Nixon, Brandt & Kissinger on Year of Europe and NATO

because of the things you do.
And I think we call this the French as we are going on.
But this would be the one thing that, as long as we understand, Mr. President, that you say if certain things go in the wrong direction, that you have to take certain protective measures, but that our aim is, all governments, to move things if we can.
in the direction of more free trade in the world, and not less free trade than before.
Now, finally, I have another element of the West-West relation, as I call it.
The problem is, how will the United States deal, through the years to come, with the individual West European states, and with the institutions, or with the community, as
There are problems which I think cannot be dealt with anymore just by contacting the individual national governments.
This is true as far as trade is concerned, but also as far as defense and general foreign policy is concerned.
For me, that is no doubt anymore.
that the European Union, as we said it would be ten years from now, this will be an economic unity with certain elements, certain elements of common foreign policy.
Not too much, but certain fields of common foreign policy.
This raises the question, how will the United States handle this, to have contact, of course, directly with the national governments?
And how will, for example, the President of the United States, when he is going to visit Europe this autumn, he would be most welcome, but he couldn't go in any case with us in the federal public.
It would be good if the President of the United States would contact not only NATO, where the U.S. is the most important member state, but also have some kind of a contact with the European community.
Now, for example, to just relay a question, if you came to see NATO, why only see the NATO Secretary General?
the council wouldn't make too much sense because then you wouldn't be the ambassadors.
But it ain't your name, most of them, but it's not your letter.
If you came not only to see the Secretary General, then the National Council could meet at the level of heads of state and or heads of government.
This has been done once before, ten years ago.
And one said, well, Pompidou would come.
In that case, I would come.
And what we could do, Mr. President, would be then, in a conformal way, the same day, make this a new first day.
What is it for now?
In the morning.
In the morning.
And then, Mr. President, at the lunch, if you say Brussels in a conformal way, it would be afternoon or for dinner.
In a conformal way, it would be evening.
the Prime Minister's early community with the President of the United States to discuss problems of trade and monetary problems in a more informal way.
But still, by then, you would have contact with institutional government, with the NICU, where we all are members, and in a somewhat less organized but still effective way that it changed the views
Not only with the investors, as I said, who are there, with respect to the matter of course, but with the responsible leaders.
If only in one case, the Secretary General would have to be here.
In the other case, of course, the Chairman of the Committee would have to be here in that informal discussion.
If you would be kind enough to think about the possibilities in this case, it's not necessarily that you want anything, but I had talked earlier, even as the chancellor, as to how this is a visit.
We might perhaps talk a little about it.
Would you have the visits to the individual countries, basically the big four, take place before the
Would you like tea, or coffee, or cold drink?
Ice tea?
I don't know.
No, it's not here.
All right.
What about beer?
We're open-minded.
I can go either way.
What do you think?
I never know where you're going.
I don't know where you're going.
In other words, we started to discuss and started to get our thoughts all together and exchange views so that when you said, I think you're right, because we all just need...
And for a day in Brussels, my goodness, you go to the Sun and you just start to gas it around.
You don't know what you're gonna come out with.
We don't want to go to the Sun without knowing what's there.
Chief, what do you think?
No, I think it's better for the Sun to leave the country.
It's better for me to die.
To Sun up and to Sun up.
And that, of course, doesn't formulate some general principle that we can have some sort of a manager.
But let me say, what about the technology?
Atlantis may not be the best.
Well, it could be, but I would rather not at this time.
I tell you, I myself would delay it, because the French then said that, ah, well,
Okay.
But the content of this is accepted by us as a basis of what you're asking of us.
It comes in contact with the label.
When you're asked about that issue, well, the president of our relations committee, I think you should say, you and I discussed it.
And we said the label is not really important.
I mean, that's been worked out lately.
It's the content of the book.
Well, that's right.
That's right.
That's right.
That's right.
That's right.
That's right.
That's right.
That's right.
That's right.
He felt that this might be a possible suggestion.
He couldn't go out and be picking up new initiatives.
Good.
I heard.
I think it might be.
And then you and I talked about it, and so forth.
And then we were in a meeting.
We talked.
And then the village decided to be kind of...
Could these two gentlemen be kind enough to give us the few sentences that we could?
I don't want to bother him.
That's a very good idea.
That would give, uh, that would be a follow-up.
It shows movement, yes, that we've discussed.
Now, now, the one thing that I think is important, though, is the sensitivity of the charge.
I'm going to do a few thoughts on it again.
How, how, how is it held with the Chancellor's idea?
Well, it should be the Chancellor's idea, but I don't do it in such a way as to say, listen, the gate's completely open.
And of course, there has to be children discussed with other major, major neighbors from, uh, you know, uh, allies, too.
So it doesn't look like, frankly, it doesn't look like a terrorist American company.
No, you have to.
You have to.
Very important.
Let's go right, right in that way.
Do you agree, Chancellor?
Yes.
Okay.
That's a little more than considered, a little less than desired.
Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes,
That's a very good idea.
I think the chancellor's speech should be very important to Valerie Henry.
I would suggest she might talk to Sigler personally, talk to his general counterparts.
But they ought to build that speech up as being a major pronouncement.
See my point?
Your speech before the press election should be built up as a major pronouncement.
And all you have to do is have two paragraphs in that speech to pronounce it.
I wouldn't, I wouldn't give it away to the Senate or any of the Senate or any of the Senate or any of the Senate or any of the Senate or any of the Senate or any of the Senate or any of the Senate or any of the Senate or any of the Senate or any of the Senate or any of the Senate
Man, it's the head of government.
You tell them.
Don't let them tell you.
Believe me.
Sure, they prefer just to get up there and harass you a little bit.
But you make your speech, and that doesn't harass you a little bit.
Right?
So what do I do, anyway?
It's always the game with the press.
You don't have what you're... That's an excellent idea.
In other words, then you would suggest that the...
He would suggest that we get whatever money they could be to the foreign capitals.
Yes, but that was either then or this.
This is the meeting that is the impressions of the impressions.
So those were the, of the Scandinavians.
Unfortunately, we just can't, you can't go along, you know.
And, uh...
But what happened is they would all come to the Native Americans, right?
That's it.
And now all of them.
And you see, let's face it, the ones that really matter are the big, uh, are the big tree.
But you've got to go to the other side.
Because the attack on the terrorists, they had to.
But they're terrorists.
And so you've got to go to the other side.
So you've got to go to E.E.
Pompidou Brown.
And I don't know if they aren't ready to wear it or not.
