Conversation 898-008

On April 17, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Giulio Andreotti, Andrea Cagiatti, Neil A. Seidenman, Paolo Gesfulo, Anna Saxon, members of the press, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:34 am to 12:19 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 898-008 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 898-8

Date: April 17, 1973
Time: 10:34 - 12:19 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Giulio Andreotti, Andrea Cagiati, Niel A. Seiderman, Paolo Gestulo [?],
and Anna Saxon. Members of the press and the White House photographer were present at the
beginning of the meeting. Portions of this conversation are in Italian.
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                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                              Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

       Italian press session
               -Schedule

       Welcome ceremony
             -Andreotti’s appreciation

[Photograph session]

       White House correspondents
             -Relationship with President
                     -Compared to promotional weeks
                           -Volunteer opportunities, good health, bread, wheat
                           -”Be Kind to Your President” Day
                                   -”Be Kind to the Press”

[Translation of President’s remarks into Italian]

       White House correspondents
             -Relationship with Spiro T. Agnew

[Translation of President’s remarks into Italian]

       President’s greetings to members of press
              -Photographs of meeting
              -Past photograph, circa 1971
              -Author of previous article on Henry A. Kissinger
              -Ronald L. Ziegler
                      -Presidential pens

Members of the press and the White House photographer left at an unknown time after 10:34 am.

       Andreotti’s schedule
             -Meeting with President
                      -Postponement

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]
                                                -9-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                                Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

       Italian parliament
               -Compared to US Congress
                      -Close votes

Henry A. Kissinger entered at an unknown time after 10:34 am.

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Greetings

       Seating arrangements

       Meeting agenda
             -Informal nature of talks
             -State dinner
                     -Seating
             -Morning discussion
             -Similar world views of US and Italy
                     -Contrasted with meetings with other world leaders
                            -Confrontation

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Italian friendship with US
                -Italian domestic policies
                        -Majority viewpoint
                        -Minority
                                -Communist opposition
                        -Socialist support

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Italian domestic politics

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]
                                              -10-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                      (rev. October-2011)

                                                               Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

       Italian domestic politics
               -Postwar parliamentary coalition
                      -Socialists, Communists, New Conscience Party
                              -Opposition
                      -Majority
                              -Social Democratic Party
                                      -Socialist International
                                              -Willy Brandt
                                                       -East Germany
                              -Italian Socialist Party
                                      -Pietro Nenni, Francesco De Martino
                      -Center-Leftist government, 1952

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Italian domestic politics
               -Postwar parliamentary coalitions
                      -Aldo Moro, Amintore Fanfani, Mariano Rumor, Emilio Columbo
                      -Disagreements
                              -Foreign policy
                                     -Socialists
                              -Domestic policy
                                     -Center-leftists
                                     -Fascists
                              -Dissolution of parliament
               -Current government
                      -Christian Democrats in Cabinet
                      -Confidence
                      -Elections

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Italian domestic politics
               -Coalition government
                       -Elections
                       -Social Democrats, Leftists
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                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                              Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

                       -Majority
                               -House compared with Senate
                                       -Margin
                               -Socialist support
                               -Christian Democrats
                       -Christian Democrat convention, June 1973
                       -Role of Socialists

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Italian domestic politics
               -Center-Left Cabinet
                      -Possible crisis
                              -Support for neo-Fascists
                              -Role of Communists
               -US role

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Italian domestic politics
               -Andreotti’s coalition government
                      -President’s admiration
                      -Margin of majority
                              -Stance

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Italian domestic politics
               -Majority
                      -Difficulty

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Italian domestic politics
               -Andreotti’s historic role
                                                -12-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                             Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Meeting agenda
             -Middle East

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 10:34 am.

       President’s schedule
              -Meetings with Andreotti
                      -Changes in schedule

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Giovanni Leone’s letter to President
                    -Concerns
                    -Peace settlement
             -Peace settlement
                    -US support
                    -Compared to Vietnam, Indochina
                    -Andreotti’s visit to Soviet Union
                            -Talks with Alexis N. Kosygin, October 1972
                    -Oil interests
                    -Italy’s role
                            -Interest
                                    -Development prospects
                                    -Compared with capability
                                    -Proximity, security

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Andreotti’s talks with Kosygin
             -President’s and Brandt’s election
             -Kissinger
                                                -13-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                             Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

                       -Kosygin’s admiration

       Middle East
             -Difficulty composed to Vietnam

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Significance compared to Vietnam
                     -US casualties

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Possible effects of failure to settle
                    -Oil
                    -Confrontation of super powers

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -US-Italy communication, correspondence
                    -Candor
                    -Kissinger’s role

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -US role in peace negotiations
                    -Meetings with Israeli representations
                    -Meeting with Anwar Sadat

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -US role in peace negotiations
                    -Meetings with Jordan
                                                -14-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                             Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -US role in peace negotiations
                    -Discussions with Soviet Union leaders

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Peace negotiations
                    -Degree of disagreement

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -US role in peace negotiations

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -US hope for breakthrough

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Italy’s role
                     -Andreotti’s previous statement

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Italy’s role
                     -Possible impact on Israel and Egypt

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]
                                                -15-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                                Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

       Middle East
             -Italy’s role
                     -Geographic, cultural, historic ties to Arab bloc countries

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Italy’s role
                     -Diplomatic policies
                           -Mediterranean states
                                   -Possible influence

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -US-Israel relations
                    -Impact on US relations with Arab states
                            -Moderate course

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Italy’s role contrasted with US

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Prospects for peace
                    -Israel’s neighbors [Arab nations]
                            -Support of allies
                                    -Soviet Union
                                    -Extremists
                            -Italy’s role
                                                   -Relations with non-Communist states, as
                             compared to Communist states
                            -Relations with anarchists
                                    -Potential danger
                                                -16-

                     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                               Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Middle East
             -Provisional government
                    -Suez Canal
                    -Evacuation of territories
                    -Rehabilitation of canal
                    -Detente
                            -Dialogue between Arabs and Israelis
             -Balance of power
                    -Israel compared to Arab nations
                            -Petroleum revenue
                            -Armaments
                    -Negotiations
                    -President’s view
                            -Longevity of Israel
                                    -Surrounding hostility
                                           -Financial resources
                                                   -Oil
                                    -Strength of opposing military forces

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Peace negotiations
                    -Interim settlement
                            -Israeli’s willingness
                            -United Arab Republics [UAR] [Egypt]
                                     -Suez Canal
                                     -Compared to general settlement

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
                                                -17-

                     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                              Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

               -US role
                      -Interim settlement
                      -Goal
                              -Stability of region

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -President’s conversations with Golda Meir
                    -President’s conversations with representatives of Anwar el-Sadat
              [Mohammed Hafez Ismail]

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Kissinger
              -Candid discussion
                     -Shared interests
                     -Influence

