Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 909-025
Date: Wednesday, May 2, 1973 at 11:04 AM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Brandt, Willy; [Unknown person(s)]; Kissinger, Henry A.; Rogers, William P.; Scheel, Walter; Bahr, Egon; Members of the press; White House photographer
Recording device: Oval Office
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/909-025

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[0:49] Yes.
[1:33] I wish you well and all your problems.
[1:37] And as I say, we're going to look back on this as the beginning of a great day to come.
[1:42] I mean, Henry's going to be off to Moscow tomorrow.
[1:45] And we'll try to set up the, you know, discuss some of the things we'll be discussing with the Russians in June or July.
[1:58] It's the only answer, isn't it?
[2:00] If we could...
[2:28] Well, you got another lovely day here.
[2:33] Oh my goodness.
[3:00] And you go to the club, most of the time you go to that.
[3:04] You go to that.
[3:05] Go to that again.
[3:08] I know.
[3:08] That's not a good idea for me to do it.
[3:15] Oh, yeah.
[3:16] Come on around here.
[3:18] That's a good idea for me to do it.
[3:21] That's a good idea for me to do it.
[3:25] That's a good idea for me to do it.
[3:34] We're going to make sure you're getting a good chance for it.
[4:20] I don't believe it.
[4:20] I don't believe it.
[6:10] Yeah, that's pretty good.
[8:40] tremendously.
[8:40] Three times.
[8:43] Even three times I couldn't start the right time.
[8:50] I had a delay of six, between six and eight hours.
[8:57] So since then, I prefer to use the Chancellor's home.
[9:01] It's because we take place from the mountains.
[9:06] But now we should
[9:08] As I said, if there's not any more Secretary of Defense, it's going to be some college media house.
[9:13] We have to find a new president.
[9:14] Yeah, to draw the lights.
[9:16] Draw these.
[9:17] And I hope that the Chancellor and I were just talking before you came in.
[9:22] We thought it would be very useful.
[9:41] of course, perhaps some comments from the committees.
[9:46] Naturally, we assume you have a solution.
[9:49] We don't.
[9:50] We think foreign ministers always have solutions for their own problems.
[9:57] And then we thought we'd chat a little, as the Chancellor suggested, on energy, which we didn't get into yesterday, and where you have a common problem, but anything else that would be
[10:11] We, of course, went into these subjects of some detail yesterday ourselves.
[10:19] We'd like to get sort of a feel as to where we stand.
[10:21] Let us begin by saying that you know, tentatively, I am trying to plan a trip to Europe in the fall.
[10:43] basically, which is American.
[11:36] Well, I would suggest, concerning Berlinda, should tell us the actual situation of Berlinda and GDR.
[12:09] I think it would be helpful, particularly on two points.
[12:24] One, apparently Russia is chipping away at a four-bar agreement with China to take Spanish.
[12:37] Cheating a little here, cheating a little there.
[12:40] We've got to be careful that we don't let them get away with that.
[12:46] This is the main point, that in fact we have now to stand firm with each effort of the Soviet Union, which they are doing steadily, to get away a little bit from what they have believed in the
[13:06] Let me mention an example.
[13:11] We have this Russian industrial exhibition in Berlin.
[13:21] In the past, these exhibitions of different countries always have been inaugurated by somebody of the country concerned.
[13:34] the mayor of the burly and a representative of the federal republic this time the russians projected to accept representatives of the federal republic so nobody nor of the federal republic nor the federal government nor of the burly senate participated and then we had during such transmissions only three flags
[14:05] a flag of the Federal Republic in connection with that exhibition.
[14:11] So we have as an investment that West Berlin has.
[14:14] The next item is that the representative of the Soviet Union, who inaugurated the exhibition, made a speech there and said, well, there are great chances in the trade
[14:35] on the basis of a particular trade agreement between Berlin and the Soviet Union.
[14:41] That means they are working extremely against what they themselves had agreed contractually.
[14:51] And we have to prove that we do not allow to get away from that.
[14:59] We have some examples.
[15:03] I asked you during our lunch that the United States perhaps should make a statement somewhere, somewhere, or get in contact with the Soviet Union in Berlin by the ambassadors they meet, not officially but unofficially.