He's a good man.
He survives.
He's a good man.
He's very impressive.
He's a good man.
He's a good man.
You don't think so?
I don't think so, no.
I think he'll lose.
I think he'll lose tomorrow or something like that.
He'll lose tomorrow or something like that.
Well, they were today, I think in June, about June.
June or July.
I don't get a constitution like the French, where they have a president or something for a certain department.
You're in for, what is it, five years?
Four.
Well, that's good.
It's a long time.
76, if the world can survive simultaneously elections in Germany, United States, and France.
Mr. President, I have one problem in connection to this idea of getting a contact, a meeting also with the community.
This is, talking about the foreign ministers, under the constitution of the EDC, the council consists of the foreign ministers
Then you have, they, they, they, they have, they have the chairmen and the, the, the, the turns around, and they have the commission, the orderly, the former fresh minister now is the president.
Now they had, they had among themselves discussed the possibility that the, the president of the United States came to Europe.
They would, they would invite him to participate in the meeting of the council, the council of the community, together with the,
See, the problem we have with that, though, is this, that we're not members.
Now, the fact, you see, they have another objection, as you, what we do have is another objection.
What we do says, if the President of the United States participates there, he would leave me in the chair, and he would have another objection.
But if I don't, if I don't do that, I don't care.
We'll put Mark in the chair.
Now, what you would be able to say, like Miss Max said, is that wherever he would be at the table, he would say, his place would be the chair.
For he said to his old man, what would that be?
And I think that's wherever he says it's the head of.
And this would be through with it.
Matter of fact, they said he would be at that corner.
without committing ourselves to the foreigners.
Because I don't mean it, Joe.
It might be everybody that came out of the fort.
Mr. President, that also is a difficulty, because if the French, or if anybody wanted to be bureaucratic, they could insist that the community meet with a vote first.
Yes.
I can't confront you with a united position.
I won't do that.
I can't.
And that united position, every time they reply to you, they won't do it, but they could do it if they wanted to be.
So...
that the Chancellor's idea of a NATO meeting is much more suitable for this kind of formal discussion.
Yes, either an afternoon drink or a dinner party.
A dinner party, that one could actually go.
And that you could much more easily discuss in a less structured manner.
You had already, without going into all the details,
Yes, well, I guess he has really put our thinking forward here.
I think he's formalized it.
He's given the structure, which is very important.
And that's very, very good.
I didn't know how this was going to work, but I knew it should come.
Because it is, as I say, before, I guess it's right for everybody to come here.
We've got to go there.
Since 1969.
I want to come anyway.
I want to come.
And I think now that the war is not over, we can avoid a few demonstrations before they begin to be destroyed.
And we haven't done demonstrations here in a long way.
We've done tons of demonstrations.
I don't mind.
I don't mind anything.
But what I had is, with the board being non-considered, it was rough because, you know, oh, I don't mind a few people not caring.
I mean, I'm used to that.
That seems like a very...
Well, let me ask you this.
Where does the ship this all stand with our British Frenchmen?
I see what we do with the last of them.
The tentative plan now is May 31st in Iceland.
And we don't know where.
Iceland.
Iceland.
Yes.
They say that you won't come here.
And they haven't booked many of the agents.
Have you seen them?
No.
Well, it's summertime soon.
What?
I will go to Greenland a few weeks after that, fishing for two days.
You will see him.
He will come to see me for a private visit.
Because he wanted me to be in contact after I had been here, after I had seen Brezhnev.
What we do, we'll come to see him in the middle of June.
In other words, two weeks after he has seen you.
So we will...
The thing is, follow us when we get another close contact.
We had a very close contact with Bertrand.
So that there'll be no difference.
I think that this will be managed with general consensus.
Because I think he can only do it for the same reasons that Bertrand forgave.
I prefer a head of government meeting in the framework of NATO to a foreign minister's meeting in the framework of the community.
Yeah.
I agree.
All right.
That's all we do.
Yes.
And the call is now on the meeting with NATO and the .
OK. Then you mentioned, Mr. President, the east-west part of the
As far as we are concerned, in Germany, we are coming close to the end of the Bayer-Palmen business.
We still have to get our agreement with East Germany, and this will be done around the 10th or 11th of May.
Then we did an agreement with Czechoslovakia, but the Munich agreement was the difficult point.
But now they have found a partner, the lawyers.
I think the Russians have been helpful, don't you think?
They have told the Czechs that we should find a solution.
In any case, my foreign minister is going to see them in May.
and he hopes that he can get that release sometime soon.
Because I think the Russians and the Warsaw Pact companies want to have this settled before an eventual foreign minister's conference in Helsinki would take place on European security and cooperation.
It's my impression that they would have the Czechoslovak-German thing ready by then.
And it's okay for us.
It's okay for us.
This has to be done.
Then we only have left the problem of our relations with Hungary and Bulgaria.
But this creates no problem at all.
Just two selfish, diplomatic relations.
They have, as a result,
of decisions within the Warsaw Pact may have not been permitted until now, to establish diplomatic relations with us, because they have been told only after our relations were changed to Wagner, and established.
They were permitted to do the same thing.
So, then, when we will see that I stand in
In the fortnight's, not in the fortnight's, not the case that you will see before I understand, we have, at the end of this week, yes, yes, Saturday, yes, we expect him to, well, we expect to sign a few bilateral agreements.
They seem to like this tonight.
And I'm looking forward to signing.
They like it, but they don't like it.
Well, we have one on corporate, long-term corporate principles.
That's fine.
Well, today, we are doing the same as us.
We have about five business leaders.
Now, we think we would like to meet.
One on cultural and technical, scientific, and one on air traffic.
Please, please.
We don't need to get done.
Thank you.
But then, they may also propose, Mr. President, some more political exchange, especially at this point.
We have looked into your document and the one we had with the French.
some meetings from time to time.
For us, the meeting has some connection again with the GDR history and Berlin.
We don't know how long this will last, but it is still a situation where we can use the Russians a little bit to use their influence.
on the eastern coast, for the more difficult of the Russians.
It's a very big area.
And basically, not because they're communists, but because they're Germans.
The most productive and the toughest communists in the world are Germans.
Yes, but at the same time, they have more reason to be afraid of the Russians.
You next one.
Yes.
This policy of getting small contacts, small meeting of people, is not just a contact close to you.
Yes, I think it's a problem for them and not the way that they're set up.
They're set up there isolated.
East Germany holds close to the West.
It runs.
And inevitably the system is dangerous because they are still Germans.
