Nixon phone call with Haldeman on Second term reorganization

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Ready with Mr. Haldeman, sir.

On the line.

Yes, sir.

What's the report?

Well, I just got back.

Spent an hour and a half with him.

And he's going to stay on.

He completely accepts all of the conditions, understands them.

That we'll go ahead with reorganization, that you will make the decision on all appointments, as we're doing in all departments.

promotions in the Foreign Service and any activity there has got to be based on loyalty.

And I hit the Yost thing hard.

Good.

That we've got to shift to working within the system, that we've got to get out of the president going through the agonizing role of being the referee and all this stuff, and that you've got to agree to work that out.

And it's got to be done.

And we have a clear understanding that the departure is June 1st or sooner.

And he said, absolutely.

He said, I just took June 1st out of the air, and it may be that it would be much better to go in May or even April.

But in any event, he said, I feel strongly I should go by June 1st, because I don't want to get started on the European Security Conference, because the new secretary should do that.

Right.

And also, it doesn't give the new secretary nothing we've got to think.

We can't ask a guy to take over in the job.

He's got to have his four years, that's the other thing.

Yeah.

I think after thinking it all over, I hit him pretty hard on all the stuff.

I said that it was kind of a surprise to go through the thing that we went through there because the understanding, the thought that you had had and I certainly had was that Bill intended to leave.

Right.

That there was no intention of anybody firing him.

It was a matter of confirming what we thought was the plan.

And he said, Well, I did.

It's not a question of that at all.

It's just timing.

Right.

Okay.

And I didn't want to look like I was being fired.

Right.

And then he goes into all his stuff about, you know, the usual same stuff he went through with you, the loyal Foreign Service, all of that.

But you correct him on Yost.

I sure did.

And, of course, he doesn't blame it.

He mitigates it by the

that old Moynihan Flappenhauer, you know, when he was— Right.

Byron said, Yost— Yeah, but Yost— If he had gone on the right grounds, he wouldn't have done this.

No, but Yost was disloyal before that.

Well, I said, you know, the guy didn't change his thinking as a result of that.

And, you know, sure, that probably aggravated the situation, but it didn't create it.

Good.

And he agreed with that.

I hit him hard on how rough it had been for you in some of these things where you've had to, on top of making the decisions and all, to get into a refereeing of a sparring match between him and Henry.

That you just couldn't perpetuate something that's going to work that way.

And he came back with the, you know, I understand that, but it's hard to work with Henry because he lies all the time, which is true.

And Henry admits that.

Then he went through some specific names and ideas and stuff.

But he's— Incidentally, I've sort of in my own mind come around to the view that we'll definitely make the ship from—to put the view of Laird's idea of putting H. E. W. Richardson over to defense.

We're going to have to really sell that to the committees on that, but I don't think they can object too much to that.

Well, especially with Clemens there.

Right.

And putting Cap on the other one.

I think Cap is going to really enjoy the other one.

ATW.

Sure.

Yeah.

He's more of my view.

That's all there is to it.

And on defense, I'll run the damn thing.

No.

Okay.

Anything further on the Colson matter?

No.

I haven't talked to him.

With your conversation with Connolly though, Connolly, was he very hard on it or thought we could do it either way?

No.

No, he wasn't hard on it, but he was very positive.

He just said, of course that's what you should do.

He didn't really see any—I made the Colson case.

He said, well, that's—he just sort of dismissed it out of hand.

He said, well, that just, you know, it isn't going to be a problem.

What's he think about the business of loyalty, I mean, to a fellow?

You know, we do have that problem, you know, loyalty to Colson.

Well, he thinks you're doing the right thing by moving him out.

So you're not damaging the loyalty.

because he thinks he sees the possibility that Colson is going to be a lightning rod further.

Yeah, and his point, though, is that even if he isn't, this is the time for him to do it.

You're doing the right thing.

That'll be obvious to him a little later.

Keeping him in for four or six months is going to deteriorate his position, not improve it.

Right.

And even Colson, in a sense, recognizes that when he makes the point that if he stays in, he's got to be promoted, moved over, and all that sort of stuff, which...

really isn't realistic, you're then in a really untenable position.

I think.

It's out of the question.

Because it doesn't fit into the whole scheme of the reorganization either.

That's right.

If that's the decision, then the only way to handle it with Colson and let me take the heat on it is and he'll do it.

But it's got to be done on just a straight, hard-line basis.

All the arguments have been thought through, weighed carefully.

There are obvious merits to both sides and so on.

On balance, the decision clearly comes down that for everybody's interest, the way to do it is to— And also say that his interests require that, despite what he says, that the president's concern when you raise him is this.

I don't want to have to turn my back on him at a later time.

And that's really the case, that there is a chance.

It's maybe one of five, but that's a hell of a big chance.

Now it can be done in the right way and we can have the proper relationship and I would appreciate his finding the men for us that we need.