[15:33] Thank you very much, Mr. President.
[15:35] I'm going to use that expression of mine to see us today.
[15:41] I said in the letter, saying that there wouldn't be much sense in us following about how Lynn should be included in some agreements they want to have with us.
[15:55] I think this should be discussed following a cooperation council
[16:03] So, and he knows, and I have the reason to believe that he accepts this, that we have the same formula that we had for the trade agreement.
[16:13] We'll get to that at the end of the conversation.
[16:43] It was done as a compromise, but we do not want that this is worked out against.
[16:50] Well, we have had a discussion about that.
[16:53] I think we can't handle it.
[16:54] Yes, our master is here.
[16:59] They accepted, Mr. President, the Soviet Union now to conclude new contracts, new agreements on
[17:10] of technical cooperation, cultural exchange, and so on, except in this, including a Berlin Clause, a clause with which we are completely satisfied.
[17:24] But the problem is that in their practical behavior, they do not follow this.
[17:31] But this is not limited to the Soviet Union, but also, I must say, the Chinese,
[17:37] who have set a far better verdict clause for our trade agreement, in practice are also very hesitant to follow their own, their own conscience.
[17:53] We must force them to do what they can.
[17:56] This is in fact also the problem I, yes, I mentioned, one of the collaborators mentioned in Helsinki,
[18:06] There, the Soviet Union again tries, concerning the very complicated problem of the borders in Europe, non-violation of borders, they tried to get away a little bit from what they agreed was a Moscow Treaty.
[18:28] We negotiated a treaty in Moscow
[18:35] question under the
[18:51] problem of non-use of force and now they try to get away from that in their multilateral therefore i ask you to cooperate or to to make up your mind and the statement that you
[19:16] Up to now, the Russians must have the impression that these are only the cause between these then-Germans and the U.S. Soviets.
[19:26] Because up to now, they have the impression that the U.S. and the Western powers have not engaged, have not said one word to the Soviets.
[19:36] So it might be the logical next step that the Western powers draw the intention of the Soviets that they are
[19:46] uh may have these things in mind anyway this is something you might if you haven't followed it because there's a conflict really a difference of the statement between your community and the one we had your community in moscow suits suits you
[20:08] In your communiqué in Moscow, the problem of France and Europe was separated from others.
[20:20] It was just blank, mentioned in the communiqué.
[20:24] And they refer to that.
[20:27] So it's referred to this communiqué.
[20:29] But I think this is no problem at all.
[20:32] We have to...
[20:33] What this is about is the Russians are trying to have a statement which says the fact that territorial boundaries are immutable.
[20:42] They can never be changed.
[20:44] This is not, of course, the German view.
[20:48] But the German view on it is, on our side, I think, is that territorial boundaries should not be changed by force.
[20:56] Exactly.
[20:57] So we want to...
[20:58] I agree.
[20:58] Of course they can.
[20:59] Of course.
[21:01] Keep the boundaries.
[21:02] But in the conference on European security, we've got to be sure we fully support their position on that.
[21:10] Because that's the, really that's the thing that the Russians are trying to get out of the conference.
[21:16] That is the principle objective.
[21:17] In other words, they just want to put the line down there and there it is forever.
[21:21] And have an agreement that it seems to be the most candid chance ever.
[21:26] By agreement or by any other.
[21:30] Elections or anything else.
[21:31] Elections, right.
[21:33] And the German view and our view is that they can't be violated, foreigners can't be violated, they might use the force.
[21:42] This is right.
[21:46] But we have to keep up with the European option, correct?
[21:50] And the option of the German question.
[21:54] Of course, of course.
[21:57] And we agreed to do that in our treaties with the Soviet Union.
[22:01] This is completely over.
[22:02] And we even wrote to them the so-called letter on the German question, and there is said what we had in mind in our long-term policy.
[22:15] I think they always agree to follow the line of what they have concluded with us.
[22:26] They feel that we stand firm together, and together in the West.
[22:32] Mr. Powell, you are used to... No, I have to add only one point, which I'm especially interested in, I think all of us, and this is the including of West Berlin into international air traffic.