Thank God.
Well, then we have, I suppose, some of the problems connected with the conference in Helsinki and one which they prepared in Vienna.
He still sent a letter to you, I think, or a message four days ago on Helsinki.
We told them that if preparations were working out in the way it should, we have no objections to the fund.
If this could meet towards the end of June, then the Commission should work.
But on the third point, we were a little bit reluctant because he
He seems to be interested in getting a meeting on the Russian side, in other words, a meeting where he could participate.
This may change, I've thought about it, since he has made Lomiko member of the Berlin Bureau.
This changes the situation a little bit, because Lomiko, who belongs to the Bureau government, could represent Russia in another way than he did as an expert for it.
So, we said that we would not be absolutely against having a meeting on a higher level, but we would first like to see what the results of the commission should look like.
We haven't formally replied to you, Mr. President.
I haven't seen any.
Well, it doesn't really require a formal answer.
It was a question of what I heard.
What did you hear?
No, I couldn't leave it with this.
Let the front ministers have that meeting, and then don't get the result that the Commission spoke.
The real, real problem with that European Security Conference, and I know that it has the enormous appeal in your country, but the real problem is that for the Russians, they want it to appear to be
all the appearance of, uh, detente and so forth and so on, and they're looking at basically a disintegration, you know, uh, in other words, a lot of, a lot of atmospherics and, and so forth.
Now, uh, I think, uh, I think actually that the fact of the meeting is, is all right.
I mean, uh, I got, when I think of the, when I think of the Rumanians, when I think of the Poles, when I think of the, well, the Hungarians and the rest,
with all of us but on the other hand we must not allow that kind of meeting to have the effect of creating a euphoria in our community
If there has been a danger, it already has declined, because as far as I have been following these preparatory talks in Helsinki, they have shown that the positions discussed within the NATO alliance and on the Western Union circle, they have built with things that have so worked.
So I think the danger of euphoria is a small danger now, compared perhaps with what it could have been if it had an integrational effect and not the Western power.
You're just coming to the end.
Yes, yes, yes.
Well, integrational effect, I think.
I think this is an unusual story.
I don't know why.
Well, I may be a little bit more concerned.
you are perhaps because i i let me say this there isn't just about 100 congressional leaders this morning on nato and foreign there's an enormous access to war in vietnam there's an enormous new isolation that's developing in the united states
The old internationals, the McCloys, etc., all of us remember, the McCloys, see, they're old, and Patches is dead, and so forth and so on.
And what has happened here is that those that were the internationals, those that were employed in the U.S. 25 years ago, now they're here in very isolationist
And frankly, the U.S. should disarm it a lot.
I think the United States, Mansfield, for example, get out of Europe.
Get out.
Period.
O-U-T is the way he puts it.
Or rather, the polar way he puts it.
O-U-T. O-U-T. Out.
Which is what he said first about Vietnam, and now he says it about Europe.
Well, he's a nice man.
A nice man.
But basically, he's a total pacifist.
I'm not a total believer in, naive about the communist intentions, which you aren't, and I'm not, because not that we're Dr. Nair, but we know the world, right?
But the problem we've got here is that the American political scene, we've got to do everything we can
to see to it that this sentiment that, well, everything's changed now, we've been all over lives and so forth.
We talked about the table one time.
The problem is if the American issue is weakened and becomes, frankly, less credible, and if the American participation becomes less.
And it also, the isolationism, as it, as a result of Europe paying down, as some said, economic, becomes one of economic confrontation.
We could be building a very difficult world.
That's what we face here.
And we cannot have economic confrontation.
We cannot separate the temporary from the economic.
What we have to realize is that we're all in this
And it doesn't mean we all come out the same way.
But it does mean that, looking in Europe, I've watched your public opinion, and I know what your younger people are saying.
There's a whole new generation of men born since World War II, and their voices are being heard.
They're being heard here, they're being heard there.
As world leaders, we have got to do everything that we can
to always put in, even tilt some toward a harder line, another realism, while at the same time saying publicly, the path needs to be set to give people hope.
People need hope.
They're desperately wanting it.
But on the other hand, what we do, we have to remember we're dealing with the Russians, and for that matter, with others in the world.
who are not naive, who are not euphoric, who will not be affected by all this.
And for us to go to these negotiations in such a way would be very, very bad.
That's really what, what we need.
I mean, Mr. Chancellor, the Senate man is the key to it.
You are.
You are for a reason.
I mean, how, if you don't mind, this is the bottom of the only battle there.
There, only because I've had the people behind me, and I have the people with me, the Senate and the House.
You are the man.
You're, you're, after all, you're the Senate.
You're, uh, the Germans are the strongest people in America.
Uh, you also are the, uh,
the man of peace, uh, you're out of politics, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
And so everybody says, well, if Brown says there's no nature, there's no problem, et cetera, et cetera, what's all the fighting about?
What is all, I don't see that.
Brown's got to go out and say, look, the Cold War goes on.
We've got to do this and that.
The other thing, I'm only suggesting that everybody will be watching you and everything you say or any excuse
or America, frankly, to get out.
Henry, have I overstated that leaders meeting this morning?
It was a very sobering one.
It certainly is a very strong threat in the direction of this country.
But we will meet.
And I was going to say, we will beat it.
Let me tell you, we will beat it because it's wrong.
I told the leaders this morning, finally, I said, listen, the reason we made great progress in 1972 in Big King and in Moscow and in the war in Vietnam is that we were strong.
We didn't do the latterly, you know, throw in our chips before we had a deal.
And I said, we must maintain our strength.
We must be fortified in terms of being willing to talk
But we do not talk, we do not listen before talks.
We don't give away our own property.
We've got to keep that old property.
Always have it there.
And in our own minds, we've got to know what the game is because we're dealing with people.
And I respect them for it.
I mean, I respect the pressure.
I respect these guys.
These are two.
If I were in this place, I'd probably be the same way.
But let's remember.
He's not there, you know, just to tip off the glass of vodka, or champagne, or whatever it is they do.
He's there for other purposes.
And we've got to be there for other purposes, too.
I think, uh, I think a secretary of a couple along those lines, uh,
mind, both of us in our countries have public opinion problems, which we must deal with.
So you deal with the public opinion problems at the same time and say, look, the way they talk, let's face it, the way they talk, the way that our relations with the Russians is not through a naive, soft-headed
uh, Wheaton approach, saying, look, the fellows are trading on the Carolinas trade, and, uh, you know, we'll sell you some Wheaton, or get some gas, or produce in Siberia, and the rest, and all that.