Because we do need his IPR app.

And we'll count on him to make the recommendations and to set it up.

You see, in a sense, that gives him—by setting it up, it gives him the stroke over.

Also, tell Colson I'm very intrigued with the idea of Brennan for, say, transportation or something.

Okay.

You know, a labor guy in another position.

I think transportation's the only one that'll work, though.

Don't you think so?

It really is, yeah.

There's not much... You can't realistically do HUD.

And you can't... No, no, no, no, no, no.

It's too big.

And you can't do interior, because it doesn't fit that.

Right.

No other position is there.

That's really it.

Transportation is it.

But it's a good thing.

see whether we can't work that.

Most people say he's not qualified for it.

What do you think of that?

I think what you say is that we're going on the basis of people that are generally qualified.

You could say Richardson's not qualified for defense also.

But he's never been in the defense program.

He's a very capable man.

You're putting men in who can do the job, and they'll build the qualifications and the credentials.

They have the qualifications.

They just don't have the credentials.

Tell Colson, run that by Colson, if you would, fairly soon.

I'd like for you to get at it to, you know, say, look, that gives him a chance and we'll let him offer the job in effect, too.

Yep.

And that if he wants to take it, but he's got to be sure that Paul Hall will take it.

You know, that's maritime, okay?

Yeah.

Well, Henry says he's having some more problems with Tew.

He's kicking up his heels— All right.

—according to a line from Bunker and so forth, and wants to renegotiate this and that and a hell of a lot of other things.

And I told Henry, well, just go right ahead to Paris, get the very best deal he could, and then we're just going to have to, in my opinion, then say to Tew, this is it.

You don't want to go?

Fine.

Then we'll make our own deal, and you'll have to paddle your own canoe.

But don't you think that's what we have to do?

Let's see what else you can do now.

Right.

Well, it's a good deal.

That's the point.

The only thing is that what—the big thing we have here is that Debt II doesn't go.

Of course, it poisons the agreement to an extent and so forth and so on.

But then we have completed Vietnamization.

We have made a deal with the others.

We're getting out, and South Vietnam is strong enough

to vend itself and now it's up to South Vietnam.

If he collapses then there we are.

I don't think he'll collapse.

He's going to ride that out anyway.

Well, he will certainly collapse if he plays this thug in the manger thing.

And on that because the Congress is damn well not going to appropriate the money for him.

That's what it gets down to.

Yeah.

Well, we're going to tell him that again.

I wondered whether you were—you're going to stay down tonight then?

I'm going to stay down tonight and go over and go back up tomorrow at about—oh, perhaps tomorrow at around four o'clock.

Okay.

Well, I was planning to come up later on tomorrow evening.

Fine.

No problem.

I'll just go up tomorrow.

Start cracking them through again on Monday.

Right.

I talked to Len Garment a moment ago and asked him to come up tomorrow about 5 o'clock.

I thought we'd have him be open, but then I want to have a chat with Len.

Oh, good.

Okay.

Good.

So put him on the list.

All right.

Okay.

Is that to come Sunday or Monday?

Monday.

Okay.

Good.

All right.

Nothing else of interest at the moment, huh?

No, no.

I'm planning to do Flanagan on Monday and Klein on Tuesday.

Right.

Up there.

Yep.

Well, then they should come in and see.

And I think, well, I got to thinking, but first I said they shouldn't.

I think they should, because that's, you might as well get all this crap over with.

Right.

And if they don't come in and see, then you're going to have to do it later, which means it's hanging on your head.

That's right.

I think it's better to do it, wrap it up, get the trauma over with.

With Flanagan, it really isn't, we don't really have anything to offer him, have we?

Nope.

Because we really don't think he should stay, well, CIEP, but under Schultz.

Well, did you talk to Shultz about that?

No.

Okay, I'll check him on that.

If he wants, he could do that.

But that's what we're going to do if he wants to stay under those circumstances.

There's no problem of his staying, in my view, in the White House.

In that role.

But he's got to get out of his personnel-type roles and his agency-type roles.

Personnel and agency thing we're putting all over to ash.

Right?

Yeah.

And isn't that true?

Well, the agencies are divided up in different places.

The regulatory ones we're putting through John Dean.

Right.

So they're non-politicized.

But we're going to get it out of the political thing, right?

But Pete's got to understand they don't have CIEP alone, but to kind of realize that it's a different deal now.

Yep.

And we'll be glad to offer that, but no cabinet thing.

Okay?

Yep.

Fine.

But I don't see, you see, I see no problem having him stay in if he'll stay in under those circumstances now.

Right.

Does that change his title?

No, you leave it the same.

I think you have to leave it the same.

You can't leave it the same.

You could change it, but I don't think you can.

Well, we can leave the same.

Fine.

Okay.

Bye.

Very good.

Nixon phone call with Haldeman on Second term reorganization

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on November 18, 1972

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