Conversation 903-014

TapeTape 903StartFriday, April 20, 1973 at 11:43 AMEndFriday, April 20, 1973 at 12:02 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On April 20, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:43 am to 12:02 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 903-014 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 903-14

Date: April 20, 1973
Time: 11:43 am - 12:02 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Kissinger’s forthcoming speech in New York
           -Summary of President’s actions
           -Atlantic world relations
                 -President’s schedule
                       -Trip to Europe
           -Preparations
                 -Meetings
                       -“Big Four”
                       -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
                 -Response
                       -Europe’s leaders
           -Associated Press [AP] publishers
                 -New York
                 -Questions and answers [Q & A]
                       -Vietnam, Laos

     Vietnam
          -Bombing
          -Memorandum from Elliot L. Richardson
          -Kissinger’s request for contingency plans
                -Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]
                -Attack on Laos
                -Attack on Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]
                -Attack on both sides of DMZ
          -Richardson’s view
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             NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                (rev. April-2011)

                                                    Conversation No. 903-14

     -Kissinger’s view
     -National Security Council, [NSC] meeting
           -Bombing contingencies
                 -Kissinger’s recommendation
                       -Laos
                       -Khe Sanh
                       -South Vietnam
                       -North Vietnam
                       -“Out of control”
     -US actions
           -Mines [?]
           -Economic commissioner
           -Reconnaissance mission
           -North Vietnam’s reaction
                 -Caution
                       -Statements

Kissinger’s schedule
      -Egypt message
            -Meeting in Europe
                  -Soviet Union
      -Le Duc Tho, Hafey Ismail
      -Absence
            -Vietnam settlement
                  -Moscow
                  -Soviet summit
      -Vietnam settlement communication
            -Brent G. Scowcroft
                  -Decision making
            -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                  -Kissinger’s alter-ego

Kissinger’s schedule
      -Trip to Soviet Union

President’s schedule
      -Florida
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             NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                 (rev. April-2011)

                                                        Conversation No. 903-14

           -Kissinger
           -Ronald L. Ziegler

Camp David
    -Kissinger’s invitation

President’s schedule
      -Florida
            -Reflection

Watergate
     -Decision making
           -Personal
           -National
                  -Cien Fuegos
                  -Jordan
                  -Cambodia
     -President’s position
           -Full disclosure
     -Press reaction
     -John N. Mitchell
     -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman
     -Departures from White House staff
           -Manner and timing
           -Effect
     -Haldeman’s possible departure
           -Replacement
                  -Leonard Garment
                  -Roy L. Ash
           -Bureaucracy
     -Haldeman and Ehrlichman
     -President’s conversation with Henry E. Petersen
           -Corroboration
                  -Jeb Stuart Magruder
     -Halderman and Ehrlichman
           -Evidence
     -President’s activities
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                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. April-2011)

                                                                   Conversation No. 903-14

                 -Comparison with Harry S. Truman and Lyndon B. Johnson
           -Effect on individuals
                 -Haldeman and Ehrlichman
           -Mitchell
                 -Appearances on television [TV]
                 -Responsibility
                       -Charles W. Colson’s role in campaign
                       -Haldeman
                       -President’s responsibilities
                       -Haldeman’s White House functions
           -President’s knowledge
           -President’s action
                 -Haldeman and Ehrlichman
                 -Bureaucracy
           -Comparison with political campaign

     Vietnam
          -NSC meeting
          -George P. Shultz
                -Attendance
                -Economic matters compared with military matters
                      -Statnatory members
          -Attorney General