[22:56] We have by now a situation in which it's sure that the GDR, in other words East Berlin, will be included into the international air traffic.
[23:09] In West Berlin up to now, we have only some internal lines between West Berlin and West Germany carried out by the three Western countries.
[23:23] American VA and Air Force.
[23:29] Now, I think we have made two agreements with the Soviets concerning air traffic from West Germany to the Soviet Union.
[23:40] We have consulted these agreements with the Western powers, including the possibility to
[23:49] and we should look for the possibility that Westphalia as a whole will be included into the international network.
[24:03] Otherwise it would be very sad because people coming to Westphalia would rather prefer to go wild.
[24:16] all the Westerners, when they want to leave the city for international traffic, they will be obliged to go to Guam, East Berlin.
[24:25] This cannot be in our interest.
[24:26] The point is, even the, even in this case, the three Western powers have to decide to pick up this idea.
[24:36] And to go with it.
[24:38] Because in discussing it, Mr. President, you've got a mixture of juridical arguments.
[24:43] Yes.
[24:43] Yes.
[24:48] And I've mixed up also a little bit in the argumentation of the security interests.
[24:53] Well, I meant that was a little bit.
[24:58] Yeah.
[24:59] The accord would have to stay untouched at the hour.
[25:03] But the U.S. interest is of all the U.S. and the other mentioned...
[25:11] Communism.
[25:14] Yes.
[25:17] It's a very good business to have.
[25:20] It was a good business.
[25:22] It no longer was such a good business because of freer movement of the roads.
[25:28] Yeah.
[25:29] It was a good business as long as roads were blocked.
[25:32] Yeah.
[25:34] But now it is.
[25:35] That's worked pretty well, hasn't it?
[25:38] Yes.
[25:38] Well, the very traffic roads, we'll see that.
[25:49] This education of the Berlin, uh, and Cleveland shows no difference.
[25:59] In fact, even the exhibit, which Mr. Sheehan mentioned, is an absolutely new one.
[26:09] We had never before.
[26:12] From this exhibit in West Berlin, this is the first one.
[26:17] On this occasion, they may create some unity.
[26:20] I try to do that.
[26:22] Yes.
[26:22] But what, in fact, happens when they are threatened with a flag?
[26:27] We have no flag at all.
[26:29] No flag and no inauguration.
[26:32] No speeches and no flags.
[26:33] No speeches and no inauguration.
[26:36] Maybe you can come, but no speeches and no flags.
[26:41] It's brushed at the back of the...
[26:45] He did not, I think.
[26:46] No, not yet.
[26:49] But the answers have worked on the issues of it.
[26:52] He has reacted by...
[26:55] Answered by practical behavior.
[26:58] Yes.
[27:01] Well, do you want to talk to me a little bit about the United Nations this fall?
[27:07] How do you see that?
[27:08] Yes, in a good way.
[27:10] This is...
[27:15] And of course also the consequence of the Berlin agreement that Berlin West is represented by the Federal Republic in international organizations with the exception of the question of status and security.
[27:36] So this is clear and it is practically on the way by a letter of the three powers in Berlin to the Senate of Berlin informing the Senate that the three powers suggest such a regulation.
[28:01] And the three powers will inform the Soviet Union about their decision.
[28:07] And then I write a letter to the chairman of the parties within the parliament and will inform them about this very complicated regulation and procedure.
[28:34] a remark in my introductory speech during the second reading of the Relic Treaties and the United Nations Charter Bill we introduced that will inform the Parliament just roughly that this question is
[29:05] clear and I mentioned that I have declared the details to the heads of the different parties represented in the Polar Star.
[29:15] I think this is that part of the technique of our entry to the United Nations.
[29:24] After the ratification debate, I must say, we will ask for membership
[29:34] and we will put forward an application to the Security Council.
[29:41] I'm not quite clear if we will do that still in May or in June, but there's no difficulty.
[29:51] The Security Council meets in July, and there are some ideas to put it forward to the Council in July.
[30:02] This would mean that the Federal Republic and DDR will become a member of the United Nations, the ordinary general session of the United Nations.
