Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 577 › Conversation 577-003

Nixon, Mitchell & Burns on Supreme Court appointments

Monday, September 20, 1971 · 12:45 PM–1:30 PM ET · Oval Office · 58 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Mitchell, John N.; Burns, Arthur F.; Sanchez, ManoloConversation577-003 on Tape 577 (tape position 00:19:26–01:17:22)StartMonday, September 20, 1971 at 12:45 PMEndMonday, September 20, 1971 at 1:30 PMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 577-003 ↗

President Nixon met with John Mitchell and Arthur Burns to discuss a range of sensitive political and economic issues, including potential Supreme Court appointments following Justice John Harlan's resignation and the administration's international economic strategy. The participants evaluated the challenges of currency realignment, the gold standard, and U.S. negotiating positions ahead of upcoming international meetings with central bankers and finance ministers. Additionally, they addressed the implementation of the administration's post-freeze 'Phase II' economic policies and the importance of securing labor cooperation to maintain public support for these initiatives.

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Position in tape: 00:19:26 – 01:17:22

part A, 19:24

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On September 20, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, John N. Mitchell, Arthur F. Burns, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:45 pm to 1:30 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 577-003 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 577-3

Date: September 20, 1971
Time: 12:45 pm - 1:30 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President talked with John N. Mitchell; Arthur F. Burns entered at 12:45 pm while the
conversation is in progress.

[Conversation No. 577-3A]

[See Conversation No. 9-95]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Greetings

     Supreme Court resignation
          -John Harlan
                -Health
                      -Georgetown Hospital
          -Announcement
                -Date
                      -Speculation
          -Appointees
                -Number
                -Effect on Supreme Court
          -Justice Department
          -Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]
                -Role in appointing Justices
          -Appointees
                -Congressman
                -Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.
                -G. Harold Carswell
                -Richard H. Poff
                      -Credentials
                           -Harry F. Byrd, Sr.

                            -Conservatism
                            -Practice of law
                            -Judiciary Committee
                                  -American Bar Association [ABA]

     International economics
           -Burns's European trip
Show the rest of the log (378 more lines)
                 -John B. Connally
           -US objectives
           -Europeans
                 -Currency re-alignment
                 -Convertibility of gold
                       -France
                       -Restoration of convertibility
                             -Results
                             -Significance in France
           -France
                 -Price of gold issue
                       -Reactions
           -Price of gold
                 -Burns's conversation with Connally
                       -US position
                             -Policies
                             -Tariffs

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 12:45 pm.

     Refreshments
          -coffee

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 1:30 pm.

     International economies
           -Price of gold
                 -Raising price
                       -Amount
                       -William Proxmire
                       -William V. Roth, Jr.
                             -Opposition
           -Congressional actions
                 -Price of gold

            -Increase
            -Attitude
            -Political and economic objection
                   -Political objection
                         -Rewards for countries
                               -South Africa
                               -Soviet Union
                               -France
-Price of gold
      -Comparison to earlier prices
            -Official price compared to market price
      -Action of raising price
            -Percentage points
                   -Inflation
-Future action
-Europe
-Japan
      -Subsidization of exports
            -Canada
      -Free trade
            -Relationship with Canada
-Great Britain
      -Political situation
      -Common market
-Germany
      -Relationship with the US
      -Question of future policy
-Forthcoming economic meetings
-International Monetary Fund [IMF] and Group of Ten
-Preparation
-Location
      -Washington
            -The President’s schedule
                   -Alaska
            -Forthcoming IMF meeting
                   -Possible statement by the President
-Reception
      -Connally, the President
      -Secretary of the Treasury
      -Central bankers
      -IMF chairman

     -Number
     -Statement by the president
           -Impact
     -Location
           -White House
     -Secretaries of the Treasury
     -John B. Connally
     -Timing
-Great Britain
     -Connally's evaluation
           -European market
     -Common market
           -Effect on foreign policy of the US
                 -Economic policy
-Approach
     -Integration of economic and foreign policies
           -Japan
                 -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                 -Soviet Union
-Japan
     -Relationship with US
           -Commercial relationship
           -PRC, Soviet Union
-Relationship with Europe
     -Comparison with the US
-Europe and Japan
     -Relationship with the US
           -Competition
-Japan
     -Relationship with the US
           -The President’s previous comments
                 -Competition
                 -People
                 -Type of governments
-Relationship between foreign policy and domestic issues
     -Group of Ten meeting
     -Congress
           -Meeting with the President
     -Isolationism
           -Surcharge
           -Foreign aid

             -Trade barriers
                   -Canada
                   -Japan
                         -US public
                               -Possible speculation
                                     -Anti-trust laws
                                     -Subsidization
                                     -Okinawa reversion treaty
                                          -Textiles
                   -Type of diplomacy for the US
                         -Strength
             -Public posture
             -Congress
                   -Jacob K. Javits
       -Current situation
             -Projections for the future
-Britain
       -British press
             -Influence in US
                   -The Economist
       -Relationship with the US
             -Politics
       -Orientation
-Italy
       -Rome
             -Memorandum
             -Conversation between the president and burns
-Foreign restrictions
       -Impact in the US
             -Timing
-Economic theory
       -Floating exchange system
             -Milton Friedman
             -Godfrey [Surname unintelligible]
             -Marketplace forces
                   -Demand and supply
             -Contrast of theoretical and practical conditions
             -Current environment
             -Restraints
                   -Government rules
                   -Central banks

