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They are extremely sensitive .

They are very .

.

What is involved here is.

the negotiations on the petition that we're on.

We know that they have been hung up, stalemated, deadlocked for a year.

The essence of the deadlock, and I will oversimplify a very complicated situation, is this.

After we got past the point where we both realized that a comprehensive agreement at this time was not in the cards, we were our negotiators and the Soviet gave theirs the discretion to attest and negotiate a comprehensive agreement that was less than comprehensive.

The Soviet Union, as you have noted from news reports, has emphasized

that their interest is in negotiating an agreement which would limit defense discussions on it.

They discuss the other, but their interest is in limiting defense discussions, and that's natural.

But if we were to have a decision on one or two of the other things, that's an area where we're moving, and where at the present time they are not moving.

On the other hand, our interest was to be an entity that instructed .

When they went back to Vienna and earlier Helsinki had been to negotiate .

Now looking again at the interests of the two countries, there is an action which we would have to take.

So in the field of offensive weapons, they're moving, and we're not.

In order to break this

And I thought it was important to try to break it rather than through sessions that were taking place in the regular talks where a number of people had participated.

I thought that it was at least worthwhile to try at the highest level to break the deadline.

I was unable to inform, could not inform the people in our own government except, of course, for Bill, that we were, that I was sending, had sent a communication, or was sending a communication.

That communication went to them in early January, January 8th, as a matter of fact, and it had an effect.

It said that we felt that the time had come and that we were willing to report an agreement in which we would agree to limit our defensive weapons, our EDM.

return for their, well, and at the same, that both sides would agree to limit defensive weapons, that would be ADM on both sides, and that we would also, at the same time, limit offensive weapons.

And so far, as numbers were concerned, as you can see, that is not, it doesn't all bear on the table, all the other problems.

Great.

That was in January.

No progress was actually made on that situation that we thought was a neck and neck until Dobrynin returned from the Soviet Party Congress that we are trying to recall about four weeks ago.

at the time he came back, there was an indication on the part of the Stoke leaders.

They were now interested in reaching a joint understanding with the United States in which we would instruct our delegations, our so-called SALT delegations at Vienna and later Helsinki, to work toward an agreement limiting

the weapons of the, of the and also a limitation, for us to understand, a limitation with regard to the offensive weapons.

Now, as a result of those discussions,

which have culminated in the last 30 days, the Soviet government and the government of the United States will jointly issue the statement today at 12 o'clock, which I will read to you, and it will, of course, be repressed later.

It will be released in Moscow by a Soviet radio television at 7 o'clock tonight, which, of course, is 12 o'clock U.S. time.

This joint statement, I would like to say that I should tell all of you that we knew yesterday, as a matter of fact, yesterday morning, that the Soviets finally agreed that they should be issued at this time.

We did not inform anybody because we thought it was very important that there be a lead one.

Second, we did not inform anybody except, of course, Dell and others and NSC now.

We informed many legislators for a very fundamental reason.

If we had, it would look

like a power play with regard to the men's movement.

I think we all have to agree it was handled with very, very great skill by our people on our side, and I quite agree with Bill Rogers.

I love him in no way, and I know all of his work, and I certainly want to say we appreciate it.

This is the state of the issue today.

The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic remnants, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

They have also agreed that together with concluding an agreement to limit APMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it would create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic economies.

These negotiations will be actively pursued.

Now, let me indicate briefly what this is and what it is not.

This is a major step, a great mistake.

It does not, however, mean that an agreement has not been reached.

Both sides at the highest level are now committed to pursue this year reaching an agreement limiting defensive weapons and limiting offensive weapons in certain respects.

The work, the hard work, the hard negotiating process now goes forward.

It will go forward in Vienna and later in Helsinki with Smith, Jared Smith and his delegation on one side and Semenyuk and the Soviet delegation on the other side.

But without overstating the case, I can say that with this case being made today, with the commitment having thereby been publicly indicated that the governments at the highest level want an agreement,

in these areas, that progress in the talks could lead to an agreement.