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -US policy
                    -Compared to Andreotti, Leoni
                          -Interim settlement

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Egypt’s position
                    -Interim settlement compared to overall settlement

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]
                                               -18-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                             Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

       Middle East
             -President’s proposal
                    -Meeting with Ismail
                    -Sadat’s public announcement
                    -Sovereignty separated from security

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Sadat’s interview with Newsweek
                    -Statement on US attitude
                    -Mention of President’s proposal

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Peace negotiations
                    -General principles
                            -Egypt
                                   -Interim settlement
                                   -Overall settlement

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -US policy

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Jordan
                       -Settlement
                              -Possibility
                              -”Egyptian model”
                              -Timing
                                     -Egypt negotiations
                                               -19-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                                Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

                                             -[Hussein, King of Jordan] Hussein ibn Talal

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Jordan
                       -Assessment of Israel’s position

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Jordan
                       -Assessment of Israel’s position

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Translation
              -Communication of message

       Middle East
             -Jordan settlement
                    -Egypt negotiations
                            -Progress
                    -Timing
                    -Hussein’s possible action

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Middle East
             -Italy’s diplomacy
                     -US role in negotiations
                            -Priority
                            -Optimism
                            -Engagement of all parties
                                    -Goal of settlement
                            -Arab public opinion
                                    -US objectives
                                                -20-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                                 Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

                                              -Israel’s influence
                                              -Fairness
                                                      -Messages to Israel, Egypt

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Middle East
             -Arab nations
                    -Shift in attitude
                            -Recognition of Israel’s right to existence
                                     -Compared with occupied territories
                    -Integration of smaller countries
                            -Sheikhdoms
                            -Oil resources
                                     -Per capita wealth
                                     -Speculation
                            -Possible action by United Nations [UN]
                                     -Balance of power

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Year of Europe
              -Announcement of President’s visit
              -President’s visit to Italy
                     -Timing
                     -Italian domestic politics
                              -Anti-US sentiment
                              -Anti-European Economic Community [EEC] sentiment
                                       -Communists
                     -Preparation, timing
                              -Political event in Italy
                     -Timing
                              -Autumn

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]
                                                -21-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                                Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

       Year of Europe
              -President’s visit
                     -Communications
                              -”Big Four”
                              -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Council
                     -Timing

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Year of Europe
              -President’s visit to Italy
                     -Timing
                              -Discussions with Andreotti
                                       -Concerns
                                       -30-day framework for planning
                                              -Preferences
                                       -Kissinger
                                              -Preparatory talks

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Year of Europe
              -President’s visit with EEC
                     -Compared with NATO Council
                              -Brussels
                     -Significance
              -President’s visits to non-friendly countries compared to friendly countries
                     -Possible reception
              -President’s previous trip to Rome
                     -Andreotti’s displeasure at reception
                     -Compared to President’s domestic travel

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]
                                                -22-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                              Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

       “Price of freedom”

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Year of Europe
              -Possible outcomes
                     -New approach to Atlantic community
              -Preparatory talks
                     -Italy
              -Compared with “Grand Tour”
                     -Press characterization
                     -Working trip
                                                  -Compared to President’s trips to People’s
                              Republic of China [PRC], Soviet Union

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Dangers posed to Atlantic alliance

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -President’s previous trip to Italy
                    -US-Soviet Union relations
                            -Italy’s position
                                    -Detente

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -US-Soviet Union detente
                     -Effects on Western Europe
             -Atlantic alliance
                     -Andreotti’s remarks
                     -US policy
                                                 -23-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                          (rev. October-2011)

                                                                Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

                              -Priority

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Dangers posed to Atlantic alliance
             -CSCE
                    -Italy’s support

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Possible effect
                    -Reduction of tensions between East, West

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       CSCE
               -Communist influence
                    -Europe’s defenses

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR]
             -Western Europe
                    -Defense forces

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -MBFR discussions
                    -Possible effects
                           -Reduction in defenses
                           -Incentives to Soviet Union
                           -Possible dissolution of Atlantic alliance

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]
                                                -24-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                              Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

       US-Soviet Union talks
             -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] II

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Soviet Union disarmament
             -Europe, Italy’s response

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Soviet Union negotiations
             -SALT I and SALT II
                    -Possible effects on Atlantic alliance

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Dangers posed to Atlantic alliance
             -President’s support for European unity

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       European unity
             -Alcide de Gasperi

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Possible economic confrontation
                    -EEC

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -NATO
                    -Military strength of Atlantic alliance
                                                -25-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                                Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

                              -Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR]
                                    -Soviet Union

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -CSCE
                    -Communique, speeches
                    -Effect on Atlantic alliance [NATO]

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Atlantic alliance
                     -Moral commitment compared with [NATO] treaty
                             -Source of loyalty, strength
                             -Possible effects

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Atlantic alliance [NATO]
                     -Opposition in Europe, US
                             -Support for unilateral reduction in forces

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -European media, US media
                    -Liberal influence

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Neo-isolationism
                    -Effects on US, Europe
                                                -26-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                              Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Leadership
                    -Strength of stance
                    -Preservation of Atlantic alliance
             -Soviet Union diplomacy

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Prospects for global peace
                    -Strength of Atlantic alliance

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Atlantic alliance
                     -Importance of European countries, Canada
                     -Leadership
                                                   -Edward R. G. Heath, Andreotti, Georges J.
                              R. Pompidou, Willy Brandt, President
                             -Strength of stance
                                    -Media, public opinion
                             -Parochialism
                                    -Effect on peace prospect, detente

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Public statements
                    -Leaders of smaller countries

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Realists
                                                -27-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                                Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

               -President’s meetings with Heath, Andreotti, Brandt, and Pompidou
               -Summit
                      -PRC, Soviet Union, Europe
                      -Leaders’ input
                      -Substance contrasted with ceremony

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -President’s policies
                     -Opinions, moral stance
             -Italian domestic politics
                     -Media relations
                            -Liberals, conservatives
                            -Election results contrasted with press analysis
                     -Public opinion
                            -Cultivation of educated classes
                                     -”Men of culture, men of science”
                                     -Influence
                                             -Public opinion through media
                     -Media
                            -Radicals
                            -Compromise
                            -Cowardess

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       US-Europe relations
             -Atlantic alliance
                     -US diplomacy
                             -Soviet Union, PRC
                                    -Effect on alliance
                                            -Strength
                             -European public opinion
                     -Strength
                                                 -28-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                          (rev. October-2011)

                                                                  Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

                             -Possibility for detente
                                      -Soviet Union leaders
                                             -Authority for contact, negotiations
                                                     -Public opinion
                       -MBFR
                             -Significance, necessity
                       -US military commitments compared to Europe
                             -US human, financial investments
                             -Increased European investment
                                      -Andreotti’s position
                                             -President’s appreciation
                                             -Domestic appreciation

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       State dinner
               -Continued conversation
                      -Seating arrangements

       President’s forthcoming meeting with Andreotti, April 18
              -Topics of conversation
                       -Trade, economics
                       -MBFR
                       -Other topics
                               -Kissinger
                       -Economics
                                                    -Andreotti’s meeting with George P. Shultz
                                and William J. Casey, April 18

[Translation of the President’s and Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Shultz
                -President’s confidence
                       -Casey
                                                -29-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. October-2011)

                                                              Conversation No. 898-8 (cont’d)

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Kissinger’s introduction to Andreotti
              -Lorenzo Natali [?]