[30:19] I met Adam Malik, one of the members, and I asked him also to
[30:29] talk a little bit around with his friend in the Security Council, his friend in the Security Council.
[30:38] So I think the idea has not pursued very long.
[30:41] It was an idea of who liked, as the president of the General Assembly, liked to do that under his president.
[30:52] And the next president will be .
[30:56] But I think this is
[31:00] of the best one.
[31:04] So that we will become a member of the United Nations in form.
[31:16] Very remarkable.
[31:18] Yes, which is not good for us, because up to now,
[31:24] is, uh, is, uh, is, uh, is, uh, is, uh, is, uh, is, uh, is, uh, is, uh, is, uh,
[31:53] But now it's changed.
[31:55] Well, it takes a lot of time for the foreign minister to stay there every year for at least a weekend or something like that.
[32:03] Oh, yes.
[32:03] Even the foreign ministers have to stay in about 100 countries.
[32:07] Yes.
[32:09] So, Mr. President, one of the things we talked about that I think is quite important, and that is the follow-up to the European Security Conference, what the Russians want to achieve aside from the
[32:25] what they refer to as a permanent organ, followed on after the conference, which means, actually, that you create another organization, and it would start with a small beginning, but it would grow and grow, and that would give Russia the opportunity to inject themselves into all kinds of problems in Western Europe, and it would provide a useless but irritating machinery that we think is quite undesirable.
[32:54] I think the Germans have strong views about that, and we certainly do.
[32:57] On the other hand, the British, on the British side, too.
[33:02] Well, it was an idea.
[33:03] Originally, it would be a Michael Stewart idea.
[33:07] You remember Michael Stewart, he was foreign minister at that time, and he brought about this idea of a standing committee.
[33:20] Standing committee, and yesterday, if you remember, one of my colleagues said, well, this was the time he just was in an election campaign, this was an idea of
[33:36] Before the election, he lost the election.
[33:44] Well, the question is your analysis of how the conference is going to work in terms of the sessions, first session.
[33:55] Well, we have these three phase conference in mind.
[34:01] This is an idea of my late French colleague, Maurice de Roche, who left Germany now, and made a race for the US.
[34:14] And these three things are, first, a conference of the foreign listeners.
[34:26] where the 35 foreign ministers, including the one of Monaco, will make their speeches.
[34:37] That means, at first, 35 hours of speeches of 35 foreign ministers.
[34:44] I don't know Monaco, but perhaps the Princess herself will.
[34:49] And under these circumstances, I would listen very carefully and with great interest and admiration and joy, I think.
[35:03] But nevertheless, and then we will have certainly a discussion in preparing
[35:15] the next phase of commission work about amendments we have already prepared during the multilateral preparation time, in which we are now, phase four.
[35:32] And this may take some months, two, three, four, five.
[35:37] And then we will decide whether we will have this third phase
[35:45] in which the foreign ministers again talk about the results, or a third phase of the hands of states, summit conference.
[36:00] This is absolutely dependent on the results of the second phase, the working group.
[36:07] If the results are poor, I'm quite sure that
[36:16] But it seems that it is not really a very brilliant one.
[36:21] We have to ask whether or not the heads of state will do that hard work.
[36:29] Thank you very much.
[36:30] He said it more directly yesterday.
[36:33] He said yesterday that if the conclusion is that it's a brilliant success, it will be a summit meeting.
[36:41] It is almost a failure, a total failure for ministers
[36:48] But I do think it's undesirable to set up another organization.
[36:55] No, no, no.
[36:56] The United Nations is bad enough.
[36:57] I think it does some useful work, but my goodness, if you know the United Nations, Mr. Chancellor, you're going to have to take positions on a lot of issues, like Rhodes Beach.
[37:16] Yes, sir.
[37:18] You know, I mean, things that you always say, I mean, that's our problem.
[37:23] Really, you know, unbelievable.
[37:29] What the Russians want is to create some kind of regional international law.
[37:37] And they want to institutionalize this by such an organ, as they say.
[37:44] We do not want to create European international law, but refer to the United Nations Charter.
