the PRG had failed to approve the treaty.
But that Saigon isn't, I said, they're a bunch of liars.
But, you know, this vote may be right.
His analysis is pretty good.
He doesn't believe, and I'm inclined to agree, that the North Vietnamese either want to take him away, as he said, if they go ahead and take the damn thing, what the hell are they going to do with it?
The other point is, he doesn't believe, even more important, with regard to the South, he says they want to keep the level of violence up and all the rest, but he doesn't think they want a major confrontation.
They don't want to get just so far that they can promise
And also, if I still live, they want the goddamn aid.
I think that's right.
I think that's right.
They can't get the aid without a compliance decree, can they?
Sure.
No chance.
They can't do this.
If we get the aid, if they don't agree to Article 20, which is removal from Cambodia and Laos, then it's just totally...
Done everything.
Right, Professor.
I can see it isn't getting better.
Just very well.