Nixon, Agnew & Dent on SALT negotiations and US-Soviet relations

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Nixonand they have been extremely sensitive about the matter. Therefore, any kind of a premature announcement was made, they'd want to pull out of their leaks and braces, and they are very—not great friends. They're pretty tough on leaks. They don't break them.

NixonAnd so our discussion this morning, historically, between this room, we'll brief the legislative leaders, and Henry will follow up with the same detail. He has on the other hand, of course, the briefings of course on the Soviet [unintelligible]

NixonNow what what is involved here is negotiations on the limitation of nuclear armaments. As you know, they have been, how about, stalemated, deadlocked for, oh, over a year.

NixonThe essence of the deadlock, and I will oversimplify a very complicated situation, was this: after we got past the passive point where we both realized that a comprehensive agreement at this time was just too huge and too complicated,

Nixonwe we and our negotiators, and the Soviets gave theirs the the the instruction to attempt to negotiate a comprehensive agreement, but it was less comprehensive. And the Soviet government, as you have noted in their in news reports, has emphasized

Nixontheir interest is in negotiating an agreement which would limit defensive weapons only. Uh they discussed the other, but their interest has been in the defense of defensive weapons. And that's natural. They want us to do other things. That's an area where we're moving

Nixonand where, at the present time, they are not moving with regard to [unintelligible].

NixonOn the other hand, our interest has been, and we have had and have instructed Amb. Gerry Smith this spring, when they went back to Vienna, and earlier at Helsinki, again to negotiate on the arms limitation that included both defensive and offensive weapons.

NixonNow looking again at the at the interest of each country, that's actually the position we would have to take because in the field of offensive weapons, they're moving and we're not. So you have a stalemate, a deadlock.

NixonTheir interest, and looking at their own, we understand it, would be to control what we are moving on. And our interest would be to limit what they are moving on. So, temporarily, we crashed into each other.

NixonNow, in order to break this this deadlock, and I I felt it was important to break try to break it rather than through sessions that were taking place. In order to break into the talks where a number of people participated,

NixonI thought that it was at least worthwhile to try at the highest level to to break the deadlock. I I have been unable to discuss, could not discuss it with people in our own government, except of course with Bill, that

NixonI would handle sending, had sent a communication, was sending a communication to the Soviet leaders on the highest level. That communication went to them in early January, January 18th, matter of fact. And it in effect

Nixonsaid that we felt that the time had come and that we were willing to work toward an agreement in which we would agree to limit our defensive weapons, our ABM, and in return for their—well, and at the same time, both sides would agree to limit defensive weapons, that would be ABM, on both sides,

Nixonand that we would also at the same time limit offensive weapons insofar as numbers were concerned. As you can see, that is not that's not comprehensive, and all the other problems that we have would remain.

NixonThat was in January. No progress was actually made on that situation that that leads that we thought was significant until the Brezhnev return from the Soviet Party Congress.

NixonThat, you recall, was about a month or three weeks ago. At that time, we came back the communication on the part of the Soviet leaders they were following up and reaching a joint understanding with the United States

Nixonin which we would instruct our delegations, our so-called SALT delegations, at Vienna and later at Helsinki, to work toward an agreement limiting the weapons of the of the defensive nature, and also a limitation

Nixonor mutual understanding or an agreement with regard to offensive weapons. Now, as a result of those discussions

Nixonwhich culminated five days ago, the Soviet government and the government of the United States will jointly issue this statement today at 12:00. I will read it to you, and I will, of course, read it to the press later, then.

NixonIt will be It will be released in Moscow by on Soviet radio and talk at 7:00, which corresponds to 12:00, U.S. time. This this joint statement

NixonI would like to say that in fact that we we know just a matter of fact this morning that the Soviet finally agreed that this should be out at this time.

NixonWe did not inform anybody, because it was very important that there be no leak, one. Second, we did not inform anybody else, except, of course, Mel and others in the NSC now. We didn't inform the legislators, for very fundamental reason: if we had, it would look like a power play

Nixonwith regard to the Mansfield amendment. It's an amendment, I think we all have to agree, was handled very, very skillfully by our people on our side, and our friends. I think Bill Rogers lobbied tremendously. Now, there are I know all of them of course carried a certain amount of leadership.