[37:55] And we want to use the existing regional organizations of the United Nations, for instance ECE, Economic Commission of Europe,
[38:12] for the work to be done as follow-up of this conference.
[38:18] And as I mentioned, if there is need, for instance, for something particular, for more exchange of views or something, well, let's talk about it.
[38:29] Apropos, you have been forced to decide on all kinds of problems.
[38:36] He has, I'm ashamed to say this in documents,
[38:41] This one.
[38:43] One day he sent a cable to all, what is it, instructions to all ambassadors or ministers, as they were then, and said, cable should only be used when it is really important.
[38:57] Otherwise, he sent a letter.
[38:59] So one day the minister didn't don't go.
[39:02] I said, sir, otherwise you must pay.
[39:04] Yes, and the, uh, the minister in Bangor had claimed that there was a war between Thailand and the neighboring Khmer tribes.
[39:12] Bismarck put a note in the margin and said, it's important that the ambassador pay for himself.
[39:21] Well, tell, tell the president a story about the fellow who smoked these cigars.
[39:27] Which one?
[39:33] Oh, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes.
[39:36] There was somebody who liked very much Cuban cigars, as I do.
[39:42] For me, it's always very difficult to, just to, to, because of, oh, I did not forget.
[39:52] And then he had the last, he had the last side.
[39:54] And he put it dry.
[39:56] He put it over country.
[39:58] He put the American base on Cuban cigars.
[40:01] Yes, yes, yes, yes.
[40:03] Somebody came and had a box of Cuban cigars, and he came to the customs officer who had to confiscate, here in the United States, who had to confiscate the box of cigars.
[40:18] And he did, and the guy who brought the cigars, he was very disappointed.
[40:25] I said, Mario, these cigars are great, aren't you?
[40:28] Oh, yeah, just one single box of them.
[40:30] For the next year, I'd like to use it, and you confiscate these cigars, and...
[40:35] I can't understand.
[40:36] What do you do with these cigars?
[40:38] Officer said, well, of course, I don't know it.
[40:41] We burn them.
[40:43] One after another.
[40:46] One after another.
[40:50] It's not good for the cigars.
[40:51] Do you have something on that?
[40:53] I thought I would tell you.
[40:55] Don't tell me.
[40:57] Don't tell me.
[40:59] Don't tell me.
[41:01] Yes, yes, tell us.
[41:04] Well, there is, Mr. President, a problem which has been raised also by Dr. Dissinger, his teacher, and he talked about the necessity to cooperate in new problems, as, for instance, energy.
[41:29] We are dependent much more than the United States on oil supplies from abroad.
[41:38] And by international companies in our case, international companies supply 75% of the needs of our markets.
[41:52] Forty percent of these companies are American companies.
[41:57] Forty percent of the supply are supplied by American companies.
[42:03] We, in our energy, we supply 53 percent by oil of our total energy need that we have shifted.
[42:22] largely to oil, from coal, of course, and hydroelectricity to oil.
[42:32] The German oil group, we have one, the German oil group, share of the market is 25%.
[42:43] And this group has no direct relation with our producing countries.
[42:49] For the time being, we are, however, trying to enter into business with Iran.
[42:57] This is the first intent that we have.
[43:02] And the activity of the German group
[43:07] Of course, on the basis of 25% share of the market cannot undermine the position of international companies, because we understand that the need of energy is increasing from year to year.
[43:27] And we at the government are, of course, we are interested
[43:34] even in further commitments of international companies, and in particular of the United States companies.
[43:47] Under these circumstances, we are very interested, as government, to coordinate our oil interests with the oil policy of the United States.
[44:02] um this applies bilateral relations but also the future oil policy of the european community we have a meeting of the europe of the community in may and will
[44:27] We discussed this matter of future energy and oil policy of the community.
[44:37] What we already now think, not only as the Federal Republic, but in the community, within the community, is that a coordination
[44:51] The United States community and Japan is indispensable if we will not run into great difficulties for the future.
[45:03] For instance, by having competition as consumer in oil producer countries.
[45:12] Therefore, Mr. President, I'd like to
[45:28] are intended in the United States.
[45:31] What do you think about what is your downstream operations?