-European countries
      -Unification of ideas
            -Competition with the US
                   -Obstacle
                         -Percentage points
-Connally
      -Presentation of US position abroad
            -Understanding of problems
-Foreign countries
      -Problems
            -Gold prices
                   -US understanding
                         -Type of problems
-Impact of us action
-Import surcharge
      -US position
            -Duration
      -Currency realignment
            -Relation to surcharge
      -Negotiations
            -Length of time
-Gold issue
-Devaluation of the dollar
      -Psychological impact
      -Political impact
-Price of gold
-Inflation
-International reserves
      -Measured by gold
            -Reduction
                   -Special Drawings Rights [SDR’s]
-Economic theories
      -Political economic effects
      -Political factors
            -Parliamentary bodies
            -US position on gold prices
            -Congress
            -Economic change
                   -Election period
                   -Proxmire, Roth
-Burns

      -Connally
-Burns's trip
      -Education
      -Burns's credentials
            -Representation of the US
                  -Negotiations
                        -International economics
      -Domestic versus international matters
      -Burns, Connally
      -Meeting with central bankers and finance ministers
      -Clarity of communications
      -Connally
      -Representation of the US position
            -Connally
                  -Credentials
            -Type of trip
      -Connally
            -Obtaining information
            -Conversation with burns
      -France
            -Gold convertibility
      -Germany
            -Percentage points appreciation
      -European economic community [common market]
            -Director General's position
-Price of gold
      -Political compared to economic problem
            -Economic problem
-Foreign, economic discussions
      -Conally's position
      -Limitation on discussions
      -Central bankers
            -Tradition of discussion
                  -President’s approval
                  -Connally
      -US position
            -Unified position
                  -Possible outcome
                        -Press
      -Burns
            -Relationship with Connally

            -Role as economist
                  -Representation of the US
-US position
      -Connally
            -Agenda proposal
                  -Price of gold
                  -Trade
                  -Currency re-alignment
-Domestic political scene
      -Conversations between Burns, Connally, and the President
      -William P. Rogers
            -State Department
      -[Federal Reserve Board [FRD]]
      -Treasury Department
      -Council on International Economic Policy [CIEP]
-US negotiating position
      -Connally's staff
            -Limitations
      -Connally's
            -Credentials as negotiator
                  -Understanding of foreigners
                  -Perception by Europeans
                        -Toughness
                        -Understanding
                  -John Foster Dulles
      -State Department
            -Relationship with the President
-Number of individuals involved
      -CIEP
            -Peter G. Peterson
      -State Department
      -Commerce Department
      -Peterson
            -Number involved
            -Type of discussions
      -Connally's role
            -Foreign policy
      -Nathaniel Samuels, Philip H. Trezise
-Henry A. Kissinger
      -Relationship with the President
-Peterson

     -Kissinger
          -Foreign relations factors
                -Germans
                -France
                      -Georges J.R. Pompidou
                -Britain
                -Japanese
                -Future implications
                -Member of group
                -Political interests
                -Domestic advantages
     -IMF
          -The President's appearance
                -Statement
                -Reception
          -Pierre Paul Schweitzer
                -Possible meeting with the President
                      -Connally
                             -Possible reaction
     -Detroit Economic Club
          -Upcoming Question and answer [Q&A] session with the President
                -Date
                -Preparation of background information by Burns
                      -Audience
                      -International issues
                             -IMF
                             -Gold
                      -Handling
                             -Transmittal
                                   -Date
                                   -Time
                                   -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
                                   -Rose Mary Woods
                                         -California
                      -Type of information
                             -Impact

The economy
     -Phase II
          -Meetings with various special interest groups and individuals
               -Date

                  -Decisions
                        -Directions of policy
      -Congressmen, Senators, business leaders
            -Preferences
      -Labor leaders
            -Position on Phase II
                  -Comparison to business leaders
-The President's schedule
      -Trip
            -Alaska
-Unified position
-Direction
      -Freeze
      -Phase II
            -Follow-up
      -Budgetary and tax action
-Follow-up
      -IMF meeting
-Freeze
      -Impact
-Meeting between Burns and the President
      -Freeze
      -Phase II
            -Sequence of follow-up action
                  -Burns's conversation with Herbert Stein
                        -Changing process
                              -Mechanics of change
-Labor leaders’ cooperation
      -People
            -Support of the President
                  -Results of polls
      -George Meany
            -Lack of support versus support
-Freeze
      -Impact
            -Freedom
                  -US people
                        -Support of the President
      -Election
            -Restraint imposed by freeze
                  -Labor unions

           -Forthcoming Q&A session
                -Memo from Burns to the President
           -Phase II
                -Date
                      -Preliminary statement

Burns left at 1:30 pm.