NixonThis is the statement that is issued today: "The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year

Nixonon working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. They have also agreed that together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

NixonThe two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic weapons. These negotiations will be actively pursued."

NixonNow let me indicate briefly what this is and what it is not.

Nixona huge step breaking stalemate. It does not, however, mean that an agreement, an instrument, one, a treaty, whatever we call it, [unintelligible] has, at last, been reached. What it does mean is that

Nixonboth sides, at the highest levels, are now committed to pursue this year reaching an agreement limiting defensive weapons and limiting offensive weapons in certain respects. The work, the hard work, the hard negotiating process, now goes forward.

NixonIt will go forward in Vienna and, later, in Helsinki with Gerard Smith and his delegation on one side and Semenov and his Soviet delegation on the other side.

NixonWithout, without overstating the case, I can say that with the with this statement being made today, with the commitment having thereby been publicly indicated that the governments at the highest levels want an agreement in these areas,

Nixonthat progress in the talks which could lead to an agreement now becomes a very good possibility. Not certainly, a very good possibility. It will require, like this, very, very hard, heavy negotiations [unintelligible] that it's all done.

NixonAssuming that we are successful in reaching agreement in this area, it will then mean that this will open the door to a resolution of differences in other areas.

NixonYou'll say what areas? I cannot say, but there are differences in other areas, but if the two governments can work out differences in an area as fundamental to their national security as this area, it could work. It could be very significant in opening the door for approaches in other areas,

Nixonand the Soviets are aware of that, and, of course, we are aware of that. The other point that, of course, can be made is that the we we feel that the that the achievement of this, getting this far, I am for getting this far, isn't solved,

Nixonand I don't think anybody around this table, except the people that have participated, will know it's solved, just, frankly, doing the long going through the long, hard process of developing an American position, fighting for it, sticking to it, being reasonable,

Nixonbut then knowing what our what we wanted and then negotiating, just as the Soviets did what they wanted, negotiating in a way that we now think, why, for there is a chance for very significant success.

NixonBill, Mel, Vice President, John Mitchell, and others sat around this table, hour after hour, and we discussed SALT. I think most of us felt after they'd gotten into it that we'd never reach this point. Henry Kissinger and I often talked about it in this office,

Nixonand this and have been on this subject several and signed letters to Smith and so forth and so always wondered whether anything would come. We can only say this morning that this statement, a joint statement by the Soviet and the United States in an area so important, is significant.

NixonIt is a first step. It could be a decisive step in not only opening the door for an agreement in this area, but in other areas, and we will actively pursue it. It is important for us to remember, however, that this is not a time for euphoria. In the matter of demands, we still have very

Nixonsignificant differences with the Soviet Union. Their differences in the Middle—as Bill has pointed out, so effectively, on the Middle East, their differences in Berlin, their differences in their attitudes toward, well, a number of problems, and we also should keep in mind one other thing, is that this is not only not a time for euphoria,

Nixonbut it's also, particularly—Mel and I were talking about this yesterday, it's particularly a time when, in terms of our own ABM systems and our own arms, never has it been more important for us to continue to go forward until we get the deal,

Nixonbecause, as you well see, if we, at this point, as a result of a possibility only of an agreement, you know, we should say, "Well, we'll cut back on the ABM or we'll cut back on our own programs." Their incentive for making a deal is totally removed.

NixonAnd this is an area where Mel is going to have to work very hard and all the rest of us, particularly with the—get the the I'll I'll just say the illusions, had it not been for the fact that we had ABMs, we fought and got it, and the Vice President was there to decide the vote on that, wasn't it, two years ago?

NixonThat we kept it last year and didn't have it put in escrow as some suggested that, and frankly, the United States wouldn't have had nothing to give in order to get something. And with them, as it is with us,

Nixonunless you've got When you want something from somebody else, unless they you have something to give, there's not going to be, you can't. In this area, that is what happened. There was something we had that they wanted, there's something they're doing and they're always fascinated to know what we want. And as a result of that, we've had this initial, intermediate stage,

Nixonwhich we'll announce today. So that is, I think, a fair summary of the situation. Bill, I didn't mean to turn to you now to see if you like to if you would like to talk about things in the matter of security now, et cetera.