We're gonna have some scientific exchanges.
Uh, that isn't the way.
The way to talk with the Russians is the way, uh, also, the way is not to stand there in ugly confrontation.
which of course has been your policy and mine.
But the way is a cold turkey proposition.
They want something, we want something.
And so we sit down there and we talk.
And it's very, very important that we get together.
It's very, very important that we not allow that to succeed in attacking what they're after and that's to divide, not only divide Europe, but also to split off Europe from America.
Now that, in my view, is the Soviet... And if I were a Soviet leader, I'd be doing exactly the same thing.
Harry, do you agree with my analysis?
Uh, yes, there's certainly the, uh, the Soviet preference, yeah, to... That's right.
Now that doesn't mean you say it critically.
Uh, I mean, because basically... Basically, basically, you put yourself in their position.
But what would the Soviet want?
I mean, the Soviet desire is not a war.
God knows, I don't think they won any war.
But the Soviet desire is not to have to be Europe, which is strong and free, and so forth.
And not, therefore, an easy target for areas less
I would like to make two remarks.
One on public opinion, which you mentioned.
So we have a problem, each of us.
I saw the press reports on some of the cases.
So we should know that there exists a nasty lot of talk during the last few weeks about what they call anti-feminism in the federal public.
I will be at the Airhouse of Euphemia, two of our main public opinion polls.
I will use them at the national press conference.
They would ask, which is our most important path?
And 76% say, not the Air Force, since they did get
a few years ago.
But, under my government, the percentage of those from the U.S. first has decreased compared to the United States.
It's very interesting.
It's very interesting.
And the other thing is that they ask people, I mean, problems with relations, good relations,
Are they good, or are they just normal?
And 57, or something like that, says good, and 30, and some people say normal, good portion, but still it would be wrong not to add.
that sometimes one has problems, but most of these problems, which, which, which press and television people use sometimes, they have nothing to do with the United States.
And generally, taking the example which has been built up to large things about some places for the troops near the Anarbala, people would come with delegation to Bonn to see your ambassador,
uh, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the,
And people don't take it.
How kind of you to so small the ask this.
They'll ask you, well now, they don't want the Americans and the federal public to go home.
I hope you get that hard.
I mean, our kids want to do their best.
Their parents, they read about all this.
But you're right.
It's wrong.
We don't know that.
You can't have people who have 25 years without having to go up to, you know, they throw all their
But I mean, there are certain problems in the world, relations between an army and civilian life, which you have also with your own military setup, and not only with friends from the Prado, who are there.
I wanted to make another point.
People predict it.
that when I would face my party focus a few weeks ago, I would have great difficulties defending a reasonable foreign policy.
True.
But this was the period where there was an overwhelming, strong discussion, an overwhelming support.
A fairly small minority supporting
not even a pacifist sign, but something which was not in accordance with the principles of the Allies.
So this went very well, and that brought more stability into the scene.
The other remark I would like to make in connection with Brezhnev is this.
I have no doubt that his aim, or the leaders' aim, is
if possible, to bring about a division between West Europe and the United States.
But at this time, I mean, for example, just in the years we are living through now, for technical reasons, they seem not to concentrate on this single regime of theirs,
It looks as if they find that they should, in a way, everyone who sees it should work for or promote
uh it could have bad effects on them too because it could bring about a general feeling in europe that the two alliances of european soviet wouldn't be necessary anymore they would have their problems not only with the romanians but some of the others as well so a nato
which is working, is a section and also a kind of a guarantee for the stability of the Warsaw Pact.
In fact, this is a little bit of an exaggeration, but something in it.
Because also they, if one looks upon the resolution which they took at the central committee last week,
where they can concentrate so much more upon the Chinese than upon anything else.
They make the final paragraph of their resolution.
And so, I think this is so much of the center of it.
Why do they worry about the Chinese?
The Chinese are 20 years away.
They hear them because there's so many.
They're 20 years away, you know.
Right, Harry.
But, you know, it's the inequality of 30 million Russians in Siberia and 800 million Chinese on the other side.
Yeah, but I mean, let's face it, let's face it.
That's in terms of conventional warfare.
The Russians are looking down the Chinese throats and the Chinese are down the back.
Oh, the Chinese don't have that, do they?
They're tough ones.
We have security.
We have security.
We have security.
We have security.
We have security.
We have security.
We have security.
We have security.
We have security.
We have security.
have changed their position within the last two years and so far that they have accepted the presence of the United States in Berlin for an unlimited period of time.
Why have they been in Berlin?
To accept the United States as the power for European security and European cooperation.
In other words, the power
which is necessary to solve these problems concerning MPFR and this European Congress.
This is quite a change.
They have accepted this as a matter of fact.
They base their policy upon this acceptance of the United States as a power in Europe.
Oil is important.
If the United States would change that position to us, you know, they would be pretty, I think.
Maybe.
By now, I think.
By the time that I said, they are having to pass the United States also, you know.
Yeah.
The building in this place, they have made the work in different years.
In 1969, certainly, they attempted to create it.
Yes.
And it lasted three years.
And it lasted three years.
Yes.
To hold it up rather.
Exactly.
They, uh, no, nothing like that.
That's a very good thing.
What is your feeling now, Mr. Chancellor, about, uh, about MDR?
I do not know too much about it, Mr. President.
I understand that, uh, that, uh, that you are going to, people are going to table proposals tomorrow.
Uh, my, uh, people here at the embassy had a chance to look into that last week.
So, uh, uh,
I think we find no difficulty in going along with the way of thinking.
I have a problem to speak about trifecta with my emissary of defense.
that if one should get a first cut of the most symbolic character limited to two superpowers, there's too much for fuzzies, this would create a
psychological problem for him and others, so he would prefer to have something where the, what do you call it, the islanders, the indigenous forces also would participate, human with only a flesh and a small percent.
This was the original general position, but both of us say that I find
We can live with the other, and yet, if years were made clear, that the other problems, through the years to come, would be, uh, discussed in, uh, at least not like that.
Well, we are actually presenting various approaches to you.
Yeah.
One of which is exactly the one you've described.
And the other one is more a superpower cut.
Yes.
But we will soon, there will be a, a, an opportunity for,
We're not going to just make this deal and say, look, here it is, boys.
This is going to be a mutual deal.
That's what the word mutual means, Henry.
Oh, yes, I understand that.
We're not going to speak that.
I live in the United States.
You understand?
I think the problem, Mr. President, is intellectually.