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Right.
I see.
Oh, yes.
Got it.
I think it's much the best job to do it.
I mean, not to let Bill, you know, their nurses and everything else will talk out there and it'll get all over John.
I'd rather not do it.
So don't push it, but since he's ready, he should do it.
Right?
Good.
Good.
Good.
Bye, John.
Bye, bye.
Well, I'm going to read some of the bad people on the phone.
We have a great guy.
Cory Carlin.
John Harlan is almost 36. Who knows?
Out of the church, I must know.
He'll resign today or tomorrow.
It'll be announced, but you forget your duties to do this.
Something might happen.
So that means that I will have four appointments to occur.
We've got two more, and I think these two are very important.
But having two made at one time is a double parlay, wouldn't it?
Pick one.
Yeah.
I think I'll cover it, but we'll make absolutely sure this time that the Justice Department, the FBI, does its homework on these phones.
That's right.
They've got to.
So we don't get caught.
They let you down.
I think we could get actually a very.
In one.
We may pick a congressman.
That's pretty hard.
Well, we're going to try to find somebody.
You pick a congressman.
It's pretty easy.
We've only got one, I'll tell you what it is.
Well, you've read about it.
There's an outstanding man, Paul, who's just occurred.
He's from Virginia.
He's in the Harry Bird County, the fall.
Outstanding, decent, conservative, and so forth.
The question there is that he's never been a trial lawyer, but never practiced law.
But he's been on the judiciary committee for 15 years, which of course is
On the Supreme Court, you don't need to try to argue the case.
The important thing is to have a good sense.
You know what I mean?
And so the American Bar were trying to run that by in the House.
Well, I wanted to get a little feel of your trip.
I had a job conversation this morning at midnight that he had suggested that I should talk to you.
Get your work done on it.
and to see where our next move is.
Yes, well, I'm very glad to have this opportunity.
And I thought
that we could at least develop the agenda for the next week.
And we didn't.
And that resulted in a bad press for us.
You see?
Yeah.
Well, it's a bad press for a while.
No, the, um, I'm disturbing.
I think we may come to the takeaway.
The Europeans recognize
that they must be relying on currency currencies.
Everyone recognizes that.
Lastly, they realize that you can't go back to convertibility.
That's quite an advance.
I don't know what to think of the French, terribly.
and expect to be the only trough in the maritime, or restore, convertibility curve to meeting time.
I don't think they could blow up in a few days.
It would be to our interest.
It would be to the interest of Rangnall and his friends.
You sling yourself in.
They have not been causing any trouble on that issue, and that's a very significant issue.
They are very stubborn on the price of gold issue.
And we're very stubborn, too.
Our stubbornness, I hope this is your position.
I've talked this over with John Connolly thoroughly.
Our stubbornness is tactical.
Now, if we can get a good agreement, I see no reason at all why we shouldn't.
There's another issue, I'm afraid, and the currency currency is .
We shouldn't.
Can we reverse something other than coffee?
I don't know.
There's so much that I'd say, you know.
Just a minute, sir.
No, that's fine.
I don't know why we shouldn't help them and deal with their problems.
Raising the price of gold from 35 to 37 pounds.
We have no doubt on this.
On that.
Approximately.
And let it be known that there are hundreds in the opposition.
And it's a very different, you see, we have these debates in Congress and all over the country, two years ago, three years ago, it was under the discretion of Adam Herman, doubling and tripping the price of gold.
What I always break is a political objection to that, and also some economic objection.
The political objection was that all of the bad people will be reworked.
They have a windfall.
The South Africans, they have the races.
Yeah.
And the Russians, and they have gold, and the French have a lot of gold, and then the speculators have gold.
But now, well, there's a profound difference in the first place.
Certainly before April 1968, the official price of gold and the market price are identical.
Now the official price is $39.
The market price varies.
And it's in the $41, $42 range.
If you go from $35 to $37, you're not rewarding any bad people.
So that argument's out.
And on the economic side, nobody can seriously argue that raising the price of gold by a few percentage marks is going to have any inflationary consequences.
Doubling the price, you can argue that.
Now, I think, Mr. President, that the difficult question is, where do we go from here?
The Europeans and the Japanese are hanging up, no question about that.
And the Japanese have just made a move, which I'm tracking down.
They have apparently moved to subsidize their exports.
on something like the Canadian planet, but on a less ambitious scale.
They've been a little foolish, the Japanese went to Canada and asked the Canadians to join them in a worldwide movement to free trade.
Think of the Japanese leading the world on a free trade policy.
They can lead the world on the right by dropping all their restrictions.
But they're hanging up, and I think they're going to be tough, really.
The Japanese are just going to hang up the others.
Now, the British no longer have any political dependence because they're entering the common market, and they've got to play with the Europeans.
The Germans are, well, practically they tell me they'll play with the United States.
And for a while I think that's true, you see.
Whether that will be their permanent policy or not, I don't know.
Now I think we've got to make preparations for the next meeting.
We ought to be able to.
And now the next meeting is right here, the I-Man meeting.
Well, no, well, you're not talking about the I-Man meeting.
Well, they have two meetings in Washington.
They have the I-Man meeting.
That's right.
And before the I-Man, there's Rupert's meeting.