RogersWell, Mr. President, I I think that what you've said, this is a extremely significant uh action on the part of both governments, and I think it does hold out uh hope that many of our problems can be solved.

RogersAt the same time, as the President indicated, I think we have to be careful that it isn't overplayed uh, because if it does develop into an agreement, and certainly there's every indication it may, there'll be plenty of time then to claim full credit. If it If we give it a very big ride now and then if for some reason or other it doesn't work out,

Rogersuh then we're going to be very embarrassed in the administration, the government—is good for the government. So, I I would merely say this, that chances are that the developments will come fairly quickly. We don't have to wait a long while to see whether we have something or not. Every indication is we will.

NixonSeveral months. Month, few months.

RogersFew months.

NixonIt won't be a few years. That's the whole point.

RogersSo, I would think that if we in all our discussions, private discussions, we can say this is very hopeful, but we, of course, want to wait and see uh for an agreement, et cetera. Another thing I'd like to mention is that the as you can see, this language is a little awkward in phrase. That's carefully worked out between the two governments, and part of the reason, of course, is uh translation problems both.

RogersThe uh the agreement that is referred to first, the ABM agreement, will probably be a [unintelligible] treaty, and it will be really formal in nature, whereas the other will be something other than that. Uh would not be in treaty form, but still would be binding,

Rogersand I think there, if anybody's

Unknowndoes mean that they're trying to explain it. In other words-

RogersIn other words, uh we say, the first will probably end up as a treaty, the other may be an understanding. And the two and that in respect to both, whatever that should not be linked and not part of the same agreement, but yet, in fact, they are, obviously, because the governments wouldn't have announced it at the same time.

RogersSo, it's a tricky business to make it clear that it's not part of the same package, and yet, it's being done at the same time, and that's that's the rush in the policy. But, we have to go along with the gag, otherwise, we could, uh, tip over the apple cart.

NixonThe reason the reason, to a certain detachment, you've seen the ABM, the ABM, uh, love that. But, that's first again. We couldn't even talk be talking about the possibility, the possibility of reaching some final agreement in a few months

Nixonif we hadn't, an enormous amount of work already been done. In other words, all these physicians, the very state, that physicians, we have physicians, and so forth, they cover everything. When you get on that, what is the issue of bringing the it would be a treaty, which will be submitted to the Senate.

NixonThe the other would be an agreement between the two governments, but it would not be, it would not be so precise, insofar as, uh, the various elements of a treaty in regard to verification, and so forth, as to be submitted to, in regard to a treaty,

Nixonand it would still have the binding effect, uh, and it's a very important one. Is it it is, that's what

LairdYeah, I think that would be awful fuzzy and then last, uh, and we we ought to be very careful that we don't give any indication that we've given up on an idea as far as treaties are on on offensive limitations are concerned. I don't think we ought to come out and talk about that, is this kind of a [unintelligible] very dangerous.

SmithMr. President, there's no doubt that, uh, I think, uh, everyone the two are simultaneous, and would be concluded simultaneously, and they're not separated in that sense. The degree of formality is something that Gary and [unintelligible] have to work out, but I think it's too complex an issue for anyone except Bill to speculate on.

NixonYeah. It's a very it's a very important The the The two, the the the agreement in the one hand, it will be so formal, as to then lead to Senate ratification, and the understanding, which will not be so formal, at that point, to go to Senate ratification,

Nixonwill be reached at the same time. That is the understanding. That's the fundamental point here, and the point that Jerry Smith realized since since the negotiations were fighting for. However, we should have in mind, that,

Nixonand I can say this here, that our that we will continue to work, once this initial stage is passed, we can continue to work then for a a formalized agreement

Nixonon the offensive weapons. That is part and that that and this is only We don't stop here.

RichardsonMr. President, I would hope that, along the lines of Mel was talking about, that we put in some little qualifier like probably it will be a treaty on the ABM because the more it's sure that it's going to be a treaty, the harder it's going to be to get the offensive part of it in a formal fashion.