[45:37] And are you of the opinion
[46:01] of your understanding in that field with the Soviet Union.
[46:08] I think this covers mainly natural gas.
[46:14] What is your opinion of that energy source?
[46:22] What do you think about liquidifying of natural gas or transportation of natural gas?
[46:38] That means besides the higher committee, which we have at OECD, is there a possibility of
[47:20] in the development of the research in this area.
[48:23] the first place the President described it.
[48:25] We admit the cost would be about $1.50 from Soviet Union.
[48:29] Our domestic price is about 30 cents, but that's kept artificially low.
[48:54] The big problem we face is that our countries don't want to invest unless they get some government guarantees that the countries will be willing to take their chances on the price.
[49:08] If we give some government guarantees to their investments that they send into the ground, it's only due that we could get private banks to finance the ships and anything that can be used as collateral.
[49:24] So the decision that the President and the Secretary of State will have to make will concern the degree to which the United States attacks the investment in the Soviet Union in the form of guarantees that we guarantee that we can get
[50:02] The supply is fine.
[50:03] The estimate would be that the supply wouldn't exceed 10%.
[50:06] But that is always 10%.
[50:08] It's natural gas.
[50:10] Natural gas only 10%.
[50:44] We have made it possible for our oil companies to get together, and with the European oil companies, to deal with these producing countries.
[50:55] So we've been as helpful as we can in a common approach to it, both our companies and European oil companies.
[51:05] Now, it's a day-to-day proposition, because you make a contract with them, and something happens.
[51:10] The monetary field, they want to renegotiate, and then they bargain with each other.
[51:14] Shaw wants to outdo the King, and Gaddafi is so unpredictable.
[51:20] He goes, well, then we have a problem with Venezuela, so it's an ah-ha proposition.
[51:24] We have to do it, you know, regularly.
[51:26] So far, it's worked out pretty well, and we've recently made a good contract with Shaw, which is, I think, he pleases.
[51:43] If they can put gas into the Soviet system, feed their neighbors, then we can get gas on our side.
[51:51] So it would not be the Iranian that must go to that side trying to get gas.
[51:57] It is the difference between Shah Kavir and Mosul.
[52:02] That's right.
[52:03] If they get to Shah Kavir, which is better, we have a different relationship.
[52:22] This thing's really the last one.
[52:23] I guess that's the Middle East, you guys.
[52:26] Obviously, if you can't get a piece of the Middle East, you have no insurance.
[52:29] You'll have to supply more.
[52:30] Well, the prime minister should know what's going down there.
[52:36] Well, there's no contact in the next weeks with our friends in Europe and, of course, with Secretary General Granville, who also is interested, as I'm informed, in the Near East.
[52:53] And then I leave this talks and go to Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon.
[53:01] Egypt is a very good state place.
[53:05] Yeah.
[53:05] After my return, a friend for Mr. comes again, and so we have to talk with him about Mirage and such things.
[53:17] And the Chancellor's going to Israel to his esteemed colleague, Mrs. Moina Amin.
[53:22] Who is, of course, a political friend of the Chancellor.
[53:28] Political friend of the Chancellor.
[53:29] We have a great chance.
[53:41] We know that there are no easy answers, as we've said to you, Mr. Chancellor.
[53:47] In fact, we don't have one.
[53:49] However, we also consider it of very great importance, not only from the standpoint of world peace, not only from the standpoint of the energy which comes from that area, but also quite candidly from Israel's standpoint.
[54:09] Israel now is in a very strong bargaining position.
[54:14] It will never be stronger.
[54:16] And every year it goes by.
[54:19] their bargaining position is going to become weaker.
[54:22] Now, this is my interest to see it that way.
[54:25] Yet, some others may see it that way.
[54:28] There is one other point in Israel's position that they haven't realized, and that is that Israel, with American support, which we will continue to provide, we've made that very clear, because we have to let the balance change.
[54:45] But Israel, as long as she has American support, is going to be rather safe, even against the madmen that surround her.
[54:53] Unless the Russians decide to play a tougher game.
[55:00] Who holds the ring against the Russians?
[55:04] And the point is, only us.