Oh, Rupert's meeting is going to be here?
Be here.
Just as I would think, indeed.
Well, I don't know the date, but it will be this coming Sunday.
Oh, I understand.
Now, I think we ought to... Oh, I'm going to ask him.
Well, your sister... Oh, you'll be the last.
You know, it might be a very good thing, Mr. President, for you to say a few words to the Iron Man.
Well, let me tell you, the problem I have with that...
Unless I'm prepared to say something that is something more than literary generalities, that I should not.
I think that lacking that, what I should do is rather than have coffee, give a reception, I should give.
And I thought I'd give a reception, not just for the 1,500 words you don't compliment on people, but just for the Secretary of the Treasury and the central bank of each hundred and his wife, which is about 400 people.
That way they can all come through.
And then I'll walk around and let them see me.
But you see, I believe that we're not ready to shoot yet.
And if I get up there and make some speech, I'll say, well, the president flopped or this or that.
But if I get in the reception and show that we're warm-hearted and generous and we want to talk to everybody and we're not trying to protest on you, and move the reception to the White House, you know,
So that we, now that's, that's a compliment to him.
It is, it is.
You have to go and have receptions for the Secretary of Treasury.
You should have in front of the Prime Minister.
How's that?
No, that's a great fine.
I want a very quality country event.
Well, that's what you would be complimenting.
I think we're going to do that.
It's like the Connery Reception Center of 29 times.
You know, in relation with the bridge,
He had colleagues asking him if he thought they were trying to sell.
He said the same thing.
He did their network.
At least he implied the British should do anything in order to push through to the end of the market.
So they ran us against it for rather years.
They are... Well, this has implications that you would understand more than I.
But the...
The British are going to play with the common market.
To what degree they will continue to be your partners in foreign policy?
What part of the economic area?
I don't know.
That's the question.
So we talked about the foreign left.
What is involved here?
Our great political forces and movements.
We've got to try the economics and the politics.
It's got to be linked.
That's true of the Japanese, too.
Only a whole degree of doubt that the Japanese aren't really on the economic side.
Otherwise, they're sitting over there under the gun with the Chinese and the Russians, their big neighbors.
They go that way.
But because we're their biggest customer,
we have a struggle to settle this out.
Now, with Britain, with Europe, it's different in the sense that Europe without the United States could never, of course, have a vile defense against the possible Soviet intrigue or level of war that you would expect.
And so they know that, and that's on the other one side of the coin.
The other side of the coin,
Europe and Japan, as you well know, aren't going to have it, but they're going to be our toughest competitors in the world because they are the biggest free industrial nations, right?
So here we have the irony that, since I've lived with Japan, but I'm sorry to advance it, but with Japan, I said, it is inevitable that Japan and the United States will be competitors.
and very strong advantage because of the kind of people we are and our systems of government.
It is indispensable that we be friends.
So the question is, how do you rationalize these things?
Now, the real, another point that comes to mind here is that the whole world is, well,
What do you think can be done at this first issue?
We don't want to move too quickly.
We have a terrible problem.
I've met with members of Congress.
And not that it's right, but it's a fact.
The people of this country at the present time are pretty damn isolationist.
They like the surcharge.
They like to keep it permanently.
They like, you know, cuts in foreign aid.
They like to cut all of them, cut every wall.
You and I know that we've got to live in the world.
I don't believe in that sort of thing.
On the other hand, I do realize that it is necessary for the United States to have a better deal abroad in order to sell their home.
And also, you know, here are the Canadian subsidizing marriage orders.
Of course, the Japanese have all kinds of barriers.
Now, Arthur, we just can't tell Americans, we can't say, we're going to force antitrust laws in a way that you cannot be defective.
We're not going to subsidize, if you do not, of course.
We're not going to tie, like, the purchase of airplanes and the rest to the political needles.
We're not going to say, when we give you open knowledge, you're going to give us protections.
We're dealing with an old world that deals with the old diplomacy.
And we, we now have got to find ways to be just as strong in dealing.
Now we, our public posture must not be that.
We must publicly say, well, we will be responsible in the world.
We've always been good neighbors and good competitors, and we want to build an international stability for us.
But on the other hand, some way, we've got to find some ways, Arthur, you've got to see, if you will, if you help us find a way.
to serve this domestic political interest at the same time.
You've got to do it.
And other than that, if you go down to the executive of Congress, if you leave the building, you will find that's the thing these guys keep talking to us about.
I mean, except for at all, like Chavis, who actually, being from New York and having an understanding of the world, he only got three or four senators up there that talk this kind of thing that I'm just saying right now.
Most of them would just as soon get the hell out of the world.
Yeah, but I'll tell you the...
I think I understand, but I'm just...
I'm trying to... You describe the condition that exists today.
All right.
You're absolutely right.
A year from now, unless you're
unless we have done something.
In other words, then we become vulnerable to the attacks which will mount from abroad.