RichardsonSo, I'd like to have the public questioning Probably it'll be a treaty, but it's not completely certain.

RogersMr. President, to tie in with that point, I think that there's going to be a obviously, tremendous effort to find out what this is all about, and try to clarify it. And our role is not to clarify it. And the whole point is not [crosstalk] deliberately It's deliberately, It's deliberately, uh, not clear, because basically we're not to that point yet.

RogersAnd the way you can, it seems to me, handle it in conversation is that it's a delicate matter. It's solving the future security of our country, and that it should be up to the negotiators. That's why we have them. It's a time for quiet diplomacy. Let them handle it. Let's not let's not negotiate in public. Let the negotiators negotiate it.

NixonWell, on two points, could I could I just say a a word? One, there should be uh I have I have indicated here, uh, a little of the process of how we got this far.

NixonLet me say that as we I want everybody in the government to take the position that is, they say, "Well, how did this all happen? Where did all this happen? The whole state department? There wasn't an issue at the highest level. How did all evolve?" Uh,

Nixonclose it down. And, all those who have responsibility for this may, period. Do not, it we're not going to open up anything because then you get into the business of, "Well, did we do it through this agency or that one or the other and so forth and so on?" And and that is something that the Russians would be very sensitive about, very sensitive.

NixonIt would serve no interest of ours and the Soviets. We want to just close down the curtain right there and say, through the init- we have, we have an understanding, which is that foreign minister's statement, and the agreement, and we go on from here. That's one. Second, where do we go from here?

NixonThat's a matter that we're not going to speculate on. We're not going to speculate on because that's a matter that it will be left to the negotiator at Vienna, and later back at Helsinki. Uh, and the speculation on on that, uh, would tend to tie the hands of the tie the hands of our negotiators.

NixonAnd they need a great deal of flexibility in this area. That's, that's that's the way I work your point, Jerry.

SmithSounds first rate.

LairdI think the breakthrough here, Mr. President, is for the first time we have a negotiated framework. We have not had any framework before this agreed upon by both sides, and this is the major breakthrough in this thing.

RogersMr. President, I think there's one other thing we have to keep in mind, and our allies, when there's any sign of hope, run, you know, very fast. They think everything's fine, and all the problems are behind us now. Particularly, that's true with Scandinavian countries, and Belgium, and some of the other [unintelligible]. So, we've got to be very careful now that the whole

Rogersthing doesn't move too fast that, you know, mutual balanced force reductions, all those things. Now, there's going to be tremendous urge to do everything overnight. And I can see those NATO ministers now, for all- on May 11th, so the whole thing, "Well, now we got, uh, détente and all the rest of it."

RogersAnd, uh, oh, so we've got to be very careful about that. Have that in mind in public statements. I I have that in all my conversations. So, let us understand that very intensive negotiations are now required before we reach an agreement. And we have to remind you all of us that just the the last time there was a spirit of détente in Europe, [unintelligible]

Rogersthere was a spirit of détente, everybody talked about it, and NATO people were very deuced about détente, right after that, Czechoslovakia occurred.

RogersSo, we have to keep in mind that that's a possibility, you know, that something else is going to happen, and we want to we want to be very careful about how we phrased the things we say regarding

NixonAll right. I think it is very important not to overstate this. That's why, let me say that, uh, I, when I go out to read this statement, I'm going to say this, with a sentence in front, and a sentence in back, and no more. And you're always tempted to say, "Gee, this is uh this is the end of uh this and that." Well, well,

Nixonit will be, actually, but, you indicate, Jerry, there's some hope now. I mean, it's this so obviously it's been taken, but Bill couldn't be more right, because the we have too many people, not only in NATO, but too many people in the United States Senate who would say, "Well, because of this, because of the new détente and so forth, why do we still have to have the draft?

NixonWhy do we, why don't we wait? They still have put the draft in escrow."

LairdSome of them will try to take a walk on ABM, too.

NixonWell, on that on that one, I think you've got a total argument. If anybody takes a walk on ABM, this deal is off the wagon. It is pending being voted.