[55:17] uh, because they're, uh, they have, uh, they have, uh, their Chinese friends who are playing around, and the Russians are, and the Jews, and so forth, and so on.
[55:27] So, and also the Russians have a very great interest in not having any confrontation with the Mideast, just as we, that's what I know, have a great interest in looking out for the time, and not having any confrontation with the Mideast.
[55:40] So, so you look at that big puzzle,
[55:44] What it really comes down to is this, that it is that all of us must, through proper channels, recognize that moving toward some, not toward some, that it's going to take, I mean, people that have hated each other for a thousand years aren't gonna sell them a thousand days.
[56:14] or even a thousand hours, but a beginning.
[56:17] A beginning must be made.
[56:19] A beginning must be made, and time is enormously important, even with the Israeli elections coming up in October, because while the Israelis are, as I said, the chancellor of the people that I know, the ableist and strongest people in the world, I mean, considering the number that they have, you know, they're bigger and a ton stronger than I admire and respect them,
[56:44] On the other hand, they are surrounded by people.
[56:49] The Israelis also are irrational.
[56:51] They aren't going to do anything stupid.
[56:55] They are surrounded by people who might do something stupid.
[57:02] That is the problem.
[57:03] Therefore, the urgency of the situation, let me say, we feel just as strongly as you do.
[57:08] As far as we're concerned,
[57:11] We do not take the position that Israel is all right and that the Arabs are all wrong.
[57:19] As a matter of fact, we hint that it's time for both sides to be rational about this thing.
[57:26] But it's going to take a little give on both sides.
[57:30] Now, what can we all do about it?
[57:33] Spreading reason into this matter, it means that we probably need to raise the issue up.
[57:45] We discussed it in how to approach the problem, and the question is in fact, Mr President, you have mentioned that they had to start with talks, one with each other, and I think it is that they should start this talk between Egypt and Israel, because it's more difficult, we see, to start anyway.
[58:21] This is right.
[58:22] And therefore, the Egyptians had to start.
[58:25] But the question is, who brings them to a talk?
[58:30] And under whose auspices should they start a talk?
[58:34] Should they start under the auspices of the United Nations?
[58:39] They had bad experiences.
[58:42] They had bad experiences with that.
[58:45] And I think even the Egyptians wouldn't do that.
[58:49] This brings me to the point
[58:52] Of course, you mentioned, Mr. President, that the United States has the key role.
[58:59] Everybody knows that on the spot.
[59:04] And the key role means as friend of the Israelis and in friendly manner towards their country.
[59:14] You want to be friends?
[59:17] Yes, of course.
[59:19] This is, of course, a very rational position.
[59:22] concerning the Lushkan relation of the future.
[59:26] Now, but the problem is whether the Arabs would accept, for instance, a talk moderated, let me say, by the United States.
[59:43] And what will the Russians think about it?
[59:46] Should we, for instance, should we try to
[59:53] talk to Brezhnev, ask him to think about it.
[59:57] What is your approach, attitude?
[1:00:01] Do you think that we should, from our side, propose to get into talks under the auspices
[1:00:12] And let me say, unofficially, not officially, unofficially, by someone of the United States, and so on, so that he may get every regular with the Egyptians, and so on.
[1:00:24] That's right.
[1:00:25] Well, it would be very helpful, or we've talked yesterday about that, to inquire.
[1:00:29] I think you'll find that this is a standard answer.
[1:00:32] Yes, sir.
[1:00:32] You'll find it.
[1:00:33] But I think it's also what the Egyptians want.
[1:00:35] Sure, it's a good thing.
[1:00:36] Go ahead, Master.
[1:00:37] But we know him exactly, and we will advise and reply, but this is just as a seed you show us.
[1:00:42] But behind the seed we know, by our own contact with you, that they do what you want them to do.
[1:00:49] Mr. Chancellor, I'm convinced, really, that Sadat is prepared for an interim agreement in Israel, as Israel is considerably more flexible this year than it was last year.
[1:01:00] If we could get a formula for the
[1:01:08] Israel will say, we'll completely return the territory, give all of the territory back.
[1:01:12] I don't care about when.
