Conversation 901-002

TapeTape 901StartWednesday, April 18, 1973 at 5:20 PMEndWednesday, April 18, 1973 at 5:33 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  [Unknown person(s)]Recording deviceOval Office

On April 18, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:20 pm to 5:33 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 901-002 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 901-2 (cont’d)

                                                                     Conversation No. 901-2

Date: April 18, 1973
Time: 5:20 pm - 5:33 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Watergate
          -Preservation of the Presidency
          -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman
                -Possible resignations
          -Haldeman
          -Unidentified co-conspirators
                -John N. Mitchell, Jeb Stuart Magruder, Frederick C. LaRue, Paul L. O’Brien
                -Haldeman, Gordon C. Strachan, Ehrlichman
                -Effect
          -Haldeman and Ehrlichman
                -Possible departures
                      -Effect on Presidency
          -Haldeman
                -Role
                -Effect of departure
          -Assertion of President’s authority
                -Foreign policy
                -Kissinger’s conversation with Ronald L. Ziegler, April 18, 1973

An unknown man entered at an unknown time after 5:20 pm.

     President’s schedule
           -Helicopter for Camp David

The unknown man left at an unknown time before 5:33 pm.

     Watergate
          -Continued revelations
               -Magruder, John W. Dean, III
                                             -9-

                  NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                     (rev. January-2011)

                                                               Conversation No. 901-2 (cont’d)

                       -Target
                 -Effect on Presidency
           -Haldeman and Ehrlichman
                 -Replacements
                       -John B. Connally
                             -Domestic side
                       -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                             -Military role
                       -Bureaucrat
           -William P. Rogers’s departure
                 -Timing
                       -Cabinet
                       -Tightening of administration
           -[David] Kenneth Rush
                 -Possible appointment
                 -Loyalty
           -Preservation of Presidency
           -James T. Lynn
                 -Possible appointment
                 -Loyalty
                 -Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD]
                 -Compared to Rush
                 -Domestic orientation
           -Kissinger’s conversation with Ziegler, April 18, 1973
           -White House staff departures
                 -Strachan, Dean
                 -Haldeman and Ehrlichman

An unknown man entered at an unknown time after 5:20 pm.

           Message to President

The unknown man left at an unknown time before 5:33 pm.

           -Kissinger’s conversation with Ziegler, April 18, 1973
                 -Resignations of Haldeman and Ehrlichman
                       -Behind power curve
                                              -10-

                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                      (rev. January-2011)

                                                             Conversation No. 901-2 (cont’d)

                        -Subordinates
                              -Responsibility
            -President’s statement, April 17, 1973
            -Unindicted persons
                  -Suspensions