UnknownI certainly understand the considerations that have been touched on about the pitfall of going into or attempting to fit into speculation about what it means and what it makes come out of it.

UnknownAnd the necessary ambiguity is therefore is in the in the language. But it does seem to me that the other side of that point is the question, well, then why is an announcement being made?

UnknownI think Mel's point that it is the real breakthrough is that a framework has now been established for the negotiation of It maybe it may be far the end, but I think it would be useful to have a little more color on that because if on the one side we say, well, we can't go into that, you know,

Unknownwell then why did you say anything is the next question.

UnknownI think the answer to that, though, is going to be quite clear and that is we have been pushed all the time for, you know, what they said, they said, "Why why don't you have an ABM only?" This has been everybody that's when you go to the the questions, that's what they say. Why why not?

UnknownAnd the President's taken the position, "No, you have to have uh you have to have both." Now, for the first time, the Soviet Union says, "Okay, we'll have both." They say it in a way that gives them a little hedge.

NixonThat's right.

UnknownAnd they have that's why the two sentences. But in effect, they've come around to our position. Now we don't want to crow about that much, but any sophisticated person is going to know that's what's happened, that they have backed away from the ABM only and are willing to combine ABM with offensive

Unknownweapons, which is a very significant in effect, a victory for the President because that's the position he's taken all along. We don't want to say it too much because

UnknownWell, he spoke they wanted to announce it themselves. It is

— 6 min 32 s with no transcribed speech —

Unknowndetail the negotiations, and that we should not now uh uh speculate on uh subjects that-

RogersMr. President, let me make this comment-

NixonAll right.

RogersI don't think we will be under any pressure from the public, or really from thoughtful members of Congress to say anything more. This obviously is very significant. And, and the the best thing to do is to say, well, let's wait to see how it develops now that the two governments have spoken. The main thing is that-

ConnallyI agree with that 100%, but I

Rogerscan be game now. But, let me, let me say it that this come uh we have, for clarification's sake, ABM works out, the whatever the agreement is, could be a final agreement. And it will cover ABMs finally, whereas defensive missiles, it looks to the future, it says we're going to make uh an agreement on that, and we're going to continue to to work out a more uh far-reaching uh form of an agreement.

UnknownSo that's why the second is poorer, the little bit poorer.

RogersIBM is a final one, whereas defensive one is You'll notice, by the way, make it the word treaty searches anywhere in that United States where treaties are, red blood is in the state of uh just as ours.

UnknownDo you happen to have a pencil?

MitchellAll right.

LairdMr. President. Mr. President.

NixonYes, sir.

LairdJust speaking as a senator, I hope Mel will emphasize uh uh the necessity to continue debate on the ABM. We may need to get few supporters uh see this as a signal to

MitchellI took a harder line than I was before.

LairdAll right, okay.

RogersWell, if they if they I uh Any senator who gets pressed in now, they'll have they'll have to have a hole in the head. This is the argument they gave in the whole thing, the reason that the President's been able to do this, because he was right and they were wrong. Hell, we never had this kind of an agreement if those senators had-

NixonNo way. Right.

Rogersall right. If this proves that they get to stand up to their their testimony up there, and the importance of the ABM.

MitchellWell, we're in a very good position on that that uh

RogersI think that I think it's uh, if I may say so, that uh this is a a very I think we need to give some leaders a little later. Give them a graceful you know, very gracefully push and then and listen. Let's give them an opportunity to uh to support this.

Unknown[Laughter]

Rogersothers uh I mean, I've listened very good chairmen and uh others as what they say, but uh my point is that here uh we haven't, and if they do not see it now, that means that uh not only their intelligence is subject to a question, but something else, quite frankly.

MitchellWell, I think they showed their votes and votes on the [unintelligible] amendment and the resolutions on that, they stand this kind of negotiation, so this Brezhnev statement helps a lot.

NixonJohn, you're you're you're uh you're a new John Connally, you're a new uh person around this table on this subject. You've been through the solve here today. What did you what did this Did this did anyone give me some reaction from your perspective?