Kissinger left at 12:02 pm

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Monday.
Oh, yeah.
Good.
And what I'll do, Mr. President, the basic theme is to summarize what you did last year and to say that what you want to do this year is to bring up, to make the same sort of breakthrough in relations in the Atlantic world that you made.
Sure.
And so that by the time you travel to Europe in the fall,
it will be a significant event.
And I'll put it in terms of, in effect, it's being a message from you other than a speech by me.
This is what the president intends.
That's what I've been working on.
And then we can go into an armistice amount of preparation.
We're having meetings with the big four and meetings with the head of NATO.
And, you know, I mean, it's really quite impressive, the record.
And then we can get, I think we can organize some European response.
Probably so.
I mean, from the leaders to you.
Right, right, right.
And then you'll be in the lead of some.
Right, wherever he makes the argument.
Yeah, to the AP publicist.
Originally, I had just intended to answer questions, but I think it's too volatile a situation to be up there only answering questions.
Yeah.
That's right.
That's right.
Yeah.
Well, for example, I think you don't really want to get into the Vietnam thing.
Yes.
That would be the danger if I did answer questions.
I think it stays this time.
That's what I thought.
It would be 90%.
Lars and Vietnam, and I think we ought to make clear that you have, that this is not the major thrust of your foreign policy.
We have.
Richardson had sent you a memo on bombing in which he in effect asked for an NSC meeting.
I had asked the chiefs to give us a plan for three contingencies, one an attack on the Lars, another an attack along the DMZ, and the third
and attack on both sides of the DMZ.
He, of course, takes the minimum option.
All our experience is, Mr. President, if we do something, we better do it massively.
You don't get any less heat for farming a little.
You know, we thought about the NSC.
Maybe we should.
I think we should have that.
No, no, I think you must have it, as a matter of fact.
My recommendation is that in case of an attack in Laos, we should hit heavily in Laos and flop over just at Khe Sanh into South Vietnam.
In case of an attack in Vietnam, we should hit heavily in Vietnam and flop over into North Vietnam.
We must always seem just out of control.
We've got them worried now with pulling back our mine.
I think so.
And calling back our economic commission.
We flew a reconnaissance plane over them yesterday.
Yeah, do you think it's getting their attention?
Oh, it can't tell yet.
Or you think so, but you don't know yet.
You know, they're much more cautious in their statements this week.
In their statements?
They were going to deliver a message to us today.
A bit more public, I think.
Well, the problem is he's gone.
that long away from the Vietnam situation, which is... Well, the Vietnam situation, when I speak four days at Moscow, then I have to do for the summit.
Yeah.
And I can come back in between and go again.
I think that's better.
You know, your way is so long.
We just can't communicate around here.
I've got to do it all myself.
I really don't have a second plan.
Okay.
I'm still a Rothschild believer.
You know, this is my kid, you know.
Well, Scowcroft is a mild man, but he's a good man.
He's a goddamn good man.
I've talked to him.
That's why I'm very thankful.
He can do everything, but except when you get into the decision-making thing.
No, he doesn't have to wait.
He doesn't know my thinking.
And he doesn't.
And he just was your old ego.
That's right.
That's right.
But I had a sense that you could go there and he'd rush in and come on back.
That would be good.
I could do that.
You're not going to Florida, though.
No, but any time you need me.
Oh, no, I was just thinking, I was invited.
I told them I'm not having anybody go except Ziegler, because basically it's Easter, and I think all people should stay with their families and so forth.
And so they're going to, and you're welcome, also, but you can't leave until it gets open.
It's going to be open.
You know, I have no idea.
That's as much as you can do.
But this is just getting me pretty up there now.
I'm going to try to stay in Florida.
I hope, uh, maybe, uh, I want to say the weekend, I thought I'd swap over and say, you know, once you, you know, I think you'd make a little, you'd get a little, you'd get a little problem with the sun.
I think you'd get some time for reflection.
Yes.
It'd be brutal to be anxious.
Huh.
You've had it before.
Oh, you?
This is more brutal in one way.
It's humanly.
Less than another.
I mean, this is more brutal than a statue.
And we know, actually, we make these decisions about everyone, even if it's the Uyghurs or Jordan, let alone Cambodia, et cetera.
We know, then, that all the checks are out there, all the checks.
And those are tough.
And quite local.
It was so tragic, as you said, and all the arguments you have gone through.
I mean, there's any man who deserves a little rest.
A little rest.
We'll survive it.
We have now made it absolutely clear to everybody concerned to get to the bottom of this son of a bitch and let the chips fall where they may.
I think that's getting across to people, don't you agree?
Yeah, I think it's getting across.
Because the newspapers are
Say, who's higher up?
I'm stirring it up as to who's higher up and what else is going to come out.
That's going to be the thing.
That's the part that's going to be a drain.
Sure, because as it comes out, Mitchell, he's flourishing.
You see, when we talk about the line of moving right away on St. Alderman, and or, well, not and or, and or, Alderman Longmore, Alderman, it's a confession in advance that they are guilty of that.
I'm not speaking of what affects them personally, but I'm looking at the presidency.
The only thing...
I'm a goddamn fool.
Why the hell did I keep them all this time?
How could I have been misled for nine months?
The basic reference now is to preserve the presidency.
I understand.
You see, preserving the presidency, if I thought preserving the presidency would be helped by firing the whole White House staff, I'd do it.
But the problem is,
No, I don't know whether you should fire them.
And since I don't know the facts, it's hard for me to tell.