Is it good enough for the domestic consideration?
it would be better to confine the cut to Soviet and American forces, because if you cut indigenous forces, then you're trading good German divisions for lousy Czech and Polish divisions.
And therefore, these are equivalent numbers.
It is a disadvantage to NATO to trade German divisions for Polish and Czech.
On the other hand, the proposals we have made envision
that one continues to say it can't be a symbolic US-Soviet country, that a symbolic indigenous country, and both approaches are possible, and it's really more up to you than to us to decide.
Do you understand?
But this is a real hard thing to do, instead of the political poetry you just mentioned before, the connection to this converse.
Well, let me just say this.
Mr. Chancellor, as I was understanding, Henry and the bar are the closest concentration apart from the things we're doing.
I think this has to be handled in the highest level, don't you think so?
And obviously our people will be doing it too, and I give you that.
You know what I mean?
And we can't just leave this to the defense ministers.
If you want to send people over to look at us, that is.
Yeah, yeah.
May I say a word about the Middle East?
First, I should convey the most respectful greetings of Mr. Tito, my son.
All you say now is me is, I am like the hour.
I expected to be the man that had a slug.
So we had difficulties to speak.
We all had difficulties to react.
All this was wrong.
He would come with us and be his own chauffeur.
Yeah, yeah.
He was in the most hot cigar in the world.
He started at first whiskey and breakfast.
Half past seven.
He was proud of that.
And I told this to my doctor when he came.
Then I came home and he said, if you are bleeding, you may start with this candle.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
But at this stage, he was full of activity.
When Elizabeth had been there, he had danced with her, and they hadn't came out until two o'clock that night at this place there, you know.
So he is, he is a ghost, you know, where there's just brave liberty.
But I can't understand, was he a liar?
Not at all, right?
No, no.
No, but apart from that, the, my feeling is that
I was really nervous about the future of Yugoslavia.
It looks a little bit better.
My impression is, I am speaking to various people, some of whom I have known before, it looks as if they may be able to keep this to be a healing when he will have gone.
God, it's a famous day in the world, isn't it?
And riots, uh, demonstrations, and, uh, and, uh, summits.
My company is mostly, like, peaceful.
We don't have a holiday here, but, uh, they have, uh, they have parades, parades.
Yeah, yeah, they parade in the yard, and, uh,
Well, if you don't pay, you can't use it.
Yeah.
But you don't have a check problem, do you?
No.
Small groups, small, very small groups, they had, what was it, 0.3% of the last election.
But...
Well, we'll give you an easy time today.
We'll have our chat.
Are you doing any other events?
What year are you going to TR for?
No, I have my reception at the embassy tomorrow morning.
Oh, alright.
But I would like to take it.
I would like it to be the night of the year and I think they'd like to.
Because I would prefer that they'd like to.
Right.
Oh, I killed you.
You know, everybody thinks they save the day, but you fly all night and the next day you're not worried at all.
I did the same thing in California.
I didn't save the day flying.
Yes.
Because I say, look, I can't, I saved the plane, but you come out so tired.
Mm-hmm.
Sure.
How are they, uh, the, uh...
We're in economic conditions.
Everybody's got inflation.
We all have it.
Yes, we haven't.
Mr. Renner, could we have a press picture?
Because the picture's taken.
Yes, good.
That's true.
They have this one so often.
I have one tonight at the dinner.
At the dinner tonight, yes.
At the dinner tonight, I want to be sure to have it set up down below.
uh, so that we can get a really good shot.
In the Grand Hall?
Yeah, in the Grand Hall.
Okay.
And I want that one done in color, because I want to give that a chance.
Well, that's a nice thing.
You know, we've been through this before.
That's a nice picture to have, the four of us together.
And, see.
Well, we, uh,
They told us to hear Charlie, and I implicated you and I and our dogs perhaps with a mortar to the back here than anybody else.
That's why this is so important.
I thank you very much for the invitation, Mr. President, because I think it's important for these relations between Europe and the United States, and also important for our
Well, in relation to the East, you're outspoken.
Yes, well, what they call us, what they call us, well, by and little, part of it comes to an end, so we'll become more and more part of it.
Well, there's a little of it in what we started to make, for example, and this year we're going to have that MBFR thing.
And also it was terribly important.
I thought, I told Henry, I said, I want to be sure to see Jensen with Brownlee before we see him.
Yes, because we should have a very frank talk as to what you want in a player.
No, but when I said, Mr. President, I appreciated that you would be kind enough to invite me.
So, I was thinking about the fact that you have some domestic problems, and I appreciate that you still want to see me today.
We have been through difficulties before, both of us, so you should not worry about them.
I'll worry about them.
They all work out.
You know, the thing is, I remember there, that people were sort of... Yeah.
Nobody remembers you today, right?
All I remember are the big floods.
Now we handle them.
In fact, I watch you here and don't you be a bit concerned.
And if I ask you about it, you just say, oh, we didn't discuss them.
There are more important problems to discuss, which is no one's problem about business.
But we do have more important problems.
I never ask people about business.
And it all works out, you know.
The, uh, what do you see when you start to think of this year with the, uh, with the U.S. government and, of course, the F.E.F.R.
and the European Security Conference?
And then I, I hope that you will chat about that.
At some time, I can perhaps make a trip to Europe.
Not for the purpose of a grand tour.
You and I are good enough friends that we don't go for a protocol.
But for the purpose of good frank talks.
Because you should know if you're coming here, I should be going with you.
You know what I mean?
Like I did to your predecessor, you know, my first trip abroad.
And I trust we can work out a date, you know, in probably October, November, if that sounds all right to you.
But that's far ahead.
I just met a little ambassador.
He told me about him.
He was a vetting movement.
He was a vetting in Estonia.
He went to the chairman from Estonia.
I had worked with him.
He said, this is Estonia.
I said, how did you get here?
He's a very good man, and most charming and intelligent wife, who also was a young diplomat with our embassy, so that they married, and you both have before they could marry.
And he had stayed here before?
Yes.
Oh, good, good.
I probably have not met him.
No, I think not.
No, he was here at that station.
He was here.
Yeah.
So, you know, he is, he knows this thing.
Here's our old friend.
That's the man I had with you.
Yeah, I always saw him.
Oh, and I love him.
Yeah, and he hadn't met tonight.
He was in the bar.
Yeah, he was in the bar.
Right.
I said, oh, I'm going to meet him at the bar.
Yeah.
Yeah, I said, the bar is the bronze Kissinger.
Or should we say, Kissinger is Nixon's bar.