Now, it seems, is a very good possibility.

Not a certain, but a very good possibility.

It will require, as I said, very, very hard, intensive negotiations, and we do not want to indicate that it's all done.

Assuming that we are successful,

in reaching agreement in this area, it will then mean that this will open the door to resolution of differences in other areas.

You say, what areas?

I cannot say.

But there are differences in other areas.

But if the two governments can work out differences in an area as fundamental to their national security as this area is, it could work.

It could be a very significant opening the door for approaches in other areas.

And the Soviets were aware of that.

And of course, we're aware of that.

The other point that, of course, is made is that

we feel that the

The achievement of this, in getting this far, I feel that getting this far is a result.

And I don't think anybody around this table except the people that are participating would know.

So, just frankly, doing the long, going through the long, hard process of developing an American position, fighting for it, sticking to it, being reasonable.

But then knowing what our, what we wanted, and then negotiating just as solely as what they wanted, negotiating in a way that we now, we can point to where there is a chance for very considerable success.

Bill, Mel, Vice President, John Mitchell,

and others, et cetera.

Hour after hour, we discuss salt.

I'd be opposed to this self-touching, but whether or not, and that made me more regretful.

Hillary Kessinger and I often talk about it in office, on this subject as well.

I've signed letters to Smith and so forth, and we always wondered whether we could make good comments.

We can only say this morning that

This statement, a joint statement by the Soviet Union and the United States in an area so important, is significant.

It is a first step.

It could be an exciting step.

and not only opening the door for agreement in this area but in other areas.

And we will actively pursue it.

It is important for us to remember that this is not a time to be quarreling about other matters.

We still have very good differences

There are differences, as Bill has pointed out in his report to you on the Mideast.

There are differences in Berlin.

There are differences in their attitudes toward, well, a number of processes.

And we also should know that this is not only not a timely for you, but it's also particularly, and Mel and I were talking about this yesterday, it's particularly a time when

in terms of our own ADM systems and our own arms, never has it been more important for us to continue to go forward until we get the deal.

Because, as you well see, if we, at this point, as a result of a possibility of an agreement, we should say, well, we'll come back to the ADM or we'll come back to our own programs.

their incentive for making the deal was so terrible.

And this scenario now is very hard on all the rest of us.

I'll just say a conclusion.

It had not been for the fact that we had A&M.

We bought and got it.

And the vice president decided to vote on that two years ago.

That we kept it last year and didn't have it put in escrow.

as some suggested, that frankly the United States would have had nothing to give in order to get something from the Soviets.

And with them, as it is with us, unless you've got, when you want something from somebody else, unless you have something to give, there is nothing you can get.

In this area, that is what happened.

There was something we had that they wanted.

There's something they're doing.

Their offense is over us and we want it.

And as a result of that, we have an initial and immediate situation to denounce you then.

So that is, I think, a fair summary of the situation.

I feel like we can turn to you now and see if you'd like to view it and talk about the matter of security and all that.

Mr. President, I think that Mr. Farmer said this is an extremely significant action on the part of our government.

And I think it does hold out hope that many of our problems can be solved.

At the same time, as the President has indicated, I think we have to be careful that it isn't overplayed.

Because if it does develop into an agreement, and certainly there's every indication that, hey, there'll be plenty of time then to claim full credit.

If we give it a very big ride here now, and then for some reason or other it doesn't work out, then we're going to be very embarrassed as administrations and the government.

So I would merely say this, that chances are that the developments will come fairly quickly.

So we don't have to wait a long while to see whether we have something or not.

Every indication is we do.

Several months, a few months.

A few months, so a few years.

So I would think that in all our discussions, prior discussions, we can say this is very hopeful, but we just of course want to wait to see a final agreement, etc.

Another thing I'd like to mention is that there, as you can see, is that language is a lawfully trade.

I'm scared we worked out between the two governments.

Part of this, I suppose, is translation probable.

The agreement that is referred to first, the M agreement, will probably be a retreat.

It will be very compiled in nature, where the other will be something other than that.

It would not be a retreat.