[Translation of Kissinger’s remarks into Italian]

       Natali [?]
               -Intellectual

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

[Andreotti’s remarks in Italian]

       Natali [?]
               -Italy’s ambassador [to Austria or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ?]
                       -Vienna
                              -Beauty

       Andreotti’s schedule
             -Lunch with State Department officials
             -Blair House
                      -Pleasantness

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Williamsburg, Virginia
              -Beauty in springtime

[Translation of the President’s remarks into Italian]

       Camp David compared to Williamsburg, Virginia
             -Seasonal changes

[Translation of the President’s remark into Italian]

Andreotti et al. left at 12:19 pm.
                                           -30-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                   (rev. October-2011)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

All right.
Mr. President, let me repeat to you my congratulations for your decision
for this beautiful event.
Oh, shit!
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
That day, one day, the White House correspondent said, be kind to the President.
Of course, it works both ways.
It's mutual.
It's also a day where the President is kind to the person.
We're encouraging them now to have an interview with us.
Thank you.
Thank you.
That's all right.
That's all right.
I remember about 20 years ago, they used one of his pictures.
Excuse me, I just want to meet you.
I'm sorry, we're here.
Where's that one that said they aren't going to kiss you?
Thank you very much.
Yes, I know.
Good to see you again.
Good to see you again.
That's right.
That's right.
For many years.
Good to see you again.
You look well, huh?
You look good now.
Yes.
What?
Well, we regret, Mr. Prime Minister, that your visit had to be postponed, but we sign gladly to find you in person.
You have the same problem with your parliament that I have with our Congress.
Close votes.
Thank you, Mr. President.
We, uh...
In our meetings, Mr. Prime Minister, it's our custom that you like us to talk very informally.
We will, tonight again, we will be seated together and continue to discuss this problem tomorrow.
And fortunately, our two countries
see the world with so much light that we don't have a bigger confrontation sometimes than I have with some leaders when they come here.
President Consiglio, I would like to say at the beginning that in these meetings we do not have the opportunity to orient ourselves on a rather normal basis, so we will talk here and then we will meet again at the table this evening, we can continue our conversation in that seat and then tomorrow we will meet again in the White House.
And then, having said that, I would like to say that the crisis of our countries, the fact that our two countries see the world in a very dissimilar way, that to us this type of conversation is not like some of these bitter, bitter conversations that I have to contemplate with other countries.
Thank you, Mr. President.
I would like to say that this is an important and not normal conversation, because I believe that the best convergence of the Italian policy and the American policy has always been that we have had, over the years, different types of majority.
However, on the underlying issues of our friendship with the United States, there has never been a discussion on the part of the majority, and certainly not on the part of the people, but rather on the part of the community.
However, the rest of the Parliament on these issues
and the socialists themselves, who for many reasons we could talk about, they think as they think in the current world, but when they have been in government on the theme of alliance, on the theme of relations with the United States, they have been illegal.
This is a time, Mr. Prime Minister, of very great danger for the alliance.
When I first visited Italy as president, I remember that my Italian friends were pressing the United States to have talks with the Soviet and to cool the
relation between the superpowers.
I remember the first visit I made in Italy to the President that my Italian friends pushed me to have conversations with Soviet leaders in order to, let's say,
But now, as a result of such talks, some Europeans feel that this puts Europe in a secondary position.
We do not accept that.
We consider, as the Prime Minister said in his remarks a few months ago, we consider the
the European-American alliance was the cornerstone of our policy.
I'm taking the other dangers to the line, the European Security Conference, which the Italian government has always very strongly supported.
It could be very helpful if it reduces tensions between East and West.
But to the communists, it is a device potential to lull the West into a sense of
No concern about the need to maintain strong defenses.
And as you take a year of the MPFR, we would all welcome a reduction of the burden of maintaining the advance forces in Western Europe.
But Erkin, if we allow the fact that we're going to have such discussions to lead us individually or collectively to
to let down our guard, to reduce our defenses.
First, there will be no incentive for the other side to reduce theirs.
And second, the alliance will become part of the same.
President, if we let ourselves be hindered simply by the fact that the objective of this conference is to let ourselves be hindered
Third, we have the talks that we're going to have with the Soviet, and I have now with regard to SALT II,
The whole world, including our friends in Italy, as well as other parts of Europe, welcome the United States and the Soviet Union moving to limit the terror arsenal of nuclear weapons.
But we must, in the case of SALT II, as well as in the case of SALT I, negotiate limitations, having in mind always that
But at the same time, in relation to the negotiations
as we did in the case of Salta 1, these negotiators must concede, always keeping in mind that such negotiators, it cannot be allowed that these negotiators weaken or put in danger or create an interference in our, in what is the safe haven of our
Now, there's a third danger, a fourth danger to this.
I have always supported, as the prime minister, the idea of European unity.
In fact, Italy, from the days of the Gaspar, whom I know and respected and loved, has always been in the forefront of the move to the European Union.
But now, we have a situation where, as Europe becomes an economic unit, the nature of economic confrontation
But now we are in a situation in which, as Europe moves forward on the road of economic modification, this danger of a confrontation arises, not only a competition, but a confrontation
So I conclude by saying that we must, at all costs, first maintain the military strength of the NATO alliance and not reduce it under any circumstances unless the other side eventually reduces it.
Second, we must not allow combined speeches in the land communicated from the European Security Conference.
to lead to, if not the actual disintegration of the Alliance, to its, frankly, moral disintegration.
It's the moral commitment we have in our hearts
to adhere to, to be loyal to that piece of paper.
That is what has kept the alliance together and makes it strong today.
If that disintegrates, the alliance will be gone, even though we still have that piece of paper.
It is really the sense of moral commitment that we carry in our hearts, with which we adhere, that we are loyal to this final document of this conference, which constitutes the true strength, the safety of the practical alliance.
Without these elements of commitment, of moral commitment, we will no longer have this alliance, even if we respond to the pieces of paper.
Speaking right candidly, there are great forces in Europe and the United States that would welcome the disintegration of the alliance, the reduction of forces in Iraq.
Your media-like army is heavily influenced by the lack.
No isolationism is a disease that is growing in the United States and in every country in Europe.
And this is going to require the leaders, the leaders of all the countries
of major countries in particular, the leaders who stand up to lead strongly to keep this alliance together.
Because the only reason the Soviet is interested in talking with us now, the alliance and the US, is because the alliance has been successful.
And when your game is going well, you don't change the game, the game plan.
You continue.
And then, here, with respect to the leaders of all the countries, but especially the leaders of the main powers, to really raise their voice of support with firmness, with determination, to keep this alliance safe, because the only reason why the Soviet Union is willing to deal with us
At the present time, I don't think it overstates Mr. Prime Minister to say the future of peace in Europe and the world is based on a strong
athletic community working together so they had this for the past 25 years.