Speaking of our British friends, the British press is more influential in America than it is in Britain.
People read the columns and all the rest, and the British are quite honest.
That's what I heard.
So there you go.
We're talking the practical politics here.
You know, a lot of people, basically, are more European-minded than American-minded.
You know that.
Well, you know, in the last week, that has grown.
I'm going to keep you fully informed on that, because I think this is part of the background of your thinking.
I'll keep on sounding my way.
Sure, absolutely.
I expect that as these restrictions multiply, there will be another crime within the United States within the year.
And the restrictions, of course, the restrictions imposed by partners against us,
You know, we have an economic theory tested out now.
So many people, my friend Robert Friedman, Godfrey's model, and others have been purging the clothing exchange system.
And the argument is that the way to determine the value of a particular national currency is to leave it to the marketplace.
the forces of the command and supply.
And then he has his arbitrary reason, the nature of price fixing, and causes trouble.
And they're absolutely right for a world in which you have no governments, in which you have no politics.
And that is the world.
And you see,
According to their theory, other currencies ought to be floating now, but they're not.
The floating is restrained by government action, central bank intervention, and governmental rules.
And by uniting, as they may do,
they can frustrate what we're trying to achieve.
Now, we would want to achieve an appreciation of foreign currencies with a label of 10 to 15 percent.
And they may make that impossible for us, you see.
We have to...
Now, Carly succeeded in, he was both a success and a failure.
I'm being very candid with you.
I'm not useful to you.
Honestly, I am.
He was very successful in indicating that they wanted to give, and that our position had to be firm, and they understand it better than they did.
But he was not successful in indicating to them that we have some understanding of their problems.
And now their problems are in large part political problems.
And on this gold price question, what we ought to say to them is not that our position is inflexible.
We'll never even talk about that.
What we ought to say is this is a technical problem that we will be ready to discuss with you after some fundamental economic issues have been approximately worked out.
Now, that would be
That would make a tremendous impression on them.
In my book, we're giving up nothing.
But if something is important to the other fellow and costs you little or nothing, why not indicate to him that, well, your mind isn't actually closed.
You have a certain stage.
Well, the next thing that I would do, I think, would be to say to them, look, we don't like this import search any more than you do.
We've explained time and again that this is a temporary expedient.
And if you will indicate to us what realignment of currency
If you're willing to agree to it, and if that comes anywhere near the mark, as far as our needs are concerned, we will gladly give up the search search.
Now, you're not losing.
Because, because they're gonna give up very, very little on this.
This will be an negotiation that will take a year or two or three.
You agree?
I don't think they did anything.
Let me ask you on the gold thing.
Are they united in that?
Yeah, absolutely.
I'm sure they might have all that.
Which means, in fact, does that, to the average person, means the value of the dollar?
I'm trying to think of the negatives from our standpoint.
The negatives from our standpoint is, you know, as it can be described, it's the value of the dollar, what the hell.
Done it right here.
What does it have?
The economics of it is psychologically and politically.
The purpose of central banks, if we don't raise the price of gold in terms of U.S. dollars, and if there is an appreciation of foreign currencies in terms of the U.S. dollar,
Then the price of gold, in terms of the currencies of European countries and Japan, will have to go down.
Well, the central banks say, hey, oh, we're a lot poorer than we were, you see.
They don't like that.
Now, this is sheer accounting.
But people pay some attention to the appearance of books, you see.
All right?
Now, next they say that international reserves, as measured in terms of gold, will be reduced.
Now, in the world of SDRs, that doesn't matter any longer, you see.
So there's nothing here of economic substance.
But politically, politically, I think they have to go to their parliaments, not all of them.
some of them do, and they have to justify an appreciation of their currency against the U.S. dollar.
And they feel that since they have to make this concession, they can argue the case with their own people better by indicating that the U.S., which has had this rigid position on the price of gold, has yielded.
And in a sense, you know, when
When everybody has a political problem, misery must come.
That's right.
So what do you think?
I understand that position.
I think that at the end, if they meet our economic requirements, this ought not to be a stunning one because if you're not giving them anything of substance,
There will be an inconvenience of going to the Congress, but I don't think you need to have any problem with that.
The Congress moves over a period of time.
Well, I think this will not be, this will be after the election, and it will be minimal change, and Proxmire has already committed himself publicly, and Royce has done a few channels indicating he will not vote.
You go over.
I think the main thing we must do now is to keep our own frowning eyes as we can.
I'm just going to explore that.
Apparently, you and he have been talking very closely.
I'm going to explore that with you.
I have to take the same position as Conrad.
If I do that, I'm not going to learn anything.
I could take another position, indicating, indicating, well, I am a central banker and an economist.
I don't really represent my government in these negotiations, but I'm interested in resolving a U.S. problem, an international problem.
