Nixon & Shultz on Watergate and White House administration

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Okay, there's no step.

Second.

George, how are you?

Sorry to rush it, but I'm all right.

Hey, Brian.

Six doctors have been hunting me today.

A few senators and a few others, and I didn't see them all.

Got a hell of a lot of them.

All right.

Well, Mr. Hartman, I...

I feel somewhat presumptuous in coming in.

I've been thinking and worrying about the levels of Watergate problems, but not that particularly, because I don't know about that, but trying to think constructively about what would be helpful.

And I see the problem, and I...

I'd like to state the obvious, but as I see the problem, there's the Watergate business, and that's something you're dealing with, and we can get that out of here, dealt with, that's, so there's that.

Then there is the essence of the work of government, which you referred to in your speech, which is the ball game that we're all here to play, and that's what's important.

In other words, why do we substitute for what is left?

And then there is a third element that I think is important in order to get from the one place to the other place, and that has to do with our own conception of how we work in the White House with the departments and the whole general posture of things.

And I think that as I have puzzled over this, that we

have to concentrate very heavily on, for want of a better word, I would call legitimacy.

Legitimacy of what we do that shows that we are out in the open, that we are candid, that we are doing things according to the proper procedures.

And I believe myself that there is

it is true that for a variety of reasons, some of them quite good reasons, the departments are not really carrying the ball on policy and operating matters.

And it's partly their fault.

It's partly their fault and it's partly our fault.

And we have to make them do the work.

And I worry they don't do it well to make them do the work.

They're all going to have the same problem.

I agree with you.

Of course, Henry had a very sensitive thing.

You know, Henry is, God damn, I had the time.

Look, you've got to talk to Rogers, and you've got to talk to Schultz, and you know how he is.

Go ahead.

Well, I find Henry is, he's hard and difficult to work with, but he is a joy because he is so able.

And he is, as I agree, one of my labor elections friends says, sorry to be a prima donna as long as you can sing.

I don't want to make any mistakes in a hurry.

We're going to do it.

You know what I mean?

Bob is gone.

John is gone.

Two of the most selfless guys I've ever known.

They're gone now.

We have a new start.

Let's get going.

a replacement for Bob, as I have thought about it.

He's not replaceable.

He is a unique person with a set of skills and relationships to you.

And I felt, well, one shouldn't think about replacing Bob, because he was very special.

And one should think of a different kind of instruction.

And I think there is a fair amount to be said, and not to mull about it very seriously,

to some parallel with the British system in which you bring into the White House to help organize the work, so to speak, a really top-level civil servant, somebody who is a person of breadth and scope and integrity and so on, and who is...

organizing the substantive side of the work has nothing to do with the political side of how it operates so i think that is an idea worth considering i think that the the white house operations or the executive office operations go best when they are put in a very legitimate posture that is i think the council of economic advisors for example all those people stand for confirmation

All those people are available to the Congress.

The Congress doesn't over, doesn't abuse, that's right.

And so on.

So I, I believe that there's a lot to be said for saying.

Let Peter Plant's post be confirmed by the Senate.

Let the head of the Democratic County Committee have a quick operation on the bill.

I also have come to the view of what the personnel system is operating.

that the cabinet people need to be much more involved in the personnel selection process.

We've got a lot of unfilled posts.

We have had a very slow process of getting decisions made.

And I believe, as a matter of administration,

People in the department, their presidential appointments, they need to be loyal to you and identified with you, but they also need to feel that the person that they're working with most directly thinks they're great and had a hand in their selection.

And that is also a measure of confidence that you have in the cabinet office.

well i i well i emphasize with the treasury people as i have with the labor people in omb that uh their boss is sitting over here in this office and everybody should recognize

is smaller groups that we can get in line with.

And we said, have a good project.

You know, I heard a lot of that.

And I think the job, I'm waiting to have the whole county do this, and then have a project, or a ministry council, or an agency.

Or don't forget the Council on Economic Policy, that's it.

And we have got a fantastic program of... No, no.

You set me up as chairman of the council on... Oh!

We have a great...

Well, Arthur is concerned, as we all are, with the sort of demoralization of the country here and the need to pick it up.

And I think that... Well, Arthur worries.

He comes in so you can help him rather than the other way around.

I understand.

All right, well, let me say this.

What I'd like you to do, and I'm glad you've done this, if you wouldn't mind, maybe, could you, could you sit down in one of your personal panels, just about the way you would like to serve in this situation?

I don't know.

Let's see.

I'm anxious to do this.

All right, approach.

You'll see the last piece.

Now, all right.

Now, you're on fire.

All right.

There are a lot of these people who are very good at this.

Well, I'd like to see it in more detail.

Well, I've just written it down.

I'm so shy about writing memos that I don't...

But I'm a man.

I'm just going to go with the Russians and talk to you in favor.

So I'm going to leave you.

I think I've actually promised you that I'm going to help.

I've got the point.

We'll talk again.

I think we're moving in the same direction, but I'm going to think it through very carefully.

You can tell Arthur the rest of it, but you can be sure that I'm doing the right thing.

Well, I think we all feel it's a very serious situation.

And everybody that I've talked to wants to be helpful in the discussion.

And we feel, I feel, anyway, we need to make some changes along the lines that I've suggested.

And it can be done.

Things will work well that way.

and we can make a virtue out of it.

That's it.

Sure.

Oh, we've got lots of time.

Well, we've got the... We've got an easy time.

I think that the sooner you can come to whatever conclusions you do about how we should operate and what changes must be made and so on, the better.

With the constraint, as you mentioned, that rushing into something that you wish...

you have to undo is obviously undesirable.

But within that constraint, I think that it's important to take hold and to rearrange things here.

I've been trying to come in and sit in on a meeting in the White House meeting, because I can't just provide an over-the-counter perspective.

I think our tax program, with all of the criticism that we've had, nevertheless, went pretty well.

People were fascinated with the simplification idea.

And even on the...

Yes, it was.

by the suggestion, proves himself, that he's worse than other people.

You know the name for it.

But you think we're right?

I think we're right.

I think that, in many ways, the greatest blessing would have been if Congress had screwed it up and had passed that law and put it out from under.

But anyway, I don't know what the response is.

But don't you think so?

Or are you the opposite?

No, I think you're right.

You need another reason.

Oh, God, Mr. President, I think we have to make it clear that we don't want that.

I think I think.

They're very set on that.

But I think that that is part of the process of letting people see that we don't like criticism.

We hear all points of view.

And a little controversy within the family is all right.

And I think that we can get ourselves going here, get on a little different track.

We can create this atmosphere that people want.

The idea of submitting the condemnation and so forth, I think is going to take a lot of time.

I mean, that's only a tactic, of course.

I would say this, though.

I wish you could talk to Bill Rogers about it.

Bill and I have had a long talk.

All right.

Well, I think we were concerned about here.

we have had him go and testify it's done a world of good for him he's testified he's handled himself extremely well people are glad to have him out in the public domain and i think

Well, I have, I'm going down to make it to the Inter-American Development Bank, and I'll be coming back to you tonight.

Well, I'll be, that'd be great.

We appreciate it, sir.

Nixon & Shultz on Watergate and White House administration

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on May 3, 1973

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