It's a question of firing.
It's a question of whether they should... No, they should be able to leave with the same thing.
There's no way anybody can get it to leave without an effect saying, well, the president asked you to go.
So it's a question, I agree, I agree, don't worry.
I've thought of all those things.
But it's a question of how they can do it and when, you see, and what are what certain chances.
And also whether that removes any of the poison.
How much is it removed?
It's a whole other question, Mark.
See, when Holden said it's got to be a company that, in my view, is equipped with the reorganization of the government because it means that the whole mode of operation will have to be changed.
This is my honest view.
I'll carry on anyway.
But I have seen this now in great detail.
Well, the best man will be the best man.
But he's still not as well as Alden.
He'd do it very well, though, because I have to do more of it myself in the future.
I have to.
Now, Lynn would be the right man.
And we've got a very strong man, and she's by far the best man we've ever had in that damn job.
That's right.
Now, Lynn would be...
But I think what you then have to do, whenever it reaches the immediate white house, is
There has to be absolute brutality towards the bureaucracy, Mr. President, because they're going to take runs at us that we haven't seen.
Because when they think you have to prove to them that you are in brutal charge, they're now sort of waiting to see.
But I think all of this can be done.
I think you can come out of this strongly.
Well, we're leaving.
In the end, in the end, it'll take several months, though.
We're gonna have to settle for this in just several weeks, but it's gonna be several months of goddamn tough stuff.
The strategic choice is whether or not to dribble out slowly or whether or not... Yeah, well, the parties have moved it earlier, and I'm not sure... You can't really get it all out, you know.
Basically, they are all so contingent that the other right will come out to see.
Well, one can wait until it reaches them and then ask them to take leave, but...
I hope.
I want to come soon.
I want the jury, whatever they have, I want the goddamn prosecutor.
I just told Peterson, I said, if you've got anybody, get it up so that we can decide.
I said, because I'm not going to convict men that are innocent.
He said, I agree.
He said, you've got to.
He said, we've got to.
We haven't got corroboration.
I'll put them two separate problems on this.
and that they're guilty.
The other is when they should say, oh, do I not stand?
No, no, no.
I agree that there's a problem.
But you see, I need the device.
Yes.
And the device, I think it's got to be, I've got to have proof.
Yes.
I mean, and I don't mean, and it doesn't have to be total guilt.
I mean, it's just got to be.
I'm not at all sure what you're saying.
I just don't want.
And I don't worry.
The main thing on the president is to say that this president is doing something that is very difficult to do.
He is insisting on thorough investigation of activities that it touches closest associations.
It's an administration investigating itself, and that's the main truth.
And that's hard.
Truman wouldn't do it, Steve.
Johnson wouldn't do it.
I'm the human, the human heartbreak involved in this.
It's unbelievable.
Because after we're dealing here, men, with Falterman and Erlichman, these are fine men who did nothing.
And they tried to do the right thing, and they did do the right thing in what they were trying to do.
I see him on television every day saying there's nothing to it.
I feel for him, too, Henry, but not as much as the others, because down with Mitchell.
Mitchell was in charge.
He had the responsibility.
You know all of us were running the goddamn campaign campaign.
Oh, do you?
No, take Colson and him.
They said Colson and him were running the campaign.
It was only in terms of the issues, attack and counterattack, which is perfectly proper.
You've got to run a campaign.
I was busy with other things.
What you were doing at that time, let people forget.
Now, you weren't.
paying any attention to the campaign.
You had one major foreign policy decision after that.
And also in the summertime, I paid little attention, but we were, you know what we were doing.
We were in the campaign negotiations.
Of course, and in the summer it was already.
It had been done.
It had been done anyway.
And Bob had to run that part of the government.
No other thing to do, though, is this.
We can't.
This is the time.
And knowing, by God, we're just doing the best in this.
The one thing, God, one of the things, the President, due to the fact that I was there, he doesn't think no goddamn thing is not involved at all.
So I was frank with him.
He doesn't give me much.
The major thing now is whether the time, whether the point in time can be fixed.
That's over.
Well, if you brutally assert yourself, I don't know, I'm not saying that's today or next week, but at some point, you have to take a step that doesn't look as if you're driven by events.
Well, the brutal assertion really only involves two men.
I don't know whether that point will ever be reached, but then it's reached.
And if you survive that, if you will, I mean when you survive that,
And that's easy to do because the bureaucracy is covered.
It's covered.
Yeah, we found out.
And then events and other objective news is going to begin dominating again.
Oh, this is good.
This is bad.
It's like a political campaign.
People hear about the God damn thing for three or four months, and then it's over.
They hear they're glad it's over.
That's what they said.
This is going to be a bloody campaign.
We run as God.
God damn run.
Attack, attack, attack.
Leap, leap, leap.
You get hit hard.
But, well, and I think the, uh, so on, on Vietnam, I'll schedule a meeting, uh, for maybe the day of the
No, sir, it's not the end.
I've changed the rule.
I don't want him or the Attorney General.
They always shall explain me fairly.
Under the NSA, we are, we are limiting, except when he, when he's not in marriage, if it's today or then, but
Otherwise, on military matters, only the statutory members will be present.
Just say that's true.
And for him.
Right.
But that he will be there all the time.
God damn it, lay it to him hard on that.
I have, George.