I can sort them out in that fashion.
I'll not do that unless you want me to.
Well, how will I send you back?
I can't listen to that, is it?
This is a domestic one.
You're right with that, but the problem is that I need to see the big flag in the effect of a very explicit economy.
Oh, no, no, no, no, no.
This I will do only, first, with your explicit permission, and second, only with the central bankers and with one finance, with two finance ministers.
What they are...
I don't know.
That's the problem.
I don't know.
I don't know.
There is that risk.
There is that risk.
I think it's important to be sure that we all know what everybody's doing.
As a matter of fact, I think...
That sort of thing kind of appeals to me.
I have more information.
I've done a little of this.
Not very much.
At least I've educated the children.
You see, I know a whole lot.
You may go out on a sort of a fishing mission and see what he calls yours.
This is exactly my point.
You see, I can't speak for the administration.
You're not going to recommend, you're not going to urge me to say, you've got to, hey, what do you do?
Maybe that's the way to approach it.
Maybe you should talk to the main thing is, I think you have no problem at all.
You know, he was a very sophisticated politician.
You could tell him.
Just tell him that he's probably a creepy crook.
Well, no, I won't have any problems.
You know what I mean?
He is, of course, not an expert in this field, but he'd probably say, sure, go out and find out what you can.
Just be careful that we don't indicate that we're giving something away.
Lee, I'd like you to discuss it with him.
Boy, what a bag of appeals to make, as to, as Davey made.
See, Connie isn't going to find out what's happening.
Well, because his technique is not one designed to elicit any information from the others.
Now, look, I know this much.
The, uh... First, let me tell you what I found out with Connie.
First, that, uh...
No one, not even the French, will insist on convertibility into gold.
I know that.
Next I know from the journalists that they think that an average appreciation of 10% can be worked out.
Next I know from the Director General of the European Economic Community
Exactly the same thing.
Well, I've been able to draw them out by indicating one thing, that this gold problem is a political problem rather than an economic problem.
That's quite a conception because the position of the U.S. government
as being that this is a terribly important economic problem.
It isn't.
Let Connolly take that position.
Or let him take the position he can't discuss it because he's under instructions from his president.
That's the position he took.
It's a very good bargaining position for him.
But it's not a position that enables him to extract anything from the other fellow.
Now, there is also the tradition among central bankers to talk rather frankly, more frankly than .
But I'm going to do that only, you see, if I have your explicit approval and Colley's full understanding, just so you know.
Oh, yeah, I am.
I have already got it.
I just have the one, the only concern I have is that I don't want to have the feeling there's a hell of a split about the thing because they would be just alive.
Oh, well, I mean, of course it is with our domestic trade.
Well, I know that.
I know that.
And the...
Well, I'm going to play this as far as the press is concerned.
I'm going to be with Connolly 100% completely.
As far as these other polls are concerned, well, here lie an economist exploring questions with that.
Not representing my government.
Good.
What do you think, well, let me see if I understand what you think the plan should be.
Yeah.
So where are we going from here?
Do you think something should be developed before the meeting at 10 or not?
I think we ought to, before we have a discussion,
a better facade than exists in the present time.
And one way of doing it would be for Connolly to propose an agenda, an agenda that if he was not prepared to do that,
to prepare an agenda.
And second, to indicate that as far as the price of gold is concerned, well, that is a very important question, of course.
Let it blow it out, you see.
But the other questions are still more important.
And if we see that we make some progress on trade flight issues and on currency realignment, we will.
At that time, be willing to listen to your proposals.
We will be willing at such a time to consider them.
At the present time, other things are far more important.
We must act right on it.
Now this is as part of the discussion of the agenda.
And that will be fairly well received.
They will do fairly well.
Now, let's suppose you do that.
Then within our government, that's the best way to understand it.
Well, I think our own government, I think within our own government, you have to take, you spoke to Connelly and to me about the domestic political dimensions.
You have to do the same with the writers.
And you can do that.
He's no friend, sure.
Because the forces within the State Department, just as within my own shop, and within the Treasury and the Council of Economic Counselors, you see, would be working hard to get this thing, you see, off the ground quickly.
So the writers have to understand thoroughly
And then you can count on other countries stretching this thing out.
Maybe stretch it out to the end more than you would like.
I understand that, but I was wondering, how do we work out the United States negotiating position, whatever the hell it is?
You see, California doesn't have enough of a staff over there to work it out beforehand.
It doesn't have enough of a staff.
There is something else, Mr. President.
I'm not sure if Connolly is your best negotiator here.
He doesn't understand Harvard sufficiently.
Not although the, I don't know, really.
He doesn't understand Harvard sufficiently.
And he now has, now there's a certain opinion that Europeans have formed of it, you see.
And the opinion, I think, is two dimensions.
First, he's very tough.
That's good.
Second, he doesn't understand us, and that isn't good.
I don't quite know how to deal with that, because the fact that he's tough is good.