Mr. President, I don't think it's exaggerated to say that the future, the future of peace in Terra Roca, as it is for the whole world, is based on the safety of the Atlantic Alliance, in the permanent collaboration as we have in the past 25 years.
And while all the leaders of Europe are important, and of course the Canadians are important, the future really is in one hand.
And there are five hands.
There are five hands.
There's heat and reality on two wrong things.
The five of us, if we stand firm, even despite our
that we support in the public and the media, in the public and the media, we can avoid disintegration of this great alliance.
If, on the other hand, we are parochial, each of us, and those are separate ways, then all vote in my name of building a structure of peace and a real, and a con that does not mean surrender.
will be damaged.
So there it is.
We must stand firm.
I think the governments of Europe, even in Canada, are very important.
This leadership is in the hands of five people, rather than five men.
There are Yves, Andreotti, Pompidou, Brandt and Nixon.
If we stay still, despite, let's say,
a lack, a real lack of support from the media and the press, we could avoid the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance.
But if instead we choose the parochial way, if no one goes for his way, then I believe that our hopes for the building of a real, truly safe structure of peace is a distension
Without the defeat, without the defeat, these hopes will be completely lost and destroyed.
So this is the road.
We are five men.
Neither of us would say it's politically, because we would not want to injure the feelings of the leaders of smaller countries.
But if it really is, we know it's the truth.
And that's why I have met with he and I'm meeting with you now.
We'll meet with Ron.
We'll work out some meeting with Pompidou and some before we meet again in the fall.
But we want the meeting in the fall to be more than atmospheric.
I do not believe you should go to the summit unless you know what's on the other side, whether it's Peking, Moscow, or Europe.
It's your real need, and that's why we want you to give your thoughts as to what should come out of this meeting.
We've asked Heath to do it, and we will ask Brown to, so that we can have something very positive other than just the usual.
salutes, the honor guards, the fine dinners, etc.
Those are all right, too.
But we have more on our hands than that today.
That's our responsibility.
And therefore, I think, ultimately, we don't have this information, because there are other possibilities, but with good and realistic comments, we know that this is the truth.
That's why I've decided to meet with you, Mr. President, as I did with Mr. Yves, as I will meet with Mr. Brandt, and then we'll see if we can also meet with Mr. Pompidou before the 21st of October.
But what we want to get out of all this is more than simply creating a...
I don't think we should go to the top without knowing what's on the other side, be it Beijing, Moscow or Europe.
That's why we are really asking and reading his ideas, as we have also asked the Prime Minister there, as we will ask in France, in order to realize that this ceremony can bring out something really positive, not only press releases, greetings, honor guard, good food, even if these things are very valuable, but we want to find ourselves with something much more important,
This is what we are committed to, and this is our responsibility.
Yes.
I would like to thank the President, not because I am so convinced of his opinion, but for his moral sense of understanding the essential lines of a policy.
I believe that
In many countries we have, especially the newspapers that represent very rich people, very conservative groups, we have an opposition to this real policy that must come to form a new community.
But what is important is that
the readers behave in a different way from those that are the lines that suggest these great journals.
At this point I think it will be useful to work to create an opinion,
more qualified at the service of these ideas, that is, putting us together, men of culture, men of science, to support these ideas, because otherwise the world, I will call it radical, although it does not count numerically much, but it manages to give an imprint and that the imprint that opposes
Let me briefly answer to a president, and we might possibly come back to these questions also tomorrow, since these are very fundamental questions
I wish to thank you very much, not only for your opinions, of which obviously I was already convinced, but for the strong moral sense which you express and which you put in the essential guiding lines of your policies.
In fact, in all countries we have some media, some newspapers, which represent the richest classes or the conservative classes, and these media oppose a policy which we want to carry out in order to create a new world community.
However, it is encouraging to see that in elections the citizens vote in a manner different from what these media suggest.
In any case, it is necessary that we should work hard in order to create a more qualified and better public opinion in our country at the service of these ideas which we share.
And also in Italy we want to gather greater support from men of culture, from men of science, in order that there should no longer be this predominance of some circles which are not very numerous in numbers, but which
are able to shake public opinion through the media, this kind of radical media that we have throughout the world.
And this media of those, on the one hand, courage to a kind of attitude of compromise and of transaction, or even cowardice, I would say, against danger.
I am absolutely convinced that the policy of contact that the United States has had with Russia, with Syria, is not a weakening, but rather a strengthening of the alliance.
Because, of course, this has been well explained by each of us in our countries, it is not the pretext to be less courageous and less ready for defense.
I would like to add under this aspect that I am convinced that if there was not a position of force, it would be impossible.
Perhaps even the Russian leaders themselves are favorable to some form of
could not have a sufficient majority if there was not a force on our part.
So, the balanced revolution is absolutely a necessity.
We have to make it clear, in perspective, and I would like to conclude with this, if the President does not want to hold us accountable for what he has already dedicated to us this morning, but in perspective we have to
I think that recognizing that America will not go to infinity, will make us think about Europe, a part of the defense, 300,000 people.
I admire America, not only for its financial support, but also for its human support.
but it is necessary to get to this form of self-sufficiency of Europe, to get gradually to a climate of great friendship.
For the rest, I refuse to believe that the markets or the finances can compromise our great lines of a true peace policy.
I am convinced that the contacts with the United States and with Russia and with China did not weaken its position on the contrary, they did not weaken the alliance rather.
They strengthened this alliance, provided however in every one of our countries
We explained well these concepts and these moves to public opinion so that these concepts should not be a pretext for a less courageous action or for a lesser readiness to defend.
And let me also stress that if we had not this position of strength in the West, it would be impossible to have a greater detente also on the part of Soviet leaders.
even though Soviet leaders who favor detent would not be able to undertake these conflicts and these negotiations because they would not have sufficient authority from their public opinion if we were not strong enough in the West.
Therefore, the mutually balanced forces production is absolutely indispensable.
We must see this in prospect.
and who will close the area.
This is a problem.
We don't want to take more of your time this morning, Mr. President.
It is not possible or it is not fair that the United States should carry at infinitum the burden of the defense of Europe, in which the U.S. still has 300,000 men.
I must say that I greatly admire not only the financial but the human effort which the United States is making in further defense of Europe after so many years since the war.
Therefore, Europe should gradually share the burden and take up its own defense.
But this should take place in a climate of friendship and of cooperation.
And we should not let the merchants and the funds shared to
Distract us from this work and from this donation.
Mr. Prime Minister, that's a very constructive statement.
Of course, I admire your courage and standing for such principles, despite the heat that you get from all that.
Mr. President, this is a very constructive statement from the professor.