I was like, no, you are, you know.
No, I think just saying that, and you're going on and on and on and on.
That's a small kind of thing.
Listen, I know, I know, Mark, you are, I know, and Henry, Henry tells you, he says, I'll get, I'll get barred.
I said, I said, I don't bother with the checks.
It's all, I'm called barred, so I'm called barred.
And it's all sorts of arrangements that I know nothing about, but I'm sure very good.
Does anybody agree with that?
No?
We can't do that.
You trust him, I trust him, yes.
We all know what matters is the big play.
That's what this is all about.
And it's good to get on with the great problems in the world.
And that's what we're here for.
As old friends of...
shall we say, relatively young politicians.
And then we both came back, right?
And remember the dinner?
And so now we must get on with the problems of the government, the problems of our bilateral relations.
We should have also, of course, talked about SALT
whatever you'd like on that, and anything else you want to name, your economics, or anything you want to do.
I would like to have a bird if also on the Middle East, an excellent bird energy club.
Actually, it's a matter of fact, the Middle East was on my agenda too, but I didn't want to raise it unless you were going to raise it.
Because the world, when we think of the Middle East,
I mean, you are far more dependent upon that oil than we are.
I mean, right?
And so, if you've got a solution, please come over.
As a matter of fact, Forrest's got a solution.
Come over and I'll exchange skis for you.
Skis for you.
And the draft shows.
And the draft shows.
What draft shows?
What would you like to start with?
I think it would perhaps be just as well to start with
I think the Europeans of Europe and East-West relations are doing so very well.
I've seen your letters and I've seen your public statements, but what are your feelings on the situation?
Because I just met with the congressional leaders and told them not to cut NATO until we had a chance to negotiate.
Which of course I'm sure you agree with.
You can't go into a poker game and give up the chips in advance.
How do you see, how do you see these things developing?
And how do you see MEFR, what do you see coming out of the European Security Conference?
UTEP, OTEP, I mean, you know what I mean, as we always do at the end of the year, knowing that it's all a conference, you know.
Well, perhaps we should take the, the West-West relations in West and Europe, United States.
Excellent.
And Japan, as it has been.
Excellent.
Uh, mentioned, not only in, uh, the Kissinger speech, but also in the D.S.U.C.
in Moscow.
Well, President, my theory is my theory for a long time.
Nothing would be a greater strength than to have the New York
be in confrontation economically or any other way with the United States.
And also, nothing would be more disadvantageous to our interests to have Europe and America, whatever our relationship is, be involved in such a way that Japan feels like the odd man out.
Japan, I think we've got to feel, is part of our whole community.
Because after all, Japan is, they make a lot of, a lot of conversation, the three great economic powers of the world are Japan, Germany, and the United States.
I mean, you know that.
I mean, we don't want this to be totally organic, but I mean, looking at it from an actual standpoint, there's where it is.
Now, if you say in Japan, I look here, you play your game, we'll play our game.
It's a very dangerous business because the Japanese just cannot be ruled out.
So I feel very strongly that we have to have the closest possible relations with Japan.
I don't know if you understand that, but I think that's very profound, and I think your statements are very instructive in that respect.
So that's, yes.
Well, indeed, if we take the West Resolution stress, we have NATO and the problem.
If you can, I hope you can, go on with your policy not to enter into new level of reductions because that will weaken the MPFR in very much.
Um, we have a little, uh, bilateral problem there, an offset problem.
The State Department people and our Foreign Office people are starting to talk about it.
I hope they do not talk too much of it because
The two secretaries of training, finance ministers, have agreed among themselves that they will handle it, and I think they are the best ones to do it.
Schultz, you side, I'm on my side.
Because Mr. Schmidt is not only the Secretary of Defense, but he has the experience as well.
They have agreed among themselves that no damage would be done if they made the new two-year arrangement, only sometimes to all of them, but if the old one ends on June 30th,
Last time we also renewed it towards the end of the year, but it wouldn't be in effect on the first few nights.
So the people who follow this from the New State Department, they can start a vision of doing things different from the Treasury.
This is my opinion.
Now, we may return to NATO in connection with NPFR.
I just wanted to mention the various fields, as Dr.
Killing has done in his speech, trade, monetary problems, general political relations, in addition to defense.
We, of course, accept that there is an interdependence
various products and would not at all oppose the idea of putting something on paper also to make this into the balance sheet.
At the same time I think we should agree that difficulties in one area should not unnecessarily make things more difficult in an area where one couldn't
made progress and performed help to it over the whole period.
The monetary thing, I hope that for your Secretary, ours, the British, the French, they meet in the front of Sweden, I think, sometime soon, in the next six weeks, and I hope they will prepare the Nairobi meeting of the International Monetary Fund in a way so that the reform of the
the international system is making progress.
I do not see that we can do anything about that now other than to encourage our people to keep in close contact with the French and the British and others and prepare for that meeting so that we can, I think this would not be under the existing next year,
the reform of the international system.
I think they will not get into the disorder, but next year might be possible.
Trade, you have here a trade-built, what proper to call this, the commission of the European Community has made proposals for our trade, our negotiations, and I hope that
that knowing about some of the difficulties, both of us will orientate our testers so that they aim at not more rape restriction, but more liberalism at work.
You can always be sure that we will be, I hope the British will too,
being in favor of giving the European community a more forward-looking everything.
At the same time, I think I have to say again, I think I have done it before, if you form such a community as we do, you have to make certain compromises.
One of the compromises we have to make is
is to live with the position of our French friends.
The Franco-Japanese is a possessor of the local, and the French pay more attention to agriculture, their own agriculture, and they ought to now have been a little bit more inward-looking.
This is changing.
France, towards the end of this decay, hopes to be as strong an industrial power as the federal public is.
I think they may almost reach that goal.
In any case, every country will, before this decay has come to an end, please lay a minimum role in France compared with what it did under General Guillaume.
And France as an industrial power is developing in a very convincing way.
Now, as I'm right along, the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the... the...
But what he wanted me to tell you was not this, because it was his concern about the Middle East.
He says that the President of the United States should know that things are perhaps moving in a very critical direction in the Middle East.
He said that still he is in power, but he may get great difficulties from two directions.
One is from within, where he had the support of the army, but the other forces, not within the army, but also others, are getting more and more critical about what they call his electivity.
The other nature, combined with this, comes from Gaddafi, the leader who has money and seems to have his...
religious fanatic, much more of a nationalist than what Sadat is, but he may get support.
Then he gave us another example, Morocco.