That's very good.
We haven't had much of that in this country in the last year or something.
In fact, we haven't had it since Dawson.
I think you have to make, I think, I think that a team to work with Connery will have to be set up and the State Department will have to be represented.
You know, Mr. President, the State Department can work around you and around us very easily.
And therefore they have to be a party to this.
I think that, yeah.
Well, you see, we've got a lot of people in this, Arthur.
We've got the council's in it.
You've got Peterson's.
I'm going to just stop the person that's interested in this problem.
They brought in the page department.
You've got the stage department.
You've got the commerce department.
You know, I would try.
I think I would have a group, a small group,
Perhaps no more than five or six.
Partly because of the, this has to be, these deliberations have to be secret.
You understand what I mean?
I don't know either.
I think you might.
I have a point, but I think that national economy is going to be in charge of it.
And what's the country?
What's the country in charge?
Sure, sure.
I don't know.
Like the O.P.
economy.
No, about the foreign policy dimension here, which has to be respected.
Who would you pick out of the state?
Sam is precise.
I would, I...
Samuel is more precise as an old State Department hand.
That's right.
He'd be better than me.
Exactly what you mean.
Samuel would be more dependable.
I think he'd be thoroughly dependable.
He may not be the strongest of the ageless man, but he's politically dependable.
Whereas Jesus is not.
Well, I have a question for him.
I have one.
I have one.
I have one.
He's an able-bodied owner, and the judge is not.
He's going to be with a bureaucracy.
Yeah, that's probably it.
Yeah.
Now, will he want Kissinger on the act or not?
I don't know.
Kissinger should be informed.
Yeah, he should be informed.
Because he's so close to you on questions.
Well, also, he will know all the political questions.
With Peterson there, you can sort of keep him.
Kissinger's got awfully good judgment on things like this, too.
What I meant is, he's smart enough to say something that I don't think about.
Yes, he does.
On the other hand, he just says, I don't know anything about it.
But he'll put in the heavy words, hey, look, you can't do this with the Germans.
You should do it with the French, or the British.
They'd better not talk that way or do something in particular with the Japanese.
You know, this is very important for Kissinger, maybe.
ought to stay in a meeting when you get further down the road.
I think actually, Mr. President, Kissinger ought to be the fairly active member of this group because... Have you learned about him?
Well, who doesn't learn about him?
He's got to protect your political interests in this whole question.
There's no sense
from your viewpoint, you say, in winning a certain domestic advantage and losing the main battle that you've been concerned with.
Losing the world, again, right?
That's it.
And nobody can do that in that group.
Let me ask you two or three points on this, because I want to ask you about one other thing.
I think you can see why I believe that it would be better for me to keep them social than to try to make a speech, as I am not ready to say anything on that.
It's useful.
The speech I wrote about it.
There is something that I will do there.
Remarks at the beginning.
They're sitting on it.
I can do that.
Well, I'm just thinking possibly having Schleuser come and see you in five or ten minutes.
Oh, that's...
that he feels hurt, that you've never received him, and that he's been neglected by you and by the others, and I don't know.
Well, you know, he's, I think he's becoming bitter, and this world, this world, it's a state of mind.
Who should I see with?
I'd see him alone.
Yeah.
and given a chance to talk and, uh, and seeing you alone was going to mean awful to him.
Now, a couple of things.
I am going to go to the... A couple of things make me feel unhappy about this.
Well, I... Well, you explain it to him, and after all, how does he think he's going to get the world out of me?
Me?
Well, you know how things are.
The President watches everybody else, and everybody watches the President.
That's right.
I want to ask you for one thing you would do.
I'm going to do the Detroit Economic Club in a Q&A first time.
I would like for you to prepare a brief, maybe two paragraphs,
answer to the inevitable question that will come up but what about what is the position of the united states what is it about this uh go for me you know you know what the questions are now i don't want to remember this will probably be televised nationally
So figure it's going into the house of morons.
And yet it will be listened to by very intelligent people, too.
Could you do a little thinking as to what you want me to say?
See, this will be Thursday, just before your meetings next week.
And I think it could be a very interesting point to prepare.
On the GO question.
Now, the GO question.
I don't know if anybody will ask the question that precisely, but the question more likely is to be the general question.
What about the concern that our friends abroad have expressed about our deserting international monetary club and so forth?
When a white and not
I'd have to get rid of the surcharge.
What is our position?
In other words, if you wanted to try to position me, where do you think I ought to be?
I've asked Conley to do a couple of thoughts, whatever he wants.
But I'd like an independent to send me over, and I'd like to have it if I could by tomorrow afternoon about 6 o'clock.
I'd have to start setting it tomorrow.
And send it over if you want to.
Send a call to me.
Right.
And just a little note saying this, and Rosa said, she's in California, but just send an order and say this is what the President asked for me and I'll get back to you.
And if I just, just some thoughts, I understand, put yourself in the position of my speaking group,
40, 40 million people out in the country.
So we've got to keep it fairly simple.