I have admired your courage, in the face of certain principles that you have mentioned, and I think that tomorrow, of course, we can talk tonight, as I said, very freely, because we'll be sitting together
No eavesdroppers.
But tomorrow, I think that we said that it would be very useful for both of us to talk some about trade.
with economics, and also useful to talk about MFR and the effect of MFR on those two subjects.
And anything else that the Prime Minister would like, if you would indicate through your, Dr. Gister, we can go into any subject you want tomorrow.
And Henry, you can go straight away if you don't have anything.
It is a separate discussion on economic matters, Mr. President.
I would like to say that this evening we will have the opportunity to talk about these issues, even without spies, we will be not only seated at the table, we can talk with our four eyes, but I would suggest that we return here, it will be very useful that we focus on the commercial and economic issues, and then on the balance of the forces,
on these two issues, in light of this problem.
And then, any other issue that you would like to set, you could, perhaps, present to Mr. Rakesh, who is in charge of this issue, that you would like to address.
And, of course, there will be a second part regarding economic affairs, Blair House, with Mr. Schultz and Casey,
Chosen.
Chosen.
That's what I told her.
Chosen.
I apologize.
I can't get it out of my head.
Mr. Cacciardi introduced me to the prime minister ten years ago.
He was one of the most promising in American politics.
You know, Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, we understand the fact that you want to get from the dead to the men, and that's where I thought I had a guess.
So you don't know what you do?
I don't know what I do.
Mr. Kansas is going with new ambassador to Vienna.
Vienna?
Yes.
Thank you very much.
I'll support you.
You have lunch at the State Department.
You'll have time to go to Blair House.
It's very pleasant at Blair House.
You'll like it there.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you for your attention.
And I am also glad that we're going to have this spontaneous and informal talk.
I would like to say that the best evidence of the convergence which exists between the policy of immigration in the United States
is that throughout these past years we had several types of majorities in Italy.
However, there was never any discussion by the majorities on the basic questions of our friendship with the United States, although certainly these questions were debated and opposed by the minorities.
As you certainly know, Mr. President, we have a rather strong communist opposition in our country, but the rest of the parliaments, the other partisan parliaments, agree on the problems of our basic friendship with the USA.
Even the socialists, which are not in government now, were always in agreement with the partisan government when they were
in the government, and they were always fair and loyal on basic questions of friendship within the States.
If this is appropriate, I would like to say a few words on the present political situation in Italy.
Until about 1960, we always had coalition and opposition governments in the local government, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the so-called Socialist and Fascist Party.
We had not very large majorities, but we had never had the idea of changing these majorities.
Then there was an approach of approach between the two socialist parties, the Socialist Democratic Party, which comes from the International, like France, like other democratic parties, European Socialist, and the Socialist Party, in fact, of the Honourable Denis and the Honourable Demartini.
And from this,
Since the end of the war and until 1960,
We always had a coalition government in Italy, and we had the opposition, the socialist party, the communist party, and the so-called behind social movement, to say the neo-fascist party.
Our majorities in government were never very large, but never the wisdom or grace of changing this majority.
Then there was an attempt to approximate, to bring nearer the two socialist parties of Italy.
That is to say, the Social Democrats, which are members of the socialist international, as Brandt in Germany and other European socialist countries, on the one hand, and the Italian socialist party, which is the party of Nemi and Demastino.
After this bringing, coming nearer of the two socialist parties, there was formed a so-called center-leftist government, which was in power from 1962 until the elections of that year.
In these ten years we have had different governments, one longer, represented by Mr. Leone Moro, and others represented by Mr. Ruffani, Mr. Leone Romo, and Mr. Leone Colombo.
These parties that formed the coalition have not improved, they have also highlighted major contradictions, including in foreign policy, that is, Atlantic loyalty, but not Atlantic conviction on their part, but especially from the point of view of economic policy, which then we had
a significant deterioration of the economic situation, which at the same time, due to the reaction towards this leftist policy, the neo-fascist party was taking a force and a push that was worrying.
That's why last year
During these 10 years we have several cabinets in Italy, one which was the longest one
presided over by Monsignor Moro, and other shorter governments presided over by Mr. Anfani, Mr. Umoz and Mr. Colombo.
However, during these censored cabinets, the relations between these parties did not improve.
On the contrary, there were many frictions and contradictions between these government parties.
On the one hand, in the field of foreign policy, where, for instance, the socialists were loyal to the Atlantic Alliance, but they were not convinced about this Atlantic Alliance, and in the field of internal policies and economic policies.
Thus, we have a worsening of the economic situation in Italy, and there is a reaction to this fact, and to this center-leftist policy.
The fascists...
had become weary because they should have an ever-growing strength in the country.
This is why last year I proposed to the President of the Republic of dissolving Parliament, which was done, and I was entrusted with the task of forming the Cabinet.
The first Cabinet which I formed was composed only by Christian Democrats, but it did not get the confidence of Parliament.
However, during the election, things improved.
After the election, we also formed a government with the Democrats and with the return of the Liberals after 10 years in the government coalition.
We have rather small margins in the Chamber of Deputies.
As long as it is not possible for the socialists to have a revision of their fundamental positions, I think it is better to have a small majority than to have a majority like the left-wing one, which would not have equal vitality.
There is, however, a part of my party
Social Democrats who are preoccupied with this small majority who would like to return to a coalition government with the Socialists.
We will have a Congress of Christian Democracy in the month of June and I believe that in the Congress
If there will not be a strong change from the socialists, we will not accept as a majority the party of the return of the socialists to the government, precisely without any profound modification from them.
So after the elections, the general elections of last year in Italy, we formed a government, a coalition government, with the Social Democrats and with the Liberals, the Liberal Party, which had not been in government since 10 years.
We had a rather small margin of majority in the two houses of Parliament.
In the House,
the Chamber of Deputies, this margin is sufficient.
However, in Senate, we just have four or five votes of majority.
So, obviously, this creates a situation of great weakness in relation to the national parliament.
However, I'm convinced
that as long as the socialists do not revise their basic attitudes, it is better to have a very tiny majority than to form a new centralist government which would not be viable.
Also a part of my party, that is to say of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, however, are preoccupied by this small margin of majority and they would like to make again a coalition of socialists.
Now in June next year we are going to have the big convention of the Christian Democratic Party.
However, I believe that if the socialists do not basically change their attitude, also the majority of my party, the Christian Democrats, will not accept a return of socialists to government.
very well before, we will have after a short time a situation of crisis and we will especially make a lot of room
This is my main concern.
If we create a new center-led cabinet without deep preliminary discussions, without going too much into the basic questions, we would soon have again a presence in the government and this would promote a rise in the vote in favor of the neo-fascists.