One would still be binding.

And I think there, in our discussion,

I'm trying to explain it better.

In other words, as we see it, the first probably ended up as a treaty, the other way of understanding.

And the two, in Russia and in Oregon, should not be linked and not part of the same agreement, but in fact they are, obviously, because the government's going to announce it the same time.

So it's a tricky business to make it clear that it's not part of the same package, and yet it's being done at the same time.

That's Russian diplomacy for you.

We have to go along with the gag, otherwise we could, uh, the reason, the reason, too, that that, you see, the ATMs, the ATMs, let's first, again, we couldn't even be talking about the possibility, the possibility of reaching some final agreement in a few months if we hadn't.

the enormous amount of work already been done, in other words, all these decisions.

The other would be an agreement between the two governments, but it would not be so precise

insofar as various elements of the treaty, in regard to verification and so forth, as to be submitted to the government of the treaty, but would still have the right to defend.

And it's a very important point.

We ought to be very careful that we don't give in to things that we've given up on an idea, as far as the treaty route on offensive limits or uncertainties.

I don't think we ought to come out

talk about that at this time.

I think it will be very interesting.

The question is, I think that the two are simultaneous and will be concluded simultaneously.

They are not separate in this extent.

The degree of formality is something that Jerry will have to work out, but I think it's two.

complex an issue for anyone except Bill to speculate on.

It's a very important.

The two, the agreement,

In the one hand, it will be so formal as to then go to Senate ratification, and the understanding, which will not be so formal at that point to go to Senate ratification, will be reached at the same time.

That is the understanding.

That's the fundamental point here, and the point that Jerry Smith realized in his speech earlier.

However, we should have in mind that, and I can say this here that we are, that we will continue to work once this initial

stage is passed, we continue to work then for a formalized agreement on the offensive weapons.

That is part, this is only, we don't stop here.

Mr. President, I would hope that along the lines that Mel was talking about, that we put in some little ballpark, like probably it will be a treaty on the ABN because

The more it's sure that it's going to be a treaty, the harder it's going to be to get an offensive part of it in a formal fashion.

So I'd like to have the public question, probably it'll be a treaty, but it's not very certain.

Mr. President, as I said on that point, that I think that there's going to be obviously tremendous effort to find out what this is all about, try to clarify it.

And our role is not to clarify it.

The whole point is not deliberately, it's deliberately, it's deliberately not clear because basically we're not to that point yet.

And the way it seems to be handled in conversations, it's a delicate matter to all the future security of our country that it should be up to the negotiators.

That's why we have them.

It's a time for quiet diplomacy.

Let them handle it.

Let's not negotiate it in public.

Let the negotiators negotiate it.

Could I just say a word?

I have indicated here a little of the process where we got this far.

Everybody in the government take the position

That is, they say, well, how did this all happen?

There wasn't even the highest level.

How did all of this close down?

All those who had responsibility for this thing, period.

We're not going to open up anything because then you get into this as well.

Did we do it through this agency or that one or the other and so forth and so on?

And that is something that the Russians would be very sensitive about in the future.

very sensitive.

It would serve no interest of ours.

So we want to just close down the curtain right there and say we have an identity, we have an understanding, we're just set forth in this statement of agreement and we go on from here.

That's what I'm saying.

Where do we go from here?

That's a matter that we're not going to speculate on.

We're not going to speculate on because that's a matter that

it will be left to the negotiators at Vienna and later at Helsinki.

And the speculation on that would tend to tie the hands of our negotiators and they need a great deal of flexibility in this area.

Does that satisfy what you're here for, Mr. Chairman?

Sounds great.

I think the breakthrough here, Mr. President, is for the first time we have a negotiated framework, and this is important.

We have not had any framework before.

This is a major breakthrough in this area.

Mr. President, I think there's one other thing we have to keep in mind.

Our allies, when there's any sign of hope, run very fast.

They think everything's fine.

All the problems we were in are behind us now.

I think that's true in Scandinavian countries.

We've got to be very careful now that the whole thing doesn't move too fast.