In other words, we're outgoing, we're ready to do it, and maybe do the thing in a couple of places where it would be very well taken abroad, but then not very simple to put it in.
Now, another point I want to make while we're here is just that
You know, we've been meeting with all these groups out here on the states, too.
Yeah.
And by the 30th of this month, the end of the month, right after this meeting, I've got to sit down and start making up my mind about that.
And I hope you can put your mind to some of the where we have to go.
There's no question that we already decided that.
We all know.
Most importantly, it must, there must be a phase two.
Somebody has said maybe phase two, maybe, maybe, but the more I, when you talk to congressmen and senators particularly, and of course the businessmen on one extreme, as I said, which are labor leaders who just regret everything they've done, congressmen, senators, business leaders, they want a damn tough phase two, very tough.
and uh you were there at the meeting of the uh the leaders well they hear this about 180 degrees away from the distribution the tripod i think was this leader like that but uh would you would you
And I don't want this to move, but give me your independent thinking on this that I could have mulling around in my mind, and if I could get that within a week.
See, I have to go to Alaska next week, next Sunday.
Now, of course, when we get down to what we're going to do, we'll all be here.
But you see, before we get down, I've got to have a, I've got to use, I've got to work on this thing.
But I can tell you this, I know we've got it right now.
This move that we made was right.
The freeze is right.
The following of phase two is right.
The budget actions, the tax actions, and so forth, they're all right.
But what will really put the icing on the cake, Arthur, is not a follow-up, but something that's meaning now.
that will mean something, psychological in particular, to the country.
Because I think we may get the benefit of the promise that way.
In other words, the freeze is kind of pretty god-deaf about affecting the cooling phase.
Yes, sir.
And so I ask more.
You should have got your mask on.
You know, what's it to my thinking is the simple thought that I presented at our last meeting here.
We'll freeze now.
Now we're going to move the bracket to the audience.
In other words, you would move to a 2A.
I wouldn't even call it 2A.
Well, I guess if I need the services, it must be put up.
It's correct.
If it's 2A, I don't want to call it that, but I can't.
No, I understand why.
Yeah, that's what I'm thinking about.
But if it's 2A, it's not 2A to be followed just by 2B.
It's 2A to be followed by 2B, by 2C, by 2D.
And what I think is most important is...
the machinery whereby the gradual relaxation will take place.
I see.
And before I left, I called Stein and told him, excellent man, yes he is, that the machinery, what I consider fundamental, is working out machinery under which gradual relaxation will take place.
And what he's done.
You agree it properly, haven't you?
Those fellows in the labor district, without their cooperation, it's difficult for them to work.
You know, if they're not cooperating, I must say, we're not getting on.
That's no good either.
If we wanted to have them work, then cooperation is more of a duty.
Well, I don't know what the polls show.
If the people are still with you, they're cooperating.
Right away, they're cooperating.
Well, look, you know, George and me and Andy and others, they started out fighting.
And then, you know, they brought the people to work.
Now, if you take, if you take, if you, if you, if you pass from the present freeze to the restoration of freedom, you lose the people.
You get to do the right thing.
Well, don't worry.
Oh, I know.
I know.
As a matter of fact, I want to freeze on right through the election.
Please.
Well, I may be wrong, but I mean, I want a curve to restrain.
Having gone this road, we've got to have another thing.
We may have to get out of this labor car.
They play too rough.
I think that what this race has demonstrated is that the thinking of the people has been ahead of the thinking of many of our politicians.
Unbelievable question.
They don't spoil the news.
If I won't graduate, I think you'll have people with you, and the label leaders will come around and go, and they'll press us, and we'll pass.
But as long as it's an honored person, it will happen.
Next time, send me a note.
If you will, then, a note.
As long as it's what I get, what you want.
I'm not going to share it with the president.
Inspector, I'll leave you with that.
Before the, well let me put it this way, before the, I don't need your money, I'll be flying back by, by Tuesday of next week, or Wednesday of next week, you're preliminary thinking with regard to phase two.
Fair enough.
It's time to go over.
Good.
Good to see you.
Bye.
  • 009-094 12:00 PM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 12:00 pm and 12:45 pm.
  • 576-012 12:01 PM · 39 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:01 pm and 12:10 pm.
  • 576-013 12:10 PM · 17 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Phyllis A. George, Laurie Lee Schaefer, Dorothy Chevager, Stephen B. Bull, Oliver F. ("Ollie") Atkins, and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:10 pm to 12:24 pm.
  • 576-014 12:24 PM · 17 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:24 pm to 12:25 pm.
  • 576-015 12:25 PM · 53 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald G. S. Au, Andre LeTendre, George T. Bell, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:25 pm and 12:44 pm.
  • 577-001 12:25 PM · 18 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald G. S. Au, Andre LeTendre, George T. Bell, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:25 pm and 12:44 pm.
  • 577-002 12:44 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 12:44 pm to 12:45 pm.
  • 009-095 12:45 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John N. Mitchell talked on the telephone from 12:45 pm to 12:46 pm.

Conversation 577-003, September 20, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/577-003 (accessed November 18, 2026).