This impressed me because I remember in 1968, the spring after the Israel-Arab war, I was the foreign minister that saw the Kingdom of Morocco was very moderate.
explaining things and what not to do.
Tito said, based on his information, which came from the King of Morocco, they are now prepared to send soldiers as soon as the new conflict should develop.
And I said, this doesn't impress me very much because if they send soldiers
Ha, ha, ha, ha!
But he said, what should, what should they do?
He said, you all know the things you're saying.
Well, I had Donald, who was the leader of this, the general secretary of this party, who just came back from Syria and Iraq when I arrived in Baghdad.
He also talked about the new state of Iran.
I said, this doesn't impress me too much.
I've heard all this before.
And so, but he said, yes, but still,
One should know they have more weapons, more enemies, and finally there will come a situation where a large number will be able to endorse more.
So this should be a reason, if possible, to introduce things in the direction of political
negotiations.
He has been in contact, as I deal with them, and three days with Nahum Dolman, the former leader of the Jewish World Congress.
But he has almost no influence in Israel, on Dolman, I think.
But the
Well, yes.
And the... Well, he had, I don't know if he proposed, but he was deeply concerned.
Also, of course, because he knows that should any serious conflict develop, that the region, that the Mediterranean, that his own government get into trouble.
And, I don't know if we can do the phone ministers, I think, are discussing this, but I imagine they can send us to the motorway for you.
Ah, ah, I hope so.
I hope so.
Right.
Let's get out of the way.
I'll do that.
What did you say?
What are we going to do?
Mark, this is your telephone.
What did you say?
What did you say?
What did you say?
What did you say?
To have quiet talks with us, to find out what is possible.
As soon as we talk, it leaks all over the Arab world, Israel, so that before anything, we formulate a bit of a public debate.
And it's been very hard to find a mode of negotiating with us.
I want to mention this because I knew that I'm going to visit with you.
Shane is going to Egypt, to Jordan, and, uh, and, uh, Lebanon in the second part of May, just after Brezhnev has people to see us.
Immediately after that, I will go to Israel.
I should have been there last year that I had elections and I had to postpone it.
And the Arabs, this is interesting, the Arabs would have opposed this strongly before.
They do not do that now.
The Ismail who with favor from the heart of Saddam even came to see me and said that they would ask me, make objections to use my influence, be the reason I was in the direction of a more moderate life.
But they have, they have elections.
They have elections.
In October I did.
Oh, there's an election even an hour later or something.
You can't do anything about it.
What do you suggest about the Israeli government as a Chancellor?
I, I, I have no solution.
Do you have any thoughts?
What do you want us to do?
What do you think we should do?
Look, we know that 80% of the oil of Indonesia goes to Europe, and 90% of Japan's oil comes from Indonesia.
And we know that we depend on the country.
We have also, if that whole place blows up, we have a crisis of energy on these enormous proportions, right?
That's not the case.
I know.
That's what we've got to work on, and I believe that if it doesn't, then I don't.
But on the main issue, let me say, we are, just for your confidential information, we are working both sides of the street as partners in public and private channels.
Public and private channels.
Is there anything more we can say?
I mean, to report on that, I'd be very candid with our friends here.
But I'm just going to say that there's been not much debate on either side.
That's the difficult thing.
It's really a position that's impossible to count.
They have no account of the historical process.
It's impossible for three million Israelis to hold over a hundred million Arabs for eternity on their threatened lives and jeopardize the oil supply of both Europe and the United States.
It's impossible for the Arabs to demand that the Israelis agree to their total program as a free condition to negotiate.
One of the issues that's been raised in our talks to the church is that they now say, in addition to withdrawal, which is time and time, there has to be a settlement with the Palestinians.
And those are, of course, the most attractive.
And also, in the point you're alluding to, now you're actually alluding to somewhere.
So they, both sides, are very attractive,
I'll say a very heavy responsibility falls on these traders who have not yet made a proposal that one can even take seriously.
Yeah, but don't let us leave you with the impression that if all is lost, there's nothing to be gained.
Must I consider admitting settlement at the highest priority in the year 1970 true?
I consider it because I think we have become terribly exposed to the major powers that are going to be drawn to the confrontation and are surely sick.
And we are using our influence with the Israelis as well as the Arabs.
I want to assure you too, we are not Israel's lawyer.
And we are pro-Israel.
We are.
Because basically, for reasons that all of you are quite aware, we want them to survive.
But on the other hand, we do not support their intransigent position.
I know this is my awareness.
I told her very frankly.
I hope you tell her the same thing.
She cannot be continued to be intransigent.
Israel is like all the Arabs.
It's 100 million of them for the next five years.
Maybe the next six, seven years, ten years.
But in the end, Israel will lose.
Now is the time for Israel to make a deal.
Israel's ahead.
Make a deal now.
That's the point, and that's the thing I'm going for.
And I have not.
And I think Henry, I think the Chancellor is telling them that would be helpful.
What do you think?
We make the deal now.
They'll say, well, we can never do this.
We can never give any territory.
Nobody gives us any guarantee.
We can't deal with the Palestinians.
We can't trust the Arabs.
We're afraid of the Russians.
Let me say this.
Israel can lend the whole Arab world for the next five to ten years.
except for one big man, the Russians.
If the Russians decide to play hardball there, if they decide, in addition to military assistance and the rest of the British advisors, and war even, violence, Israel has had it.
In other words, and putting it another way, without the U.S. existing there,
without the U.S. holding the ring on the Soviet, Israel's had it.
Israel's got to realize this, that Israel feels that, well, that America has no choice, that America will support Tom Heller, I wonder, if necessary, fight a world war and do so.
America ain't going to do that.
American public opinion has very drastically changed on this.
There's still a very heavy pro-Israeli sentiment for reasons that you're quite aware of.
But American public opinion now is not one to say it's all for Israel, regardless of how defensive they are.
We will stand by.
We will not try to oppose the settlement.
Israel has got to be reasonable or it will lose its support in this Congress.
I know the political situation in this and I know all of them are just, they read the New York Times and think that the United States will go down the line for Israel to come out of high water.
The United States will not do that.
Not at the risk of confrontation with the Russians.
Now, I'm going to go to the Russians, Mr. President.
Since the National Security Service has
made the, or has got the confirmation of his, apparently his power over Europe is, well, would it not be in his interest to be more cooperative and move together with the United States?
Because how could he?
Well, the difficulty with that is that
Both sides, and of course particularly the Israelis, say they don't want a Russian-American in both sides of the break.