ConnallyI haven't thought about that [unintelligible], but uh I want to say here that uh it's very, very significant. It's that, and it should be treated as such uh Frankly, uh I don't think most of us know more than we need to know now. I'm afraid [Laughter]

RogersAnd, like you tell them so, Sir, we won't [laughter] Too Too many of us don't know anything about it. We shouldn't say anything, that's it.

ConnallyObviously, it's very it will be treated as such, and those of you who understand it and know it uh [laughter] should should explain it, and the explanation

NixonVery important, my my I I agree. In other words, I think it's very important that the only ones who have any discussion here should be ones who are hiding on it. Let me say, I am going to have any discussion. I mean, the speakers, it's going to be agreed with in this room. But, I it should be basically Rogers, Bill Rogers, Mel Laird uh it should be Henry in the White House, and of course, Gerry Smith from his seat.

ConnallyRight.

NixonNow, that's enough. If if others get into it, and start into interpret it and so forth and so on, it's uh Don't try to get into it. This is one of those areas, you don't have to give any color. Uh you know, uh uh In fact, the President didn't miss a thing. It's just all that sort of stuff. Forget all that. [Laughter]

NixonYou'd like to say something, then, to these guys, and

RogersNo, Mr. President. And, I I just can uh align with your position of the uh the chief that uh it takes, certainly, a significant uh uh move ahead, and and all the uh possibilities. I I do think so that uh everyone must recognize the uh the fact that Gerry Smith had a very difficult job, in order to reach a concrete uh agreement. But, uh in my opinion, this is the way to go.

NixonThe difficult one particularly will be on the uh the offensive side.

UnknownYes.

NixonYou see the defensive side is quite simple. Well, it isn't quite so simple either, because uh it is the it involves uh

Unknown[unintelligible] which is what you've been seeking here, and that subject to negotiation, then that question is raised.

NixonLet me say it, just just to give you an indication of what kind of a sticky uh ground you can get into, people say, "What about the Are you talking about uh National Command Centers or Safeguard?" The answer is, we're just not going to discuss that. Jerry, right, Jerry? Is that the position? 100%.

UnknownWhat is the position?

UnknownDon't know. [Laughter]

NixonWell, I just want to say then, in body that is here, that that uh, if we wouldn't be naturally don't have any comment, the part of the members of our cabinet tonight, but I think that I really feel that uh Gerry Smith and his colleagues and I'm going to meet with them before they leave uh tomorrow. And I shouldn't, naturally after making a statement,

Nixonbut uh they have they have labored over there, listened to these arguments, and so forth and so on, uh for a year and a half. They've been in Helsinki uh in the summer. They've been in Vienna in the winter. At least they would have been in Helsinki in the winter, too, if I hadn't intervened. That was the first agreement we got with the Soviets, to go into Vienna, which was some accomplishment for them. [Laughter]

NixonThey've had a hard time. I told Jerry yesterday, that uh and Henry to uh I uh really sympathize with them, having to sit there and hear the same old arguments over and over again. And I said, I said, "The only person that I know of in the whole diplomatic service that has a more frustrating, bedeviling job than you, and your colleagues have, is Bruce in Paris, uh because he hears the same arguments, and he makes the same speeches. We have attained the same thing.

NixonJerry says, that isn't the case. And, this, may I say, on the serious note, while we are far apart uh in the negotiations, and very far, the significant thing about these negotiations to date is: one,

NixonUnited States has never gone into an international conference of this sort better prepared, knowing what we were for, and able to discuss it chapter and verse. The Soviet Union, in the first round, was not as well-prepared. They are now very well prepared. And Jerry indicates that, while we are still far apart, that both sides have negotiated very seriously, and very toughly,

Nixonuh and neither up to this point giving anything uh except this uh temporary statement. Would that be a fair statement, Jerry? All right.

NixonWell, we'll have to get in closer. Uh I like to see you, Gerry. [Applause]

NixonGerry, I've got to get you back more often, if you get applause like that. [Laughter]

Unknown[unintelligible]

Nixon, Agnew & Dent on SALT negotiations and US-Soviet relations

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Nixon, Agnew & Dent on SALT negotiations and US-Soviet relations

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