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Conversation 037-150

TapeTape 37StartSunday, March 18, 1973 at 10:12 AMEndSunday, March 18, 1973 at 10:13 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AudioNARA Description

On March 18, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. talked on the telephone from 10:12 am to 10:13 am. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 037-150 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 37-150

Date: March 18, 1973
Time: 10:12 am-10:13 am
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

       Vietnam
             -Intelligence evaluation
             -President's statement
                      -North Vietnamese reaction
             -North Vietnamese infiltration
                      -North Vietnamese claims
                                            - 104 -

                            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

                                        (rev. Sept-09)

                               -Medical supplies
                       -International Commission of Control and Supervision [ICCS]
              -Inspections
              -Peace Agreement violations
              -Intelligence
                       -Quality
                       -Tanks, guns
                               -US military aid
                       -Intentions of North Vietnamese
                       -       Nuclear weapons
                       -US response
              -Release of Prisoners of War [POWs]
                       -Logistics and scheduling
                       -Laos
                       -Hanoi
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello.
General Hicks here.
Hello.
Good morning, Mr. President.
Hi, Al.
Do you have any new evaluations of the intelligence this morning from where you sit?
No, sir.
I think there's nothing really significant.
What did you think of the North Vietnamese intelligence?
blasting my statement.
Yeah, I...
They're very sensitive about that, aren't they?
They are sensitive, and I think they obviously paid a great deal of attention to it.
You know, their line, Al, as you know, is that this is all medical supplies and that sort of thing.
Right.
We know that's incorrect, don't we?
Oh, yes.
Right.
As phony as it can be.
What about the, I mean, the ICCS and so forth?
We don't want to get them into this to check this out, huh?
uh no i don't think we're going to get anywhere with that they they just they're turning down one request for inspection a violation after another that's what i guessed yeah somebody asked me what i knew that it was i mean it's useless it's just just it's the same kind of a facade that the other one was uh it is although i i'm still not convinced that their intention is to
to do any more than write it as far as they can show.
I meant the ICCS thing.
As far as an instrument is not particularly effective, as far as policing the agreement, we've got to do it.
That's right.
Of course, we're trying to keep this four-party thing intact.
Right.
The way it seems to me is that in the light of having gotten their attention, though, and they're putting the AMSAs here that
We ought to continue to hold that decision until Wednesday, don't you think?
Oh, absolutely.
Even beyond that.
Because, basically, this thing is...
I sort of have, after my talk with you, the same uneasy feeling about our intelligence.
You see, the basic...
I don't have an uneasy feeling about...
in terms of, say, the fact they're putting in tanks and guns and that sort of thing.
We know the bastards will do that.
But let's face it, so have we.
That's right.
You know, they know it, right?
That's right.
We poured it in, and we poured it in before the ceasefire, and they've got to know that.
But the second point is that I'm not justifying them because they'll cheat and we won't now.
The second point is, however, that what the intelligence does not tell you is the key point we're discussing is what the hell are their intentions, right?
That's what, in other words, what they're up to.
If they can put in atomic bombs that are not going to use them, they're going to bother me.
That's the whole point, isn't it?
That's right, sir.
I think it's going to be hard in any event to get a real handle on their intentions.
That's right.
But I mean, my point is, that's why...
We cannot make a decision, that's what I'm saying, based simply on the fact that they have moved certain quantities and so forth, because first, the intelligence with regard to the movement is not all that accurate, but second, because the movement may have several different purposes.
Well, in any event, we'll have to take a hard look at it.
I think we should be able to pick up some change.
in the next week.
What is the situation now?
Are the last of the prisoners in North Vietnam out now already?
We've got the one batch here that's the cleanup.
What do we have left then?
I think we've got just about everything out now except for the last problem.
I see.
And we have, no, I'm sorry, we have one more batch.
This is the third group.
We have a fourth group to come out.
From Hanoi?
Yes, sir.
Yeah.
In other words, there have been four movements.
Fourth increment, yeah, right, right.
We've just now completed the third.
Right, right.
The fourth will start at the end of next week.
Right, right.
That's why they're looking towards Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.
Right, right, right, right.
Okay, well, we'll just continue to watch it.
Yes, sir.
Okay.
We've got an intensive.
Bye-bye.
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