Kissinger left at 5:33 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

take the liberty, Mr. President, of doing something that I have not easily done, to talk about, to offer an opinion on something outside my area, which was sparked by a comment you made to me yesterday at midnight when you talked to me.
Oh, yes, about the bargain?
Yeah.
Good.
I've given it a lot of thought.
It's very painful thought.
I proceed from the assumption that the predominant requirement is to preserve the authority of the president, and that everything has to be subordinated to that.
I don't know the facts, but if what you said is correct, namely that Haldeman and Irvingman cannot survive, what is going to happen?
I would put it this way.
I don't want to go that far.
Haldeman, probably, but Irvingman, possibly.
Irvingman is all-knowing, a friend.
I can't make the judgment.
But if that is the case, then it is my view that they ought to be let go before they are destroyed day after day at hearings and leagues and stories.
Why?
Well, that makes sense.
It is really not.
And I say this with a really bleeding heart.
They will not.
It won't work that way.
They will not be destroyed at hearings and leagues and so forth and so on.
Because the thing is coming to a head very fast.
The way this will work, very likely, is just to show you the legal situation.
You can just keep it so that you can keep it in mind.
I really admire Bob more than any other man here.
Let me say that.
The way it's going to work, if they're going to get Magruder's so that he'll make a guilty plea, and when he makes a guilty plea, they will put out some sort of statement indicating that there are
non-entited co-conspirators.
That means that, and they will put everybody in that list.
You know what I mean?
Mitchell will probably be entitled to, no, not Robert there, but he'll be entitled to the, they'll put him on the list of the non-entited co-conspirator.
There'll be Mitchell, you know, from the committee, there'll be Mitchell and Bruder in the room.
and possibly even the lawyer, O'Brien.
From the White House, there would be possibly all of them.
Possibly all of them.
Probably all of them.
Possibly all of them.
Strong, for sure.
And early wins, very marginal, whether he'd be on the rest of the list.
But an indicted conspirator or it's an indicted person?
Non-indicted co-conspirator.
Non-indicted co-conspirator.
the moment that happens, then it's over and they know it.
So in other words, the problem I've got is this, that's gonna come very shortly, that'll only come in 48 hours.
And the problem that I have is in effect telling them before that happens, look, I anticipated this much, take off.
I found his son, Mr. Levine.
Now, we've laid the foundation for that, but what I've said, we want to thoroughly do the investigation on everybody who's been guided and so forth and so on, and this is going to be a different thing.
But they, they're prepared to go any time.
I know that.
And I don't.
And the problem that I, the problem I have is a real tough one, is whether...
whether they should go earlier, or maybe, or rather, certainly, maybe one, and the one that would have to go would be all.
That is, in other words, you had to take one that was more likely to get it and see.
Now, if, on the other hand, they are not in that list, then there is a chance that they could be saved.
If they can be saved, they should be saved.
If they can't be saved...
But if they're going to be destroyed, we should, the President should move on.
My point is that the president should move on them and probably at the same time reorganize.
I mean, it can't just be...
I'm really thinking now of how to put you into a position where, under pressure, you're taking brutal charge of events.
And I'm thinking of foreign policy, how it will look to others.
Because one thing that's going to happen is that Haldeman has been the guy who's made the bureaucracy run by keeping things away.
And if he's knocked out, you're going to have bureaucratic onslaughts also.
So that's what I am groping for.
What I think you need is a brutal assertion of presidential authority that separates you from them, if that's the way it's going to go.
I say this really with a bleeding heart.
You know how I felt about this.
It must be much harder even for you.
Ron has come to the same.
You became to me.
I think today.
Yes.
He came to me.
I have never initiated this discussion with him.
He thinks you ought to let him go.
And you know that Ron, he says it's like killing his brother.
You go ahead and bring him to my office, sir.
Okay.
And, uh...
But he said it when he heard you this whole time.
About three o'clock, he says, the press will...
I can't decide how bad it is.
We have written out other things, and
we can handle it can always be handled if one knows this is the end of it and these are the facts with which one can stand but my nightmare is that with these guys like McGruder Dean all fifth raiders the fifth raiders who are getting and having incentive to lie and who and that the next one they're going to go after is you and that uh
if they can survive it.
I have really done this with the most enormous reluctance, but if your authority really gets shaken, the management of the government and the conduct of foreign policy is going to become so tough that you will then face constant crisis after the...
I mean, your record has been that when you had to
You were surgical, brutal.
It's, God knows, I can't even imagine this building without both of them.
And with all the minor problems that have existed, it's been a marvelously cohesive, loyal.
You're going to make it without them.
You've got to do it.
No question.
I'd like to find other people who may or may not replace him.
You might consider bringing Connolly.
No, no, no, no, no, no.
We'd understand.
Well, you have to decide.
You know, if you get a Connolly in here, that you'd understand.
Well, if he were on the domestic side, I could say.
No, I don't think we want that kind of thing.
I think you don't really maybe want to have him, but...
You'd have to think about that.
You'd have to have something, then.
You'd have to do something to keep the bureaucracy...
But he would be a very good man if he were a civilian.
But that would take him out of the military.
But somebody has to sit on the bureaucracy, then, or it'd be insufferable.
But that's the second problem, Mr. President.
Let me ask you that.
Let me say at this point, one thing that's related to this that's very painful to me, you know, the Rogers thing was scheduled sometime now.
We cannot have any member of the cabinet leave at this point.
It'll look like a straight...
If we have them go and Rogers goes, everybody will say, for Christ's sakes, he left because of this kind of thing.
Unless you do it in a general context of tightening up the whole administration.
Well, I just tell you that that's wrong.
I...
Let me ask you this on the man.
I just have a thought.
We have to go outside together.
How about rush?
You do what?
You breathe.
You breathe.
You breathe.
You breathe.
You breathe.
You breathe.
You breathe.
I've had a long time with them.
And I just want to ask you more of a question.
No, no, you can't, Mr. President.
You couldn't attempt it because your great strength has been your ability to preserve yourself with a big decision.
If you do that, say, it's the same thing.
The Russian inquiry has come down to the dark side.
Len Padula.
He's a loyal liar.
Huh?
He's a loyal liar.
Len?
Jim Len from Hutt.
Like me?
He would be good.
Sorry about that, Ernie.
And more domestically oriented, which you also need.
But Ron told you today that he felt that I saw the sense in you.
He said he's on the breast of heart.
That's what... That's why I finally decided.
I've been thinking it all day.
I've been taking the position all the time that I would not come to you at all.
All of this, don't worry about it.
And the major thing, Mr. President, now, is not to worry about courage, but about the future of youth.
I know, I know.
Oh, that hurts too.
Oh.
No, it's inhuman.
It's to have this, to be saddled with this.
It's not just those two.
I think the way to do it is to suspend strong Dean and whoever they all are.
Or Dean Dean also.
and then have all the others, and then have the other two resigned.
If that's your decision, then one thing that you cannot afford is to come to the prison.
Agreed.
Oh, thank you.
Thank you very much.
Yes, sir.
That you have to be separated from it.
I don't know enough about it.
That's what he said to me.
Well, because he feels the town is slipping away and that we are constantly behind the power grid.
And he said it's like killing his own brother.
But he thinks it will wind up being better for Bob and probably for John.
quickly, brutally.
I think I let him resign after some of their subordinates of mine were suspended.
One way to do it would be to suspend subordinates of them and then have them say they have to assume responsibility.
But I don't know the time.
You didn't preclude suspending people who were not indicted.
No.