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Conversation 033-099

TapeTape 33StartSaturday, November 18, 1972 at 12:45 PMEndSaturday, November 18, 1972 at 12:49 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss the stalled Vietnam peace negotiations and the obstructionist bargaining tactics employed by South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. Concerned that Thieu’s latest demands threaten to scuttle the agreement entirely, Nixon directs Kissinger to draft a firm letter emphasizing that the current U.S. aid programs will be jeopardized by the new Congress if a deal is not reached. The two leaders agree on the necessity of pressuring Thieu, acknowledging that the U.S. must take a tougher stance to force an resolution while avoiding an open, disastrous diplomatic break.

Vietnam WarPeace negotiationsNguyen Van ThieuForeign aidUS CongressDiplomatic pressure
AudioNARA Description

On November 18, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 12:45 pm to 12:49 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 033-099 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 33-99

Date: November 18, 1972
Time: 12:45 pm - 12:49 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Settlement agreement
                   -South Vietnam
                        -Possible US bilateral actions
                        -Aid programs
                              -Possible Congressional cut-off
                                    -Ellsworth F. Bunker
                        -US message to Nguyen Van Thieu
                        -Negotiating position
                              -Proposals
                                    -Vetting
                                    -Memorandum
                                    -Impact on final agreement
                                           -US reaction
                        -US efforts
                              -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s trips, Kissinger’s trips And Bunker’s
                              availability
                              -Letters
                              -Reception of emissary
                              -The President’s role
                                            - 102 -

                            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                        (rev. June-07)

                                                          Conversation No. 33-99 (cont’d)

                                    -Reading, drafting
                  -Final agreement
                        -Modification
                  -South Vietnam
                        -Negotiating stance
                              -US reaction
                              -Make-up of new Congress
                              -Thieu’s responsibility
                              -US assistance
                              -US response
                                    -Tone
                  -Thieu
                        -Blame
                  -Possible collapse of South Vietnam
                  -South Vietnam’s ability to handle agreement
                  -South Vietnamese control of South Vietnam
                        -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
                              -Map
                                    -Territory
                              -Control by Government of Vietnam [GVN]
                  -Thieu’s actions
                        -1972 election
                        -Bargaining Position
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Mr. President, I have Dr. Kissinger for you.
There you are.
In the event that we have to go bilaterally, the question that is raised is what then happens to the aid programs for South Vietnam.
That's right.
And I think what will happen is that the Congress then will... Cut them off.
Cut them off.
And I think...
We've made that clear to them.
Well, be sure Bunker makes it clear again.
What we thought, Mr. President, is we would draft a message from you to Chu saying, you see, what they've done here, I don't want to plague you with it, they have collected every comment they've ever made.
We are just now vetting it.
Yeah.
And put it into an endless memorandum.
Some we have already accepted.
Some are irrelevant because the text has changed completely.
One or two we can accept, but we've reached now a point where the accumulation of their proposal scuttles the agreement.
What we should do is send a message to them from you reciting all the changes we've already made.
Right.
And saying, we can only conclude that this latest message sent to us 24 hours before would have the objective consequence of scuttling the agreement.
It's no longer a negotiation.
And that's not acceptable.
And that we cannot accept.
That secondly, having sent Haig three times, me twice, Dunker always available at four letters.
you see no need to receive any uh emissary fully understand their position you've read every memorandum and every letter you have personally drafted the letter and that we're gonna it takes two to make a deal and there must be given taken both sides that i'm convinced that the agreement has modified and as we will modify it as a good one we can make it better but we cannot scuttle it and i will not do it and if if we don't give them some shock
this is just going to go on and on.
But that under the circumstances that I don't want it to come to the point where we have an open break about this, but we have to remember that even that I cannot with the makeup of the new Congress, I could say with the makeup of the new Congress, there is if we do not now go forward and get the agreement and
that then the responsibility for not getting it will fall upon him, and that the programs of assistance, military and economic, have not one chance of getting through the Congress.
Period.
That's right.
That's right.
Clear it right out there.
I think we have to.
Make it tough.
We have no choice, Mr. President.
Make it tough.
That's right.
we'll see they're bargainers they're bargaining just like this north and we'll see what they come up with exactly and frankly i'm i'm i'm just think you don't think you get all over more if suppose we do just go forward without him we can then by god we will blame him the record and so forth is small
Frankly, small solace in the event that South Vietnam goes down.
We don't want it to.
You see, that's the thing that bothers me about the whole thing.
I don't want to be right on a record.
What I want to do is to be right on what we achieve.
Well, what worries me, Mr. President, is that these guys are talking themselves into such a frame of mind where they may not be able to handle the agreement when it does come, even if they do agree to it.
What do you mean by that?
Well, if they conducted themselves aggressively, confidently, and positively, they would come out as the victors in this agreement.
I've had the CIA prepare a control map of South Vietnam as it stands today.
I'd put that in there.
And I must tell you, it is absurd.
95% belongs to the GBN.
We can't even find in most areas any North Vietnamese.
There'll be less if they conduct themselves aggressively, but okay, layer right out there.
We're going to play the game hard now.
He just acts as if the election has not been held, doesn't he?
He acts as if the election had not been held.
And as if he had a bargaining position.
That's right.
Okay, ride me if you're gonna be.
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