We've got mutual balance books.

We've got all of those things.

Now there's going to be tremendous efforts to do everything overnight.

And I can see those NATO ministers now, Morrill, Mel, all saying, well, now we've got the U.K. front and all the rest of it.

So we've got to be very careful.

For example, in my public statement, I had a qualified phrase, and I said, let us understand that very intensive negotiations are now required.

before we reach a degree.

And we have to remind all of us that just the last time there was a spirit of detente in Europe.

There was a spirit of detente.

Everybody talked about it.

The Mayo people were very enthused about detente.

Right after that second spot, it occurred.

So we have to keep in mind there's always a possibility that something else is going to happen and we wonder.

We want to be careful about how we phrase

It's a very good point.

I think it's very important not to overstate this.

That's why, let me say that when I go out to read this statement, I'm going to say this in a sentence in front, in a sentence in back, and no more.

You're always tempted to say, gee, this is the end of, this is that bill.

It will be next.

You've got to indicate that there's some hope now.

I mean, this is a law that's been taken.

The bill couldn't be more right.

We have too many people.

I don't want to get into that.

Too many people.

I didn't stay in the Senate.

I would say, well, because of the duty time and so forth, why do we still have to have the drafts?

Why don't we wait?

They love to put the draft in escrow.

Someone will try to take a walk on ABN, too.

Well, on that one, I think you've got to postcard it.

If anybody takes a walk on ABN, this deal is up and running.

It is depending.

Maybe 40 years.

Mr. President, I don't know if Mr. President is having some sense of what is involved in this.

Mr. President, it is extremely exciting and very encouraging as well.

I certainly understand the considerations that have been touched on about

these pitfalls of going into or attempting to sell it in speculation about what it means, what may come out of it, and the necessary ambiguities, therefore, in the language.

But it does seem to me that the other side of that point is the question, well, then, why is an announcement being made?

I think Mel's pointed it out.

The real breakthrough is that a framework has now been established for the negotiations.

So this may be part of the answer, but I think it would be useful to have a little more color on that, because if on the one side we say, well, we can't go into that, you know, then why did you say anything is the next question.

Well, I think the answer to that, I hope it's going to be quite clear, that is.

We have been pushed all the time.

Well, what we did, they said, why don't you have an ABM order?

This has been, everybody, when you go up there and you question, that's what they said.

Why not have, and the President said, you know, you have to have both.

Now for the first time, the Soviet Union says, okay, we'll have both.

They say it in a way that gives them a little hedge.

That's why the two sentences.

But, in effect, they've come around our position.

Now, we don't have control over that too much, but any sophisticated person is going to know that's what's happened, that they have backed away from the ABM only, and are willing to combine the ABM with offensive weapons, which is a very significant

in effect, a victory for the president, because that's the position he's taken all along.

We don't want to say it too much.

Why are you told that they wanted to renounce it themselves?

I mean, is it... Well, of course it is.

They're not going to tell you.

Why haven't they told us that the whole union is jointly at the same time?

We haven't had any of our business administration.

That's quite the thing.

Major international partners, U.S., U.S.S.R. Why should we try to answer that with a bit of evidence?

especially in the industry, there's pretty obvious answers that might bother you.

The answer is that it just does what you're trying to do.

That's pretty much it.

I think it's great.

I don't see, I just want to get some, you know, I would have thought from, I don't know, all the words.

that I was involved in and saw that at the end of me as I had felt was just about useless.

I think this is a tremendous thing and I, most tremendous about it is tremendous that we get particularly a view of the fact that as Mello's been pointing out, they're going like crazy on offensive weapons and we're not building any.

Oh, one other point that should be made.

Questions will be raised as well.

Does this cover MIRV?

Does this cover this or that?

The other thing, the answer is we have no discussion on those points.

Those are subjects for negotiation.

Mr. President, it must be very clear.

Do not go beyond what the statement says.

Well, in the course of the discussions that you'll have on it,

in the statement and what comes out in the interrogation of the Secretary of State.