who, on the other hand, have lost much of their importance during this last government, and this would also give it a card in the hands of the Communists, because they might say that it's impossible to form a government without them or without their external support, which is not true.
In which practice do I actually want to interfere in Italian internal politics?
But I admire your efforts to, even with a small majority, to have a government that can stand for something, rather than to have a larger majority, which would lead to a government that
Compromises, vassals, and spanks for nothing.
I would like to express my admiration to you for your work and also for your attitude in the sense of your position, because even with a small majority, at least you form a government that represents something, rather than accepting a form of a larger majority,
I realize it's very hard to govern in this small majority.
But nevertheless, you individually
can speak with a stronger, more precise voice, unequivocal voice, than any Italian prime minister in recent history.
And therefore, I wish you well.
but at the same time I have to take into account her difficulties.
On the other hand, I also know that you, as an individual, can contribute a very important contribution, manifesting yourself with strength, with firmness, with decision and in an unequivocal way.
perhaps to a higher level than any other President of the Council in recent history, and I really wish him success.
Thank you very much.
If you are interested, I would like to move on to another topic for which I have a stable relationship with the President of the Republic, namely the issue of the Middle East, because
I would like to explain that we are deeply concerned because there are problems directly related to the land, there are problems of living in an area closer to us, but we are also concerned about the danger of not coming on the way out.
of the letter that the President of the Republic sent to President Nixon is this.
We are trying to have good relations and we want to cooperate to find a solution, but we want to do it and it will continue in this direction only if this coincides with a political line that is being decided because we know very well that without
A strong push from the United States cannot lead to a gradual resolution of this problem.
I hope that, as it has been a happy political line that has brought to an end, I hope that it has completely re-entered, even outside of Vietnam, the issue of Sino-China, so that we can also find a solution for the improvement.
I would like to tell the President that the details of the
President Nixon, and I believe that, even though it is perhaps a more difficult problem, because the
but that there may be some resolution.
We would like to integrate ourselves in a solution that may have a development, so it is not a desire to overestimate ourselves or to inject ourselves in a matter that is very close to our competence, which is very important.
Thank you very much for all these expectations, Mr. President.
And if you wish, we can now proceed for him to another question.
So this is appropriate, we might perhaps proceed to the question of the New Reef, which was also the subject of an exchange of letters with the Italian President of the Republic.
We are concerned with this issue because obviously we are directly involved in the province of the Mediterranean, which is an area very close to our country.
But also we are very concerned, nearly, because we feel that if no way out is found of this question, the situation may become really dangerous.
So the meaning and the sense of the letter that was sent to you by President Leone is the following.
We are seeking to establish good relations within this area because we want to help find a solution in the settlement of this dispute.
But we want to pursue this solution only if this coincides with the political line followed by the United States.
because you know very well that without a strong push and a strong trust by the United States, it is not possible to find a solution even a gradual one to this issue of the Near East.
Therefore, I hope that if it was possible to find a happy settlement for the question of Vietnam and of Indochina,
throughout Indochina and things are going to be settled now.
In the same manner, it should be possible to find a settlement for the Near East.
I must tell you, by the way, that I learned the details of the successful prospects in Vietnam from President Putin of the USSR when I visited the Soviet Union in last October.
Also in private talks which I had with him, I was able to realize all the respect and confidence which they had for the action of your Mr. President.
So even if the question is perhaps more difficult in the near east because of the oil interests, I hope that the solution may be found.
And I want to specify that we want to participate in this solution
provided it has a development, a prospect for the future.
We are not overrating our importance or would not want to interfere with any action in this field.
We are only interested and we want to take part in the solution because we are concerned by the situation which is so close to Italy.
So, we hoped that the disaster would be present in Italy and that it would come back.
To say this directly.
President Prusikin told me that he hoped that both President Nixon and Chancellor Brown would win, and he also told me that he had a great admirer of Mr. Kissinger.
Well, he, uh, diminished his, uh, if anything, more difficult idea, though.
Mr. President, I would say that the problem of the Middle East, if we have to say something about it, is even more difficult than the problem of Vietnam.
Except for the distressing loss of American lives, it is more important than Vietnam.
And then, I know that the factor of this loss of such worrying African lives will be even more important
Because failure to settle it will not only affect the oil, the lifeline oil for Europe, and to a lesser extent, the U.S., but failure to settle it risks a major, a confrontation of the major powers, the U.S. and Soviet Union.
I think that this current of oil is so important for Europe that it is perhaps a little less important for the United States.
But not only that, it would also cause the risk of a dangerous conflict between the two great powers.
I will be very, totally honest with the Prime Minister, and not only in this conversation, but through correspondence that Dr. Kistler, I now directly will send directly to the Prime Minister on him and Adrian's problem.
We have met with the Israelis.
We have met with representatives of Salah.
and also the Jordanians.
The matter has been discussed also with the Soviet leaders.
However, I would say that the parties this time are very far apart.
We are pressing through every channel that we can for a possible compromise of the problem.
And we can only pray that
that some reason will come into an area that is inhabited, for the most part, by medics.
Now, what is very important is what the Prime Minister said regarding air patrol.
The Prime Minister has, of course, been quite realistic when he said that we cannot directly affect the two major parties, Italy and Israel and Egypt.
But on the other hand, Italy is a Mediterranean power.
Of all the countries in Europe, it has the closest ties, both geographically and culturally, and historically, with the number of nations in the Arab world.
And it will be, it will have major, it will be a major help if ill-advised diplomatic policies can have the closest contact
with all of the countries that border on Mediterranean, for the purpose of bringing, for the purpose of leavening the attitudes of their leaders, and bringing a more reasonable approach to these problems, to the problem.
It would be very useful if Italy, with its diplomatic policy, could maintain closer ties and contacts with all the nations, all the countries of the Mediterranean basin, in order to encourage an encouragement, an attitude from all their leaders, in order to be able to bring to this picture a great reasonableness in the implementation
Because of our close contact with Israel, America has some difficulty with some of the nations in the Arab world, the communication of attempting to influence them toward our moderate course.
And I hope so.
Italy does not have this problem.
While this will not solve the basic issue, it is vitally important that
is 100 million people who surround Israel and their governments feel that they are alone except for the Soviet, the radical extremist elements that are trying to influence them.
It is very important that
that major nations like Italy have contact with them, so that they feel that they have ties to and interests in the non-communist world, as well as in the communist world, or even worse, the anarchist world, which is the real problem there at the present time.
That's the show.
because this, of course, would not represent the definitive solution of the problem.
Although it is very important that these 100 million inhabitants that surround Israel and their respective governments, who currently feel abandoned, alone, except for their relations with the Soviet Union and with the radical or maximalistic elements of that area, the extremists, who are always trying to stop them,