And that means that we're talking to the Russians about it, but let's talk very frankly about that.
I think it's a real tough problem for the Israelis.
They don't like us to talk to the Russians about this.
Yes, but that's one of the problems.
Another problem is that now these people, then they change.
But the Soviets...
That has not been really the only way a Soviet-U.S. threat could work.
If both of us ask our respective friends to do things they don't really want to do, then a Soviet is going to frankly squeeze the ejection decision.
It's going to squeeze the Israelis.
A Soviet won't squeeze the ejections, and we won't squeeze the Israelis.
Not yet.
Not yet.
But at any rate, the Soviets have not separated themselves in any discussions we've had with them.
from the maximum Egyptian possessions.
They haven't given an inch.
The Soviets are as intransigent as are the Israelis.
And strangely enough, I think the expulsion of their forces has hurt this, because they had no particular interest in making Saddam look good.
So I thought since the expulsion of their forces, the Soviet interest in talking to us about a Middle East settlement has really diminished drastically.
Well, we've talked frankly about it.
I don't want to leave the impression, though, and I think it's very important not to leave the impression, Jennifer, that we think it's hopeless.
As a matter of fact, we are working on this, as I said, in a number of channels that are not known.
Right, Henry?
And we'll continue to.
We understand the Russian problem.
We understand the Jewish problem.
We understand the Israeli problem.
We talk very frankly with them.
We must...
I wish I had it.
You know, everybody says, well, gee, if only the United States would squeeze Israel or something, it would be something.
It takes two.
Somebody's got to squeeze the ejections too, right?
Because the ejections are totally intractable.
Mike and I have suggested Israel has to make a deal with the Palestinians.
The maze has always been basically a spongy mess, and it hasn't changed.
Frankly, the reason Israel stands there so strong and firm is that, let's face it, the Israelis are the ablest people in the world.
They work hard.
They produce more.
They'll fight harder.
They'll sacrifice more than anybody in the world.
And they're up against a lot of very nice people.
I say nice, some are very nice, some are not.
But what I meant is, well-intentioned people, you know, our Arab friends come in and they do this and that and the other thing.
But they haven't got a chance against this tough, united, Israeli complex.
You see, that's the problem.
So you put yourself in the position that goes with my Arab and Russian communists.
So she says to us, well, all right, Mr. President, I trust we're going to continue to provide the planes and the rest of you because we probably want to keep our enemies.
But she said, well, we don't want your men and so forth.
But as far as we're concerned, well, thank the last man.
You know, they've got that, they'll show up to you.
They have that place in Israel where years and years ago, two centuries ago, where they
the Israelis fought from the very last and that is what they think now these are great people I admire them I admire them for their courage and their guts and the rest of it and I think they're totally wrong with their strategy mainly because they aren't seizing the moment now is the time when you're up that's the time to make your deal right with the Jetsons don't make your deal later on
We have talked very frankly with them, and I had the chance to talk very frankly with them, and they were very helpful.
And we'll continue to, and we'll be in touch with you on it if we get a chance.
It's helpful.
And we're working every channel, privately and publicly, if we can.
We know the seriousness of the matter.
Well, I would suggest that one of the things that we should do is perhaps in our meeting tomorrow, let's go into this energy thing.
I think that energy is a big problem.
I hope you guys, we've got a great program in the future.
We'd like to work directly with you as any thoughts that you have would be most helpful.
There are foreign ministers that have not worked out.
You and I could decide.
Mr. Chancellor, the energy minister which the President submitted two weeks ago was dealing primarily with our domestic policy.
Foreign aspects, the relationship between the consuming
currency aspects until what we're dealing with in a second study which is going to be finished early in June.
That's why I'm not quite ready to do that, but we will give that to you early in June.
Because that's exactly right.
But let me say this about the energy thing just one more.
We're in a very efficient position.
You see, we are three nations.
And particularly in the United States, for example, we have three competitions.
They'll make all the nice words about, well, we want to do the right thing for the country and the rest of it, but when it comes to a fighting thing in Spain or New Jersey and Mexico, they fight each other for whatever it is you want to be.
All right.
In addition to that, looking at the free nations, you've got the names of Europe.
You've got Germany.
You've got Britain.
You've got Japan.
Most of them, at least, are more
You have more control over your so-called oil companies than we have.
In other words, you can speak with one voice in the field of energy more than we can, although not totally, as I understand it.
But here's the situation.
Here in some nations of the world, despite the, you know, how many we've got and all that jazz, the free nations of the world are all, you know, in business for themselves.
consumers.
The consumers are in business with themselves, and so the producers are playing one against another.
Even our good friend the Shah of Iran does.
So the Shah of Iran, let me give you a good example.
Take Algeria.
Algeria proceeded to expropriate the French.
And so an American company, El Paso Natural Gas, goes in and says, we're going to pick it up.
Now, we can't control weather here.
We can try.
But you see what I mean?
That's wrong.
That's wrong.
How we can do it?
First, our own domestic problem is that we've got to bring our domestic companies into line so that we speak with one voice.
And then, all the consuming nations have got to recognize that if we allow ourselves to be picked off and played against each other, we're dead.
That's what I wish you'd think about that over time.
See what we can come up with.
It's a very good analysis.
Yes, I think the problem is what the relation of the producing nations, of the consuming nations would be towards the producing nations.
Sorry to admit it, the consuming nations.
don't make it easy for producing, actually, because... That's right.
If the U.S. moves in, where the French get kicked out of the French movement, when the Dutch get kicked out of the Japanese movement, and everybody gets kicked out, which is what they're supposed to do, the Japanese movement, then it becomes a hopeless process, and then we create a situation where, strangely enough, we reduce the incentives.
Yeah, and if that is true,
We have produced, in addition to any, this is not a country that has put anything with great pressure on us, we have produced an economic incentive that stifles production beyond what they need to be able to have this.
But we're going down the line, you know, they're asking for such-and-such coal, and that's the air zone.
That's the air zone.
The day-to-day living in the oil, we take another weight.
Do you know?
Yeah, I do.
Well, I spent a lot of time with you.
I'm happy to be back here tonight.
Oh, yeah.
Well, I hope this time you can have fun with the young people.
And, uh, I'll see you.
All right.
I'll search you.
Tonight it's very easy.
I'll make a brief dose.
They want to hear you, not me.

Nixon, Brandt & Kissinger on Year of Europe and NATO

AI Summary

Audio

Transcript (AI-generated)

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on May 1, 1973

Cite this conversation