Will it become apparent that you're talking about, in the ABM area, a treaty?

It seems to me that the minute that comes out, the next question will be, will the offensive thing eventually be a treaty?

And then they're going to try to get in there and

the fact that there's something different between the two and that they have really capitulated to the Soviet positions.

Will there be anything said about a treaty which seems to have nothing to be gained?

I think Jerry Smith just got the answer.

We shouldn't try to deal with that.

That's what the statement says in reverse.

I don't think any cabinet member should speculate on what subject is going to be in the treaty.

It's too complicated.

This is the second thing.

This is within the framework of the August Court negotiations, which we have confirmed.

This doesn't expand the basic proposal.

It contracts the area to the face.

But precisely because each of these issues has a special technical meaning that people tend to qualify to answer it, really only Bill and Jerry and anything else is just going to emel and get us into highly technical

It seems to me that it's good to have a discussion here.

It's a gracious question.

It seems to me that the less about the

what goes on from here, the better.

Now, let me say we've been criticized for not telling more about what was going on up to this point.

Well, frankly, the reason is that until you get some sort of an agreement talking about it, it could only have the effect of reducing the chances of getting the agreement.

That's one thing we've got to understand in international affairs.

Now, at this point, I think,

As I said, there are two areas that there should be no conversation on.

How do we get this place?

And how do we go from here to there?

I think we should simply say that these are matters for negotiation.

But this does involve the vital principle of , which we have not had previous.

The simultaneous nature of this that I think all of us realize is enormous.

Gary, do you agree with that?

Now, you, Bert, but looking at it from the standpoint of negotiations, what do you feel, what would help you the most?

To say nothing, of course, but you can't say nothing in this town.

Mr. President, I think the fact that this announcement is going to give very strong, specific impulse to our negotiation.

I don't have any words beyond that announcement.

Is it needed or would it be helpful?

Mr. President, I didn't ask that question for personal guidance, because I have no knowledge of what you're saying.

I really was wondering, because I misunderstood the statement, but

It did seem to put, or maybe what you said, in qualification or addition to it, seemed to put the treaty, put the offensive and the defensive thing in two different contexts.

Well, it does.

It does only in this sense.

Could we ask again, please?

Sure.

The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitations of these agreements, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement

for the limitation of the deployment of animalistic missiles.

They have also agreed that together with the, that together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree

on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive weapons.

Well, that's pretty clear that you're going to have two agreements at the same time.

Now, what Bill's referring to earlier was merely the specifics.

What is the order of magnitude of the agreements?

Well, as a matter of fact, it could be said

that if things move, we cannot say at this point that the offensive lane is not pretty far off.

Who can know?

So you, Henry, do you have any comment on that?

I think that the area for man is very, very open in those states.

And it is there for us, the negotiators, to determine the degree of formalities that they should give.

It's in two senses because the Soviets had to go back from their original position that no offensive weapons could be discussed at all.

And simply to lump them would have been too very- But too much of an open discussion.

Of the agreement.

I think it's something that Bill and Jerry will work out in the detailed negotiations.

And that we should not now speculate on.

I don't think we,

will be under any pressures from the public or really from both the members of Congress to say anything about it.

It's obviously very significant.

And the best thing to do is to say, let's wait and see how it develops now.

The two governments have spoken.

I agree with that 100%.

But let me say this for your clarification's sake.

8PM works out the, whatever the agreement is, can be a final agreement.

And it will cover 8PM's firing.

Whereas the offensive missiles, it looks to the future and says we're going to make an agreement on that and we're going to continue to work out a more

far-reaching agreement.

So that's why the form is a little bit different.

I hear again there's a final one where it's an offensive one.

The only point I was making is that the word treaty surfaces anywhere in that area.

That's where the word treaty is.

The red flag was in the state of the college system.

Did you have something?

I didn't.

Anybody else?

Mr. Trafford.

Just speaking as a senator, I hope Mel will emphasize the necessity of the continued need for the ADN because there may be a few supporters who see this as a signal for us.

I'll say a harder line than that was before.