It is important, I say, that countries like Italy try to begin to maintain this contact with their people, because they seem to have a role to play in maintaining their contact and that they perceive an interest in maintaining contacts with the non-communist world, or even with the anarchic world, which is currently the most serious problem.
Yes, because our idea was to have a provisional agreement for the re-opening of the canal, with this one part of the territory close to the canal.
In fact, we still have another half a year, two years, for the works, and we will have with this mode,
a period of a certain dissonance, especially since it would be the first time that Israelis and Arabs meet, because it seems to me that this is the point.
Time, in our opinion, does not work in favor of Israel, because the great minds that the Arab countries have will always have more.
for the sale of oil at increasingly high prices.
A part of these investments will be fatally intended to create other arms purchases and to reinforce the arms market.
a more favorable perspective.
I don't know if this is the opinion of the state of Israel, the official opinion, but there are many in Israel who feel this way.
So far, however, there has never been a sufficient push to be able to convince the Israelis of some form of intention, of strategy.
This is our
Our idea and its connection is the following that we should seek and reach a provisional agreement for opening again the Suez Canal which would involve the evacuation of a part of territories bordering the canal
Then this would require one year and a half to two years for the works required to open again the Suez Canal, and this would bring about a period of some detente.
And for the first time there would be a dialogue between Arabs and the Israelis.
In our opinion, the point is the following, that time does not work in favor of Israel.
In fact, the very large means which are available to our countries now and more and more in the future, since they are going to sell petroleum at always higher prices, a part of these financial means will be used to acquire arms and to strengthen the position of our countries.
Therefore, the outlook is not favorable to Israel as time goes by.
I don't know whether this is the official opinion in Israel, but I know that many people think this in Israel.
However, the problem so far was that it was not possible to reach a sufficient thrust, a sufficient push, in order to encourage Israel to do some form of negotiation.
I agree completely that time is not on the side of Israel.
Israel...
defeat all of its neighbors for five years, maybe ten.
But in the end, Israel cannot survive.
A hostile neighborhood who, with all of their money coming from the oil, will eventually get not only the means, but the training, which will enable them to be buried
I clearly agree, Mr. President, that the time is really not...
because maybe they would be able to defeat all their enemies in their neighborhood for 5 or 10 years, but they will not be able to survive in this hostile environment in which the neighboring countries will act as enemies of the people who drink petrol to buy these war systems.
The problem, Mr. Prime Minister, however, is that while Israel, like people like to make a temperance up, the UAR, the UAR's position is
that there will be no interim settlement opening the canal unless there is agreement on a general settlement at the same time.
And this is a sticking point in the negotiations as we see it at this time.
The real problem is the fact that while Israel could be willing to accept the provisional regulation of this situation, the United Republic is really firm and it seems that it is immobile in the situation that it could not accept the regulation.
However, to answer the Prime Minister's question as to our policy, we are using our influence from both sides to move in the direction of
some kind of settlement at this point, interim, if possible.
And so that we can take some of the poison out of the situation before it spreads to the whole area.
But, in response to your position, Mr. President, in relation to our politics in this sector, we are working as much as possible to influence both parties.
in the sense that we could proceed in the direction of a regulation, a solution of some kind, in this moment, perhaps, of a provisional language, in order to be able to, let's say, disperse the dangers, that is, to eliminate this situation in the whale, so that this whale would not scatter throughout that area.
But I would also say, having talked many hours with the Prime Minister, also, I didn't know, and being privy to many talks with Mr. Sadat's representatives, that it often seems that we have the classic situations of the immovable force and the irresistible object.
but after many hours of dialogue with Prime Minister Maier and with everything that has happened to me, I am very happy to have this opportunity.
And from the conversations I had with the representatives of President Sadat, it seems that we are facing the classic situation of
Could I suggest, Dr. Kissinger, might I add a word?
Because we can talk too, Mark.
I think I'm very candid about this because we want, because not only of their interest, which is the same as ours, because of their influence,
Mr. President, I would like to ask you to allow me to say a few words about this issue.
Of course, we feel free to express ourselves frankly and openly on this issue, not only due to the identity of interest between this country and Europe, but also due to the possibility of military influence in this country.
Mr. Ismail when he was here.
We both consecrate thanks to King Hussein.
Our policy is very similar to what the Prime Minister has pointed out, that is, what the President of the United States
And also, President Leone, I would like to say, he will measure himself in his first step.
Of course, the Egyptians want to make it, as you know, as close as possible to the road roads.
Well, when Ismail was here, the President developed the idea, which Sadat has now made public, of separating the issue of sovereignty from the issue of security.
And that's why, as a result of the speech of Mr. Isma, when he was here, President Nixon formulated the idea that then President Sadat, in this public, in the sense that he should divorce or separate the cause of sovereignty from the cause of security.
When, in his new speech two weeks ago with the border, Sadat made some complaints about our attitudes
But he specifically mentioned this idea and he didn't reject it.
We are trying to see now as well if we can establish
some general principles which would enable the Egyptians to begin negotiations on an interim settlement and then after that on an overall settlement.
We want to do that as far as possible.
But we want to do this in the most discreet way possible.
But then, in the case of...
With the Jordanians, quite frankly, our opinion is that the Israelis are totally unreasonable.
But we are frankly waiting to see whether there will be some progress on the Egyptian front.
And then we think the King will settle very quickly.
I would only add, Mr. Prime Minister, you can be assured in your discussions with your friends in the Mediterranean, you can assure them that we, including
the President personally, are working on this subject on all fronts.
We consider it the highest priority.
And honestly, I would not indicate over-optimism because it is so difficult, but we are not taking the position that
Let the dust settle.
We are pushing on both parties, using all parties involved in order to try to get some movement towards settlement.
And we will continue to.
The people of the Arab world must realize that the United States is trying to be fair, reasonable, that we're not in the pocket of Israel.
We're not.
We want to solve it fair to both sides.
And I told the Israelis this, and I told the Egyptians this.
Mr. President, I would like you to tell us about this security issue, and maybe you could share this security issue with your friends in Italy, in the Mediterranean Pacific, in which you talked about this problem
I would like to have the absolute certainty that we, and I personally, are doing an effort on the whole line, since this problem concerns me,
the maximum priority in our international politics for a solution to this problem.
Because, honestly, I would not say that there is a reason for an exaggerated optimism, since the problem is so complex, so difficult, but we are not simply in the position that we have to wait a little for the people to disappear, for the walls to close,
We are pushing in all directions towards an agreement, and this is what we want to do.
In addition, the people of Arabia should realize that the United States is trying to reach an agreement that is just and reasonable for all parties.
It is not that we are in the pocket of the Israelis.