[1:01:15] You can leave that about 10, 15, 20 years.
[1:01:18] All I want is something like that set so I can say, I have a commitment of complete withdrawal.
[1:01:23] Israel won't do that.
[1:01:25] Now, what we are working on now is something just short of that, which will convince Sadat, give him a face-saving device to start the talks.
[1:01:32] Once the talks start, I'm convinced there's sufficient agreement so that he can have an interim agreement.
[1:01:38] As far as the linkage is concerned, they may raise the question, the Egyptians, particularly the Arabs, that Israel won't agree to any linkage.
[1:01:50] That is untrue.
[1:01:51] Complete linkage.
[1:01:51] The linkage is that the interim agreement will be the first step, and as soon as that's headed into an active negotiating process will be started, which...
[1:02:01] will fully implement Security Council Resolution 242, so you have a clear express linkage to 242.
[1:02:07] But what they do not want is to negotiate the final solution before they start the talks.
[1:02:15] Exactly.
[1:02:17] And Israel says, so if we can find some kind of a facing, one of the things that Egypt is certain of is that if the United States just stands its fingers that we can make Israel do what we want, that's impossible.
[1:02:33] And secondly, Egypt has a feeling that it doesn't want to negotiate.
[1:02:36] It wants somebody else to give it a solution.
[1:02:39] All the other problems in the world are being solved by negotiations.
[1:02:43] Walter said yesterday, the parallel between your situation and then Egypt's situation.
[1:02:49] It's the same.
[1:02:51] It's the same.
[1:02:51] It's the same.
[1:02:52] It's the same.
[1:02:53] It's the same.
[1:02:56] It's the same.
[1:02:57] It's the same.
[1:02:58] It's the same.
[1:03:05] we get
[1:03:34] If we ask in the media, that's a different thing.
[1:03:37] But if we ask out of the government...
[1:03:39] There's no former.
[1:03:41] And both sides go to the same.
[1:03:43] Yeah, this is particularly... We have to agree that one should not impose a former.
[1:03:48] This is impossible.
[1:03:49] What they want, the Egyptians may want that, but one could not impose to them a former that they have.
[1:03:57] You must understand.
[1:04:01] I mean, people say, well, you can't do anything but after the Israeli elections.
[1:04:09] The point is, it'll be harder after the elections than before.
[1:04:14] You'll get the shots.
[1:04:16] Yes, sir.
[1:04:16] Well, I'm glad you saw that, probably.
[1:04:33] versus Jennifer or Mr. Gold.
[1:05:00] The Russians perhaps would like very much to be involved in this, but as far as the Israelis are concerned, they go right up a wall.
[1:05:13] That's the imposed set up of the supercars.
[1:05:20] It just doesn't want to be there.
[1:05:24] We've been trying, Mr.
[1:05:25] Ambassador, we are... Well, let's see this bill, it doesn't matter.
[1:05:28] The United Nations want us involved.
[1:05:31] It's not so bad as if it will stalemate it and break it somehow.
[1:05:38] If we can get a little bit of a position where we have to come up with a formula, if we are in the media, that's a different thing, but if we have to come up with a...
[1:05:47] There's no formula.
[1:05:49] And both sides will do it.
[1:05:50] Yes, this is specifically...
[1:05:52] Yes, we have to agree that...
[1:05:53] What should not impose a formula.
[1:05:56] This is impossible.
[1:05:57] What they want, the Egyptians may want that, but what could not impose to them the formula that they have.
[1:06:05] You must understand that there is no formula that can be imposed, that we cannot impose a formula on Israel.
[1:06:11] They won't accept it, particularly before elections, and probably not even thereafter, because in the elections they're probably going to have a mandate to be even tougher.
[1:06:23] People say, well, you can't do anything but laugh at the Israeli elections.
[1:06:26] But the point is, it'll be harder after the elections than before.
[1:06:31] You'll get the chance.
[1:06:33] Yes, sir.
[1:06:34] Well, I'm glad you saw that, Bobby.
[1:06:36] Well, I'll start you.
[1:06:39] Yes, sir.
[1:06:41] For a minute, sir.