Hard, okay.

Bob, if any senators press this now, they'll have to have a bullet in their head.

This is the argument.

The reason that the president has been able to do this is because you were right and they were wrong.

No, we've never had this kind of agreement with both senators.

No way.

Right, right.

If this proves out, many of the statements we made in our testimony out there, and the importance of the ABM book, we're in a very good position on that.

I think it's, if I can say so, that this is a very, I think we need some leaders a little later.

give them an opportunity to support this.

Others, I mean, I'm not referring to the chairman or others, it's what they say, but my point is that here, we have, and if they do not see it now, then it means that

Not only their intelligence is such a question, but something else.

Well, I think they showed in their votes, and to the resolution itself, they understand this kind of negotiation statement.

It helps a lot.

John, you're a new, John Connolly, you're a new person around this table on this and you weren't meant to do this all.

You're just, you're just, you think we're doing things the right approach in our public presentation.

Thank you so much, but I'm very, very, you know,

and be treated as such, frankly, I think most of us know more than we need to know now, I think.

Too many of us don't know anything about it, we shouldn't say anything about it.

I just think it's important.

Everything will be treated as such, and those of you who understand it and know it should explain it.

It's very important, I personally think that.

I think it's very important that the only ones who have any discussion here should be ones that are highly knowledgeable.

Let me say, I'm not going to have any discussion.

I mean, with the speakers, it's going to be a very good meeting in this one.

But it should be basically Bill Rogers, Mel Laird, it should be Henry Whitehouse, and of course Jerry Smith from his team.

Now that's enough.

If others get into it and start to interpret it and so forth and so on, don't try to give color.

This is one of those areas you don't have to give any color.

I'll just forget all that stuff.

Would you like to say something that the Chiefs have said?

No, sir.

I think it's in line with the position of the Chiefs.

I think it's certainly significant to move ahead in all the possibilities.

I do think so that one must recognize the fact that Gary Smith has a very difficult job and all that sort of stuff.

reach a concrete agreement.

But in my opinion, this is the way to go.

The difficulty in particular is going to be on the offensive side.

As you say, the defensive side is quite simple.

Well, it isn't quite simple either.

It isn't even.

It involves which defense is sitting there.

And that's subject to negotiation, and that question is raised.

Let me say it, just to give you an indication of what kind of sticky ground you can get in here.

People say, well, what about Haiti?

Are you talking about national command centers or safeguards?

The answer is, we're just not going to discuss that.

Right, Jerry?

Is that the position? 100%.

What is the solution?

Don't tell us.

Well, I just want to say that while he is here, that we naturally don't have a lot of other members of our cabinet now, but I think that I really feel that Jerry Smith and his colleagues, and I'm going to meet with them before they leave tomorrow,

And I should, actually, after making the statement.

But they have waited over there, listened to these arguments and so forth and so on for a year and a half.

They've been in Helsinki in the summer and Vienna in the winter.

At least they would have been in Helsinki in the winter, too, if I hadn't intervened.

That was the first agreement we got with the Soviets going to Vienna, which was some accomplishment for them.

But they've had a hard time.

I told Gary yesterday that

I met a group of women that I really sympathize with, and I'd sit there and hear the same old arguments over and over again.

And I said, I said, the only person that I know in the whole diplomatic service that has the more confrontational, the indelible job that you and your colleagues have is Bruce in Paris.

Because he hears the same arguments, he makes the same speech each week, the same speech.

Jerry says that isn't the case.

And this, may I say on a serious note, while we are far apart in the negotiations in various ways, the significant thing about these negotiations today is, one, the United States has never gone into an international conference of this sort better prepared, knowing what we were for, and able to discuss it chapter and

The Soviet Union in the first round was not as well prepared.

They are not very well prepared.

And Kerry indicates that, well, we are still far apart, that both sides have negotiated very seriously, very toughly, and these are up to this point giving anything except this temporary state.

That would be a fair statement, Kerry.

All right.

Well, we'll have to finish those with a collection.

Get out of here.

That's what a truck is for all three of us.