We simply want an agreement that is fair for both parties, and this is what we have said to the politicians.
I don't know what you think of this point, but I think it's a good point.
Up to two years ago, the Arabs didn't recognize the right to the existence of Israel.
Now, instead, they only talk about new territories, so they recognize the right to the existence.
I think this is a first point that can be considered positive.
Second, I note that it is a much more broad-ranging problem of perspective.
I believe that it will be necessary to find a formula in which even the small stadiums, but which are very rich, certainly those who know, find an integration in a wider community, without which I think it is impossible to think that it remains
this enormous financial availability for countries that are half a million inhabitants and therefore are in the hands of speculators and also of adventurers.
This is a problem of wide range, perhaps the United Nations could discreetly study it and then launch it, but I believe that it is for the future an important problem for the global economy.
So these latter points are very important, Mr. President, and I would like to make two final remarks on this issue.
The first point is something favorable.
That is to say, up to two years ago, the Arab countries did not even recognize the right of Israel to existence.
Now they only speak of the new territories occupied by Israel, but they do recognize this right of Israel to existence.
And this is certainly a positive factor.
The second point is more in a wide-range question and a longer-term issue.
Just to say we believe that it is necessary to find a formula by which also the smaller Arab countries
Just to say, for instance, these ancient or chic tombs, which are very rich because of oil, should be integrated in a wider Arab community.
Because it's inconceivable that there should be these very small countries having huge funds coming out of the sale of petroleum, and which are invented by only half a million people.
These countries are in the hands of speculators and adventurers also in the future.
Perhaps the United Nations might discreetly explore a possibility of doing something in this sense, but we believe that this question is very important for the future world plans.
I would like to make another comment on the announcement of a visit of the President to Europe.
Of course, we are very happy that this event has already taken place in our country.
I think it's a good idea to have a calendar with the trade agreement.
It should be a point to solve some big problems that are still open.
not in the first place to make an anti-American speculation, because now we have this that there are European fans, first of all I want to return to European parameters, but there are also European fans, that is, we have seen, for example, that the Italian communities were also very hostile to the European community before.
They are not very favorable, but they are trying to put a strong anti-American note of controversy.
So I think that for success, even this former president, because of his policy, it is necessary to study well what they are.
Now I would like to proceed to another question, if you allow me, Mr. President.
I read with very great pleasure the preliminary announcement of your trip to Europe this year, and obviously we are very glad that you should visit also Italy.
I would like to know whether there is already some idea of the exact time of this visit.
It is necessary to very carefully study the timing of this visit.
Yes.
In connection with the plans for the trade negotiations this fall, in fact, this visit which you would make to Italy would help us solve or discuss a few points, but it should not be used by opponents in order to make an anti-American speculation.
In fact, we now have the danger in our country of having false European
we may come back to Europe today or tomorrow.
I mean that there are, the Italian communists were once hosted to the European community, and now they pretend that they are in favor of the community, that they are false Europeans, because this favor to the community is accompanied by a very strong note of politics against the United States.
Therefore, in order to ensure the personal success of your business and the success of your policies,
It is necessary to very carefully study and prepare this, the way that means and the timing of your visit to Italy.
Obviously, I do not want to interfere with your plan, but I think this will be a big political event in Italy, and therefore it should be carefully planned.
Mr. Prime Minister, we have no date at all in mind, except that generally it will be sometime in the fall.
We will be in touch with the various governments involved, the big four, plus probably the NATO Council, to be sure that the visit comes at a time that is most helpful for all countries.
And as we get closer today,
I would greatly appreciate it if the Prime Minister and his government would keep us informed on any concerns he has about the date.
So what we need to work with is a framework of about 30 days, because we have to work so many countries into it.
But if he could say, well, we wouldn't prefer it in this period, or we would prefer it that period, then at least things would help with that, you know, to know better.
Yes.
And also...
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.
So, Mr. President, I would be very grateful if, as we approach the time when we will be able to carry out this visit, I would be very grateful to you if you did not mind how much the events of your concerns regarding the times of the visit.
We will have, let's say, a delay of about 30 days.
to dedicate this visit to the spirit of the new modalities, since it is about different governments, and therefore this preparatory phase would be very useful for you to let us know of your concerns about it.
Also, Doctor, I would like to add that it is very important from the point of view of the negotiations with the different governments in order to prepare the visit.
I would like to say two things.
The first is that, as you have seen, there can also be a contact with the community, with the age, a contact with itself.
The President will insist on having a meeting with the head and the head, and there is no doubt about that.
I think it would have a positive meaning, an official contact with the European community.
And the second thing, then,
I think it's important that this grant be prepared also from our side, from European countries, because it's absurd if not that they manage to put in the hands of the countries, not the friends of the countries.
Friends, I understand that there is no opposition, but we want to prepare better
Let me ask you a question, Mr. President.
First, do you plan or do you envisage the possibility of paying official visits to the community as such?
Since you are going to visit the NATO Council in Brussels, it would be no problem since both parties are in Brussels.
I think this would have a very positive significance if the President of the United States should take official contact with the European community in Brussels.
Secondly, this trip needs to be very carefully prepared, also on our side, by the European countries, because if it would be absurd that your trip should be more successful when you go to non-friendly countries than when you visit friendly countries, surely in those countries there is no opposition.
In any case, I must tell you that I was not in government when you came to Rome last time, but I was not happy at all of the way that this is.
We understand.
Let me say that trips to the United States are more difficult than trips to Rome.
But it's the price of freedom we're paying.
Let me say, Dr. Kissinger pointed out, we intend to have preparatory talks with the big four and also with, of course, the community representatives before
in the weeks before the trip comes off.
And what we would like, Mr. Prime Minister, if we can all agree, is to have something positive come out indicating
a new approach to the political and economic problems of the community, of the Atlantic community.
But that, of course, is very narrow at the moment, but our preparatory parts would appreciate your government's suggestions.
We just don't want this trip to be what the press has called a grand tour.
That's the purpose.
The purpose of this is that it's going to be a working trip.
to talk with our friends just as we have at work to talk with our ancestors in Moscow.
For example, let's say an eventual announcement of a new setting of political and economic problems that should affect the Atlantic community.
Of course, this idea will come up at this time.
However, there will be these new preparatory meetings and during that phase we will be very grateful
a recommendation like those of the other governments.
We simply don't want this to come out as what the press calls in our country a great journey, a great style.
We would like it to be a journey of work, in which we will have open and valid conversations with our friends, as we did in the case of our opponents,